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A MANUAL OF THEOLOGY

A MANUAL OF THEOLOGY

BY

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INTRODUCTION

THEOLOGY is the science which deals with the Being and Nature of God. Christian Theology is the expression and analysis of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. All speculation into the First Cause of the world, the ground of moral obligation, even the immortality of the human soul, is or may be theological; that is, any one of these questions may be so discussed as to bring before us the notion of a Supreme Being, who made the world, whose nature is the source of the distinction of right and wrong, who brought man's soul into being, and preserves it continuously from dissolution. On the other hand, all such questions fail to be theological just in proportion as the idea of the Supreme Being is dropped out of sight. They must then be treated as subordinate sections of physics, or of psychology, or of metaphysics. They take their theological colour from their contact with the idea of a Supreme Being, and no treatment of them apart from this idea is, in the strict sense, theological at all. As for the Being and Nature of God, apart from the Christian revelation of Him, we must derive our knowledge of it from the theological treatment of the questions mentioned above. By reflection upon the order of nature, of a certain kind, we reach the notion of a Creator. By reflection of a certain kind upon the moral law we reach the notion of a Personal Ruler of mankind, who rewards and punishes; and this result leads on to the discussion of the Immorality of Man.

These are the contents of Natural Theology, as it is called; and they represent more or less completely the area over which man can move in the way of independent speculation.

As Natural Theology starts from the facts of experience in nature and the moral life, so Christian Theology starts from the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. As Natural Theology results in an idea of God in nature, real, but somewhat bare and conjectural in character, so Christian Theology, in virtue of its new start and wider scope, ends in an idea of God which is more certain, more definite, and more coherent. Christian Theology throws light upon the same questions and problems as its simpler predecessor, but just as the treatment of them ceases to be theological when the idea of God is left out of sight, so it ceases to be Christian apart from the assumed truth of the Incarnation.

These circumstances point to a fact which distinguishes Theology from many sciences, both in its nature and in its method. No science, we all know, proves its own first principles; every science must derive them from some one or more of its sister sciences or take them as unexplained facts from the world of experience. The results of arithmetic are assumed in geometry, the conclusions of geometry become premisses in mechanics: or, to take another case, the existence of animals of various kinds is given in nature, and is assumed as a starting-point by biological science. But Theology does rather more than accept as premisses the conclusions which other sciences have proved. It uses its own central facts—the Existence of God, the Incarnation of Jesus Christ—both as premiss and conclusion. It does not and cannot start with just a few bare assumptions which are not theological in character, and then present its theological doctrines as the reasoned outcome of these, aided by the ordinary rules of inference; but rather, taking the idea of God as a starting-point, it endeavours to set forth the

necessary coherence of this with all other forms of truth; or taking the Incarnation for fact, it analyses it and traces its full significance, and then endeavours to show the coherence of it with previous apprehensions of God, and with the rest of man's knowledge. To take a parallel case, the evidence for the existence of our own personality is of the same character as the evidence for the existence of God. It appears both as conclusion and as premiss. To prove the existence of my own personality, I must assume it, and show that this assumption falls in coherently with everything else that I know, and that without this assumption all my system of knowledge falls to pieces. It must be assumed anew in every step of any argument I may employ. And when I prove its existence, supposing that I do, I prove at the same time that I could never have taken a single step in argument without assuming its existence. Much the same is true of the existence of God, as we shall hope to make plain in the next chapter. The evidence we allege in proof of the fact proves also that the investigation is reasonable only when the fact is assumed—that is, that the existence of God is the hinge upon which the whole process turns.

There are various reasons why this should be so. We will mention here only two—one depending on the nature of the fact in question, the other upon the nature of scientific investigation in general. First, then, let us consider the nature of the fact in itself. It is not like asking, Are there inhabitants in the moon? That is a question of detail, a question which relates only to the contents of our world of experience. We may wonder whether our universe contains such beings or not—either decision is possible, and neither is very disturbing. But if it be true that there is a Being such as we mean by the name God, His existence will be involved in that of every existing thing. The world outside us, ourselves, our powers of thought and will, are all dependent in

the strictest sense upon His will, and to consider them apart from it is, strictly speaking, to consider them in a partially false light, *if He exists.* We cannot expect the idea of God to fit smoothly on to a predominantly godless view of the world. Because God, if He exists, is not merely one of the elements in the universe, which we may or may not take into consideration in our view of it; He is either the permanent condition of all that is and happens, or He is nothing at all. To inquire into His existence, then, is not to ask whether we are to include this one more Being in our catalogue of the contents of the universe, but to ask whether we can form a consistent account of our experience as a whole, assuming the existence of God. Something of the same sort is true of the Incarnation. That the whole of Christian Theology is an expansion and analysis of this truth we hope to show in the sequel. But simply considered as a fact, it is surely true that there is no method of arguing to it, on general principles, except this one of showing its coherence with our whole scheme of things.

Secondly, we have said that the nature of scientific investigation itself provides an argument for the validity of the method which we regard as distinctively theological. To show this, let us consider first what science professes to be and to do. It differs surely from ordinary knowledge simply in completeness and in coherence. It does not relate to a different order of things. Ordinary knowledge is regulated by circumstances. It consists of the products of a man's observation during his lifetime. If he is a sharp man, quick at forming principles and seeing the working of things, his knowledge will tend towards the scientific ideal. If he is stupid and passively receptive, his mind will be like a sack full of miscellaneous rubbish, from which anything may emerge, but probably nothing of any value. What such a man wants is arrangement, system, coherence. And this is

what science gives to ordinary experience. Science divides the field of experience into allotments. In each of these it places a body of workers, who collect and tabulate the facts obtainable within their special area. These collections form the special sciences. The greatest achievement, perhaps, yet attained by the scientific mind is the recognition that the barriers between the separate allotments are arbitrary and movable, and that the whole field may be dealt with upon one comprehensive principle. This, then, is what science does. It does not invent new facts. When it finds one it puts it in its place. It is ordinary experience systematized. The man who knows one fact as it really is, knows it so far scientifically. Just as the man who owns sixpence can command the labour of the world to the extent of sixpence, so the man who holds one fact truly is, so far, scientific. Science uses various methods where the ordinary man is content with one,—with simple observation. It deduces, it performs experiments, forms and verifies hypotheses. But the end is always the same—systematized, empirical, and coherent truth.

Now the scientific man deals, for the most part, with facts which the senses can verify. His questions of fact are settled by further observation. His theoretical questions, often the most important of all, arise over the explanation of his facts—that is, their place and importance in his system. But the theologian deals with facts which the senses do not and cannot verify, with facts which underlie the created order as a permanent condition, which are always there, and can never be completely left out of account with success. And this is why his facts require a new method. If the life of God and the spiritual world could be separated from the facts of physical nature, and considered alone, they would form a special province of science, in which the usual ways of experiment and observation would be

valid. Theologian and scientist would pursue each his own way, each using the regular method in his own field. But this cannot be. The theologian has not only to deal with a class of facts of his own, but he has also to look at the facts of the scientist from his own special point of view. He looks for his facts in the same world as the scientist, and he sees the same facts. But he believes them to rest on a condition which his senses cannot verify, and therefore the proper method for him is to show the cohesion of the whole system of sensuous things with this non-sensuous condition, if it be assumed. He does not by co-ordinating sensuous facts alone arrive at the non-sensuous condition as a result, though it may suggest itself as a solution of some difficulties in the interpretation of the sensuous world: he finds the spiritual world in his conclusion only so far as he has assumed it at least, provisionally, in his premisses.[1]

It is, we believe, the failure to recognize these truths which has led to much of the strain between Science and Theology. The theologian has been expected and in many cases has himself attempted to use the methods of natural science in his own area,—in an area, therefore, for which they are wholly unsuited. If these fail, as, of course, they must, that failure has been ascribed to the intrinsic weakness of the theological case, whereas the truth has been that it is due to the irrelevance of the arguments employed. If we have said what is true above, it is plain that the ultimate truths of Theology will not emerge at the end of a process of argument conducted without assumptions. It is contrary to their nature to expect them to do so.

The true method of any Science is that which is most appropriate to its subject-matter: this will be readily admitted. But it is not sufficient to say this only. A Science requires not only a valid intellectual process, but

[1] Cf. S. Thom. Aq., *Summa*, P. I., Q. xii., Art. 4 and 12; and Q. xxxii., Art. 1.

also a particular attitude of mind. This is, no doubt, widely recognized. But the ideal of the scientific mind is somewhat narrowly construed: it is assumed to be a mind which passively accepts demonstrated truths. The reason for this assumption is that the popular conception of scientific investigation has been formed during a period of exceptional activity in Natural Science, in which the passive ideal has most claim to be recognized. It is clear that any investigation that depends on exact measurements or precise observation of the results of experimental processes of any sort, will be vitiated if a desire or even a readiness, however slight, to look for one issue rather than another has any influence in relaxing the severe attention of the mind. It is open to argument whether the mind is absolutely passive even in a case like this: but it may be treated as being so without serious misfortune; such problems, however delicate in detail, are of a simple and straightforward order. The case is different when the problems are no longer simple. There are cases in which an entire absence of presuppositions is a positive disqualification for producing a scientific result; because these are cases in which an adequate knowledge of the conditions of the problem, in itself constitutes a form of bias. No person, to take a somewhat extreme instance, who knows anything of the nature of problems of racial and linguistic affinity can profess to start with a mind wholly free from presuppositions on such an inquiry as that of the identity of the English with the lost Ten Tribes. In this and similar inquiries it is the unscientific enquirer who starts without presuppositions and as a consequence is deceived by arguments which are plausible to his ignorance.

In this and in many questions connected with history the presence of knowledge adequate to the investigation of the problem at all, definitely tends to narrow the field of possibility. But there is also a large area of discussion

in which a condition of will is also necessary to such a right appreciation of the problem as will lead to a scientific result. There must be a readiness to accept a particular conclusion. And this means not merely an intellectual indifference which will be equally pleased with any view: but a sense of the importance of the matter and of the moral issues involved. A person who started to inquire into the nature or authority of the moral law in a state of entire mental and moral indifference would be out of court as a scientific investigator. And something of the same sort is true of theology. The questions of the existence of God and the truth of the Incarnation cannot be approached scientifically in the condition of entire indifference described above.

The mind will never be compelled in spite of itself to accept such truths as these, as it may be compelled in the region of Pure Mathematics or Logic. But it will be satisfied, and that not in the least degree in an unscientific manner, if it recognizes the special conditions of theological speculation and approaches them in an attitude of readiness to follow their leading. It will be led always, never compelled.

The condition of will here described is a moral state. And like all other such states it admits of only one alternative. Between the bias for and the bias against there is no half-way house, just as there is no alternative beyond right and wrong at the bar of conscience. The condition of suspended judgment is, in reality, only possible in matters where the mind justly expects to be compelled to have its assent wrung out of it by sheer force. Where this is not the case, the decision turns on the presence or absence of a certain moral condition, and this must be either there or not there. The evidence is admittedly insufficient to force the assent; but it can never be estimated at its real value, if the mind consciously or unconsciously is either disposed to insist upon compulsory

evidence, or inclined to hope that the evidence may not carry the conclusion.[1]

These facts, we are persuaded, have not received adequate attention at the hands of philosophers: still less are they properly recognized in popular discussion. It has been readily assumed that the one hope of a trustworthy decision in these matters lies in the possession of a balanced mind—a mind in perfect equilibrium, without any colour of prejudice or prepossession or natural tendency. Such a condition of mind, we venture to assert roundly, exists nowhere under the sun. Moreover, if it did exist, it would not judge accurately. For it would be deficient in the very capacity for judgment: it would be blank and void, without any materials upon which a judgment could rest. The act of judgment becomes more and more certain, especially in cases where evidence is less than demonstrative, in proportion as the mind is stored with facts which lead it to determine itself in one particular way. All education shuts the mind out of certain positions which it might otherwise assume. The scientist gets to know as he goes on more and more of what is possible in nature; and his mind becomes therefore, by degrees, biassed against the very possibility of things, which the uneducated mind would think quite likely. So the evidence for theological truth is convincing, not necessarily to any chance mind, specially educated or not; but to those who are aware of the special character of theological facts, and the peculiar evidence they require.

This brief statement of the special character of Theology as a science will not have been wasted if it succeeds in making plain in some degree the reasons why Theology is a difficult science. Its nature is only another name for its difficulty. It is difficult, because it is what it is. It deals

[1] Cf. W. Ward, *The Wish to Believe*, pp. 6-10, and throughout the book.

with the most abstruse of all subjects: its questions are raised at the most remote points. Its whole matter lies in a region which the senses cannot verify: and the estimation of its evidence requires a fuller exercise of human powers than is consciously at work in any other field. It makes an exceptionally severe demand both upon the intellect and the will, and the arguments arrayed against it (as their appeal is without complications, and lies directly to the intellect) have almost always a more convincing appearance than they deserve. To put the matter quite briefly, Theology is concerned with all the facts of nature and human life, viewing them as a living whole, in which God is: and the truths of Theology are statements of facts in the life of God, which have their bearing on the life of man, and which lose their meaning when analysed and dissected and treated under separate and exclusive aspects, just as surely as flowers lose their beauty when picked to pieces by a botanist. It is true the botanist learns the structure and the history of the plant he dissects, and can generally correct his merely scientific conception of it by simply looking at another specimen in his garden. But no really scientific botanist would claim to be able to realize the full beauty of a plant which he had never seen growing by mentally putting together the dissected fragments of it. A thing which lives and grows is always far more beautiful than an intellectual reconstruction of its parts would lead us to expect: its beauty appeals to more in us, and requires more of us in the way of sympathy and insight. So it is also with the great truths of Theology. They are too solid and concrete to bear dissection: their value and significance will not emerge in response to a knowledge of their structure and history, however useful this may be for deepening and strengthening their power. They must be believed in order to be fully understood.

It remains to indicate briefly the method we propose to follow in this book. We shall start, as we have already said, from the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. It will be our endeavour (1) to present this, assuming it to be true, as the true outcome and explanation of the various efforts towards the knowledge of God in various peoples and periods; (2) to show its coherence with the claims of Christ for Himself, and His Apostles for Him, and to express its meaning as interpreted by the Church; (3) to indicate its bearing on the idea of God, that is, its connexion with the doctrine of the Holy Trinity; (4) to place it in relation with the human race and to indicate God's purpose for them as revealed in it; (5) to describe its extension and continuance in the world by means of the Church and the Sacraments. By this method we shall hope to cover all the articles of the Christian Creed. If the order be somewhat unusual, we believe that the unity which will result from our mode of treatment will fully make up for this defect.

CHAPTER I

THE INCARNATION AS THE SATISFACTION OF HUMAN ASPIRATIONS

THERE is a question which would seem to arise naturally, when we are proposing to consider early efforts at expressing the religious idea: and that is the question of the origin of religion. Like all questions of origin it is a difficult one, if treated accurately; for it would mean an attempt to show how, from a non-religious condition, the mind of man passed to a belief in some religious ideas. There are many difficulties about this, the chief of which lies in the fact that no certain case has been produced of a man entirely without sense of religion. We have, therefore, no positive idea of the psychological process by which the passage from the non-religious to the religious state of mind has been achieved; and we are left therefore to guess at the meaning of the problem in question. As this is a singularly unfortunate method of approaching any question it will be better, for the present, to ignore it altogether, and allow ourselves to be guided in our consideration of early religion by verifiable historical facts.

As we look back over the history of religion we observe that it has performed, at various times, two prominently different functions for man. It has been the source of his metaphysic, that is his explanation of the world, and of his

morality. The gods he has worshipped from time to time have been useful to him as explaining the phenomena of nature. The seasons, the fertility of the earth, the storm, the earthquake, and the like have all appeared to him as the direct and immediate action of separate deities. Instead of a metaphysical system of forces and causes and laws, he has satisfied himself with a heaven full of gods, each with his separate function and range of activity. Then, again, these beliefs have guided him in his life. The gods whose existence he has feigned have been to him a motive for regulating his conduct. He has endeavoured to please them by action of a particular kind, or, at least, to avoid their displeasure. His family and social life have been consecrated by being connected with his religious beliefs and experience.

The truest and loftiest religion will hold these two elements in close connexion. The God who is its object will be at once the Cause and Sustainer of all that is, and the source of the obligation to live a holy life. But it has not always happened so. The history of religion shows us many instances in which the two constituent elements have been separated, or, at least, very differently emphasized. Thus, for instance, the Greeks seem to have had, as it were, a genius for metaphysical speculation, and into this form all that was valuable and permanent in their religious idea soon found its way. The host of deities dwelling in Olympus and elsewhere, by whose arbitrary and capricious action the world was kept in order, gave place to the thought of a universal single substance, by participation in which all things had their being. This development was in many respects a gain. The old religion had sprung out of a lower moral state, and fell far beneath the ideals and aspirations of the greatest minds in Greece. It had its day and perished, as all things must do when they become obsolete. But there

was loss involved in the change as well as gain. For the philosophical conception of God was intelligible only to a few; and the philosophical ideal of morality was above the capacity of most Greeks at the time when it appeared, so that it, too, failed to extend the sway of religion over the popular mind.

On the other hand, the Hebrew race presented to the world an essentially moral idea of God. They felt the temptation of the surrounding nature-religions, as we may see from the long list of their relapses into the idolatry of their neighbours; that is, their minds were open to the influences which produced these effects in their neighbours; they were not, so far, peculiarly constituted. But, nevertheless, there arose amongst them a body of men of whom one chief aim was to destroy not only the crude practices of these heathen religions, but also the very desire for them; to divert the people from the tendency to nature-worship and fix their hearts on a God who refused to allow any images, even as symbols of His Presence, who was indeed the Creator of the world and all that is therein, but was also a God of Holiness, to whom every sin was an abomination, and every alien worship an insult. This permanent moral interest goes to make the uniqueness of Judaism, and has much to do with their inspiration as a people. And it crushed out every form of metaphysical interest. Strictly speaking the Jews had no metaphysic, as has often been pointed out. They cared little for the difficulties which may be raised about the origin of things; the mode of God's action upon matter and similar questions had no power to excite the inquisitiveness of the Jewish mind. When the Hellenic influence began to operate in Judaism a philosophy of nature possessing Jewish characteristics became possible, but not till then.

These two cases—the Greek and the Jew—may fairly be

taken as representing the two necessary elements in religion in separation from one another. Each religion followed a one-sided law of development; neither covered all the ground which religion has at times claimed for its own. But it may be asked, If the two elements are thus separable, may it not be true that neither is necessary? May it not be that religion is after all merely a mythological form of the investigation of nature, or a theory of morality with the idea of a moral Governor thrown in? To this question we must now address ourselves. It is an extremely intricate one, but its importance is too great to allow us to pass it by.

If the two factors are the normal constituents of the religious impulse, we shall expect to find them fused, or nearly so, in the most primitive types of religion of which we have any information. We will investigate this point first. We shall then pass to a further question far more serious and difficult, and ask, What is it which such early attempts at religion imply? What is the expectation which they wish to have satisfied? When this is answered we shall be in a position to decide how far the Incarnation meets and responds to the ultimate religious aspirations of mankind.

A. First, then, how far are the metaphysical and moral elements present in early religions? As to the former there can be no possible question. Any one who has made the most superficial study of Comparative Mythology knows that every known form of undeveloped religion has myths in plenty describing the origin of the world, of the sun, moon, and stars, and all that is on the earth. These myths follow closely similar lines among different peoples. In many cases, it is true, the phenomenon of which the myth is an explanation is not easy to determine; but there is a large body of them, which must certainly be explained as a crude

and savage attempt at science. Were an illustration of this fact needed, that the savage uses mythical beings as means of explaining phenomena which strike him as obscure, one might be found in a circumstance noted by A. Lang (*Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, vol. i. p. 138): 'A queer bit of savage science is displayed on a black stone tobacco pipe from the Pacific coast. The savage artist has carved the pipe in the likeness of a steamer, as a steamer is conceived by him. Unable to account for the motive power, he imagines the paddle to be linked round the tongue of a coiled serpent, fastened to the tail of the vessel.' We need not delay further upon this point, for it would probably be disputed by no one.

When we come to investigate the question of the presence of a moral factor in early religions, we come into more controverted ground. The mythical element in such religions is far the most striking at first sight. It is the point of widest difference between undeveloped paganism and our religious doctrines, and is probably most often associated with the idea of savages. We think of them in their religious aspects as human beings who have a false religion consisting chiefly of absurd and revolting myths. But yet it would seem that it has been a mistake to suppose them capable of nothing else: and that the mistake has given rise to several false theories of religion. Animism—the theory which deduces religion from the mistaken views of savages about ghosts[1];

[1] Mr. A. Lang in his interesting book, *The Making of Religion*, has discussed at length the evidence for stories of crystal-gazing and appearances at death, and has argued from them that if it may be supposed possible for such events to take place in the experience of savages, they may have had a real influence on the development of religion, and of the conception of the spiritual world. This is, doubtless, true, and the admission of it as true in no way binds us to the Animistic theory of the origin of religion as developed (*e.g.*) by H. Spencer, or to trace its origin to magic as is done (*e.g.*) by Dr. Frazer in the *Golden Bough*. Both these theories are in reality explanations of myth rather than of religion.

and Professor Max Müller's theory—which explains religion out of a sense of the infinite, together with a series of linguistic blunders—have both taken myth as their starting-point. In their view, apparently, myth is the element which goes deepest into the religious heart of pagan man. Yet the results of some other scientific workers in the field of anthropology do not bear them out. Mr. A. Lang (*Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, vol. i. pp. 328, 329) is convinced that the myth is an external feature in savage religion, that the savage really yearns for communion with his deity, and in the hour of peril cries out, as it were, to a friendly power, and does not think of the animal to which in his cooler moments he makes offerings, and of which he tells tales. So Pfleiderer (*Religions-philosophie*, vol. ii. chap. i. pp. 28, 29) argues against deriving religion from Animism or from Fetichism or even from mistakes in language on precisely this ground, that no amount of juggling with crude and immoral and revolting myths will derive from them the loftier contents of religion. And lastly, Professor Robertson Smith (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 19) points out that 'mythology ought not to take the prominent place which is too often assigned to it in the scientific study of ancient faiths. . . . Belief in a series of myths was neither obligatory as a part of true religion, nor was it supposed that, by believing, a man acquired religious merit and conciliated the favour of the gods. What was obligatory or meritorious was the exact performance of certain sacred acts prescribed by religious tradition.'

These citations of authorities may lead us on to consider in what precise forms the moral element in early religion shows itself. The answer is threefold: in prayer, in ritual, in sacrifice. Of these the most difficult to illustrate is the first. The undeveloped man is, like many more civilized persons, extremely shy of observation in religious matters, and it has been commonly held that his religion is always

of the coarsest and least spiritual sort. But in the work already mentioned (*The Making of Religion*) Mr. A. Lang has adduced a considerable amount of evidence on the opposite side.[1] He shows that what seems to be the earliest element of the religion of the Australian aborigines is of a high order, and that ideas of a really lofty moral kind are associated with this early element. It gives rise to prayer, and to a sense of the divine interest in virtue, for which the people have hardly had credit. Upon this he builds a theory, which we mention for its plausibility and interest, that the earliest gods were in most cases ethical in conception, but were dethroned in later times by deified heroes and the like, whose power for mischief made it imperative to keep them in good humour.

We have mentioned ritual as being an indication of the moral factor in religion, because it is always in early times supposed to enshrine the proper and safe mode of approach to a deity; that is, it is connected with the desire for Communion, which is essentially an ethical desire. It is not necessary to illustrate so familiar a point at length.

But a most important field for the development of the moral element in savage religion is to be found in sacrifice: and to this we must give a somewhat closer attention. There can be no question that men expect to establish some sort of relation between themselves and their god by this means. Whatever the special purpose of particular sacrifices, this desire, at least, must lie at the root of all. And it is important for us to consider in what way the union is supposed to take effect. In order to understand the significance of sacrifice we must call attention to one or two facts, all the evidence for which we have not space to set down, and for which we rely upon the researches of others, notably Mr. A. Lang and Professor Robertson Smith. In the first

[1] Chaps. X.–XIII.

place, the sacrifice is usually a social act of worship, paid by the tribe to its own god, who is supposed to be connected with the tribe in the way of kinship. Further, sacrifice is usually of the nature of a feast: it is a feast in honour of the tribal god, of which the god himself is a partaker; it keeps alive the feeling of family union between the god and his children. Here we come upon the most important features of sacrifice. (1) Sacrifice is an *act of communion.* God and man meet at the same table and partake of the same food. This view of sacrifice is illustrated by the ritual observed by Odysseus in Homer when he visits the dead in order to confer with Teiresias. He digs a trench and fills it with the blood of slaughtered victims, and stands to watch: the ghosts come and try to drink, but he warns them off with his sword until Teiresias comes; he is allowed to drink, and *by this means* becomes capable of communicating his knowledge (Hom. *Od.* XI. 23–30). This case is neither primitive, as it stands, nor does it refer to communion between man and a god, but it shows with sufficient clearness the character of the primitive idea. (2) Further, the man who offers the sacrifice tries to identify himself with his victim. This he does in symbolic fashion in some places, by drawing the skin of the victim over his head.[1] It is possibly in connexion with this latter idea that the notion of atonement—which is spread widely over the nations of the world—is most easily explained. The life of the animal stands in place of the life of the man, and the ritual emphasizes the connexion. But the primary idea of sacrifice is communion, and the notion of atonement is a somewhat late development from it. We may note in passing that the Jewish sacrificial system illustrates both these points, but, as is usual in the case of Judaism, what is crude and low in pagan religions, so far as it was admitted at all, is spirit-

[1] Cf. A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, vol. ii. pp. 73, 106.

ualized and purified.[1] Those sacrifices in which a portion is burnt or given to the priest, and the rest consumed by the worshipper and his friends, are parallel to those through which man all over the world has sought communion with his god. Yet it is not suggested that Jehovah consumed the sacrifice. Again in the ritual for the Day of Atonement the high priest lays his hands upon the head of the scape-goat and confesses over it the sins of himself and the people: and so they are borne away into the wilderness. That the notion of communion through sacrifice was consciously present to the minds of men is proved by S. Paul's comments on the duty of Christians as regards idol-feasts. They would be, if they attended them, partakers of the table of devils (1 Cor. x. 21), and this should be impossible to those who partake of the Body of the Lord.

The facts brought forward in the last few pages, for which, as we have said, ample evidence is to be found in books dealing specially with the subject, are fully sufficient to prove the persistence in religion, as far back as we can trace it, of the two factors which we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Religion, so far as it is historically known, aims at satisfying the metaphysical desire of man to explain the world, as well as his moral instinct. The history of Judaism and Hellenism shows how far these two elements may fall apart in actual practice.

B. We must now turn to the more difficult aspect of this portion of our investigation, and inquire what exactly it is which is involved in these two primary factors in religion. What expectations do they imply on the part of man? Briefly, we may answer at once as follows: The metaphysical impulse in religion implies an expectation that the world is a coherent and ordered whole: the moral interest implies an

[1] Cf. S. Aug., *c. Faust.* xviii. 6. Ea (sacrificia) magis perverso populo congruenter imposita, quam Deo desideranti oblata.

expectation that God is to be found and known in nature and in human life. How much or how little these two expectations are expressed in thought or word it does not concern us to inquire. It is necessary, however, to make out that these are the elements of truth which run through religious phenomena from end to end.

I. Man expects to find the world a coherent whole. This expectation is the fundamental motive of all intellectual speculation. There is no portion of experience to which it does not apply. All science and all ordinary knowledge result from the operation of this single motive, or perhaps we might better call it, this necessary law. A simple illustration will show more clearly than anything else the importance of it as a principle. Man has five senses.[1] Each one of these admits him into a different world. The world of sight is not the same as the world of sound, or the world of sound as the world of smell. But man's capacity to live and utilize his experience depends upon his being able at will to translate the reports of one sense into terms of another, and to feel himself certain of the truthfulness of his results. The eyes report the presence of certain objects to a man as he walks along—trees, houses, men, etc. By a process of inference too familiar and rapid to be noticed he thinks of them as different in size as well as in colour. The stile in front of him is an obstacle which he can easily surmount, and the wall by its side one which would be difficult or impossible. That means that the man in question has rapidly translated the reports of his eyes into the language of another sense, viz. touch. Now if his senses are in their normal state, his inference will be right, and he will act easily, without conscious reflection, just as if there were no inference or possibility of error in the matter at all. And yet his inference is not altogether free from uncertainty.

[1] Cf. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, ed. i. vol. ii. pp. 356, 357.

Strictly speaking, his eyes report one set of facts and his sense of touch another; and there is no absolute necessity that the two sets of facts should harmonize. When in a certain condition of atmosphere at the sea-side we see a distant ship upside down in the air, no one dreams of supposing that it is so: that is, no one dreams of supposing that if he went out and examined it, he would find the reports of his other senses in harmony with those of his eyes. And yet there is no reason to blame the eyes as though they had given a false report. They have reported what they saw, but the rest of experience warns us to beware in such a case of trusting them too literally. Now that which is certainly true in the case described might conceivably have been true throughout. It might conceivably have been true that the reports of no one sense could be expressed in terms of another, that man, therefore, would have been in presence of five worlds instead of one. It is needless to say that if this were so, his experience would be a chaos. He would have no right and no power to deal with it as a whole, his expectation that it would be coherent would be simply a delusion. This, then, is the value for thought of the expectation we have mentioned. Unless man can form it and act upon it, he can do nothing safely. His whole intellectual outlook depends upon its truth; if it is not true he is wandering, as it were, amongst the phantoms of a dream. We now proceed to trace its significance in religion.

In the first place, the early efforts of undeveloped man to explain nature to himself embody, consciously or unconsciously, this doctrine. He observes certain uniform movements, certain recurring sequences of phenomena, and he interprets them on the analogy of his own action. The changes in the world around him, for which he is responsible, he effects by the exercise of his own will, and he not unnaturally assumes that the far more elaborate changes for which

he is not responsible are due to the operation of much more powerful wills. That they do not occur by accident or without meaning he is firmly convinced. His intuition falls short in that he does not see the difficulty of assuming a separate existence to account for each separate effect. The host of deities which he imagines, conflict in their interests and in the region of their activity, and so the unity and certainty which their presence was to produce vanishes into confusion and chaos. The savage, however, does not know this, and is, doubtless, perfectly happy with his philosophy. But it cannot always be so. As men grow in knowledge, and in grip over their experience, they become dissatisfied with this casual and unscientific method of dealing with the world. The search for unity of principle becomes conscious and definite, and the old mythology vanishes under the criticism of an enlightened philosophy. Thus arises the desire for a metaphysical explanation of things—an account of them which traces them all to some one force, or principle, or cause, such as shall appear in various degrees and shapes in all the multiform variety of experience. Hitherto we have spoken of very elementary manifestations of this fundamental expectation of man in regard to his experience, we must now investigate some far more elaborate attempts in the same direction. In so doing, we shall not confine ourselves to pre-Christian speculation, for the impulse after a unification of experience by no means ceased with the appearance of Christ Incarnate. Men are still as anxious as ever to prove that nature is uniform, or, what is the same problem under another guise, that God exists.

We have said that man expects to find the world a coherent whole, and illustrated this position by instances of the way in which he combines the reports of his various senses. He has, of course, much more to do in the interpretation of the world than this. Not only does he want to

feel sure that he may count on things being as he sees them, he also wants to know that they will happen as he expects them. The world must not only be coherent as a whole when he looks at it, but coherent as a process. If he has seen that a certain cause produces a certain effect, he must be assured that this is not a mere accident. In other words, he must gradually exclude *chance* from every portion of his experience; there must be no such thing theoretically possible. All must move on fixed and certain principles, without jerks or unevenness or surprise. Chance means the intrusion of an alien and unintelligible principle; and every such intrusion means that man has failed so far in his aim. He must, at all costs, therefore, eliminate chance. Broadly speaking, chance may enter either at the beginning of the process of the formation of the world, or during its progress, or in relation to its end. That is, there may have been no prime cause upon which the whole necessarily depends; the world may have been the result of a fortuitous concourse of atoms: or there may be still in the course of things an incalculable element, tending to vitiate and limit our reasonings: or there may be no final purpose to which the whole scheme of things is moving. Any one of these positions is possible, and any one of them is fatal to the possession of a complete and satisfactory ideal of thought. This is the expanded statement of the expectation of which much has been already said. Practically it takes the form of a belief in a First Cause, in a uniform law of causation in the world, and a rational purpose served by and in the lives and actions of the countless individual elements which go to make the world. At this point we come directly in contact with Theology again. For these beliefs are precisely the principles known in philosophical Theology as the Cosmological and Teleological Proofs of the Existence of God. The belief in the First Cause and a uniform law of causation, when

expressed as a philosophical necessity, form the cosmological proof: the proof from the order and uniformity of the world that a God exists who creates and governs it. And the other—the conviction of a firm and constant purpose running through all the particular events in life, is the teleological proof: the proof which rests upon the signs in nature of a rational and intelligent design. These *proofs* are old in the history of thought. The latter dates back at least as far as Socrates, the former at least as far as Aristotle. And they have had a chequered career. They have not always found favour; at times they have been regarded as positively misleading.

It does not fall within our purpose to enter upon their history in detail; it would necessarily be both obscure and technical. We must pass on to a third conviction or belief, which in its turn is presented philosophically as a further proof. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that man does really acquire the convictions as to the necessity of order, which take shape in the proofs mentioned above, let us ask the question, Why does he thus acquire them? What right has he to act upon them?

Why does man acquire these convictions? He does so because he claims to interpret the nature outside him on the analogy of his own. We have seen that man assumes his right to combine and harmonize the reports of his various senses. This fact may be expressed in other words by saying that he imposes unity upon the variety which meets his senses. Now the unity which he thus imposes upon nature is modelled upon his knowledge of himself. As he is one and the same throughout the whole of his experience, so he expects nature to be one in a similar way. Its various moods and manifestations are not single and separate in their own right; they pass and vanish, but the underlying reality remains the same. In fact there is a rooted anthropomor-

phism in all his dealings with nature. He goes to it not as to a thing which is finally and irreconcilably foreign to himself, but as expecting to find in it the reflexion of a mind like his own. This is the reason why in early days he saw divine presences in sun and air and sea; why, when he has grown out of these fancies, he still expects that nature will answer to his demands, and reveal itself as a Thought not wholly dissimilar to such as he can form, unfolded in many parts and in many fashions.

The crudest mythologies, then, as well as the most advanced thought represent this one claim—to interpret nature by the analogies which thought provides. And this in the technical language of philosophy becomes the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God; the proof, that is, which rests upon the belief that a condition which is absolutely necessary in order that thought may be true and valid is necessary to the existence of the world. We reach here the most fiercely controverted district of Natural Theology. The ontological proof more than any other has met with the severest criticism. Much of this confusion has arisen, we are sure, from inadequate accounts of the argument as it was presented by Anselm, who first put it forward in its complete form.[1] His argument, as any one may see who cares, consists of three parts: (1) a demonstration of the necessity *to thought* of a being than whom no greater *can* be conceived; (2) the identification of this with God; (3) the proof that such a being exists necessarily also *in fact*. The form in which the argument occurs is no doubt scholastic and subtle, but the central fact of it is true—that *if* there be any condition which we can discover necessary to the truth and certainty of our thought, that condition must either be satisfied in nature, or our thought must fall short of truth altogether. Now we have seen that the one condition of the success of

[1] See references on p. 48.

man in dealing with the world is that he should be able to interpret it on the analogy of his own nature. Unless it means something real and definite for him, which will go into his language; unless its order is something like what he means by rational order, nature is simply unintelligible nonsense. Unless, in a word, its uniformity and its firmness of purpose mean that a rational Thought underlies it all, it is mere chaos, and his speculations about it are simply delusive.

It is of the highest importance in this connexion to observe (1) that this claim is an assumed claim—it cannot be *proved*; (2) that it is an ideal, philosophically speaking, and cannot be realized. (1) It cannot be proved. For man can never so completely escape out of the regular conditions of life as to see whether nature without him corresponds to that which it seems to be when he looks at it. We believe, no doubt, that things remain the same whether we happen to be looking at them or not; and we are doubtless right in believing this. But we cannot see the proof of it with our own eyes, from the very nature of the case. And (2) the expectation that there is a complete rational unity in nature is an ideal and cannot be realized. Because to realize it would be to know all things—to think over again the whole creative Thought of God in response to which the world sprang into being,—to think it in all its wide scope and narrowness of detail. Towards this man can only gradually move. Every access to his scientific knowledge, every new uniformity perceived and noted and combined into the general scheme, is a step forwards. But the end is not yet.

To speak metaphorically, the world from this point of view is like an orchestra playing a symphony of God's composing, conducted by the mind of man. Apart from man's mind, if it can be conceived, it would lie dead and unmeaning, like the printed score. In contact with man's mind, its meaning

is evoked. The parts of the several instruments combine for the general purpose of the whole, and man hears gradually and in time the thoughts which flashed upon the composer in a moment.[1] All depends upon an ultimate sympathy and similarity between the mind which composes and those which listen. Without this the symphony becomes a mere babble of meaningless sounds.

II. So far there is no fully *personal* result attained. It is true that the Power behind nature is most naturally conceived, even at this stage, as a personal being; but still the conditions required are satisfied by the bare assumption of a rational thought—the relation of which to further personal characters is ignored. We now come to consider this further step, and in so doing approach the other element present in all religion —the moral interest. This we saw to involve the demand to know and have communion with the Ruler of the world. The moral consciousness cannot regard God as a mere force, governing events without conscious purpose: it expects to be admitted in some measure into the Divine confidence, if we may use the phrase,—to learn something in detail of God's purpose, and to give free aid in carrying it out.

We turn, then, to the consideration of the moral sense, and inquire what is its ideal, what demand it makes upon the world. It will not be necessary to argue that there is a continuity in the growth of the moral sense, and that even in its lower and coarser forms there is a sufficient likeness

[1] Cf. Jahn's *Mozart*, Bd. III. pp. 423–425, quoted in Von Hartmann, *Phil. d. Unbewussten*, Bd. I. p. 242. Mozart, speaking of the way in which a musical subject grows in his mind, writes: 'This fires my soul, if I am not disturbed: the subject grows bigger, I extend it and make it clearer, and the whole piece (*das Ding*) becomes actually complete in my head, even though it be long, so that afterwards I survey it at a glance, like a beautiful picture, or a fine figure, and I do not hear it in my imagination successively, as it must afterwards appear, but, as it were, all at once. That is a treat! all the invention and construction goes on in me as in a beautiful dream: but to hear it over—all at once (*Alles zusammen*), that is the best.'

with the higher, to prove their kinship. Nor again need we spend time upon discussing the rise of moral sentiments out of feelings and desires which are not moral. Whatever its origin, the moral sense considers actions, and especially agents, in the light of what they ought to be rather than what they are. It is, therefore, in the first place, unselfish in its principles. Its judgment falls indifferently (so long as it is not distorted and corrupt) upon all men: it is not, as such, affected by considerations of mere pleasure or pain to oneself or any other person. It rises out of the narrowness of individual interests and longings, and considers these broadly as they are affected by their relations one with another. Like the intellect, it demands universality—a law which binds all men alike.

But, secondly, the universality of the moral law is different from that which obtains in the intellectual region. The laws of nature, as formulated by the mind, are short statements of a number of facts; they depend upon the existence of the facts, and they cannot be broken. It may happen that new facts may be observed, which involve a readjustment of the old laws: but this is simply an enlargement of experience, not a breach of law already existing. If it be found that the old law was altogether on wrong principles, it is ourselves who have made the mistake: we have devised a formula to which the world will not answer, and experience has brought our error to light. If, on the other hand, it be found that a law was true so far as it went, but that wider knowledge has enabled us to form a more comprehensive view of things, we have simply to readjust our intellectual formulæ—reorganize our scheme of nature. It is different with the moral law. That is susceptible of real breach. That which should have been done—that which the moral order of the world demanded —may be set aside and its contrary realized.

Thirdly, we regard the laws of physical nature and the

moral world with widely different feelings. A man may misinterpret the facts of nature, and formulate a rule which they do not follow: and we say he has made a mistake, a miscalculation,—he is intellectually in the wrong. Or, knowing the facts of nature, he may attempt to act as if its laws were non-existent or different. And we call him a fool for his pains. Unless, indeed, his action risks interests which have no business to be trifled with; and then we condemn him morally. But the moral condemnation falls upon the act considered morally and not in its physical relations. We do not feel called upon to defend nature's laws morally: if any one succeeded in altering them, no one would mind; but we know that no one can.

These differences depend on the ultimate difference in the constituent elements of the physical and moral worlds. We may perhaps express it by saying that the physical world is a complex of facts, the moral world a society of free persons. Hence the moral law is not conceived as a mechanical and unbroken sequence, but as a law in the true sense; emerging from the will of a supreme Person; conditioning, of right, the wills of those in the society who owe reverence and love to the Supreme. It is true that attempts have been made to treat it on the analogy of physical law, and to explain breaches of it as mere mistake in judgment; and some of these attempts are plausible. But it would seem that, in the last resort, they are found to have explained away the distinctive element in moral consciousness—the sense of a course of action chosen or rejected independently of the dictates of wisdom. It is not arbitrary: it runs back into the ultimate constitution of things. We are under it, because we are human beings. It is inevitable: for, though we may stifle its representative within us,—our own conscience,—or make it speak at our pleasure, we know that such expedients delude no one but ourselves. Again, the moral law is irksome

only when we resist it: obedience brings us into true and friendly communion with the Power from whom it comes.

Hence, owing to the essential difference between physical and moral law in the consciousness of mankind, it has come about that the world, as conceived by the moral sense, is under the rule of a Personal Governor, who is Himself holy: who knows and judges the hearts of men: with whom men are allowed to enter into communion. The ideal of the moral sense is a world in which this law is fully carried out. And it is by reference to this ideal standard that individual moral judgments are made. As in the case of pure thought, this ideal is necessary as an assumption, unless we are prepared to treat the utterances of the moral sense as invalid altogether. We must not, however, fail to recognize that it, like the ideal of thought, is an ideal which is found to have been assumed when moral judgments are analyzed, but which cannot be demonstrated, and continually falls short of realization. As the ideal of Thought is hindered by the failure of knowledge, so the ideal of Morality is perplexed by evil. For the moral sense looks to find the world ruled according to its own best hopes—expects that the good should triumph and that any breach of the rule of good should be visited with punishment. But experience conflicts with this. In spite of conscience, the evil does triumph at times to the detriment of the good. And this is a far more perplexing failure than that of the ideal of Thought. Thought claimed to interpret the world on its own principles, and every step it takes in advance brings it nearer attainment of its end. The process is long, but every stage of it adds assurance and certainty. It is a progress carried on in hope. But in the other case the failure is irreparable. Every unpunished wrong is, within this world's scope, a lasting irremediable failure. The martyr can have

nothing done for him by the world to repair the wrong it has done him. No man *survives* in the verses of poets, or the sculptor's marble. And yet the moral Ruler of the world has permitted the wrong. Here is indeed a problem. It has been met, of course, with despair: but better than this, it has given a peculiar intensity of hope to the desire for immortality. The wrong done here, it has been felt, cannot really be final. Beyond this world there should be another, where all this crookedness shall be straightened out.

We have now traced out at some length the *raison d'être* of those ideas which form the content of Natural Theology. We have seen how beliefs and practices which belong to the most undeveloped types of humanity have a real kinship with speculations more elaborate and loftier than they. It may be worth while to pause for a moment, and draw together the results we have attained. They may be expressed briefly thus. This fact emerges on consideration of the history of philosophy and religion, that man claims to interpret the world on the analogy of his own nature,—that he expects to find in it the activity of a Personality more or less like his own, who cares about him, and is holy, and rewards holiness here or hereafter; and this expectation is the permanent fact which explains the presence of so many religious phenomena. To this must be added the fact that men do not even feel themselves certain of the validity of their ideals, and that a large part of the peculiar practices of religion consists in attempts to reach certainty and remove disabilities.

All over the world men are religious: as we have seen, it is probable that no such thing as an atheistic tribe of men exists anywhere. And this has been used as a proof of the existence of God, under the name of the proof from the *consensus gentium*. The fact that men agree so remarkably upon this point has been held to argue the truth of the con-

viction upon which they are agreed. Now as it stands we are not prepared to give so much weight as this to the *consensus gentium*, stated as a bare fact. For it would then always be at the mercy of a chance individual who may choose to disclaim any such convictions. But, if it be taken as a fact which is broadly true, the considerations we have here alleged have certainly a very great weight, because they tally on the theoretical side with what is generally true in practice. It is certainly a matter of considerable importance that certain psychological conditions can be found which do operate widely amongst men, and do lead to the result which is no less widely present. We are not weighted with the unhistorical speculations which led to the Deists' devotion to Natural Religion in the last century. We do not suppose that primitive man was socially or religiously such as the Deists believed—that the social state in which he lived was purer and better than ours, or that the religion which he held was the simple and true basis upon which all successive systems have been erected. We do not hold this, because evolution has taught us not to look for the ideal in the first stages of the progress of an idea, but to find it rather in the law which has determined the progress from stage to stage. But we urge that the consensus, not necessarily of the whole population of individual men, but rather of their various strains of thought converging in one direction, shows that the belief in God as described is truly natural, in the sense that man naturally comes to the consciousness of it so soon as he begins to follow out the natural laws of Thought and Life, and to deal with the world as he is qualified by nature to do.[1]

[1] It is to be remembered that the whole field which has been thus lightly covered in the preceding section of this chapter is fruitful in controversy. To enter into this controversial region would involve much minute discussion, and would be disproportionate in a work like this. It may be said, moreover, that the disputes are hardly relevant to our present purpose. It is not denied

C. We have now reached the last stage of the inquiry of this chapter: the question, namely, how far the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, assuming it to be true, corresponds with what we have seen to be the natural impulse and hope of man. The simplest method of procedure seems to be, to set down first the more abstract accounts of the Incarnation to be found in S. Paul and S. John, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and then to inquire how far this conception of it answers to the needs of Natural Theology.

Let us begin with S. Paul. The Incarnation forms a very important and significant article in his creed, and there are many points of sight from which he considers it. It is, in the first place, a manifestation on the field of history of the Will and Wisdom of God. This idea appears in each separate section of the Pauline Epistles, the two early letters to the Thessalonians alone excepted. We find it in 1 Corinthians, the Galatians, and the Romans, among the four undisputed Epistles; it reappears in the Epistles of the Captivity, in the Ephesians, and Colossians, and is found last of all in the Pastoral Epistles. It is when 'the fulness of the time' had come (Gal. iv. 4) that God sent His Son. It is a mystery 'kept in silence in eternal times, but now manifested' through prophetic writings, 'according to the commandment of the Eternal God, made known unto all the nations unto obedience of faith' (Rom. xvi. 25-26).[1] So in Christ, God has set forth His good pleasure 'unto a dispensation of the fulness of

that the idea of God on the metaphysical side results from an extension of the normal method by which man deals with experience. Nor is it denied that he proceeds by introducing order and law into experiences otherwise chaotic. The disputes turn on the origin and method of these intellectual processes, the existence of which no one denies: in other words, on the relation of soul and body or mind and matter in man. We need only remark here, that while crude materialism would put the whole of theology aside as futile, the discussion between this and some form of idealism seems to lie outside our present intentions.

[1] Cf. Col. i. 25-27.

the times' (Eph. i. 10). It is the fulfilment of the promise made 'before eternal times,' by 'God who cannot lie' (Tit. i. 2).[1] Secondly, the Incarnate Person is eternal and pre-existent. He is in the form of God (ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων) (Phil. ii. 5), and He is the image of God (2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15), prior in time to all created things (Col. i. 17). He is Son of God in a special and unique sense: God's *own* Son (Rom. viii. 3, 32). As such He has mediatorial functions, especially in regard to creation, which has in Him its system, and is brought into being through Him (1 Cor. xv. 20-28; Col. i. 16-18). Thirdly, this Son of God became incarnate of the seed of David (Rom. i. 3); was 'found in fashion as a man' (Phil. ii. 7). He was the typical and ideal man, corresponding to the first Adam (1 Cor. xv. 45).[2] By His life of humiliation, and especially by His death, He restored in man the image of God (Col. iii. 10) and reversed all the deadly consequences of sin by infusion of new life,[3] such life being eternal to all those who are in Christ (1 Thess. iv. 18, and elsewhere).

Next, S. John presents the Incarnation of the Word, firstly, as the climax of the long development of God's self-manifestation in creation and in the Jewish Dispensation. Grace and truth flowed from His presence, in contrast with the law which Moses gave: new birth and sonship of God were given by Him to those who believed on His name at His coming (i. 1–18). He it is who brings for the first time the true knowledge of the Father: 'no man hath seen God at any time; God only begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him' (i. 18); 'Not that any hath seen the Father, save He which is from God, He hath seen the Father' (vi. 46).[4] To make this revelation was the motive of His

[1] Cf. 2 Tim. i. 9, 10.
[2] Cf. Rom. v. 12, 21.
[3] Cf. Rom. v. 8, 9; Eph. i. 7; Col. ii. 11-16; 1 Tim. i. 15.
[4] Cf. chap. v. 37, 38, xiv. 6, xvi. 25; and in the first Epistle, chap. ii. 23.

mission from the Father. 'The works which the Father hath given Me to accomplish, the very works which I do, bear witness of Me, that the Father hath sent Me' (v. 36, 37). Secondly, the mission of the Son occurs in its due time and place: the events of it arrive at their proper hour.[1] His coming, and especially His death, are the means of atonement and reconciliation.[2] But it requires faith in His Person (xx. 31) and life in Him[3] in order that we should attain these benefits. Thirdly, this union with Him involves union and mutual love one with another (1 John iii. 9, 11, 14, 16), and the knowledge of God which we thus attain is eternal life (xvii. 3).

Again, we turn to the Epistle to the Hebrews. Here too we find the belief in a pre-existent Personality, whose manifestation is the climax of a series of self-revelations 'in many parts and in many fashions' (chap. i. 1-3). This Person, who is Son of God, is the instrument of creation (chap. i. 2). He assumed humanity perfect in all things except sin (ii. 14, 17: cf. iv. 15) and offered Himself as a perfect Sacrifice to God, thus closing the history of the imperfect and symbolic sacrifices of Judaism (ix. 11-14). In virtue of this sacrifice we are cleansed from sin, united with one another, and made capable of eternal life in God's presence (ii. 10-18).

These three writers represent different aspects of the Christian faith, but their witness on this point is closely harmonious. According to all three, a Divine Person has taken upon Him our flesh in due time, in accordance with the unfailing order of the world—has lived under human conditions a life of obedience and of sacrifice, ending upon the Cross,—has thus revealed God truly and fully, and removed the barriers which sin had raised—and has thus

[1] Cf. vii. 30—No man laid hands upon Him, because His hour was not yet come—with xvii. 1—Father, the hour is come.

[2] Cf. 1 John i. 7, ii. 2.

[3] Cf. 1 John iv. 14-16.

poured new life into decaying humanity, binding men to God and to one another—which life extends beyond the grave.

The Doctrine of the Incarnation as thus considered seems to bear comparison with the earlier efforts of men in four particulars.

I. It affirms definitely, and with assurance, that a knowledge of God is attainable through matter—through creation—through human nature. From this point of view it satisfies the ideal of thought. Precariously and indirectly man reached the conviction and expressed it in various forms, that a First Cause, a uniform order, a moral Ruler, are necessary assumptions in order that he may trust his experience. The Incarnation of Jesus Christ confirms this precarious and indirect conclusion. It does not do this, however, in the way in which we might have expected. It reveals, indeed, the truth of the expectation that God may be known in nature: it encourages men thus far, assures them that they are not working upon false lines, but it tells them no more. We saw above that the satisfaction of his ideal for which man longs implies the completion of his knowledge. When he has thought over again the whole thought of creation, then he will have attained the goal towards which he has striven so long. Towards *this* attainment the Incarnation of our Lord gives him no help: this it leaves to him to win by his own efforts. It does not, in other words, stifle progress by offering intellectual certainty and scientific knowledge without struggle, it only gives assurance that the efforts are not in vain.

But at this point the question of anthropomorphism recurs. Has our doctrine nothing to say about this? Does it not, or ought it not to condemn so poor and meagre a conception of God? It must be confessed that this involves a discussion which is by no means free from difficulty. For the accusation of anthropomorphism—partly no doubt because its

bearing is far from being certain—causes almost panic terror. We are inclined to surrender almost anything rather than be stigmatized in this way. We are afraid of we know not what when we are so styled, and are alarmed to find ourselves afraid.

Is not all this the result of a failure to distinguish between a true and a false anthropomorphism—between anthropomorphism which carries with it associations of limitation and weakness, and anthropomorphism which does no such thing? Let us try and distinguish them. The crude and savage tales about the gods which we were considering some few pages back, are, of course, an instance of the false anthropomorphism. The nature of man with all its limitations and mistakes is taken as affording an adequate analogy for the nature of God. The gods, in this case, are merely stronger and more wilful men, with no checks upon their passions, and no supreme or superior Powers to hold them in subjection. In applying his own experience to interpret his convictions as to the nature of his gods, man has removed the restrictions which he is apt to find irksome, and left behind all those which are characteristic of derived and circumscribed existence. This is admitted on all hands to be an unworthy conception of God.

But the question is then worth raising, whether the philosophical idea of Him, even when crowned by the Incarnation, is not merely a sublimer form of the same impulse; whether the idea of God as mind, as will, as capable of self-revealing activity in the world, in human life, in an Incarnate Person, is less unworthy in the last resort than the old myths; whether it involves any less than savage mythologies a complete transference of human conditions to that which must necessarily transcend them. It will be observed that this is one of the strongest supports of the Agnostic position—the appeal to man's consciousness

of weakness and limitation even in his higher powers. Still we cannot but demur to it. Its strength lies, let us notice, in its apparently strict appeal to logic. You admit, it tells us, that the savage myths are unworthy and degrading, simply because they transfer human limitations to the character of God. Now, how can you draw a line between these and the higher faculties of mind or will, which are no less liable to failure? Having admitted one point, you are logically compelled to admit the other.

It would seem that our best method of dealing with this contention is to admit it. We acknowledge, so we might answer, we acknowledge that the higher human powers when scrutinized reveal all sorts of faults and inadequacies which we never noticed before; and although the consciousness is nevertheless strong within us, even while we notice this, that there *is* in them some divine element, some point of resemblance between us and the Divine Ruler, yet we have no sure means of separating the eternal and the transitory in them. Yet, when we turn to look at Christ Incarnate the trouble vanishes. The Incarnation, if true, is a hard fact in history, and it affirms that God *has* revealed Himself in the way in which man had hoped. The Incarnation, if carefully examined, will doubtless provide some means of deciding where it is safe to talk of God in human language, and where it would land us in gross error. The Incarnate One need say nothing about anthropomorphism, for the Incarnation is the refutation of all anthropomorphism. This hint must be expanded later.

II. The doctrine of the Incarnation, as set forth in the writers cited above, bears comparison with the utterances of Natural Religion in regard of redemption. However it may be explained, the fact remains that men at all times have been sensible of a barrier between them and God. Communion has never been regarded as an easy thing. It has

been protected either by an elaborate ritual or by cruel sacrificial customs. There is always a strongly-marked current of fear in heathen religion. The temper of the gods cannot be trusted, and they are apt to take heavy vengeance for any slight they may have received. Much of this is, of course, purely accidental and does not touch the heart of the religion; but it remains true that the yearning for heavenly communion, which dates back to the beginning of religion, is strained by meeting with a barrier. The sense of an obstacle became explicit in Judaism. There we find a pervading consciousness that man has fallen short of the Divine ideal. Year after year, according to the developed ritual of Judæa, the whole people required and received a symbolic atonement. And besides this, their casual breaches of the Law had to be repaired and reconciliation made. The Incarnation of Christ, as presented in the New Testament, meets all this directly: and, as in the former case, it does more than was expected of it. The barrier which all men felt, had wider effects than had been supposed. It held men back not only from communion with God, but also from full knowledge of His nature. The philosopher who sought to know God by his wisdom was under the same ban as the ordinary heathen. He was subject to the strangest and most disheartening failures. And what was more, neither Jew nor Greek—the Greek far less than the Jew—was able to enforce the knowledge he did win in practice. The Jews did their best with their law by an elaborate system of casuistry. The Greek thinkers founded schools, and so insured a certain number of professed followers of a high ideal. But their whole result upon the world of their day was comparatively slight. Now over all this ground the belief that the Son of God had become incarnate and lived and died as man was supremely successful. It made possible —at least this was its profession—a real and sure knowledge

of God; it removed the barrier which separated men from His communion, by presenting a real and final sacrifice; and it supplied a stream of new life by which men were enabled in some degree to satisfy their ideal in their lives.

In saying this, we have purposely left aside some very important questions which lie round this point. We have said nothing of the origin of this sense of separation in the Fall, nothing of the way in which we must think of the barrier as removed. Nor do we propose to pause here in order to show how the Christian idea of vicarious sacrifice hangs together with the conviction that God reveals Himself in the material world and in human life. To all these points we shall return when we come to their proper place.[1] At present we have only to indicate that *in fact* the Incarnation, if true, satisfies aspirations which the speculations of Natural Theology arouse.

III. We have just shown that the doctrine of the Incarnation gave what no previous system had ever succeeded in giving, a firm basis for morality, in that it bound together more closely than ever before religion and morality. This circumstance leads on to the consideration of a third point, in which it bears comparison with previous efforts—its social character. Religion from its earliest days has been a social thing. In savage tribes it binds the members of each individual tribe together. In Greece it was the bond which united the members of a family or clan. To the Jew it was the mark of his separation from all the unenlightened world; but it was the link between the whole body of descendants from Abraham. Nowhere do we find religion solitary, an operation with which only the individual soul and God were concerned. This social character of religion was emphasized in various ways—by tribal or family sacrifices especially, but also by the names bestowed upon the gods. In some

[1] Chaps. V. VI.

sense, often a very material sense, the fatherhood of God was recognized. A savage tribe frequently claims descent from the god it worships; the Greeks regarded Zeus as father of gods and men. This notion expanded into something almost sublime in the hands of the Stoic philosophers, who thought of God as the common father of all mankind: although their inveterate materialism leads one to wonder whether they meant more by it than that He was the physical cause of their being. The Jew regarded God as Father of His own peculiar people, and, in spite of the glimpses of a universal religion which the prophets had opened up from time to time, troubled himself little about the hopes or the prospects of the Gentiles. Christ revealed God as the Father of all men in a fuller sense than before, and made religion the bond of a new society in which all men should have their places as sons, in virtue of their union with the only-begotten Son of God. Thus in this point also the Incarnation of our Lord fulfils and justifies earlier insight. From the first, and throughout all its manifestations, religion had been bound up with the social character of man, and the new religion makes no change in this. It only widens and strengthens the social idea by destroying the exclusiveness and one-sidedness which belonged to the earlier stages of the history.

IV. There is one point further which must be discussed under this head. It is a common remark that there is nothing so conservative as religion. It dislikes change of any kind, whether in ritual or doctrine. In early stages, as we have seen, the ritual was more permanent than the doctrine; the mythology was in some measure changeable, the ritual traditional and unchanged. In other words, religion tends to become stereotyped and to regard itself as final, at any rate so long as it lasts. It is true that in Greece the old Hellenic faiths were criticized away by the

new philosophy; but at the same time there was a large number of customs preserved—in connexion, for instance, with the Eleusinian mysteries—of which the explanation goes back into a primitive age and social condition. In Judaism there was a considerable divergence between the theory and the practice. In theory, the Jewish religion pretended to no finality,—looked on always to a day when a fuller and final revelation would come from God. But in practice, as the events of our Lord's life showed, the old conservative instinct of religion displayed itself, and the Pharisees, while holding tenaciously to the belief in a Messiah who should come, resisted anything which seemed likely to change the outward order with which they were familiar. The doctrine of Christ Incarnate meets this instinct directly. It proclaims itself from the first as final, but final just in the region where the tendency had been to admit change—in doctrine, not in outward observance. The instinct of finality, so firmly rooted in the religious mind, is seized upon and transfigured. It is centred upon the revealed knowledge of the unchanging nature of God, not upon the methods of approach to Him. The sacrifice of reconciliation is once performed, the Gospel is once given, and the whole scheme as it stands is put forth as a whole—a stewardship to be occupied till Christ come. The long delay before this Second Coming has brought into view new needs and new conditions of life which the apostles can never have contemplated; but the 'faith once delivered' is the source to which we still look for constant guidance. We shall have to look in detail into some of the adaptations of the old faith to new problems in the chapters which follow.[1] Here it is enough to point out how by its finality of doctrine and indifference to change in rites and ceremonies, Christianity has spiritualized religion without making it vague and fluid.

[1] Chaps. III. IV.

We have dwelt at some length on the contents of Natural Religion, and the connexion with these of Judaism and the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. We have seen how broken lights from earlier days are concentrated in the person of our Lord; how, if the apostolic witness to His Incarnation be true, the fragmentary intuitions of men are made to cohere; how their partial anticipations of the truth fall into system and order in Him who claims to be the truth. Before passing from this subject into the detailed treatment of the Incarnation, we may pause and ask the question, whether our discussion, so far as it has gone, has thrown any light upon the general character of revelation. We have represented the Incarnation as fulfilling the various aspirations already in existence rather than as introducing any sudden or startling change. Men thought that the order and regularity of nature pointed to the work of a mind, but they failed to prove it: they longed to hold intercourse with the moral Governor of the world and failed to attain it: and the Incarnation meets them where they are and gives them assurance. That is, it has a place in the history, not only of outward events, but of man's mental and spiritual development: it is in organic continuity with the progress of the world. And this character we believe to be one certain note of a revelation from God, that it involves no hopeless breach with the past, that it fulfils but does not destroy. In this aspect it forms a very striking contrast to the ordinary human notion of Divine revelation: it is historic and universal, dealing with particular events through general principles, whereas man looks most often for spasmodic information upon details. He is content, as a rule, with ordinary knowledge obtained through ordinary channels. But now and then he becomes dissatisfied with it. He wishes to know something which is outside the range of his capacities, or to do something which is beyond

his natural powers. And it is here that he expects the activity of God to step in and aid him. He wants to know whether a scheme which he has projected will be successful; he goes to an oracle and expects an answer from the divine omniscience, or he opens his Bible and accepts the first chance words as a direction from God. Or he wishes to know where the soul of his dead mother is at this moment, and how it is engaged, and he attends a spiritualistic *séance*. He always looks for some detailed information which will satisfy his particular wishes, give him a certainty in the ordinary ways of life which he cannot acquire by ordinary means, and thus bring him an advantage over his neighbours. His purview is apt to be bounded by his own individual life and conditions; he does not rise to the conception of a vast historic scheme.

But it will be said, This is only true of coarse and vulgar superstition. Has not Buddhism, has not Hellenism, risen to some wider notion than this? Where will you get such bold drafts on the bank of time as in Buddhism? How can you say that the Stoic system of recurring cycles fails to be a great historic scheme? The answer is, that it is true that the systems of the Buddhist and the Stoic have arisen by repulsion from the crude and vulgar superstitions of which we have been speaking. But with all their magnificence they show the faults and exaggerations of a reaction. They look at life from within,—as it were, buried in it. If the whole process of the world's movement tends to some 'far-off divine event,' they can only conjecture what it may be. Their knowledge of it is barren: they cannot use it to throw light on what happens now. Life, as men see it from within, is incomplete and unsatisfying, and the hope that its order is right and its issue happy is but a hope. And it is a hope which reflection tends to impair. For the causes which we see at work show no signs of ever

leaving off their activity; they seem to have been active during an indefinite past, and likely to be active during an indefinite future. Any announcement that the process must close seems sudden and violent. We have always lived in the middle of things; the world has always been going on, and our life makes no difference to it; how then can we seriously imagine that the time will ever come when the *world's* day will be over? It must surely always be in the middle of its course, always oscillating under the pressure of the forces of love and hate, of expansion and contraction, of evolution and dissolution, which we see at all times at work in it: the world's history must be a system of recurring cycles without beginning or end.

This point of view, which we may be allowed to call the regular form *of philosophic superstition*, curiously supplements the naïve and popular form of superstition. The latter thinks too highly of the importance of human affairs, the former is impressed with their littleness. The one class of men expects the gods to enter into business transactions, into petty political feuds and unheroic warfare, with all the energy and zest of a tradesman, or a vestryman, or a mercenary soldier. They hope to have higher powers on their side to tell them what the event of some petty decision may be, so that they may know it before it becomes public property. The gods are to be swallowed up in human interests. But the philosopher flies off at a tangent from all this. The laws of gravity go on, whichever political party is in power; fire burns here and among the Persians, whatever may be the state of the funds. No human action has power to stop the steady march of the forces which make the world what it is: their action and reaction go on without the smallest deviation, and the utmost that can be looked for in the way of change will be a periodic alteration in the equilibrium.

Both these are, we maintain, essentially human conceptions, and both form a vivid contrast with the scheme of Christianity. This deals with the world and its interests from the point of view of the *realization* of the purpose which they serve. It is part of the finality of the Christian scheme, already noticed, that this should be so. It does look forward to a time when the world's day will be over: and this belief enables it to estimate things at their true value. It affirms that the narrow area and limited interests of human life are of vital importance. Nothing is too small to be the object of the infinite concern of God. But it does not matter so much which way this or that question of human policy is settled, as on what motives this or that human agent made his decision. Thus there is revealed behind the play of physical forces, which is so impressive to the philosopher, a moral battle of which the physical world is merely the scene. Human ends have a human importance, but there is an infinite value in human selves. Small things become great, and great things become small, in proportion as they are fit for the revelation of human character.[1]

If our analysis has been correct, it will be clear that the determining difference between human speculation and revelation lies in its relation to human life. It does not enter suddenly and claim to revolutionize all men's opinions. Rather it comes in naturally, and blends easily with the general order. And its proper range of action is to be found

[1] Cf. Hutchison Stirling, *Gifford Lectures*, p. 78.—'Undulations there are, doubtless, that are light *to us*: but no undulation will give light to them, the globes. Vibrations there are, doubtless, where there is air, that are sound *to us*; but all vibrations are as the dead to them. It is in a cave, in a den, blacker than the blackest night, soundless and more silent than the void of voids, that all those intermingling motions of the globes go on—but for us, that is; but for an eye, and an ear, and a soul behind them!' If this be true of the speculative intellect, it is more profoundly true still of the moral life of man.

in the moral life. It gives a new meaning to moral activity in relation to that new knowledge which it conveys.

We started by affirming the presence of two factors in religion, a moral and a metaphysical. We have treated them, and the religions of which they are severally characteristic, practically as on an equality. Our last point, however, enables us to strike the balance between them. It now becomes plain how deeply true it is that the Jewish religion was a revealed one. We do not deny that the Jews were conscious of the same feelings as those which led to the mythological developments of pagan religions. We do not deny that the Jewish religion took up and embodied many elements which are found in pagan religions too. But if the Incarnation be true, as we have here assumed, it was the Jews' moral conception of God which in the truest sense prepared for it: it was the Jewish religion which, in the character of its inspiration and the closeness of its relationship, is most truly continuous with Christianity.

The lists of books appended to this and the following chapters make no claim to be exhaustive. They are simply intended to indicate the sources from which the author has drawn, and to act as a guide to any readers who may care to pursue the subjects further. They represent, in many cases, opinions which the author does not share.

For the Anthropology see the following:—

Lang, Myth, Ritual, and Religion: The Making of Religion. Magic and Religion. *Frazer*, The Golden Bough, 2nd ed. *Tylor*, Primitive Culture. *H. Spencer*, Principles of Sociology, vol. i. *Robertson Smith*, The Religion of the Semites. *O. Gruppe*, Die Griechischen Culte und Mythen in ihren Beziehungen zu den orientalischen Religionen.

For the Proofs of the Existence of God:—

In general: *Kant*, Critique of Pure Reason; Transcendental Dialectic, Bk. ii. ch. iii.; cf. also *E. Caird*, Kant's Critical Philosophy, Bk. i. ch. xiii.; ii. ch. v. *J. Caird*, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, ch. v. *Hegel*, Ueber die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes. Werke,

Bd. xii. *Flint*, Theism. *Stirling*, Gifford Lectures. *Bobba*, Storia della Filosofia rispetto alla Conoscenza di Dio., 4 vols.

The *Cosmological* Proof.—*Aristotle*, Metaphysics, Bk. xii. (A.) ch. vii. *S. Aug.*, Sermo, 197. *S. Thom. Aq.*, Summa Theol., Pt. I. Quæst. ii. Art. iii. Summa Cont. Gent., Lib. i. c. xiii. *Leibniz*, Monadologie, 36–41.

The *Teleological* Proof.—*Xenophon*, Memorabilia, Bk. i. ch. iv.; cf. *Plato*, Phaedo, 97 c-99 d. *S. Thom. Aq.*, Summa, as cited above. *Paley*, Natural Theology (cf. *Temple*, Bampton Lectures). *Von Hartmann*, Wahrheit und Irrthum im Darwinismus. *Moore*, Science and the Faith, pp. 186–200. *Martineau*, Study of Religion, vol. i. pp. 270–398.

The *Ontological* Proof.—*S. Anselm*, Monologium Proslogium, ch. i.–iii. (cf. *S. Aug.*, De Trin., Bk. viii. ch. iii.); *Descartes*, Meditations, iii.; *Spinoza*, Eth., Bk. i. Def. 2. *Leibniz*, Nouveaux Essais, Bk. iv. ch. ix. *Steere*, Existence and Attributes of God, Bk. i. pt. iii. ch. iii.

The *Proof from Conscience.—Raymundus Sebundensis*, Theologia Naturalis, Tit. lxxxiii. *Kant*, Critique of Practical Reason, Bk. ii. sect. ii. ch. v.-viii. *Martineau*, Study of Religion, Bk. ii. ch. ii. § 3.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE INCARNATION

We have spent much labour in tracing the coherence of the doctrine of the Incarnation of our Lord with the religious aspirations of previous systems. In order to do this with the requisite detail, it was necessary to anticipate in some measure the subject of the present chapter. We must now turn to inquire more definitely what is the historical evidence for the truth of the fact which for the purposes of the last chapter we assumed to be true.

I. The first stage in this inquiry will, of course, take us to the Gospels. We shall ask, What account do they give or suggest to us of the nature of our Lord? In discussing this question, it will be impossible to enter upon a subject which is, properly speaking, preliminary to it, viz. the authenticity of the Gospels themselves. For this is a matter requiring much special knowledge, and far too technical to be undertaken in passing. References will be given at the end of the chapter to works dealing specially with the point; but for our present purpose their general historical authority must be taken for granted.

It will not be disputed by any one that the Gospels represent our Lord as human. Quite directly and simply they ascribe to Him definitely human characteristics. He was born of a human mother, under miraculous conditions, but

still in the ordinary human way. He grew up to manhood with gradually-developing human powers, and was subject to His mother, like other human children; and, while He refused to allow her to govern in any way at all His course of action during His ministry, He still recognized her claims when hanging upon the Cross. Of the years which intervened between His birth and His showing forth to Israel but little is told us. When, however, the story is resumed, we find Him sharing our human conditions physically and morally. He is tempted, though without sin (S. Matt. iv. 1–11; S. Mark i. 12, 13; S. Luke iv. 1–13); and in one passage in S. Luke (xxii. 28) He describes His whole ministry as being in some sense temptation. 'Ye are they,' He says to His Disciples, 'who have continued with Me in My temptations (ἐν τοῖς πειρασμοῖς μου). He is capable of emotion, even of violent emotion. He wonders at the unbelief of the Nazarenes (S. Mark vi. 6), at the faith of the centurion (S. Luke vii. 9). He feels compassion on the multitude (S. Matt. xiv. 14; S. Mark viii. 2), upon the widow of Nain (S. Luke vii. 13). He rejoiced in the Holy Spirit (S. Luke x. 21). He wept over Jerusalem (S. Luke xix. 41), and at the grave of Lazarus (S. John xi. 35). He was wroth (S. Mark viii. 12, x. 14). He passed through a strong emotional struggle at the visit of the Greeks (S. John xii. 24), and at the agony in the garden (S. Matt. xxvi. 38; S. Mark xiv. 34; S. Luke xxii. 43, 44). Also He suffered weariness (S. Matt. viii. 24; S. Mark iv. 38; S. Luke viii. 23; S. John iv. 6), and hunger (S. Matt. iv. 2, xxi. 18; S. Mark xi. 12; S. Luke iv. 2), and thirst (S. John xix. 28). To crown all, He died, was recognized as dead, and buried. Thus throughout His life He gave cause, as these notices imply, for supposing Him no less human than one of ourselves.

At the same time, together with these manifestations of

ordinary human character, there arose a growing sense amongst His nearer followers that He was something more than man. This consciousness certainly developed, but it is not perfectly easy to see by what steps. We propose to consider the question under two heads, (1) with reference to the Synoptic tradition, (2) with reference to that of S. John.

(1) The first three, or Synoptic Gospels, are concerned largely, as every one knows, with the history of the Galilean ministry, and describe in a simple and straightforward fashion acts and words of our Lord in His ordinary intercourse with simple and unlearned folk. Yet even in this simple narrative there are signs of a gradual growth of feeling in two distinct directions, one in the direction of more unlimited devotion to our Lord's Person, the other in the direction of increasingly open hostility. Thus the wonder which S. Matthew notes as the effect on the multitude of Christ's Sermon on the Mount breaks up into its two component factors—attraction and annoyance. The Disciples, upon whom the moral appeal was effective, draw closer round the Lord, while the Pharisees, who see their methods directly assailed by the new Teacher, are surprised and also annoyed. The crowd (ὁ ὄχλος) get a very little way beyond this mere wonder. It is noted in S. Matthew's Gospel more than once. In one case (xii. 23, 24) the contrast is drawn between the verdict of the crowd and that of the Pharisees, the crowd being inclined to identify the new prophet with the 'Son of David.' In chap. xvi. 13, 14, our Lord's question to S. Peter, Whom do men say that I am? obtains for us a glimpse of the uncertain and vague speculations that prevailed at that stage. At the triumphal entry into Jerusalem the crowd came nearest to a positive view about our Lord: but when they cry Crucify, Crucify Him, they cast in their lot finally with the leaders of the people. On the other hand, the Pharisees pass into a position of

hostility at a comparatively early date: they soon ascribe the miracles of our Lord to the powers of darkness, and this draws down upon them a rebuke the most tremendous, perhaps, which our Lord ever uttered (S. Mark iii. 28–30). From that point forward their position remains practically unchanged.

The circumstances which called out this twofold judgment were generally of two kinds—miracles and teaching. Our Lord traversed in His teaching questions which were regarded as settled, such, for instance, as that of Sabbath observance: but He also gave utterance to many things which no active moral sense could condemn. Moreover, His miracles were almost invariably acts of mercy—relief of the sick, restoration of the dead. That is, they were a practical comment on His words; they expressed in action what His words were intended to convey. They do not, however, occur with equal frequency over the whole period. As time goes on, our Lord seems less anxious to perform them, more anxious to insist on secrecy. He charges those on whom they are worked to tell no man, and Himself draws back from the advances of the crowd. At the same time His instructions to the Apostles tend to become more and more distinct; as He withdraws Himself from the crowd, He draws nearer to the Apostles, and they do not need any longer the special teaching of miracles. In them miracles have had their proper effect. They have realized the presence of the Son of God in the humble surroundings of Jesus of Nazareth; they have seen His miracles and heard His words; and to them it has been given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of Heaven. In this connexion great weight should be laid upon the account in S. Luke's Gospel of S. Peter's call (v. 8). The miraculous draught of fishes so impresses S. Peter with a definite idea of Christ's character that he cries, 'Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord.' It is not necessary,

nor indeed is it possible in view of the history of the fourth Gospel, to suppose that this was the first time S. Peter had seen our Lord, but it supplies an example of the way in which our Lord's miracles impressed those to whom the Father was revealing the truth of His Son's nature. And it suggests an account of the real position which the miracles were intended to occupy. It suggests that they were not to be considered as a chief object of our Lord's coming. He performs them naturally enough when occasion demands, but He does not *search* for an occasion. He does not attempt to force men to bring their sick to Him for healing. He does not heal regardless of the moral condition of the subject of His exercise of power. But He seems to use His acts of power in the same way as His words, to attract that attentive wonder which may in the right sort of soul develop into faith.

(2) This process, which is not perfectly clear in the Synoptic Gospels, is definitely marked in S. John. In this Gospel we have at intervals deliberate notes of the growth of feeling as to the Nature of our Lord. Thus at the end of the account of the miracle at Cana, S. John remarks, 'This beginning of miracles did Jesus at Cana in Galilee, and manifested forth His glory, and His disciples believed on Him.' At the end of the sixth chapter, the mysterious discourse upon the Bread of Life, although it followed so closely upon so important a miracle as the Feeding of the Five Thousand, has a double effect. Some go back and walk no more with Him, but this is made a means of tightening the bond with the Disciples. Again, at the end of chap. vii., S. John notes a growing division of opinion; and in like manner, after the healing of the man born blind, in chaps. ix. and x. Lastly, in chap. xii. S. John deliberately sums up the whole position, showing how the position of the Jews at that moment fulfilled the gloomy prophecy of Isaiah: 'He hath blinded their eyes and he hardened their heart; lest they

should see with their eyes, and perceive with their heart, and should turn, and I should heal them.'

The Life of Christ is presented, then, in the Gospels as having been the means of judgment. It drew out the secret affinities of the people before whom it was displayed, it revealed the thoughts of many hearts. This aspect of it, as we have said, is most plainly marked in S. John, but there are signs of the same thing in the Synoptists also. What then was it which our Lord claimed, which it required moral affinity to understand and to grant? What account does He give of Himself?

(1) Beginning again with the Synoptic Gospels, we find our Lord assuming a position of exceptional authority. 'He taught as though He had authority, and not as the scribes.' He contrasted His own assertions as to moral right and wrong with those in the older law, and yet claimed that He had come to fulfil it. He claims the right on earth to forgive sins as Son of man (S. Matt. ix. 2–6; S. Mark ii. 5–12), to reveal the will of the Father (S. Matt. xi. 27), the laws of the Divine judgment (S. Matt. xii. 36, 37), of forgiveness (S. Matt. xviii. 35), of life eternal (S. Matt. xix. 16–21). He reads the thoughts of men, He knows beforehand His own sufferings. And He claims the right to confer His own powers upon others—in the mission of the twelve (S. Matt. x. 1; S. Mark iii. 14–15, vi. 7–13; S. Luke ix. 1), in the mission of the seventy (S. Luke x. 1–20), in the permission to S. Peter to walk upon the sea (S. Matt. xiv. 28), and lastly, in His commission to the Church (S. Matt. xxviii. 18–20; S. Mark xvi. 15–18; S. Luke xxiv. 44–48). Further, He speaks of Himself as the Son in close connexion with the phrase 'the Father' (S. Matt. xi. 27); as the Son of man frequently; greater than Solomon or than Jonah (S. Matt. xii. 41, 42; S. Luke xi. 31, 32); and at Nazareth (S. Luke iv. 21), and before the High Priest at His trial, He definitely

claims to be Messiah, and to be coming in judgment as Son of man (S. Matt. xxvi. 64, 65; S. Mark xiv. 62, 63; S. Luke xxii. 68-70). (2) The Gospel of S. John is written 'that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye may have life in His name.' The whole book, therefore, aims at setting forth this one idea. The life of Christ is presented as the manifestation under the conditions of human flesh, of the glory of the Eternal Word. The structure of the Gospel around this central thought is so plain that we need not spend much time in illustrating it. It will be well, however, to put together a few facts which may serve to show the character of our Lord's claims. Our Lord definitely assumes the Messianic character before the woman of Samaria and before the man born blind. In His more elaborate discourses He speaks of Himself as the Son (for instance, in chap. v.), and in other places by some metaphorical expression calculated to bring out some one special aspect of His character. Thus when He speaks of Himself in chap. vi. as the Bread of Life, the expression serves to emphasize His relation to the Old Covenant (in that He was the reality, of which the manna in the wilderness was the shadow), and to point out the position which He must occupy in the New Dispensation. He must be the food of the Israel of God—their life must depend on their sharing His. Again, He is the Water of Life, the Light of the World, the Door of the new society, the Good Shepherd. And in all these there is implied very obviously a wholly special claim. He is indeed sent by the Father to perform a certain work in the world, but His unity with the Father is never broken. He can do nothing of Himself, but then the Father shows Him all things that He doeth. There is never any question as to who the Father may be. It is clear to all—to the Jews as well as to the Apostles—that God is meant. So we read (chap. v. 18) that the Jews sought to kill Him,

because He not only used to break the Sabbath (ἔλυε) but called God His *own* Father (πατέρα ἴδιον), making Himself equal with God. Thus S. John clearly represents Him as claiming an equality with God, and a special mediatorial position between God and man.

In making these claims, our Lord was not devoid of *witness.* In the Synoptists, as before, we have bare facts mentioned, occasions described when witness was borne to our Lord; whereas in S. John the idea of witness is elaborately developed throughout the whole Gospel. There is (1) in the Synoptic account the witness of the angel Gabriel, and the heavenly host; of prophecy, (specially emphasized in S. Matthew), of Simeon, of Anna, and of the Magi; of S. John the Baptist; and even of the evil spirits whom our Lord cast out from men. And the witness of all these is consentient. It tends towards one result, that Christ was more than man. Twice there is mentioned in all three Gospels a witness of the Father to the Son—at His baptism and at His transfiguration. On both occasions the witness is definite: 'This is my Beloved Son' (S. Matt. iii. 17; S. Mark i. 11; S. Luke iii. 22; S. Matt. xvii. 5; S. Mark ix. 7; S. Luke ix. 35).

(2) In S. John the witness which is alleged as bearing on our Lord's nature is sevenfold. Its significance has been elaborately drawn out by Bishop Westcott in the introduction to his commentary on the fourth Gospel, pp. xlv.-xlvii. We need only summarize it here. It comprises (1) the witness of the Father, (2) of Christ Himself, (3) of works, (4) of the Scriptures, (5) of the forerunner, (6) of disciples, (7) of the Holy Spirit. Of these, the last two belong rather to the history of the Church. They are the integral elements of the abiding witness of the Church to Christ, and we have not as yet to do with this. The witness of Scripture and the forerunner are in S. John very much what they are in the other Gospels. At least the differences which are noticeable

are not sufficiently important to require special and detailed treatment here. The witness of works covers more than the miracles; it includes the whole area of the works which Christ did as man. And the witness they bore consisted in their revealing the character of Him who performed them. Here, too, we do not depart very widely from the position of the Synoptists. But in the description of the witness of the Father, and of Christ Himself, there is a peculiarly Johannine ring. The witness of Christ Himself is to be trusted, not because He has a right to expect the world to accept His own account of Himself—that would be the method of the self-commissioned prophets whom the Jews would understand—but because He knows whence He came and whither He goes (viii. 14). He gives witness to the Father who had sent Him, of His own knowledge, and therefore the witness of Christ to Himself lies in His conscious communion with the Father. The witness of the Father is more difficult to follow and understand. Christ appeals to it as greater than the witness of John the Baptist, and does not identify it with the witness of Scripture (v. 36). Its force is realized by those whose will is at one with that of the Father, and not by others. And it emerges in the coincidence of which Christ is sure, and which the faithful recognize, between the ministry of Christ and the will of the Father. Thus it is internal, as appearing in the consciousness of our Lord Himself, and of those to whom His work appeals.

II. The Gospels represent our Lord, then, as being both human and Divine. They offer no solution of the mystery which such an idea involves: it is presented as a mere piece of history. The Divine characteristics enter the story as naturally and simply as the human: there is no discernible effort whatever to separate, or to apportion them, or to merge one nature in the other. The Passion is as natural, falls into its place as readily, as the Transfiguration or the Resurrection.

That the Gospels *as they stand* present this view of our Lord's Person, few scholars of the present day would dispute. But the difficulty of the idea is so great that various expedients have been adopted in various ages in order to avoid it. In the preface to the last edition (1890) of his *Bampton Lectures* (p. xxvi.) Dr. Liddon pointed out that Unitarianism has considerably changed its ground of recent years. Formerly it contested the Catholic interpretation of the Gospels, now it assails the integrity of the Gospels themselves. Since this comparatively recent date there have been many changes of attitude in the regions of speculation and criticism: and these affect so seriously the whole subject of the present chapter that we make no apology for discussing some of the points involved at considerable length.

The affirmation of the Incarnation, as a fact, is the affirmation of a historical event, and must so far be tested by the principles of historical evidence. But it is also an event of a very exceptional character, belonging to the class of events called miraculous or supernatural. And therefore a question arises for discussion, which does not arise in connexion with events more completely in accordance with ordinary experience. We have to consider whether such an event as the Incarnation is *possible at all.* This *a priori* question must be taken first, for it is obvious that no evidence is worth considering which tends to the establishment of the occurrence of an event *a priori* impossible. Until, therefore, we have settled whether the Incarnation is possible, it is no use asking whether the historical evidence for it is good. It is greatly to be deplored that the difference in character and effect of these two lines of evidence is ignored by a large number of critics. The two questions are necessarily closely inter-related, but they are not the same: and any scientific treatment of the matter will take note of the element contributed by each.

(1) To ask whether such a thing as the Incarnation is possible on general grounds is to ask a very bold question, and it is a question which involves several others. Such an inquiry can only have a meaning in connexion with a theory as to the Nature of God and His relation to the created order. To ask whether the Incarnation is possible is really to ask whether God *can* make a special revelation of Himself, or whether He is so bound by the order of the created world as to be revealed only and always in *order*, natural or moral, never in miracle? That this is so may be easily proved by any one who cares to study the current arguments against the Incarnation. It is commonly urged that our modern notions of the dignity and rationality of firm and constant order prevent our adopting any of those views of God which represent Him as changeable, capable of using expedients to produce special ends, which apparently were not included in the original plan. Miracles, revelations, and the like, it is argued, are of the nature of afterthoughts, and must imply weakness and want of foresight, else why should the occasion for them ever have arisen?

It would be easy to retort upon this position, if a retort were all that were needed, that the question must be discussed after we have considered the historical evidence for the Incarnation. *If* it be true that Christ was incarnate Son of God, our notion of the Divine Being, whatever it may have been, must be modified to suit that: the theoretical question is involved in the settlement of the historic fact. And there would be a real though only a partial truth in the answer. But we must not forget that there is considerable room for explanation and readjustment in the mere statement of the problem; and this, though perhaps not conclusive in itself, will at any rate prepare the way for the historical discussion. Let us ask this question then, How does the Incarnation, and the miracles it involves, stand in regard to the order of

nature? Does it involve a sharp and sudden breach? and, if so, of what order, and in what sense of the word nature?[1]

It would be difficult to find words more ambiguous and liable to misapprehension than nature and its various derivations—supernatural, etc. We are rarely certain when we use them what nature it is to which we are alluding. There is no doubt that *nature* means the created world, and, by consequence, those substances and forces which we find in existence and operation there. But then the question arises whether man is to be included in the world of nature or not. It is clear that he has affinities with it on the side of his bodily life: he is subject to its laws, like any other animal. On the side of his mental and spiritual life, the point is not so clear. Popular language probably distinguishes still between the works of nature and the works of the human mind, denies all strictly *mental* powers to animals, and regards man as separate from nature. But the advance of scientific speculation is making all these distinctions more difficult, and the whole higher side of man's structure is claimed as a mere complex illustration of physical principles. Perhaps, the real central association of the word is with the fact that the senses have command over the world of nature. Natural events and powers are capable of sensuous verification, of verification in some of the ways which are familiar to natural science. Thus by the order of nature we usually mean that system of material laws and uniformities which underlies all our ordinary experience. If man has any such thing in him as an immaterial spiritual part, that does not fall within the scheme of nature so understood. Now if we hold consistently to this meaning of nature, the Incarnation of Christ certainly involves a breach with it. For there is no law of matter, no law capable of any scientific verification, which will account for it. It implies the entry upon the

[1] See above, Chap. I. p. 44.

material world of a new and non-material force, which yet will have its effect upon the material forces already there and in operation. And so long as it is maintained that material things are all that there is to know, so long, it is plain, the Incarnation must be inexplicable, and in the last resort incredible. If this principle be maintained the situation mentioned above will have been reached: no amount of historical evidence, however excellent it might appear under ordinary circumstances, will be adequate to prove such a claim. The general theory of the world will put all such evidence out of court. It would then be simply waste of time to consider arguments in favour of an occurrence which is written down at the outset as impossible.

It is probable that those who hold seriously and consciously that there is nothing capable of being known or being conceived as existing except matter, are a comparatively small minority in the present day. And it is difficult to see how such persons are to be dealt with in regard to the present question. Certainly there is no room for a discussion with them in this book; they require not to have evidence for the Incarnation offered to them, but to have their first principles criticized in detail. And this falls outside our scope.[1]

We return, then, to the question of nature and the Incarnation. Granted that the created order is more than a complex of merely material forces, and contains elements which do not entirely surrender to physical tests, how does this help the matter? It helps us in two ways: (*a*) it affords us a case within easy reach of ordinary observation, where the forces of the material world are utilized and adapted to ends by a force not themselves. We are all of us familiar

[1] The question of the reality and significance of the mental and spiritual part of man, and its connexion with mechanical law, has received a searching examination in Prof. J. Ward's book *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. This work contains what is probably the most serious and successful vindication of the reality of this side of human life now available.

with the process of exercising the will. We know how it is done, so far as we are concerned. We conceive an idea, and desire its attainment, and then set our physical powers in action in order to make our idea actual in the material world. The thought, the desire which we realize in action, is different and separate in nature from the act which is its result. That is generally an event in the material world leading to material consequences. A man who fires a mine, for instance, translates his idea into very definite physical form with very definite physical effect. Such an act, if ordinary scientific accounts of things are true, has a wider reach than the immediate occasion of its occurrence. It sets up a chain of physical consequences which alters in a real, if only in a minute degree, the whole face of nature. Here, then, is an intrusive power, entering into and modifying the merely material order. It may be that we cannot fully explain the process; that means, that we cannot express material force in terms of will, or will in terms of material force, and be satisfied with the explanation. But we know it when it happens; it is not strange or unusual; it is part of our regular experience. With fuller knowledge of the constitution of either we might see that a solution of the theoretical difficulty is possible: but we need no solution for its practical aspect; and that for the simple reason, that in this region there is no difficulty. Once more, this intrusive force, if we may so regard it for the nonce, owns certain general rules of its own. When at its best, it is guided by the thought of what *ought* to be, rather than the thought of what is. In the region of physical force, the conditions of one moment are the direct consequence of the conditions of the preceding moment. There is no alternative; necessity, which knows no modification or uncertainty or indecision, is the principle at work. And no moral issues have any place in the matter at all. Poison kills the saint as well as the

sinner; disease cuts off the useful and hard-working as well as the idle and thriftless. But the will, informed by the reason, takes into consideration the very elements which the physical order neglects. In the choice of its aims—the objects which it will endeavour to secure in the world—it considers not only what the mere physical antecedents would produce if left to themselves, but what, on the highest grounds, *ought* to be there. It does not ignore the stern certainties of the physical world, but it seeks to use these for its own ends, to mould them, even at times to counteract them. Every man, for instance, comes into the world with a certain physical character; he has certain powers, capacities, tendencies which, *if left to themselves*, will produce a certain result—from the point of view of material nature, a necessary result. But from the moral point of view this may be by no means a necessary result—that is, a result which ought to be. And the will, guided by the moral ideal, will endeavour by education and training so to harmonize and balance the various physical tendencies as to neutralize the result which on merely physical grounds would be necessary. Here we see a moral force working with physical forces, *not* so as to suspend their operation, but so as to use their known properties with reference to the end desired.

This state of things, with which every one is, in practice, familiar, affords us as much help as an analogous case can ever provide towards meeting the difficulty raised by the Incarnation. That is an event outside the range of physical causes or principles, but it enters upon the physical world. And it is the result, we have reason to believe, of motives analogous to those which we call moral. Christ appears in the physical world as a human being, and lives a human life amid material surroundings. He must have induced the same disturbance and need for readjustment of the web of physical causes as the entry of any other person would

have caused. So far as that is concerned, the appearance of our Lord's superhuman Personality puts us but little more into difficulty than that of any one of our own. Moreover, the manifestation of Christ is due, so we believe, to the presence and operation of moral motives. Here, as in so many cases, the physical order is made subservient to the carrying out of purposes alien to itself. It is this which is the determining cause, if we may so speak with reverence, of the appearance of this particular Personality under physical conditions at this particular time. God so *loved* the world, we read, that He sent His only-begotten Son into it. The question of the degree in which the whole process involved a disturbance of existing conditions depends upon the degree in which we regard those conditions as fixed.

(*b*) And here we reach a second point in which the analogy of man's higher faculties helps us. It emphasizes the necessity of a wider view of nature than perhaps our ordinary experience suggests. We have already observed that in fact the physical world is utilized and managed by spiritual forces. And we saw in the last chapter the general necessity of the notion of end or purpose to a rational interpretation of the world. We said then nothing to indicate what manner of end it was natural to think of in this regard. The notion of God as a moral Being was treated as arising in a different connexion, and not necessarily to be placed in immediate association with the notion of a purpose in nature. At the same time, no doubt, it is more natural to connect them: and perhaps it may be said with truth that our recent remarks as to the relative value of the physical and moral worlds may suggest that if the moral Being whom our moral nature demands as its ideal is also the Cause and Sustainer of the physical world, the end which nature serves will be a moral one. Now if this be so, it is manifest that our whole attitude towards nature in itself must change. It must be regarded

not merely in itself and for itself, as a process of ingeniously balanced forces, but as conveying a moral purpose and serving a moral end. Indeed, apart from a moral purpose, it is very difficult to see what end there can be present in nature at all. Nature considered in itself suggests reciprocal movement, conservation of energy, redistribution of matter and force, rather than onward movement towards a definite end. And here we come in sight again of those periodic cycles, those aimless driftings to and fro, which we placed under the head of philosophical superstitions.[1] Surely if we refuse to bind together the moral and the teleological view of nature we run the risk of losing the idea of purpose altogether, of being forced back upon the notion of an equilibrium of unexplained forces, and thus relapsing, practically, into the dominion of chance, from which every scientific movement has been an effort to deliver us. End, purpose—such words as these—have finally a moral meaning only; and the world conceived as a purposeful thing must be conceived as the vehicle of a moral purpose.

Physical law, then, must be looked upon as the normal method by which the moral purpose of the universe is served. It maintains in us the sense of certainty and assurance without which all our life would have to stop. It is the regular material and condition of our actions: we get used to it, and can hardly imagine its being otherwise. So familiar do we become with its beautiful and easy regularity, that we forget to take into consideration the fact that this has a definite and limited purpose, and that the mind itself has contributed a constructive element to the whole fabric of uniformity. The laws which are the result of the operation of the mind upon the manifold of experience tend to acquire independent existence and indefeasible rights. When the question is brought up of the possibility of any change in this

[1] Above, p. 45.

even flow of uniformity which we know so well, we are apt to forget all about the purpose which it serves and the history of it, and answer off-hand, 'Of course not: change, breach of uniformity, indecision, would shatter our confidence in the nature of things. We stand or fall by the exhaustiveness and universality of physical causation. God cannot change the purpose which He must have had in view when He adopted the laws of physical nature, as a means of His self-expression: change in physical order must mean, according to the moral theory of the world just described, a feeble and irrational change of will.'

But then, is this so? Is it true that, while God cannot change His purpose, He is equally restrained from purposing a change? And have we any right to be sure that physical uniformity exhausts the purpose of God? What do we conceive the purpose of God to be as regards ourselves? That is a question which must be asked first. For our present aim, it will not be necessary to open up the discussion in all its bearings. Other aspects of it will claim our attention at different stages. Here we are simply concerned to ask what it is that uniformity does for us—in what way we can understand its serving a moral end, and how far that moral end is helped or hindered by variation in the uniformity? The only moral end which *we* can as yet recognize as effected by the uniformity of nature must be the revelation of God to ourselves. We cannot look out into the infinite future and see the purpose of things there in its final form: we only know that nature lies between us and God, and that we conjecture of the Worker from His works. From our point of view the only moral purpose to which nature by itself is instrumental must be the knowledge of God in us. And this tallies with our belief in Him as a moral Being. It is of the essence of such a notion that He should desire communion with those whom He has created.

And nature shadows out for us His character as that of a rational and unchanging Being, in whom is no variableness. But then we have just had occasion to point out that the very ease and smoothness of the regularity tends to unfit it, at last, for doing that which we are sure it is meant to do. The veil through which we learn of God seems to rise up into independent being: it limits our knowledge within its own province, tends to present God as exhaustively described and known from this particular point of view; which means that the notion of character tends to sink into that of characterless mechanism. Here, then, is a juncture at which the moral end which nature itself reveals requires a more flexible instrument than the order of nature. It is not that the report of nature has proved itself false, but that there is much more to be known than the order of nature could possibly reveal; and it has become necessary in the course of the Divine Providence to bring this into notice. Theoretically, this is the moment at which miracle may be expected to occur. And when it does occur, it is not to be regarded as a mere change of will on the part of God: it is not that He has grown tired or dissatisfied with the created world; it is not that He has hit upon a new expedient for calling attention. These are the unworthy and crude ways of conceiving miracle, which the attacks upon the truth of them, and often enough the theological defence of them, have rendered familiar. From such points of view, miracles must be as startling and out of the common to the eye of God as to ourselves; and this surely runs rather close to profanity. But it is true of them that God, retaining unchanged His purpose of self-revelation, adapts the physical order to it in a way which, *from the point of view of that physical order*, is strange and startling. To the physical order—to the human intelligence—miracles are certainly supernatural; but from the point of view of the will of God, and of that

wider conception of nature which covers all His self-manifestation through the world, they are natural enough. The wider view of nature which our own moral nature suggests has room in it for such manifestations as these.[1]

What bearing has all this upon our doctrine? In what relation can we place it to the wider view of nature? The mere ordinary objection that it is miraculous may, we hope, be regarded as having no further weight. But it will be necessary, in view of what we have said, to do our best to make clear that it has a meaning, discernible after the event even to us; that is, from the point of view of God's desire to make Himself known to man.

First of all, let us place it in connexion with the order of nature considered by itself. Till recent years it has been usual to take a very simple view of nature. It was a vast kingdom, separated into provinces, inhabited by animals of different kinds, of which it was the duty of the naturalist to know the names. These various classes of being were all treated teleologically; they were regarded generally as being

[1] It is not supposed that this view of things makes the occurrence of a miracle wholly intelligible to us. From the nature of the position which we occupy in the world, and the method by which we are compelled to deal with it, dualism of a kind almost necessarily results. We distinguish ourselves from the objects of our thought, and this distinction when carried out on the widest scale, ends in two sharply-opposed realms of thought and things. In like manner, the region of bare fact, of knowledge gives rise to the notion of a uniform system of laws; the region of practice tends to develop the idea of action adapted to varying situations, flexible in outward manifestation, but based on regulative principles. And the only way of overcoming the opposition between these and similar antinomies is by attaining to a point of view wider than both from which they are harmonised. This is the perpetual and perpetually deferred hope of philosophy. We can readily *conceive* a point of view to which rigid order and flexible variation might both form parts of a single purpose. But what has never been fully done yet, is to work this conception out in detail. It is easy to say, *ex post facto*, this or that miracle has obvious relation to a scheme of self-manifestation, and it is a better way of dealing with the matter than to talk of arbitrary suspension of laws: but within the limits of our knowledge, it does not so much solve all the questioning that may arise, as remind us of these limits, and of the mischief of allowing the formal and mechanical side of our intellectual methods to dominate the whole.

there for the use of man. This was almost their only universal bond of union—the one thing that could be said quite indiscriminately of all things. And it was easier to say it indiscriminately than to apply it in particular cases, owing to the undoubted presence of noxious beasts and herbs. Still the teleological idea was preserved, and was on the whole a moral idea. But of late, all this has been altered. Instead of looking upon nature as a collection of independent existences which, for scientific purposes, it is convenient to arrange in arbitrarily chosen classes, we have come to look upon it as a single process. We have given up constructing our teleology with reference to our own ends and purposes, and have swept the whole physical order, ourselves included, into the one great process of evolution. The separate kinds are not finally separate, they represent landmarks in the movement of the regulative idea. The first form in which this theory saw the light was not such as to suggest the presence of a regulative idea at all. It seemed as though the whole might be explained as the purposeless result of accidental variations; and there is before the world still a statement of the evolution-philosophy, which depends upon the timely intervention of the principle known as the instability of the homogeneous.[1] But we need not spend time or labour upon the discussion of this particular form of the theory. The most natural and, we believe, the most philosophical exposition of the theory enlightens but does not abolish teleology. According to it the history of the world is the history of an idea, expressed first in simple and unpretending forms, but gradually taking on more and more complex shapes till human life and society, morality and religion, emerge at the end. We cannot say from the knowledge we possess that this is the real and ultimate end; we look forward still to an indefinitely long progress yet to come. But when we look back, the position

[1] See H. Spencer's *First Principles*, Part II. chap. xix.

now reached is seen to be the general explanation of all the early stages. It was prepared for from the first; there is no accident and no surprise in its emergence. It is right in its place, and will be completely explicable some day, if ever we grasp in its fulness the idea of creation.

Taking our stand, then, in the present order of things, let us apply to them the principle just obtained, that nature as we know it is to be a means of God's self-revelation to us. We do not pretend that this exhausts the meaning of the purpose of the natural world; but we are sure that we are justified in applying our principle here and now. What do we find, then? Surely, this, that if nature is meant to reveal God's character to us, the evolution of nature must mean a gradual self-manifestation on the part of God. Each new act and each new complexity is a new revelation of God to us, from this point of view; each stage illustrates more clearly His wealth of life and freedom, His manifoldness of conception. And more than this, the variety is not a loose chaotic variety; it converges upon the human race, and upon human conditions of life. Below man, there are things which merely are, and things which are and live, and things which are and live and are conscious of their life; and then there is man who is all this, and more, in that he is capable of moral and social life. The whole is a gradually intensifying manifestation of Himself by God. But is the climax reached in man? Surely not, if the object of Creation is self-manifestation on the part of God to created beings capable of responding to it. In the first place, there is the limitation which comes from the necessity of interpreting the material world. Men can realize and to a large extent have realized the presence of God in Nature: but, as we have seen, it is of the essence of this process that they have no means of testing or proving their intuitions. And this difficulty is enormously increased by the presence of evil—a problem

which will receive fuller treatment further on. The order which should reveal God is imperfect and is impeded in its course; so that the moral aspirations of man are far from being verified in it. But the Incarnation does fall into place from this point of view. If it is what the Church has always held it to be, it throws new light on the God-ward side of nature, and while opening up a way of escape from sin, places the evil that remains in the world in a new context, and indicates the possibility of its overthrow.

So far it may be represented as an extraordinary expedient for an occasion which had arisen contrary to the intention of God in the formation of the world. But it is not necessary that it should have this occasional and remedial significance only. We have taken into consideration so far only that aspect of the evolution-history in which physical nature is an expression of the nature of God, and the Incarnation is necessary to remedy failure arising at a particular point. Let us now add the purely moral conception of it, by which nature is regarded as a great appeal to man, a great manifestation of purpose and love. From this point of view the several stages in nature are stages in self-communication, increasing in fulness, in clearness, in intensity. Here again the Incarnation of Christ is a climax; it gathers up in itself all that had gone before, and explains the early stages of the process. In this way too we can see how consonant it is with the general purposes which nature and life reveal. Grant that the purpose of God is to reveal Himself to man, and then, the gathering together the broken lights into the Person of the Light of the world involves no spasmodic change of will, no sudden veering of purpose, but only alters, and alters for good, the views men might have entertained before.

Let us try and gather together the results of this portion of our investigation. We started in presence of a number

of *a priori* or theoretical objections to the Incarnation, which seemed to make it impossible and incredible from the first. By means of explanation and analysis it has become clear that these objections depend on a conscious or unconscious use of the word nature in a narrow and material sense, and that they are valid only on the assumption of the truth of this materialism; but that with a wider and ethical view of nature and its purpose, motives come into sight which we from our position can recognize as bearing with them a divine necessity. That is, however great and finally unintelligible a mystery may be involved in the coming of the Son of God upon the earth, yet this event stands in some intelligible union with the moral principles which we know, and the moral purpose in which we believe. But let us clearly recognize the limits of this result. It removes the possibility of deciding against the Gospel story by the mere denunciation of it as incredible; it gives it an antecedent credibility. But it does not follow from this that even if men had known of God as Love—which knowledge is indeed part of the result of the Incarnation—they could have inferred, from this datum only, that an Incarnation must take place, or must take place at a given time. But it is important to know that there is no theoretical improbability against it; that, on the whole, the antecedent probabilities of the case would be in favour of it.

III. So bare and negative a result as this requires to be supplemented at once, and it must be supplemented by historical evidence. To this we must now turn. And we must preface our examination of the actual evidence of the truth of the Gospel story with a few remarks touching the nature of historical evidence, because this is a matter as to which there exists, as we think, considerable confusion.

The object of alleging evidence in support of a historical statement is to prove that the facts *were* as they are said to

have been. That is, historical evidence aims at reproducing the past in such a way as may be possible—at bridging over time and enabling us to realize what was going on when we were not there. It can never, therefore (1) give us the certainty of direct experience, for the simple reason that the facts to which it witnesses are, by the very nature of the case, out of the range of our direct experience. Hence, whatever form of certainty may result from historical inquiry, it is not and cannot be of the same sort as the certainty of direct experience. (2) The evidence and the certainty which belong to history are not the same as the evidence or the certainty of a court of law. It has been not infrequently objected to the Christian acceptance of the Gospels that facts are admitted freely by Christians on evidence that would not be received for a moment in a court of law. Now this is simply an irrelevant remark, for the nature of the several inquiries is different. The special court intended is, we presume, a criminal court. It only needs a moment's thought to see that the investigations of a criminal court and those of a historian are diametrically opposed. In the law-court the fact is admitted—it is the subject of the inquiry; the question is, Who has done it and what is the legal character of the act? In history, the facts themselves and sometimes also the agents are in dispute. The parallel would lie, no doubt, if it were the business of the jury at each assize to make a return of all the crimes done within the district since the last assize, together with the names of the criminals: but this is not the practice of modern English law. But it may be argued, perhaps, that this is not the meaning of the parallel; what is meant is, that the reported testimony of dead persons who cannot be cross-examined would not be evidence in law. But then most historical evidence is open to this objection. The law deals for the most part with actions done within the memory of men: and, as it is

concerned with a definite accusation of a given person, it has to ensure that the evidence is sifted as fully as may be. Hence, evidence which cannot be brought under cross-examination is not evidence which can be allowed to convict. It falls too far short of the individual who is accused. Historical evidence is usually concerned with events which are long past, and is not capable of being subjected to cross-examination. This matters little, however, because its aim is not to convict. (3) Historical certainty is not the same as scientific certainty. Given a certain number of physical conditions accurately and clearly known, and the scientific inference from them is certain. Thus it would be possible, for any one who cared to take the trouble, to state accurately the number of minutes during which the sun was above the horizon on any given day at any period of history. And it could be done quite as easily with reference to Britain in the time of Boadicea as for Britain at the present moment. And there would be no room for doubt, because the matter is one of scientific certainty; doubt would mean distrust of the whole scientific theory of the world. On the other hand, unless a trustworthy record happens to have been preserved, it is absolutely impossible to say how many hours of bright sunshine there were on any given day one hundred years ago. Because in this case the conditions are not known. We might conjecture, and the conjecture might be reasonable. We might let it guide us in the description of a scene in a novel relating to that period, and the description might be in keeping with the period assumed; but for the fact of the matter we should be without any evidence at all.

It cannot be denied that these peculiarities in the character of historical certainty are apt to be overlooked; it is less overpowering, probably, than any of the other three kinds, and therefore the natural tendency is to attempt to bring it under one or other of these heads. This being so, let us try

to see what is the special character of historic certainty, to what convictions in us it appeals, and what are the intellectual states it produces.

The most remarkable fact about historical certainty is the complexity of the process by which it is reached. A historical event of any importance has, probably, traceable causes and consequences. It may be compared with other events of the same sort and made to illustrate principles. Just as the fall of a stone is an illustration of the law of gravity, so a historical event occurring at a given time and place may illustrate some principle of moral or social evolution. It may be possible to argue that the known conditions present at the given time must necessarily have taken effect in the form of the event in question. These are or may be considerations of great value to the historian: but his knowledge of the conditions present is always so extremely limited that he can never, as the man of science can usually, use his *a priori* arguments to prove an occurrence at a particular place and time. However clear I may succeed in making it that the political conditions of Europe in the early years of this century led up to a decisive contest such as occurred at Waterloo, the historic reality of the battle is far from being proved. Besides this, the historian requires *a posteriori* evidence,—testimony, oral or documentary, to the effect that the conditions realized by him took a particular form: in other words, evidence that the event in question actually happened. And such evidence as this never compels the reason. There is always a *possibility*, slight or strong, of mistake or bad faith: often more than one plausible account can be devised of a given historical situation, so that when all is done, the act of belief—the vote of confidence in the whole process—is still required to give it force. So complex a matter it seems that historic certainty must be; and if it is so complex, it must be idle to expect it to compel the

assent of an uninterested mind; its appeal must always be to a mind which is prepared to receive it—understands what to expect, and knows when the facts have yielded all the evidence they can.

The mind, then, which is to appreciate historical evidence duly must not be a vacuous indifferent one. It must come to the estimate of the evidence impressed already with a definite character. This brings us to the consideration of a point which is frequently passed by in matters of historical criticism. What do we mean by the *character* necessary to appreciate historical evidence? We mean first that a certain stock of general convictions and ideas is necessary in order that we may appreciate history at all. Any person with ordinary gifts of memory and attention can learn dates and names, and thus have a knowledge of history in a certain sense. But this does not, by any means, necessarily involve an appreciation of history; for that, some much more rare and special gifts are required. It is, of course, the appreciative historical mind, of which we are endeavouring to understand the nature: because the whole business of historical evidence comes before us with reference to a certain body of reputed historical facts which have met with the severest criticism; and it is, therefore, necessary to assure ourselves whether the criticism does or does not proceed upon valid historical lines. To return, then, history is not a process of ingenious guessing, but a rational and scientific process of reconstruction, depending upon the ultimate unity of all things. The past and the present must be regarded as constituting one whole, or history becomes meaningless. A fact falling totally outside all possible relations to other facts would be wholly incredible—even indescribable. For the very thing which gives history its meaning and value, is the fact that it is a step back in thought over the road by which the human race has come to its present position; it loses all

meaning whatsoever unless this road be one and continuous, and unless the general laws of life at the present day obtained then too. We must take back our criteria of truth and falsity into the past period, and examine the facts there by their means. The world must be assumed to be governed by the same laws at all times; the past must not be like 'the night in which all cows are black'; it must be as definitely coloured, as sanely and intelligibly ordered, as the life of to-day. On the other hand, it *is* past: and the laws with which we are familiar must have operated under very different conditions from those which we know now.

These are obvious considerations, but they are constantly overlooked. It is very commonly argued by persons who defend the Gospel miracles that such things cannot occur now. It may be true to say that they do not occur now: that is a matter for direct historical evidence; but it is impossible to argue without qualification that they occurred in Christ's time and *cannot* occur now. That is to assume a complete breach in the order of history, and can only appeal to minds which have no clear realization of the past at all. On the other hand, the literature of historical criticism is strewn with instances of the misapplication of present-day conditions to the past. This error usually takes the form of transferring the axioms of a modern historian to the mind of an ancient one. These very common but erroneous ways of looking at the past may be illustrated by the practice of certain schools of historical painters. One painter will dress up the characters of an ancient day in the costumes of his own time; another will devise outlandish clothing which no human being could ever have dreamt of wearing. And both are wrong; one recognizes no unity at all between his own age and the past, and the other recognizes no difference.

We must always go back, then, upon ancient history with our theory of the world formed, at any rate provisionally,

and construe the facts described in our evidential documents accordingly. This general recognition of the unity of all human history corresponds with the actual state of things, for, indeed, there is an organic inter-connexion among all the facts of history. That is, every event has its place in the history of the world, and is necessary, whatever it is, to that history. We all admit this about certain epoch-making facts. That the history of Europe would have been in many respects different if Xerxes had won Salamis, or if Cæsar had not crossed the Rubicon, or if Cromwell had not been prevented from sailing to America, or if Napoleon had won Waterloo, may be safely taken for granted. But when we reflect carefully on this admission, we find it carries much more with it than at first sight appears. Salamis, for instance, we rightly call a decisive battle—one of the great events of history. But when we consider what that means, we find that the battle of Salamis is a short name for an extremely complex event. There were involved the particular actions of a host of men on both sides, brought to the scene by various motives, and all under the governance of the Purpose in History, or whatever other universal Power we recognize. None of these elements can be omitted or be supposed to have no part in the general result. It may be said, of course, that the individual soldiers cannot matter, because any one who would have done the same things would have filled the necessary place—that it was not, therefore, the particular individuals that formed the inevitable condition but their work. And this is in a measure true, for on historic ground the individual *is* the work he does, his own private self matters little. But it is only partially true: we see only the result of the work of men whose names and prowess are mostly lost. We lose the connexion between what they did and their private self, their education, and interests. But these, after all, are just

the things that do matter; they have gone to determine the character of the event which we now call epoch-making, they have helped to decide what each man's part should be in it. History remembers, it is true, only the names of the few prominent, but the obscure many are equally necessary to the whole, though it is always impossible to trace out fully the connexion between that abstract of events which history remembers, and the concrete living events themselves.

Not only, then, must we approach history in the light of our own experience, and our own theory of our experience, but when we get to it, we find it part of our world, or at least so strongly bound to our world that without it all our experience must have been different. This unity, we must be sure, is there, though we can never fully exhibit it. And this is one of the great causes of the peculiar uncertainty which characterizes history, and makes it to differ so widely from other branches of research. We are able to trace but a few of the links which bind us to the past; records perish, events are forgotten, and we are left to put together the past out of the few relics saved from the general wreck. And hence, there is almost always some crucial fact wanting which would decide some obscure point, and let in a flood of light upon later developments. Or, what is still more disastrous, the facts there are may seem to supply all that is needed, while yet the truth may lie concealed in some forgotten document not yet brought to light.

The next question which requires brief discussion here relates to the evidence necessary to establish a given fact. The difficulty lies in formulating any general conditions of probability, owing to the great variety of cases. We may say, perhaps, quite generally that there are two main directions in which we may search for probability: both imply the comparison of the event with some general conception. We may compare an alleged event with our

conception of nature: or we may compare it with our conception of man. An event might have probability to a believer in God, which would seem impossible to a pure materialist: in this case its probability would arise from comparison with the general conception of nature. The other comparison is more difficult to carry out. Man is fallible and also at times mendacious. At the best, he speaks in the light of his own theory of things, and interprets what he sees in accordance with his knowledge. The probability of an event depending on testimony for its evidence, is therefore always uncertain, because there is no settled or certain criterion for estimating the liability to error, the tendency to deceive, and the capacity to interpret. Historical criticism is a way of working out some empirical rules on these heads: but it is far from having reached certainty yet. On the whole we may say that an event is probable, when it is in harmony with the general conception of the world and the forces operating in it, when the testimony is such as to suggest real knowledge and adequate appreciation. To this we should add, that its probability is greatly increased, when its occurrence as alleged accounts simply and naturally for subsequent certain effects.

We must now consider the intellectual effect of historical evidence. We have seen the complex process by which historic certainty is reached, and something of the principles with which we should approach the evidence. What is then the condition of the mind? Of course, if the evidence is good, and the mind is capable of appreciating it, it may take that step which we saw was necessary to complete its assent. In this case it may be said to believe in the facts described, that is, to feel reasonably sure that the order of events followed this and no other line. That, we think, is the very fullest result which can be produced by historical evidence. To it may be added much by the way of the

imagination; surviving portraits, buildings, sites, antiquarian knowledge, and the like may all help to form a vivid picture, which will gain a firmer and firmer grip upon the mind, and reduce the chance of error to a minimum. But with all these aids, the resulting certainty will be hard to produce, and fall short, after all, of the direct evidence of our senses, and of the theoretic certainty of science.

And it is by no means every fact which can possibly be expected to have such high attestation: only under very exceptional conditions can we erect so exacting a standard. Historical facts for the most part are believed, or at least not denied, when their evidence would fail altogether to produce such certainty. It is in relation with such facts as fall short, in a more or less conspicuous degree, of the ideally complete historical character, that there comes into existence a state of mind somewhat different from the reasonable assurance just mentioned. The facts are believed, on the whole; there is no need to decide on the claims of two conflicting accounts, they have verisimilitude—they are probable—there is no particular reason for denying them. Perhaps an instance will make the matter clearer. In S. Clement of Alexandria (*Quis Dives Salv.* § 42) there is an anecdote related about S. John, cited to show that it is never too late to mend. It tells how S. John had converted to the faith of Christ a young man who, after a time, had fallen into evil courses, and had become captain of a band of robbers. S. John, hearing of this, had wandered out into a forest whither his convert had gone, had found him, and brought him back. S. Clement insists that the story is true, but points out that it is variously reported by different authorities. Beyond this mention in S. Clement, there is, we believe, no evidence whatever for or against the story. It is impossible, then, to regard it as proved; it falls far short of anything we can regard as historical certainty.

And yet it is probable enough; it makes no unusual demand upon our faith; it is consistent with the character of a Son of Thunder, moulded by the faith and the love of Christ. But that is all. If it were disproved, we should have but little to resign; it would disturb no cherished convictions; we should regret it only on sentimental grounds. Till it is disproved, we cannot surely be said to do more than *acquiesce* in it, we could hardly go so far as to say we believed in it. It is important, we think, to emphasize the existence of this state of mind, because a very large number of the facts ordinarily ranged under the head of history fall, if we are not mistaken, into the province of this acquiescent state of mind.[1]

And, if its existence be not recognized, it tends to corrupt our historical judgment. We tend to look for the same evidential support for all historical events, and this means either lax criticism, or unreasonable scepticism. On the one hand we are inclined to accept statements which would really vanish under criticism, because we have to be content with less than is absolutely required for complete historical assurance in so many cases. That is to allow our critical faculty to grow lax. And, on the other hand, the sense that so many facts depend on this sort of evidence, and the want of distinguishing it from real historical certainty, lead to an undue scepticism as to history in general, or to the erection of a false standard of validity in historical evidence.

The real battle in historical questions is over the serious and vital events, the presence or absence of which makes

[1] It can scarcely be better described than by Robert Browning (*Ferishtah's Fancies*, p. 16 1st. ed.)—

> 'First, amend, my son,
> Thy faulty nomenclature, call belief
> Belief indeed, nor grace with such a name
> The easy acquiescence of mankind
> In matters nowise worth dispute, since life
> Lasts merely the allotted moment.'

a decisive difference to the whole fabric of history. When these are settled, one way or another, the position we take up in regard to them may help to give credibility or finally rule out as improbable events as to which we had only reached the acquiescent stage before. The story of King Alfred and the cakes can never be proved: it may become more or less probable according to the decision we reach as to the more salient events of Alfred's life. We should all admit the absurdity of making the failure to prove this story evidence against the general historicity of Alfred's life. Yet this inversion of true logical order is common among critics of the Gospels.

We must now face the question of the historical evidence for the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. And first let us observe that we wish to attain in regard of it real historical assurance; it must not be a matter in which we easily acquiesce. And next, let us call to mind the remarks we have made as to the necessity of bringing our theory of the world to bear upon our historical problems. We must not accept the Incarnation or the miracles which occur in connexion with it as being one of the things which might easily occur in ancient times, but could not possibly occur now. The possibility of it is a theoretical question, depending on the ultimate constitution of things, and not upon the age of the world. If the Incarnation was possible 1900 years ago, it would be in the region of possibility now, supposing that such a need could arise again. For 'possible' means that it is not excluded by the ultimate character of the world, and that must be true or false for all time. The same must be said of the miracles: if they were possible then, similar conditions would produce them unerringly now. This question has, we hope, been settled. We have seen that the constitution of the world, widely viewed, admits these possibilities, and our discussion of historical

evidence has shown us that in approaching the purely historical evidence with this question closed, we are fulfilling the demands of the special logic which such matters require.

What evidence, then, do the Apostles allege in support of their belief that Christ was Son of God Incarnate? They say, that what proved it to them was the fact that Christ rose from the dead. They had grown in intimacy and in confidence all through Christ's life: they had felt more and more certain that their interpretation of His nature was a true one, until the Passion came, and the Death on the Cross gave all their convictions a terrible shock. From this they only recovered when the evidence of their senses assured them that He had overcome death, and was alive again. Then they knew that they had been right in their surmises during the period of discipleship: they were sure that He was indeed the Holy One of God. That is their story. They do not pretend to have had a sudden revelation of His true nature, or to have formed their conclusions apart from rational grounds, by some peculiar or inexplicable process. They admit that they were puzzled and put off and thrown back by the Death on the Cross, but they assert that when they knew of the Resurrection they felt sure again. Later they came to see, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the Divine necessity and significance of death and resurrection alike.

Let us enter upon the discussion at the point which the Apostles represent as vital. What is the evidence for the Resurrection? S. Paul in writing to the Church of Corinth found himself in opposition to a class of persons who denied the Resurrection. In his answer he appeals to two sources of evidence—the witness of those who had seen the risen Lord,[1] the intrinsic fitness of the Resurrection itself. Under

[1] S. Paul's point is that the Resurrection was a historical fact; the vision of the Risen Lord was as certain and inexpugnable as the vision of Him before

the first head he enumerates a number of those who had ocular demonstration of the fact, including himself, and adds that of these the greater part were still living, but some had fallen asleep. Now there are the same elements still necessary to prove the Resurrection—personal testimony and intrinsic fitness. But in our case the difficulty is increased, because there are not and have not been for centuries any persons whatever to whom we could appeal. Are we then to fall back upon general considerations of intrinsic fitness? Certainly not. We have already pointed out that these will never prove a fact, they can only remove *a priori* objections to it. Somehow or other, then, we must put ourselves in contact with those who saw the risen Christ. Under ordinary circumstances what do we do? We inquire how far the fact in question fits in with other facts, with its period, with the rest of history as it may be known to us. Is it excluded by anything else of which we are certain? Or are there traces of its existence all down the line of history? Now it is clear that there is nothing to exclude the Resurrection of Christ, unless it be its impossibility, and this question has been already sufficiently discussed. And it is clear too that no reputed fact in the world has ever left such deep and permanent traces as this of the Resurrection. The testimony of the first witnesses has been believed steadily and continuously from that day to this. There is no break in the continuity of the evidence: no cessation in the stream of believers. The highest and most cultivated as well as the simplest have held to it as a fact. And what is more, it has not passed into the region of mere literature, like so much history; it has remained in full view of the

the Crucifixion. His argument—especially in 1 Cor. xv. 17–19—is quite irrelevant if it be supposed that he meant a 'spiritual' resurrection only, or a vigorous emphasis laid by Christ upon the idea of Immortality. The truth is that these attenuations of the meaning of the Resurrection are anachronisms as applied to the Apostles.

consciousness of men throughout. Certainly the first witnesses have not lacked continuous support.

But it will be said that all this only proves that *they* believed it; and this may be easily granted: it does not prove that their belief was justified in fact. Certainly it does not; but then no historic evidence ever does or can. The only way to *prove* that the first witnesses were not deceived is to compare their reports with the facts as they report them: which is impossible. It is true that the Apostles were more ready to believe in this event than men are in modern times: and it is true that they had a very elementary knowledge of nature's laws. It is true also that they may have been deceived, and have followed wandering fires. But we have contended that nature's laws do not exclude the Resurrection: and it is certain that the moral and spiritual effects traced by the Apostles to belief in it as a fact, and produced by no other cause, are verified in every succeeding generation. We are just as near the Resurrection as we are to any other fact in history, and the evidence for it is the same in kind: it differs in degree, indeed, for it rarely happens that any testimony is so continuously and so widely supported. More than this we have no right to expect.

It is still possible, of course, to raise further objections, at some of which we ought, for completeness' sake, to glance. For instance, it is possible to maintain that the chances in favour of men being deceived are greater than the chances that a supernatural[1] event has occurred. That may be true, and yet not decisive; unless it be meant to imply that a supernatural event cannot occur. If that is what it means, no doubt it closes the whole question. But if it does not, if it simply means that supernatural events are uncommon, and therefore are not to be expected to occur often, it does

[1] Cf. p. 81.

not touch the point. If it be possible that such an event should occur, the question whether it has done so or not at a given time and place is one of evidence and testimony. It may have been unlikely, it may be still unlikely that it should occur again; but unless it is impossible the testimony must be treated on its own merits. Or again it may be argued that no testimony can reach to the supernatural—that we may believe on the evidence that the Apostles saw or imagined they saw certain appearances; but that their supernatural interpretation of them cannot be carried by their testimony. This, again, conceals the old difficulty of the possibility of the supernatural at all. If it means that, when men draw an inference from reports of their senses to a supernatural cause, it cannot be trustworthy, that is only the old objection to the possibility of the supernatural, and this we have set aside. But if it means that no testimony can reach beyond the sensuous data, then it is within measurable distance of absurdity.[1]

We may now pass on from these minute questions, pausing first to characterize our results. We claim that the evidence for the Resurrection, so far as it is merely a historical event, is as great or greater than the evidence for any other fact in history; further, that this is such as to justify not only the 'easy acquiescence' of which we have spoken but that reasonable assurance which historical evidence is calculated to produce.[2] For the most part, the objections raised on the other side are of a theoretical or *a priori* character, and do not fall properly within historical inquiry at all. And when

[1] Cf. Mozley, *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. v.

[2] This does not mean that the Resurrection is the easiest of all facts to believe. Ease of belief is largely a matter of the insignificance of the alleged fact, or the relation of it to our system of interpreting nature. What is meant is that apart from *a priori* objections, the Resurrection is as firmly attested by contemporary evidence, and as intricately woven into the whole fabric of subsequent history as any fact on record.

we come to discuss the Church and Sacraments it will be seen that there is a wide difference between the Resurrection and other historical facts, for the Resurrection is a living fact, present still in the Church and in the hearts of believers. It is not a mere event in history, but a present and operative force among men.

The Apostles accepted the fact of the Resurrection as proving sufficiently our Lord's Divine claims: were they right in so doing? We may not unnaturally ask the question, Where lay the connexion? Why should the Resurrection prove Christ's claims? It is clear that one of their great reasons for suspecting Him to be more than man during His earthly ministry was His power over the forces of nature. Disease and even death, the powers of wind and wave, and the spirits of evil—all alike owned His sway. He had miraculously increased the supply of bread with the 5000 and 4000, the supply of wine at Cana. That one possessing such powers over the material world should have no unusual character, no closer relation with the Creator than ordinary men, seemed incredible. Yet that He should save others, and yet be unable to save Himself from death, interfered sadly with this conjecture. But the Resurrection decisively proved that the risen One had power over His own life—power to lay it down and power to take it again. And then there was the evidence of prophecy, which the Resurrection, interpreted as the Apostles interpreted it, explained and made coherent. But more than anything the Resurrection, taken in connexion with the actual words and claims of Christ, left no doubt that He was what He claimed to be. The Resurrection, then, was justly used by the Apostles in justification of their faith in Christ. Has it any special evidential significance for us? We think it has. It is the one miraculous event in Christ's life with which we are, historically speaking, directly in contact. True, the

Church has borne continuous witness to the Crucifixion also, but that, apart from the Resurrection and all that it means, has no miraculous import. But through the Resurrection we may approach the other facts in Christ's life, to which there is no such continuous evidence, with an antecedent probability that some of them will be miraculous. That a Person who was to die and rise again should offer no sign during His lifetime of exceptional character would indeed be surprising. The Gospels tell of such *signs*, and their credibility on these points is the more easily established, since their character as witnesses is so fully maintained on the crucial fact of the Resurrection.

We have now considered, at considerable length, the position of the central doctrine of the Christian faith in regard of Natural Religion and historical evidence, and we hope to have made clear that it is coherent with the facts which we know of nature in the ordinary way, and has sufficient historical evidence to support it. It may, perhaps, be felt that all such discussions as these belong rather to a book on Apologetics than to a Manual of Elementary Theology. It is probable that in another age this might have been so—when there was less criticism upon the truths of Christianity, and agreement upon these, at least, might safely have been assumed. This state of things has ceased, and it is not possible any longer to start from the Christian stand-point without making plain at the same time how the faith is situated in regard of the rest of our knowledge. This must be our apology for the argumentative tone adopted hitherto. We disclaim the term Apologetics, because it seems to contain an inherent error. The Christian faith needs no apology and no defence: what it does require from time to time is statement—statement made with an eye to the intellectual conditions of the particular time. This is all that we have attempted to give.

Books on the Authenticity of the Gospels, etc.—

Westcott, Introduction to the Study of the Gospels.

Salmon, Introduction to the New Testament.

Lightfoot, Essays on Supernatural Religion.

Sanday, Authorship and Historical Character of the Fourth Gospel; Gospels in the Second Century; Essays in Expositor, January-May 1891, on the Synoptic Question. *Robinson*, The Study of the Gospels.

Bampton Lectures: Art. Jesus Christ, in *Hasting's* Dict. of the Bible.

Zahn, Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Kanons.

Dale, The Living Christ and the Four Gospels.

Carpenter, The Synoptic Gospels.

Martineau, The Seat of Authority in Religion.

Keim, Life of Jesus of Nazara. *Harnack*, Caronologie.

Miracles and the Order of Nature.—*S. Ath.*, De Incarnatione. (On the general question of the Order of Nature and of Grace.) *S. Aug.*, Epp. cxx., cxxxvii., clxii., chs. 5, 6; c. Faust. Bk. xxi. 5, 6, xxvi. *S. Thom. Aq.* c. Gent. Bk. iii. ch. 100–105. *Spinoza*, Tractatus-Theologico-Politicus, ch. vi. *Hume*, Essay on Miracles. *Butler*, Analogy, Pt. II. *Mozley*, On Miracles. *Holland*, Christ or Ecclesiastes. *Gore*, Bampton Lectures. *Illingworth*, Bampton Lectures: Reason and Revelation.

Historical Evidence.—*Freeman*, Methods of Historical Study, esp. Lect. iii. *Stubbs*, Lectures on Mediæval and Modern History, No. v. *Langlois* and *Seignobos:* Introduction to the Study of History. Translated by G. G. Berry.

CHAPTER III

THE INCARNATION AS INTERPRETED BY THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

At the end of the last chapter we saw that the Apostles had reached a certain conviction as to the nature of their Lord, which they were to proclaim broadly to the world. To them it appeared in the light of a simple fact:[1] they had known Christ, known Him as man first, and come to know Him at last as the Son of God. And as such they proclaimed Him, not with any elaborateness of explanatory statement, but simply as they knew Him. But this simple proclamation of their faith inevitably raised a profound and abstruse problem. It was wholly impossible, in the very nature of things, that men should continue to accept the statement just as it was, without attempting to explain to themselves what it meant. They were called upon to take into their range of ideas what was really a completely new thing; it was not likely or possible that it should remain simply as a bare unexplained fact; it would require to be probed and examined and weighed, that its full importance might appear. There would be no need to point out this fact in any other connexion, because it would be taken for granted on all hands that no body of men would go on maintaining and spreading a belief which they could only assert as an unexplained fact. We should think it inevitable

[1] See note at the end of the chapter.

that they would find questions asked about it, which they would have to try to answer, doubts arising which they must endeavour to solve. Only the most extravagant dogmatism could possibly hope to come before the world, and call upon it to give up the sins which it loved, for the sake of an alleged fact which could not be explained. And we have seen that the Apostles were not dogmatists: they were witnesses. They alleged their fact, and adapted their proclamation of it to the special needs of their various audiences. In most subjects, we say, it would be superfluous to comment on the necessity of this result; it is necessary in theology because the process of interpretation, initiated in S. Peter's speeches in the Acts, carried on by S. Paul, and completed by the Catholic Church, ended in the formulation of definite dogmatic articles; and it has been customary of late to deny the necessity of such definitions of belief. The practical effects of Christianity have come to occupy the whole horizon, and it is contended that, provided these are retained, the whole dogmatic system may be safely dispensed with. Possibly this might be true, if the Christian scheme of morals did not rest upon the Person of Christ, if He were only a human prophet and reformer, aiming at the establishment of a better way of life. And of course there are many who would accept this account of Him. But for those who do not, for those who believe that He was really the Incarnate Son of God, it is imperative to say, as nearly as may be, what this precisely means.

For the thought of the Divine Son Incarnate, as it spreads through the testimony of the Church, meets with minds of very various types, with minds furnished with very various prepossessions, and all these will interpret it in various ways. To some it will seem easy enough to believe that God should come upon the earth and reveal Himself to man, but impossible that He should robe Himself in real human flesh, seeing that

the flesh is corruptible and impure, and responsible for evil. To others it will seem incredible that God should suffer such a change as is apparently involved in an Incarnation. Hence the former class of thinkers will so interpret the witness of the Apostles as to deny virtually the Humanity of Jesus Christ, the others will interpret it so as to deny His Divinity. These will be, of course, private speculations. They are neither affirmed in the earliest form of apostolic preaching nor explicitly denied. But it cannot be maintained that they are unimportant, that one is as true as the other. For they are in flat contradiction as to a matter of fact. Each interprets the testimony of the Apostles to the dual nature of Christ, so as to destroy the duality. The one favours one factor in it, the other exclusively supports the opposite. And it simply is not reasonable that two contradictory propositions should be equally true in relation to one matter of fact. It may be granted that there are certain regions of theology in which our best hope of arriving at a sound position is to state both sides of a contradiction and leave it unsolved; but this can never be the case with matters of fact. It has been maintained, for instance, by theologians of a certain school,[1] that if we say that God exists, and then endeavour to ascertain precisely what we mean, we find that God does not exist under any known form or mode of being, and therefore that the affirmation of the existence of God requires to be completed by its exact contradictory. It may be questioned, perhaps, whether there is not here an ambiguity in the word existence—whether it does not refer to the matter of fact in the proposition God exists on the one side, and to our interpretation of the fact on the other. But however this may be, the cases are not parallel. In the one, we are dealing with a wholly transcendent subject-matter, in which our senses and intellect by themselves are

[1] Cf. Dionys. Areop. *De Div. Nom.* ch. v. § 8.

quite at a loss, and incapable of definite assertion, in the other we are dealing with a fact which has its material as well as its transcendent side. But those who deny the Humanity of our Lord deny the material side of the fact altogether, and those who deny the Divinity deny that the Manhood is in any fundamental sense out of the common.

But granted the necessity of interpreting, who is to decide when interpreters differ? Differ they almost certainly will, as they will approach the matter from various points of view. Whose is the decisive interpretation? The Apostles while they live will, at least, know which interpretation, if any, expresses their meaning, and will be able also to explain what their meaning is, with reference to the particular problems raised. S. Paul, for instance, when he finds that the Colossian Christians are by way of adopting an elaborate system of angel-worship, writes to them, and stoutly denies that this is even compatible with his view of Christ. And he gives his reasons: it is practically to deny our Lord's unique prerogative as Mediator, both in nature and in grace. The Son, he insists, was the sole instrument of creation; in Him all things were created and had their system; no created being can share the solitary dignity of the Son. And then in the Incarnate Christ, the fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily; into unity with Him Christians were baptized, and in that unity, by Christ's power alone, they were saved. Further, this, he maintains, was the faith he had always preached and taught, the other was the tradition of men. Now here we have an example of the way an Apostle went to work. S. Paul refers to the tradition of the faith as he had delivered it; but that is not all, he also enters upon the subject apart from Church authority, and shows that the consequences of the theory, with which they are showing sympathy, are subversive of all that the preaching of Christianity was meant to do. To hold such a position would bring

men back under the minute and elaborate rules from which they had escaped, and would infringe the rights of Christ, by whom alone the handwriting which was against us had been removed. This line of argument reveals, when analyzed, the nature of authority as conceived by S. Paul. He appeals to two considerations: harmony with Church tradition and the inherent force of the truths: and an important element on the intellectual side of the question is the practical effect of a given doctrine. S. Paul thus excludes the possibility of a rigid separation between the intellectual and practical sides of Christianity. He assumes that it matters how the Colossians express their faith to themselves, for there are ways of doing it which cut at the root of the practical and moral significance of Christianity: so that Christian practice and the precise formulation of the faith must go together.

By means of this instance we have obtained considerable light on our problem. We see that the dogmatic statements of the facts in question are necessary not only to secure accuracy of thought, but also to assure the practical effect of them. The two things are not separate, nor are they separable. Christ saves because He is the Son of God, and though it is conceivable that men might be saved, as it were, against their will by the mere external operations of a Person whom they neither knew or understood, yet that is not the regular Divine method. Men are brought into a state of salvation when they are united with the Son of God, and to deny that Christ is the Son of God is to deny the possibility of salvation. The doctrines are not merely interesting intellectual speculations, they are intellectual exhibitions of practical truth. This, we think, is the result of a consideration of S. Paul's method in the particular case quoted. The force of Church tradition had better be left aside, perhaps, till we come definitely to discuss the Church.

The content of the Apostolic witness which they put

forward to the world, was that the Man Jesus of Nazareth, whom they knew and accompanied in His ministry throughout Judæa, was none other than the Son of God. The nature of the problem thus offered to the intellect of the Church was as follows: to explain so far as might be how these two natures were united in the one Person. Neither was to be infringed, neither to be robbed of its just rights, the characteristics of both were to be preserved. To describe accurately the way in which the Church approached and dealt with this problem, would be to write the history of the first five centuries. Nothing so elaborate as this can be attempted here. We shall endeavour to indicate generally the outlines of the discussions and point out their practical importance.

It is not without significance that the Incarnation occurred, and was first preached in Judæa. The Jewish mind, as we have already seen, felt no attraction towards the elaborate metaphysical discussions which exercised the Greeks. Their notion of God was simple and direct; it contained no elements which made it difficult to imagine the activity of God coming into very close connexion with the material world. The chief interest of their theology was, as we have said, a moral interest. At the same time they clearly recognized that in the material world, the world of nature, the hand of God was to be traced. His power was revealed in the complex order; He was concealed 'in a pavilion of dark waters, with thick clouds to cover Him;' 'He came flying upon the wings of the wind,' but the whole was ordered and directed by Him. 'Wind and storm fulfilled His word.' He makes 'darkness that it may be night, wherein all the beasts of the forest do move: the sun ariseth, and they get them away together and lay them down in their dens, so that man may go forth to his work and to his labour until the evening.' When 'God taketh away their breath they die and turn again to their dust; when He sends forth His breath they are made, and

the face of the earth is renewed.' The Lord rejoices in His works, and throughout them blesses the righteous, and roots out the sinner. And nature sympathizes with His holy will; the strife and war in it are dependent upon the evil which has entered upon the world which was created good; but in the new heaven and earth in which the Messiah's kingdom shall be reared, these wars shall cease; 'they shall not hurt or destroy in all my holy mountain, saith the Lord.'[1] The same point may be illustrated by reference to the ease with which the Jews used strongly anthropomorphic expressions in regard of God, without feeling their difficulty (if the recent theories as to the date of the Pentateuch are true) till a very late period of their history.

In all this their position forms a strong contrast with the feeling prevalent both in Greece and in the further East. To the Greek mind, determined in this direction by Plato, matter was the cause of the confusion in the world, and the soul's one chance of obtaining true knowledge and true good was to free itself from the trammels of the body. This point of view had already been brought to bear upon the Jewish Scriptures at Alexandria, and the contact of the two strains of thought had resulted in a sort of compromise. The Jewish Scriptures were still regarded as the pre-eminent source of truth, but side by side with them Greek philosophy was raised almost to a position of equality. For the Scriptures, though still authoritative, were explained in a Hellenistic sense by the method of allegory, their anthropomorphisms were toned down, and the freedom with which the Hebrew writers had spoken of God was balanced by a theory of an absolutely transcendent God, revealed through grades of intermediary beings, of whom one was the Logos.[2]

[1] Ps. xviii. 10, 11, cxlviii. 8, civ. 20-23, 29, 30, 35; Is. xi. 9.

[2] It is a keenly disputed question, into which we cannot fully enter, whether the Logos-doctrine which we find in S. John's Prologue is or is not a

From the countries east of Palestine, especially Persia, there came a strongly dualistic influence—a tendency to regard the world as the scene of a conflict between two forces of evil and good, matter being in later days regarded as the seat of the former. It is probable that this theory is directly assailed in the later Isaiah in the passage containing the words, 'I form the light and I create darkness' (Isa. xlv. 7), where God is represented as vindicating to Himself the unrivalled supremacy over the universe.

Thus it is clear that when the doctrine of the Son of God become flesh reached such convictions as these, a struggle must necessarily take place; it could not be rationally accepted without. It is not conceivable that a person who held that matter was the cause of moral evil or intellectual error, could allow that a Divine Person should take upon Him the robe of our humanity. The appearances, therefore, to which the Apostles witnessed—especially the Crucifixion—had to be explained. This could be done in one of two ways. It could be maintained that the flesh of Christ was not real, that it was a mere show. This was the view of those who are called Docetists, against whom S. Ignatius

development of this Alexandrine idea. There are reasons apart from the identity of the name for supposing that the Apostle had met with the Alexandrine doctrine, and had been influenced by it. And there is a great difficulty about the opposite view, viz., that the Logos-doctrine in S. John belongs to an independent development in the Palestinian Schools, and not at all to Alexandrine Judaism. It is difficult to prove positively the existence of such a doctrine in Palestine, as the evidence for the history of Jewish thought between the Captivity and the coming of Christ is extremely fragmentary; and the Targums, in which such a use is found, are of uncertain date. That the Jewish notion of God tended to become transcendent during this period is certain, both from the fact that they gave up using the great name Jehovah, and from the evidence of the Sapiential Books, especially Proverbs and the Book of Wisdom. In whatever way this question may be decided, it is certain that the Logos-doctrine in S. John must have belonged to a theology in which the Incarnation of the Word would not have seemed incredible; and it is equally clear that the Alexandrine doctrine as stated by Philo would not have admitted the possibility of such an event. (See *Hastings'* Dict. of the Bible, art. Logos.)

writes[1] so passionately. Or it could be argued, that an ordinary human person, born in the ordinary way, was made the home for a time of a special indwelling of Deity. Thus it was maintained by Cerinthus[2] that the Christ descended upon Jesus at His Baptism, and left Him before the Crucifixion, so that the works of power were done by this Divine Force or Person, temporarily resident in the man Jesus, whereas the humiliation of the Passion was suffered by the man alone. This position was held in slightly different forms by various heretics, *e.g.* the Ebionites, and was obviously put forward as a way of solving the difficulty arising in connexion with matter. It results, as may be seen at once, in a purely humanitarian conception of Christ. Roughly speaking, the former view is prominently characteristic of heretics who are influenced by pagan modes of thought, the latter falls in more naturally with Judaizing speculations. For it would be comparatively easy to the Jewish mind to conceive Christ on the analogy of a prophet, distinguished by a specially full inspiration. But if it be true that the followers of Basilides held this view, it shows that it solved the pagan difficulty as well. Closely allied with these are the more elaborate systems of Gnosticism, which extend a chain of æons or intermediary beings between the incomprehensible God and the world. It would be beyond our purpose to describe these more fully.

We have already indicated by anticipation the practical failure of such theories as these. They utterly destroy the whole meaning of the Incarnation. The idea of redemption from sin, as apart from the emancipation of the soul from matter, is left out completely, and what is more, the whole theory of the nature of God has to be changed. The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation rests upon the assumption

[1] S. Ign., *ad Trall.* 9–11 ; *Smyrn.* 1–6.
[2] *Hipp. adv. Hær.* vii. 33.

that God made the world out of His love and continually manifests Himself in it, and that men's actions here are, therefore, important far beyond their external appearance or effect. By means of them he moves nearer towards, or further from the purpose of his being, that is, Communion with God. With this theology, as we hope to show fully later on, the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation is entirely consistent. The act of the Son of God in His coming to earth fixes this spiritual value upon human life and human action as such. But the other theories ignore all this. Creation is practically a mistake, and always must be, so long as its permanent condition, viz. the presence of matter, is regarded as directly causing moral evil or intellectual error. Plato, it is true, and Philo after him, apparently avoid this gloomy inference by saying that God having no envy in His nature, and finding matter floating in a formless condition, did not grudge it existence, but of His goodness gave it form. But the escape is only apparent: the real result of the doctrine of matter which these words contain is seen when it turns out that, after all, the best thing for the soul is to be freed from its trammels. Then it becomes clear, too, that God, for all His kindly lack of jealousy, has achieved absolutely nothing. Unless matter can retain hold of the form He has given it, its position is not improved: it must go back to its formless condition. And since the prevention of this would involve the continued imprisonment of souls in the material world, it would be bad even on Gnostic showing. Thus the Gnostic conceptions of Redemption are really only an endeavour to remedy rather a bad mistake, which, according to some systems, arose by accident, according to others was involved in the act of creation: and in either case the endeavour is futile.

It is noticeable that these theories, for the most part, prevailed in the first three centuries of the Church's history;

and that, though they were never formally condemned by any general council, there can be no question as to the judgment of the Church upon them. The circumstances of the Church at the time were not such as to admit of a general council. Individual churches were somewhat isolated, and it would have been a difficult matter to collect a sufficient body of theologians to form anything like a representative council, even if that had been the only method of reaching a decision. The Apostles, as we saw in the case of S. Paul, had appealed to tradition, and to the consequences, intellectual and moral, of the two rival theories. The Church in its earlier centuries does precisely the same.

Tradition, after the Apostles' death, has, of course, to be preserved in some accessible form. This is achieved in two ways: by the formation of the Canon of Holy Scripture and the Episcopal succession. It is hardly necessary to point out that in the early days of the history of the Church there was no New Testament, in our sense of the word. By the end of the first century we believe that all the books now standing in the New Testament Canon were in existence and in use—in some churches, at any rate. But at the same time, there came into existence a large number of other books which did not embody the traditional teaching of the Church, but were written in many cases to recommend such doctrines as those just now mentioned. Neither these nor the canonical books were published under any external *imprimatur* (except, of course, that the fact of apostolic authorship would carry its own weight), for the simple reason that the Church was not constituted in such a way as to admit of its giving such formal sanction. There was no central unity about it, no such œcumenical organization that a definite opinion could be formulated in a clear and decisive way. But the growth of the Canon, which means the separation of the books which embody the Church tradition from those which do not, implies

the presence of a consensus of Christian opinion. The Canon, as we have received it, is the standing embodiment of this consensus.

But it was not enough to stereotype the doctrine of the Church in the written books; this written book required to be supplemented and interpreted by the living voice of the Church, as displayed in the succession of the Bishops. It may be true that in some churches, *e.g.* at Alexandria, a collegiate and not a monarchical episcopate survived till a comparatively late date; but be this as it may, there is no question that the rulers of the Church, whether one, as in most places, or many, were responsible for preserving intact the apostolic tradition. It is to the consentient testimony of the Scriptures and of the due successors of the Apostles that Irenæus appeals against the Gnostic heresies.[1] The advantage of this twofold evidence is easy to be seen. A book never explains itself. It is written under certain given conditions, which pass away while it remains. Plato's complaint about books is absolutely true.[2] You can never stop and cross-question them as to what they mean. This difficulty is, in a great measure, obviated when a living tradition accompanies the written word. The living voice is able to apply the written words to new cases and in new circumstances—to distinguish between true and false interpretations, and to preserve the meaning of the book permanent through change. There is, therefore, a natural fitness and completeness about the method in which the doctrine of the Church was preserved through the stormy days of the first three centuries. And be it noticed that the adoption of the plan of general councils involves no real change whatever in the ultimate seat of authority in doctrine. The difference lies in the method by which the testimony of the successors of the Apostles was obtained. Before, the writings of an

[1] S. Iren., *Adv. Hær.* iii. 2, 3.

[2] Plat., *Phædrus*, p. 275 D.E.

Ignatius, a Melito, an Irenæus had explained the bearing of Scripture and tradition upon current controversy; Tertullian, not himself a Bishop, had won the approval of Cyprian and others by his assaults upon Gnostic teachers. In the conciliar period questions were discussed and decrees passed by assemblies of Bishops, not as containing new doctrines, but as bulwarks against innovation; and even so the process is not complete. There were many Councils, of which many were definitely heretical. As in the pre-conciliar period, therefore, the general voice of the Church had still to ratify or reject the conciliar decrees.

The representation of this process, not uncommon nowadays, as a purely accidental one, does too great honour to ecclesiastical history. It implies that the majorities in the Church councils—and therefore the decisions of churches, the prevalence of particular opinions—were due mainly to external accidents. If this were so, Church history would indeed stand alone amidst the history of all other human institutions. We have already shown that chance is impossible as an explanation of the course of nature.[1] The course of history is no less certainly governed by fixed laws. Although, therefore, we believe the Church to be a Divine institution specially under Divine guidance, we do not wish to isolate it so completely as this theory would require from the general laws of human things; and it would be completely isolated from all other parts of our experience, if we allowed that it was governed by chance. It has happened in many matters of human controversy that the ultimately prevailing view has turned out to be the right one; we believe this to have been the case in the history of the Church.[2]

[1] See p. 24.

[2] Cf. a remarkable passage in Martineau's *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 375, on Unitarians.

We must now return from this long digression to consider further problems arising around the Incarnation. Sabellianism, which in historical order would follow next, may be postponed till the chapter in which we shall speak of the Holy Trinity. It is an attempt to express the result of a belief in the Incarnation upon the notion of God, and its effect upon the Incarnation strongly resembles one or other of those theories of which we have already spoken. The Person Jesus Christ would under its influence appear either as a mere man temporarily illuminated in an exceptional manner by a Divine Presence, who might be called indifferently Father or Son, or as a temporary manifestation of the one essence of God, succeeded by another called the Holy Spirit. The arguments against this doctrine from the practical and traditional point of view would be the same as those indicated above. And so we come without further delay to the great period of controversy as to our Lord's twofold nature, which extends over the fourth and fifth centuries of our era.

The controversy with Gnosticism had led to a comparison between the Church doctrine of the Son of God and the Gnostic systems of emanations, or æons—intermediary beings which these thinkers regarded as necessary, in order to bridge over the gap between the incomprehensible God and the material world. It was necessary that this should happen, as most of the Gnostic systems admitted the Word or the Son of God, and sometimes also Jesus Christ, to a place in their scheme. There was also this amount of resemblance between the Christian doctrine and Gnosticism, that the Son of God, upon the Christian premisses, owned a *derived* existence. 'As the Father hath life in Himself, so *He hath given* the Son to have life in Himself.'[1] But there were two great differences: (1) that the Son, according to Church

[1] S. John v. 26.

doctrine, was of the same Divine nature as the Father, no less Divine than He; and (2) that His existence was eternal. Gnosticism, on the other hand, required that the intermediary beings should *not* be of the same character as the First Principle from which they emerged; they were there on purpose to conceal by a number of successive steps the difference of nature between God and the world. As to the other point there was less agreement, and though some would seem to have admitted the idea of time into their account of the emanations, others would regard the process as eternal. Of course, when men began to think about the nature of the Son of God, a term would be wanted to express His derivation from the Father. Tertullian deliberately adopts from the Gnostic vocabulary the word προβολή or *prolatio*,[1] and maintains the possibility of using it without heretical associations. But the title—the Son of God—naturally suggested the use of the word *generation* (γέννησις), and this brought the language of the Church in close contact with Platonism. These terms, then, and especially the last, become part of the regular language of the Church, and as the fact they have to describe is new in the annals of thought, they require to be cleared from associations—heretical, philosophical, popular. It is true that Origen had expressly used the expression 'The Son is eternally generated,'[2] and had thus marked the fact that the Son is co-eternal with the Father, but the point had been but slightly discussed until the rise of Arianism. In the beginning of the fourth century the question was seriously brought up. Arius, a parish priest in Alexandria, was strongly moved to reaction against Sabellianism: and was anxious at all costs to maintain the separate personality of the Son of God. Having been trained in the dialectic which was characteristic of the school of Antioch, he formed his theory of the nature of Christ by a logical analysis of the

[1] Tert., *Adv. Prax.* c. viii.

[2] Orig., *Hom. in Jerem.* ix. 4 ad fin.

word Son. A son, he argued, comes into existence after his father; there must have been a time when the father existed, and the son did not; that is part of the essence of the idea of sonship. If this, then, be applied to the Son of God, it will follow that the Father existed alone, that then He formed the Son by an act of creation; that therefore the Son came into being in time, and in fact is not eternal or Divine in any real sense. He is superior to all other creatures, and was used as God's instrument in their creation; high things may be said of Him, and high prerogatives belong to Him, by the will of God; but He is not God; He is not even free from the possibility of moral fall. This was the context of Arius's first utterance of his views, and this was the starting-point of the whole discussion. Various efforts were made by different parties to modify the extreme Arian position in a direction which might suit the followers of S. Athanasius. We have not space to set them all down here; they can be found in any history covering the period: the point for us is to see why and how the Church found this account of Christ intolerable.

It was very difficult, in the first place, to reconcile it with the language of Scripture taken as a whole. The Arians had certainly a number of proof-texts, which are discussed at length by S. Athanasius in his Orations against the Arians.[1] But the whole tenor of Scripture was in the opposite direction. Secondly, the Arian position was in flat contradiction to the sense of the Church as expressed in the worship of the Son of God. Through the Son of God Incarnate prayers to the Father became possible, as to which there was no fear of error or lack of efficacy. Before Christ's time, men had

[1] Some of them would not strike us, perhaps, as relevant at all. Thus a large portion of the second of the Orations is devoted to the discussion of Prov. viii. 22. 'The Lord possessed me (*i.e.* the Divine Wisdom) in the beginning of His way, before His works of old.' The LXX. read 'created me' instead of 'possessed me.'

prayed rather in hopes of reaching the ears of some power who would listen and help them; but for prayer in Christ's name there was not hope but certainty. And this certainty depended absolutely upon our Lord's unity of nature with the Father. Were He less than the true Son of God, the prayers of men through Him might be as completely misdirected as any others offered up in ignorance. This is the meaning of the accusation which we meet with in S. Athanasius,[1] and in many other writers,[2] that the Arians were idolaters. They placed on a level with God one who was, on their own confession, merely a creature. What could idolatry do more? Thirdly, they applied to God the notions which belong to time. They subjected the generation of the Son by the Father to the laws which are derived from ordinary human experience, and forgot that these are involved in the conditions in which man is placed. Bound up as he is with change and decay, his life begins and ends in time. But to apply this to the nature of God is to say that He begins by being incomplete, and grows by degrees and in time into completion.[3]

These are some of the arguments with which S. Athanasius endeavours to exhibit the fatal errors of the Arian position. He does not deny their logic, he does not deny that the idea of Sonship contains what they find in it; but he deprecates the application of this notion with all the inferences which may be logically drawn from it, in a region where they are so fatally out of place. It is to mark the limitations with which all words expressive of derivation of nature must be used that the expression 'of one substance with the Father' was added to the Creed. And it means that no accounts of the Son which fall short of absolute equality in all points which are involved in the notion of Divinity can be tolerated

[1] *Or. c. Ar.*, I. ch. 8.
[2] Cf. Petav., *De Trin.*, ii. xii.
[3] *Or. c. Ar.*, I. ch. 28.

in the Christian Creed. The Church adopted one side of an exhaustive disjunction—Christ must be either God or not; the whole Christian system and consciousness affirmed that He was God.

Perhaps the most serious of all the Arian inferences from the original premiss was this, that the Son of God was capable of moral fall. It is worth while to deal specially with this point, however briefly, because on rather different grounds it has become a somewhat popular notion in the present day. How, it is asked, can the example of Christ be of any use to us, if He was incapable of sin, when we are not? The value of an example depends on similarity of conditions; such a wide dissimilarity makes all relation impossible between His case and ours. This view, though not always consciously based on an Arian theory of our Lord's nature, is likely to lead to something very like it. It implies that Christ's life and death are really *only* an example—that He is on a par with any one of the heroic souls who have lived in the past, whose principles and practice deserve our imitation. It leaves wholly out of sight the fact that Christ's life and death and resurrection are a permanent source of strength to those who by baptism are made members of Him. The latter aspect of Christ's work (to which we shall return when we come to treat of the Atonement) absolutely demands His impeccability. It can be but a small gain for us to be endowed with the spirit and the power of one no stronger than ourselves; it makes all the difference to be endowed with the invincible Spirit of God, who in the life of Jesus Christ has already overcome human temptations like our own. If it is only an example that is required, the difference between sinfulness and impeccability would go far to make Christ's character useless to us for this purpose. And what is more, such an example would be rendered still more useless by the remoteness of

its date, and the unlikeness to anything modern of the outward circumstances of our Lord's life.[1]

The next difficulty which appeared in this region of doctrine was that associated with the name of Apollinaris. The originator of this theory, who was a man of considerable learning and position, was impelled in the direction of false speculation by his violent aversion to Arianism. So determined was he to insist upon the Divinity of Christ that he allowed it to modify the completeness of the humanity. He maintained that the intellect of man was tainted by the Fall, that consequently Christ could not adopt it, but that He had instead the indwelling of the Divine Logos. Together with this he asserted that our Lord's flesh was not ordinary human flesh, but that the divine substance was in some way converted into flesh, from which the taint of sin was absent.[2] It is not hard to see how fatal this theory of Christ's nature is to the practical aims of the Incarnation, as we understand them. What we have already said about our Lord's impeccability applies with twofold force here. The example and the power of a person who has not even human capacities, who is simply the Divine Son with an appearance of a human body and an incomplete human soul, would indeed be valueless so far as the renewal of life is concerned.[3]

Yet there is a real difficulty raised by Apollinarianism. The Fall certainly affected the whole of man's nature and impaired the effectiveness of all his powers. He is not to be saved by intellectual self-development, as the Greeks were apt to think; for the intellect has its own peculiar wrongness and distortion, for which the hereditary taint in man's nature is responsible. How is Christ, then, to take

[1] Cf. *Church Quarterly Review* for July 1883. Art. "Our Lord's Human Example."

[2] Cf. S. Ath., *c. Apoll.* I. ii.

[3] Cf. S. Ath., *Ep. ad Epict.* ch. vi. and vii.

these powers? How is He to accept conditions in which sin seems ingrained and permanent? It is to be noted, of course, that the mischief is conceived as being a departure from the ideal, not inherent in the nature or the powers of man. The difficulty is that the evil touches all men just as if it were essential, because, in S. Paul's language, all men sinned and are short of the Glory of God. The answer to this difficulty is the Catholic doctrine of our Lord's Immaculate Conception. It is true that there is no possibility of raising ourselves from the state of original sin into the other higher state. 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.' There is no passage between the two realms by way of mere evolution. But Christ cut off the entail of corruption. He was conceived by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary. He introduced a new strain and a new series of possibilities into human life. He was, in S. Paul's phrase, the Last Adam, the originator of a new line of descendants, 'born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.'[1] Hence the humanity which He took was fully and perfectly human, but human without taint or suggestion of sin. In Him it corresponded to the ideal, if we may say so, which God had before Him at the creation; it was not the corrupt and degraded humanity with which sin has made us familiar. But it was a real and complete humanity, not falling short in any particular from that of any other person, save that it was wholly free from sin and from the possibility of sin. And the value of His redemption, in one aspect of it, lay in the fact that He took the whole nature of man, and wore it sinlessly: to except the intellect would be to leave the intellect outside the pale of His redemption.

In this connexion we may perhaps make a few remarks upon a point which frequently causes difficulty—viz. the

[1] S. John i. 13.

liability of our Lord to sickness and pain. Pain and sickness, it is argued, are a part of the distortion and misery which result from the presence of sin, so that if our Lord, in His humanity, were subject to these in any way, it would really imply that His human nature was touched by sin. As regards pain, the argument proceeds upon a confusion between sin and its consequences. That Christ accepted and suffered in His own person some of the consequences of sin is of the very essence of the Atonement, but this does not carry with it any sinful taint. A person who is forgiven, whose sins have been absolved, may still be unable to avoid the physical consequences of the sin he has committed; they do not, therefore, imply that he is in a state of sin. Christ had never been capable of sin, but He came into a world where it and its consequences were in full sway. If, therefore, He was to live *really* amongst men without marked external differences, He could but take upon Him their conditions unchanged, and, though sinless, bear what was in them the consequence of sin.

There is some considerable difference between the case of pain and that of sickness. Sickness always involves derangement of the body in itself, and this may be due to various causes. Frequently these causes arise from within, such as negligence or excess, and the like. These could have no place in our Lord's nature. Further, His desire to pass through the utmost of human pain and sorrow would necessarily be limited by the needs of His ministry. He could not suffer Himself to be disabled. The pains, therefore, which we read of His suffering are such as hunger and weariness, which arise in the body as normally constituted in the existing state of things, or such as were inflicted by external violence.[1] These were simply the result of His entering a world, constituted physically and morally as ours is at the present, and they were involved, and must have been

[1] S. Thom. Aq., *Summa*, Pars 3ª, Quæst. xiv. Art. 4.

foreseen as involved, in the act of His self-emptying. It is not necessary, nor would it have been possible, that our Lord should anticipate the experience of each individual. There is a sense in which the Church carries on His experience, and fills up that which is lacking in His sufferings. And we must always keep in view that He came to present Humanity before God in its ideal form, although the sin of others caused such grievous limitations in this presentation. What is vitally necessary is that His human experience should be real and normal, *i.e.* that it should be the experience of one really living under human conditions, not necessarily bearing our sicknesses in the literal sense of the terms. And this we have seen that it was.

We now come to Nestorianism. The theories we have been discussing have been highly speculative: the one resulting from the application of logic beyond its province, the other from a peculiar theory as to the nature of man. Nestorianism comes from a school characterized by literal interpretation of Scripture. At Alexandria, from time immemorial, interpretation had been governed by the principles of allegory. An author was supposed, as a rule, to have some further meaning, not upon the surface, which insight and allegorizing could extract. This method was applied not only to Holy Scripture, but also (with remarkable results) to the Homeric poems. On the other hand, at Antioch a school of interpreters arose, whose chief aim it was to present the literal interpretation of the passage under discussion. The greatest name in the Alexandrine school is that of Origen, the greatest name in the school of Antioch is that of S. Chrysostom.

The result of the previous controversies has been to maintain the reality of two natures in our Lord's person, but nothing has been said as to the mode of their cohesion. It is this problem which must now occupy our attention.

The first attempt at its solution was made by Nestorius, a Syrian from Antioch, who became Archbishop of Constantinople in the year 428 A.D. A sermon was preached before him by a priest named Anastasius, in which it was asserted that the title Mother of God (Θεότοκος) was not rightly given to the Blessed Virgin, seeing that the Divinity of our Lord was impassible (incapable of suffering) and unchangeable. The truth, he asserted, would be attained by saying that she was the Mother of the Man Jesus. This sermon was attacked as being heretical, but the Archbishop defended it, basing his defence on the practice of Scripture, by which human characteristics are not predicated of our Lord as God. Let us take these utterances, he might have argued, literally and simply as they stand, and refer them without discussion to that nature to which they apparently belong.[1] Under pressure, Nestorius seems to have gone further than this, and to have said that there were two personalities present in the Incarnate One—the personality of the Divine Word, and the human personality of Jesus—and that these two were united by a temporary link. This opinion seems to have been originated by Theodore of Mopsuestia. More even than usual on such occasions, the controversy was embittered by passion, and the overbearing behaviour of S. Cyril of Alexandria resulted in a schism of the Eastern Church, which has lasted on into the present day. There are still Christians called Nestorian in the remoter regions of Syria, though it is said that they have almost entirely forgotten the points of doctrine which separated them from Catholic unity.

Apart from these disastrous consequences, the controversy was a very serious one. It necessitated a review of the method of literal interpretation; it touched nearly the whole question of Redemption. As to the former point, there was

[1] Cf. Baur, *Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, Bd. I. p. 698.

no formal decision, but it is significant that the allegorical method reigned supreme thenceforward throughout the Church till the Reformation, Nicholas de Lyra being almost the only exception. It has become clear, at any rate, that single passages cannot be isolated as if they were alone in the world, and have their meaning decided without reference to other possibly qualifying passages. The Bible must, after all, be interpreted according to the analogy of the faith. A lesson like this we may well learn from the Nestorian controversy and its antecedents. But the great importance of the discussion lies in its bearing on the Redemption. To accept the theory of the Nestorians as to the twofold personality of Christ would be to abolish the whole of the redemptive scheme. For the premisses of Nestorianism involve the conclusion that the experiences of the man Jesus were not necessarily those of the Word of God; that, for instance, the death upon the Cross was not the act of the Word of God, who could not suffer in this way, but simply of the man with whom the Word of God was for the time linked. But the virtue and efficacy of Christ's Cross consist in the fact that the Son of God Himself entered upon human conditions (in a way which must remain finally mysterious to us), and did for us men, and for our salvation, suffer, die, and lie in the grave. The separation of the two natures, still more the suggestion of two personalities, is therefore absolutely destructive of the simplest convictions of Christians. It is in itself, of course, an intellectual speculation, and therefore might be supposed to have no very intimate connexion with the practical questions of life; but if it be accepted as true, it ceases to be possible to hold rationally and consistently a belief in the saving efficacy of Christ's death.

The answer of the Church is to be found in the assertion of what is called technically the *communicatio idiomatum* or

ἀντίδοσις, which we may perhaps translate 'the interchange of properties.' This means that Christians, recognizing the singleness of the personality of Christ, and at the same time the indissoluble union of the Humanity with this one Divine Person, are at liberty to use expressions properly belonging to one nature only, of the Person who as Incarnate possesses both.[1] This does not mean, and must not be understood as implying, any change in the Divine nature, such as would degrade it within the limits of human characteristics; nor does it mean that the humanity was in any way radically altered so as to be virtually something higher than humanity in the ordinary sense. But both natures, present in their fulness of special characteristics, were so united in the One Divine Person, that the life and experience which followed upon their union was one thing—the life and experience of the One Person, to whom both natures belonged—not merely two parallel and virtually independent lines of life and activity.

The questions which flow out from this doctrine are far too numerous and abstruse to be fully discussed here. To some, partial solutions may be found, others are involved in impenetrable mystery. But this, at least, is not so mysterious, that the redemptive efficacy of Christ's death depends on its being, in Hooker's language, the death of the Son of God. We may not fully know why this was necessary, still less how it was possible, but the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* is intended to preserve the fact, and of that there is no doubt whatever.

As in the other controversies of which we have spoken a real issue was raised which has importance still. The Nestorian discussion brings up the question of the Kenôsis,

[1] Whereupon it followeth against Nestorius, that no person was born of the Virgin but the Son of God, no person but the Son of God baptized, the Son of God condemned, the Son of God and no other person crucified.—Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.*, Bk. V. lii. 3.

as it is called, that is, the *self-emptying* of the Son of God, the meaning and extent of His self-humiliation.[1] It is important not to pass it by, for there are methods of dealing with it, which have recently become popular, which practically result in Nestorianism. And this, as may have been seen, is a serious danger.

The difficulty arises in modern times in the following way. Together with much that is negative and anti-Christian in the intellectual developments of our time, there is also a strong desire for reality in religion. This temper of mind finds itself in close affinity with all that is human in our Lord. The idea of a human Friend affords an emotional satisfaction which does not flow from the thought of the majesty of God. Hence a continually increasing emphasis comes to be laid upon the reality of our Lord's human characteristics—His limitations, His sorrows, His weakness during the days of His flesh—until the contrast between these and the Divine power, which is often supposed to be displayed exclusively in the miracles, almost amounts to a distinction of personality between the Son of man and the Son of God. The forms of expression which this point of view receives are, of course, widely different from those of the ancient heresy, but the difficulty is the same, and the danger of it is no less vital.[2] The thought that in and through all these sorrows and limitations the Divine glory is manifested, is no less mysterious than it was, and no easier to keep constantly in view. But it is true, at the same time, that the integrity of the faith demands that the reality and simultaneous presence of both natures in the life of Christ must be held fast.

The point of view we have just mentioned gains countenance from the extreme difficulty of attempting to explain in

[1] Cf. Phil. ii. 7 (R.V.).

[2] Cf. Bright, *Sermon at the Cuddesdon Festival*, 1891, p. 15.

what way the two natures affect one another in combination, yet remain without any essential change. In the fifth century the problem appeared most trying in connexion with the birth and the early years of our Lord. 'The child of two or three months old, I cannot call God,' said Nestorius. The modern discussion has arisen chiefly in connexion with our Lord's human knowledge. That man's knowledge is limited hardly needs saying. It is limited within the narrowest bounds. He has no certain knowledge of the future; his knowledge of the present depends upon the reports of his own senses and those of others; for the past he depends upon his own memory and the stored-up contents of other people's experience. Also the universe is far wider than his knowledge can compass, at its best and with all the aid that centuries of progress have given it. He has to learn by questioning other men, and utilizing the experience of others where his own fails. These facts are true of man's knowledge at its best, as we have said, and certainly mean a great deal. In contrast with this the knowledge of God is conceived as complete. No fact that is in the created universe can possibly escape Him. He is the Cause; the world was set going through His word; the various laws are of His devising, their effect must have been calculated, their result in combination foreseen. Even the human will enters into the complex of physical laws, and its effect must lie, as we shall see, within the range of the foreknowledge of God. To the mind of God, if we may so say, the beginning and the end of the world—of the whole scheme of creation—are simultaneously present. He is omniscient, by virtue of His nature as Creator of all things.

Such knowledge as this, we must believe, belonged to the Word of God from all eternity, and yet, without losing any of the Divine characteristics, the same Word of God entered into the narrow conditions of humanity and became flesh.

What can be the meaning of such a condescension? What its nature? How can such a knowledge be veiled under human conditions?

Various answers have been suggested to these problems. Thus it has been maintained that upon those occasions when our Lord asked questions implying ignorance, or definitely affirmed that He was ignorant of the judgment day, He was feigning a condition which did not actually exist, for the benefit of His Disciples. This view, which is expressed in the least qualified way by Ephraem Syrus, and is to be found not infrequently in many ancient writers, seems to have a Docetic air about it.[1] It is difficult not to feel a certain suspicion that ignorance to these writers was of the nature of sin, and that, therefore, they felt the need of explaining it away at all costs. The Platonist philosophy would offer an analogous case, in which the limitations of knowledge, connected as they were with the existence of the material body, would be closely associated with the notion of evil.

Or again, it has been said that Christ possessed all knowledge as it were in possibility, but that He did not realize it in a discursive form: that is, that He knew absolutely all the principles and laws which keep the universe in existence, but that He did not perpetually carry this knowledge out into all its details. It is difficult to estimate such a theory as this, because, however ingenious it may be, however fully it may seem to satisfy some of the conditions of the problem, it does not make it easier to understand how two kinds of consciousness can have been present at one time in one Person.

But perhaps it will be best for us to turn to the accounts of Christ's life, and ask what intellectual phenomena we find there. In the first place, we have the definite statement

[1] Cf. above, p. 99.

by S. Luke that our Lord grew 'in wisdom as well as in stature,' and in corroboration, as it were, of this, our Lord's own disclaimer as to the date of the day of judgment. 'The day and the hour knoweth no man, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father.' Then, secondly, we find our Lord asking questions as though He were ignorant. Thus He says to those who come to take Him at Gethsemane, 'Whom seek ye?' He asks S. Peter, 'Whom do men say that I, the Son of man, am?' There are other similar cases which we need not quote in full. These were discussed at length by ancient commentators, and it is for this reason that we mention them here, for they do not seem to be of very decisive importance. They may easily be explained out of the circumstances of the case, and are obviously used to excite the attention of those to whom our Lord was speaking.[1] They do not, of necessity, imply ignorance in our Lord, any more than similar questions would amongst ourselves. Thirdly, our Lord uses the language and the circle of ideas of the people among whom He chose to dwell. He speaks of God making His sun to rise upon the just and upon the unjust, and draws from this certain lessons as to forgiveness. He accepts the popular belief that men can be and are possessed by evil spirits; and in one place He seems to adopt the notion that such spirits haunt dry and desert places. 'When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he (*i.e.* the spirit) goeth about in dry places seeking rest, and findeth none.' Again he uses the Old Testament Scriptures in a way which would appeal to those with whom He talked, but which requires a certain amount of effort on our part to understand fully. A case in point is to be found in S. John x. 34, where he uses the phrase

[1] A case in which the question probably implied ignorance of the ordinary human kind, would be that to Martha, 'Where have ye laid him?'—S. John xi. 34.

in the Psalms,[1] 'I said, Ye are gods,' as an argument to show that His own claims to be divine were not blasphemous or contrary to the intention of Scripture. Also, our Lord uses the then current views as to the authorship of the Books of the Old Testament—views, it may be remarked, which have been current ever since, till the rise of the criticism of the last few years. It must not be supposed that all these three things—the constitution of the physical world, possession by evil spirits, and the ancient views as to the Old Testament Scriptures—involve questions which are the same in kind, and stand or fall together. But the three subjects have this in common, that in all of them, if our Lord had attempted to correct the popular view by what many consider a truer one, He would have gratuitously placed a serious additional obstacle in the way of His mission. It seems to be a popular conviction in some circles, that if our Lord had only spent some time in correcting ancient mistakes and settling some of the problems which vex us, our age might have been spared much of its intellectual difficulty. Supposing that this contention be true as regards ourselves, it sadly ignores the intellectual position of those among whom Christ spent His life, to whom, therefore, His first appeal was made. And there is an element of nineteenth-century pride in it, as if our education had made us more worth saving than the Jews. This is indeed the only ground upon which we can allow ourselves even to wish that Christ's plan had been different, and it is a mistaken ground. The object of Christ was a moral revolution, and for this purpose a mere addition to our knowledge, critical or scientific, would be really irrelevant.

[1] Ps. lxxxii. 6.—If the ordinary interpretation of this Psalm be the true one, viz. that it is a denunciation of unrighteous judges, modern critics would not feel justified in basing a direct argument upon the word 'gods.' Although it emphasizes the loftiness of the position of a judge, it *means* directly nothing but 'judges.'

The scheme of salvation appeals to the moral constitution of men, an element of sameness which underlies all differences of intellectual endowment. There was, then, a definite reason, intelligible to us after the event, why Christ should not have attempted, if He had wished it, to alter popular views on these points.

But now let us turn to the opposite side, and inquire what signs He displayed of a knowledge more than human. First, we have the definite assertion that 'He did not trust Himself to men,' and needed no information as to their character, 'for He Himself knew what was in man.' And in confirmation of this statement we have the various cases in which special insight was shown, *e.g.* with S. Peter, the Syrophœnician woman, the rich young man, and so on.[1] Secondly, there was a power of direct prevision, displayed especially in regard of the circumstances of the death which our Lord anticipated. Under this head we may also place the words spoken to Nathanael at his call in S. John i. 47-51. Lastly, there come the eschatological discourses, bearing on the fall of Jerusalem and the end of the world. It is in connexion with the latter that our Lord makes His definite denial as to the day of judgment. The simplest method with all these is to attribute them to the glowing and affectionate historical imagination of the Apostles. The occasions when peculiar insight was displayed can then be explained as unusually striking cases of discernment, and those in which there is an apparent ignorance can be regarded as naturally characteristic of a man. But this is somewhat too simple, if the twofold nature of Christ be held as true. The maintenance of this doctrine makes it necessary to deal more cautiously, and ask whether the

[1] The case of Judas involves further considerations than those of mere knowledge of character, for instance, the determining power of predestination (cf. S. John vi. 70, 71). We cannot enter upon these here.

manifestations described do not naturally fit in, as a whole, with the Catholic theory of our Lord's nature. The acceptance of this theory will be found to involve a *reserve* of power on our Lord's part.

First of all, the Son of God, when He came to the earth, did nothing which could alter His essential nature. Being in the form of God before, He so remained. What He did do, was to lay down for the purposes of the Incarnation those attributes of glory which, as equal to the Father, He had of right. He divested Himself of all external signs (if the expression may be allowed) of Godhead, and was found in fashion as a man. As Word of God we believe that He created and sustains the world: the world was sustained by the Word no less during the days of the humiliation.[1] In some sense, therefore, though fully Incarnate in Judæa at a certain time, the worlds still depended upon His activity, which was there (or they would have ceased to be), but veiled and unadorned. Further, throughout the narrative of the Passion we see that it involved, as it were, a continuous effort of repression. Pilate has no power over his Prisoner that he can call his own, it is given to him from on high. Were it necessary, more than twelve legions of angels would be at His command. These and other similar utterances imply a conscious reserve of power, which is characteristic of the whole history of the Incarnation. Though conscious and voluntary it does not cease to be painful, as is shown by the great agony in the garden, and the passage of violent emotion which follows upon the visit of the Greeks, 'Father, save Me from this hour: but for this cause came I unto this hour.' There is thus a conscious and voluntary reserve passing through the

[1] Cf. S. Ath., *de Inc.*, ch. viii. 1, and the old hymn—

'Verbum supernum prodiens
Nec Patris linquens dexteram.'

whole life of Christ, occasionally relieved, as at the Transfiguration, or in the words to the penitent thief, but constantly and persistently renewed. May we not use the analogy of these cases in connexion with our Lord's knowledge as man? May we not think of a conscious and voluntary reserve here also—of an ignorance as real as the Death upon the Cross was real—as the adoption of humanity was real? Such an ignorance would not touch His Divinity, any more than the pain of the Passion penetrated so as to alter the Divine substance. And it would not be feigned or illusory, any more than the Passion was a mere shadow without reality. The knowledge of all things which belongs to Him as God, would be like the twelve legions of angels, ready at His command, but not summoned before Him.

But there is a question arising here which must be considered. Can this reserve apply to *all* the knowledge of the Son of God? and, if not, to what kind of knowledge must we restrict it? At first sight this seems to be an impossible question, one, perhaps, which ought not to be asked. But some little reflection will show us that there is light enough to ask and to answer it by, sufficiently for our purpose. We have already had occasion to notice that our Lord, even though really tempted, was incapable of sin; to allow that a sinful desire found welcome in His soul would be to deny His Divinity.[1] There can have been no such sympathy with evil in the consciousness of the Son of God. Is there, then, any portion of the Divine knowledge the loss of which from Christ's consciousness would mean an infringement of His Divinity? Certainly there is. That Christ should at any moment of His life have lost the consciousness

[1] The suggestion of evil from without does not necessarily carry with it the sympathy of the soul, and it is only when the soul sympathizes that temptation involves actual sin.

of His unity with the Father would have this result. And we have already pointed out that our Lord alleges this consciousness of unity with the Father as one prominent assurance as to His mission. 'My witness is true, because I know whence I came and whither I go.' 'The Son doeth nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing.' And closely allied to this is the knowledge of good and evil. The constant sense of communion with the Father, which we have seen to be a necessary part of Christ's knowledge, would inevitably carry with it moral insight. That Christ should be mistaken in a moral judgment or in a moral precept is simply a contradiction. This point, which would seem fairly obvious, may help us to mark distinctions in the various objects of man's knowledge, and the probable relation of our Lord to them. In the first place, there is no moral insight involved in such facts as the earth's motion and the like. Such subjects are moral only by accident. A person whose duty it is to investigate them may succeed or fail morally, according as he uses his powers; and then the degree of truth or error in his convictions is an index of the degree in which he has done his duty. If Sir Isaac Newton had gone on contentedly holding the opinions which satisfied his predecessors, it would have meant that his life was a moral failure; his business, his vocation, was to find out such things. But the truths he discovers do not in themselves imply or demand any particular moral state. Over all this region, therefore, we can perfectly understand that Christ might use the reserve which we find Him using in analogous cases. The critical questions of authorship of the Old Testament books, etc., of which we have recently heard so much, do not stand quite on the same footing. It is vehemently contended by some that the only intelligible motive assignable for a false claim to the name of an author is that of deliberate intention to deceive. The book so inscribed is a forgery in precisely the same sense as

the Isidorian Decretals. On the other hand, it is argued that many of the Old Testament books—*e.g.* the Pentateuch and the Psalms—grew into their present shape gradually, bearing the names respectively of the founder of Jewish law and Jewish poetry, just as many later laws in Athens were ascribed to Solon. This process would not imply any bad faith, but would simply be one of the natural acts of a people in that stage of cultivation in which we find the Jews. It would mean that a single commanding figure had absorbed the whole memory of a people: that in the perspective of history the successive members of a series had been merged.[1] Much depends, of course, upon the alternative adopted. If we take the former, and decide that all these false ascriptions can be due only to deliberate forgery, it certainly becomes difficult to understand how our Lord used the customary titles. If, however, we follow the other view, the question of authorship falls at once into the category of scientific facts, which ordinary scientific intelligence must discuss—a category with regard to which Christ might have been expected to exercise His reserve of knowledge. Thirdly, we come to the question of the possession by evil spirits. Here a claim is made on the part of science. It is argued that in this matter also Christ was only using the ordinary phraseology of His time; that diseases which we now place under the head of hysteria, hypochondria, lunacy, etc., were then ascribed to the direct agency of evil spirits; and that, according to His usual plan, Christ made no attempt to change the popular conviction.

[1] It would still, we think, be necessary to believe that Moses existed, and was inspired to be the founder of Jewish law; and that David existed, and was inspired to be the founder of Jewish poetry. For this is not merely a literary question. Unless we take leave of the Gospel narrative altogether, we cannot deny that Christ represented Judaism as a special preparation upon the field of history, for Himself. A series of unembodied literary ideals is not a historical preparation. In any cases, therefore, where questions of authorship can be shown to involve the whole character of Judaism and its relation to Christ, we cannot be satisfied with a merely literary discussion of them.

Of course, there is no theoretical objection to applying this principle in this case, provided it be certain that there is no such difference in it compared with the others as will render the application of the rule misleading. But it is by no means clear that this is so. The existence of the Evil One and of spirits of evil is not altogether a matter for the scientific understanding to verify. It is in large measure a moral question.

I. Every man is conscious in a more or less degree of temptations—that is, of positive incitements to evil. These may be explained in two ways—either as the suggestions of our own lower nature, or as provocations from without. In the first case, we ourselves are the whole and sole cause of the suggestion; for the motions of the lower nature are just as much ours as those of the higher. We cannot, as Aristotle observed, make ourselves responsible for our good actions only. It is plain that if this be so, temptation cannot occur to us without a certain degree of sinful acquiescence; we are tempted when we give ear to the suggestions of the lower part of ourselves. On the other hand, there is in moral natures of a powerful kind a firm conviction of violent struggle, not only with the lower part of self, but with a mighty and masterful will. It is doubtless true that a consciousness akin to this occurs in persons of a nervous and hysterical temperament; but it stands in their case to the conviction of a saint, as sentimentality stands to constant love. And we believe that the conviction of a struggle with a masterful will increases rather than diminishes in proportion to the strength and acuteness of the character, so that in a mind enlightened by perpetual communion with the Father, and incapable of producing suggestions of evil from within, it reaches a point at which no doubt could be possible.

II. In nature also, there are certainly signs of a wrong influence at work; not merely of a feeble realization of the

laws of being, but of positive ruin and evil. To attribute all this to the action of God would be profane, to the action of man would be impossible. A third possibility remains, therefore, one which has the authority of Scripture upon its side, as well as a large body of human belief, that an evil spirit is at work in the world as well as in the secret chambers of the heart, to whom some at any rate of the evil in nature is due. The whole subject is profoundly mysterious and obscure, the one thing which is clear about it being this, that the existence of the Evil One, and of those spirits who follow his lead, is a question which none of our senses can settle; it must depend upon the exercise of those powers in us which enable us to distinguish physical and moral evil.

If these contentions be held valid, it would follow that our Lord in ascribing certain physical ailments to the direct agency of evil spirits, and not others, and in revealing the history of His own Temptation, must not be regarded merely as adopting current phraseology, but as really exercising His own moral insight. The difference between this point of view and that of science might possibly be settled by an extension of our scientific knowledge; some of the cases now assigned to merely physical causes may, hereafter, be allowed to be manifestations of the powers of darkness.[1]

This digression has been rendered necessary by the prevalence of the peculiar form of Nestorianism of which we spoke above. The result of it may be expressed shortly as follows: The necessity of insisting upon the twofold nature of our Lord becomes plainer on reflection, even if the mode of it remains obscure. Certain points of departure are given us by the Gospel records, which develope into something like

[1] There is a certain risk in resting with any confidence on the evidence of Spiritualists. But it may be fairly said that the investigations of recent years have made the doctrine in the text more, rather than less probable.

principles when expressed in full. We learn at any rate to restrict the freedom with which we ascribe merely human characteristics to our Lord, to restrict it according to the standard of the powers and attributes which belong necessarily to One who is in the form of God.

There remain two phases of the discussion upon our Lord's person and nature which we must deal with, though they have less direct interest for the present day. The first is Eutychianism. This was a heresy into which a monk called Eutyches fell in consequence of the violence of his reaction from Nestorianism. So convinced was he that our Lord was essentially one person, that he felt driven to deny the duality of the natures, and to assert that there was no real humanity. It was no doubt a difficult position which the Church had to maintain, and is said to have been complicated by the poverty of the Syriac tongue, which did not distinguish accurately between nature and person; but there is no doubt that Eutychianism meant virtually a return to Docetic ways of thought. It brought with it all the evil consequences which we have already described: it destroyed the whole significance of the Incarnation.

The last controversy with which we need concern ourselves here is that concerning the presence in Christ of two wills, a Divine and human will. Of all the discussions which have arisen in the field of Theology, this has more than any the air of being merely a matter of quibbling distinctions. It seems so impossible and presumptuous to attempt to decide upon a question reaching so far back into the consciousness of One whose mode of being no human mind can fully fathom. But in spite of this appearance of arbitrariness and presumption it will be found to involve a real issue. The question turns on the constitution of the human nature, and this, it will be remembered, was to be redeemed by regeneration. Does the completeness of human nature involve the possession of a

human will, or may the will be regarded as an essential part of the personality, which (in the case of Christ) we know to have been Divine? Put in this way there can be but one answer. Human nature in its completeness carries with it the possession of a human will. If a Divine person adopts human nature in its completeness it is, to use the technical phrase, an impersonal humanity which He adopts, but not a humanity without a will. Moreover, the will is the seat of all the decisive movements which conversion and regeneration involve; and if Christ had not a human will, the human will as a whole would fall outside His redemptive activity. He redeems by assuming the human nature, and He redeems the humanity which He assumes. If, therefore, it is but a maimed and partial humanity which He takes, His redemptive effect will be maimed and partial. If it be asked why will and not personality is to be regarded as essential to human nature, the answer is that directly personality appears the human nature becomes individual—it is the humanity of A or B; but will is one of the powers which belong to all men indifferently—it is part of the general character of a human being.[1]

We have passed through very shortly some of the points of controversy which exercised the minds of Churchmen during the first five centuries of the history of the Church.

[1] There are many objections to the phrase 'an impersonal humanity.' It suggests a kind of abstract idea of man lying untenanted, and adopted by a Divine Person, and it is obvious that it opens the door to scholasticism of an unduly technical sort. But the phrase is convenient, and with explanations may well be retained. It marks the distinction—which is certainly real—between the individual and the common or universal elements in a given man. The Ego of each individual is in some sense separate and peculiar: the powers which the Ego uses in life are similar in each, and gain individuality by the various uses made of them in different cases. The doctrine we have to preserve is that the Word of God entered into possession of all the human powers which any man can have, and that, in spite of all the avenues for temptation which these supply, He lived without fall. How this happened no man can tell: but it is possible to preserve the truth required (without any implication of a dogmatic theory of personality) by the use of this phrase.

We have seen by this means how the facts stated simply and without explanation by the Apostles were gradually explained and defined. The dogmas thus formulated were necessary not in themselves, but by relation to the facts which they described. They tended to preserve intact the reality of those facts and the tremendous consequences of them in the moral and spiritual world. Each heresy arose by exaggeration of a truth, rather than by arbitrary and unhallowed speculation; and the act of the Church in condemning it recalled men to Scripture and Apostolic tradition and the rational harmony of the faith.

We will set down the result so far as attained, and then proceed to point out some of the consequences of the Catholic position. Our result is this. The Word of God, eternally generated, and of one substance with the Father, for us men and for our salvation, came down from heaven and was made man; He accepted humanity into indissoluble union with His Person in all its fulness and with its limitations, so far as these involved no essential change in the form of Godhead, which was His by nature. By His triumph over sin in our flesh we triumph too, by His ascension in His glorified humanity to the throne of the Father manhood returns into its right relation with God.

It remains to point out certain results which follow from all this discussion. In treating of anthropomorphism in Chap. I. we were forced to admit that the human mind acting alone offers no criterion between true and false anthropomorphism. We cannot, for lack of certain knowledge, say in what attributes man be regarded as resembling God, what attributes are merely human and must not be ascribed to Him. The Arian controversy has brought out one point clearly, that whenever human phrases are used to express to human minds facts about the Divine nature, they must be used apart from the form of time. Even such a fact as the

generation of the Son must not be allowed the associations of time; true though it be as a fact, the inferences which man would draw from it on his own level must be distinctly set aside.

Secondly, the monophysite discussion, and those which led to it, brought before the world an idea which Greek philosophy had strangely neglected—personality. The wholly new importance of each single human soul brought it to men's minds practically; the determinations of the Church upon the subject of our Lord's nature made men distinguish it intellectually from all the powers and activities of which it is the unity.[1]

It is important to consider personality in two connexions —the meaning of personality in God and in man. The former of these subjects will occupy our attention immediately, as we consider the effect of the Incarnation upon the doctrine of God: the latter must be postponed till Chap V.

The growth of doctrine, etc., and the consentient witness of Churches:—

S. Ign., as cited above, p. 102.

S. Iren., adv. Hæreses, esp. Bk. iii. *Vincentius Lerinensis*, Commonitorium adv. Hæreses. *Gore*, Roman Catholic Claims.

The Logos-doctrine.—Siegfried, Philo, pp. 317, 318. *Harnack*, Dogmengeschichte, Bd. i. p. 66 (ed. i.) *Westcott*, Commentary on S. John's Gospel, Introd. p. xvi.; Introduction to the Study of the Gospels, ch. ii. pp. 151–156. Cf. *Cheyne*, Bampton Lectures, p. 332. *Sanday*, Cont. Review, Oct. 1891. *Bigg*, Bampton Lectures, 1886. *Hastings*, Dict. of the Bible, art. Logos.

The Discussion as to our Lord's twofold nature.—Robertson's Church History, vols. i. ii. (ed. 1875). *Bright*, History of the Church, A.D. 313–451. *Hooker*, Eccl. Pol., Bk. v. §§ l.-lvii. *S. Athanasius*, Orationes adv. Arianos, I.-III.; *Id.*, c. Apollinarium; *Id.*, ad Epictetum. *S. Cyril Alex.*, Ep. ii. ad Nest.; c. Nest. libr. v. *S. Leo*, Tome to Flavian, Epp. lix. cxxiv. cxxxix. clxv.; Canons of the Four Councils. *S. John Damascene*, De Duabus Voluntatibus.

The Kenôsis.—S. Iren., iii. 22, 2. *S. Clem. Alex.*, Strom. vi. 9. *Orig.* in Matt. Comm., Tom. x. 14; De Princ., ii. 6, 2; Hom. in Jerem., i. 7

[1] Cf. S. John Dam., *De Duabus Voluntatibus*, chaps. iii. iv. xx.

8. *S. Ath.*, Or. c. Ar. iii., chaps. xlii.-lvii. *Ephraem Syrus*, 4. Comm. in Harm. Ev. ad Matt. xxiv. 36. *S. Cyril Alex.*, Apol. adv. Theod. iv. p. 217 ; De Recta Fide, x. xi. *S. Ambr.*, De Inc. vii. 71, 72. *Fulgentius* ad Trasim. i. 8. *S. Jerome* in Matt. xxiv. 36. *S. John Dam.*, De Duab. Vol. §§ 35–38. *Leont. Byz.*, Adv. Incorr. (Mai, Spicil. x. p. 79). This passage connects ignorance with sin. *S. Thom. Aq.*, Summa, Pars 3ª, Quæst. ix.-xii. *Petav.*, De Inc. xi. 1, 2. *Liddon*, Bampton Lectures, pp. 460–480 (ed. 1890). *Gore*, Bampton Lectures, Nos. vi. and vii. *Swayne*, Enquiry into the Nature of our Lord's Knowledge as Man. *A. B. Bruce*, The Humiliation of Christ.

NOTE TO CHAPTER III.

In the foregoing chapter the phrases 'fact' and 'matter of fact' have been continually used of the Incarnation, and it seems desirable to offer some explanation of this usage. It is not intended to deny that, in strictness, the assertion that 'the Son of God was Incarnate' conveys rather a theological explanation of facts than the facts themselves on which the explanation is based. The phraseology is intended to call attention to the Apostolic habit of regarding their teaching about the Lord as a matter of testimony (μαρτυρία). In ordinary language facts are said to rest on testimony, while explanations or theories of facts depend on speculation and reasoning. It is a different question whether the Apostles were justified in their practice, viz. the question of the historicity of the Incarnation.

CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE INCARNATION UPON THE CONCEPTION OF GOD

The Christian doctrine of God is a form of Monotheism. Although Christians profess to believe in a Triune God—a God who, though one, is yet three—this view of the Divine nature stands in no relation whatever with Polytheism. Christianity, though it asserted the Divinity of our Lord quite early in its history, did not then incur the charge of Polytheism. The accusations with which the Acts have made us familiar turned upon the changes produced by Christianity in the customs which Moses delivered, in the Temple worship and the ceremonial law, and not at all upon Theology strictly so called. Again, S. Paul in his Epistles to the Galatians, Ephesians, and Colossians, contrasts the faith which his converts have accepted with the following of idol-worship, as they had done in the past. His language implies that Christ is Divine, but he has no idea that this will in any way involve him in comparison with polytheistic worships. The Trinitarian idea then, however formulated, arose in immediate connexion with the Monotheism of Judæa,—as stern and unmodified a system as has ever prevailed in any place or time. The whole tendency to Polytheism, which had been strong among the Jews at an earlier day, had been eradicated from their consciousness since the Captivity, and

their mind was full of contempt and hatred of the unenlightened Gentiles who worshipped stocks and stones, among whom Polytheism flourished.

The Trinitarian idea must be discussed, therefore, in close connexion with the Monotheism out of which it arose—with which alone it has definite historical associations.

The first question to be raised will be to ascertain how far the Hebrew Monotheism showed signs of a development in the direction of plurality of persons. The only facts which can be brought forward in this interest are those which we have already mentioned in another connexion—the ideas of the Word and the Wisdom of God. It has been customary to allege as symptoms of Trinitarian tendency the plural name of God (Elohim)—the expressions of deliberation in Genesis, Let *us* make man—Let *us* go down and confound their language—the appearance of three angels to Abraham, etc. But it seems difficult to regard any of these as decisive. The plural name *may* be either a survival from a polytheistic stage in the history of Judaism, or simply a plural of majesty. At any rate it is a bare plural; the number is not defined. And the plural in the expressions of deliberation can hardly be pressed. It occurs in strongly anthropomorphic surroundings, and may possibly, therefore, be explained as a survival. The Alexandrine interpreters, such as Philo, interpreted the phrases of the powers of God, or the angels, and this has a certain measure of support among patristic commentators. The other case is more interesting, where the number three is definitely fixed. But it is difficult even there to lay great emphasis upon the number, since in similar cases with Lot, with Jacob, with Joshua and Manoah, the number of angelic visitors is different, being in Lot's case two, and in the others one. Justin Martyr, whose fixed principle of interpretation was that the Word was the medium of all the Old Testament revelations, explains these theo-

phanies as manifestations of the Word of God, giving various accounts of the different numbers.[1]

Leaving, then, these plural expressions in the Old Testament on one side, we ask whether the Doctrine of the Word and of the Wisdom of God may be held to lead up directly to a notion of plurality in the Godhead. Our answer must be conditional. The doctrine of the Word flourished in Alexandria, as we have already seen, and cannot be regarded as lending itself to plurality *in the Godhead.* It is rather a means of preserving the absolute unity of God without detaching Him from all contact with the material world. If it be true, then, that there is no specially Palestinian Logos-doctrine, we cannot use it without considerable difficulty as an indication of Trinitarian tendency. On the other hand, if, as some contend, the Palestinian Logos-doctrine involves a radically different conception of God from that of Alexandria, it is possible that there is in it a preparation for the Christian Theology. But we have omitted, of necessity, this special discussion (see note, page 98).

It will be a simpler plan, therefore, to begin with Christianity at once, and, when we have stated its doctrine so far as may be, to trace its historical affinities and the various consequences which may be drawn from it.

The Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity represents the effect of the Incarnation on the doctrine of the one God. If the Incarnation, in the Christian sense, be true, the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is true also. For there is no break between them; they are parts of one and the same truth. Were it not for the Incarnation it might become a serious question whether we have or can have any such knowledge of the nature of God as Trinitarianism implies and demands. We must dwell on this point somewhat carefully.

[1] Cf. *Dial. c. Tryph.* chs. 56–61. A similar method of explanation occurs in many other patristic writers.

The nature of God, it may be argued, so far transcends our possibilities of attainment, that though we may be certain or reasonably clear that He is, we cannot possibly enter into any definite details as to His character and attributes. A few moments' consideration will show that the value of this argument depends absolutely upon the attitude which we assume towards the doctrine of the Incarnation. If that be a vague and idle dream, we are in a state of drifting uncertainty as to the real nature of God. We have already not only admitted this, but insisted upon it. It is the position in which natural religion leaves us,—which is of the very essence of natural religion. For by natural religion we mean the exercise of our natural powers in the religious field without authoritative rules or guidance. And in this region we can never tell whether an anthropomorphic taint is or is not clinging to our highest and most abstract conceptions of the Divine nature. The most philosophical theory of God's nature may be as anthropomorphic as that of the crudest savage, for all we know; as tightly bound, that is, by human limitations. It does not matter at this stage whether we use the loftier powers of the human mind or the ordinary facts of human life to give definiteness to our belief in God; the former are as distinctly human as the latter, and apart from positive information we do not know which to choose. Xenophanes discovered a flaw in the current Polytheism of his day, but it may be questioned whether the idea of God which he substituted—that of a hollow sphere—was *in reality* less crude and earth-bound: and so Mr. Herbert Spencer makes merry over mediæval representations of the Christian Trinity, but it may be doubted whether his Infinite, Eternal, and Unknowable Power is less anthropomorphic.[1] In the one case human characteristics were rashly imported into the notion of God; in the other they are simply left

[1] Cf. *Study of Sociology*, p. 137. *First Principles*, Part I. chap. v.

out, and there is no clear rule for saying whether or why one is better than the other. In the strict sense of the word, of course, neither the hollow sphere nor the Infinite, etc., are in the form of man; but the principle of error in anthropomorphism covers much more than the use of the human form, it is involved in all human speculations which originate in and do not transcend the mere use of human faculties.

On the other hand, our historical sketch of the efforts to define the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation has already shown us one case where the faith of the Church has served to correct an anthropomorphic tendency. The generation of the Son seemed to involve the application of the human idea of *time* to the nature of God. The Church ejected the idea of time from its foundation of the doctrine, but asserted a relation between the Father and the Son exactly as before. Though not generated in time, the Son is generated. The realities which the forms of human thought are too narrow to hold are not altered; they do not come into suspicion. Only the use of human analogies is regulated and restricted.

And here there appears a further advantage as compared with the ways of ordinary speculation. When once the use of human terminology is criticized, as by Xenophanes, or by H. Spencer, the whole falls into discredit. We begin to talk in negatives—of infinites and absolutes and so on; forgetting that the denial of such attributes as these words deny may be as irrelevant as to say that virtue is not square. The denial tells us nothing; it may possibly have no real meaning whatever. But the Catholic condemnation of the formula of Arius did more than this. It not only denied the truthfulness of certain statements, and the applicability of certain ideas, but it did so on definite grounds, in face of definite facts, and with a definite meaning. It asserted the generation, and denied that it occurred in time. But it will be said, that this is only a parallel to what Platonism did in establish-

ing its scheme of the evolution of the world. According to Plotinus the world emerged from an overflow of the life resident in the first Principle, and yet the process did not occur in time.[1] But apart from the fact that the temporal associations are very rarely consistently kept at a distance, the exclusion of them brings us more or less into conflict with facts as they are. The time idea is excluded by Platonism not from the nature of God only, but from creation. Instead of being able to separate the nature of God from that of created things in this respect, we are reduced to combining both in an immanent process which always remains the same. The world as well as God had no beginning and can have no end. The cases, therefore, are not quite parallel after all. In the Catholic definitions we have a limit put upon human logic in a certain connexion, for a particular reason, to preserve intact a particular collection of facts. In Platonism, the difficulty of allowing the notion of time to enter into relation with God is felt as a part of the general failure to express Divine truth in human language; but the effort made to avoid this difficulty is such as virtually to contradict human experience. It is not, then, by means of metaphysical speculation that we escape from the trammels of our nature.

And the difficulty of which we are speaking presses even more hardly when we come to consider the evidence of the moral sense as to the nature of God. We saw in Chap. I. that the moral sense demands a personal ideal; that the facts of conscience point to a Personal God. But in the first place we pointed out that the moral ideal is capable of as little definite proof as the ideals of thought—the First Cause, etc.; it must always remain a hope rather than a certainty. And, secondly, do we, by contemplating it, get any nearer deciding whether a given Doctrine of God is satisfactory or not? When we think of it in connexion, let

[1] ἐκποδὼν δὲ ἡμῖν ἔστω ἡ γένεσις ἡ ἐν χρόνῳ. *Enn.* v. 1, 6. Cf. v. 2, 1.

us say, with Trinitarianism, can we really maintain that it offers any suggestions which can reasonably be regarded as pointing towards plurality of persons? Our notion of Personality is for the most part single and individual, excluding all others who belong to the same class. What do we mean, after all, by saying that God is Personal? Does it carry any definite information, or is it only a negative idea, simply implying that mechanical views of God do not square with morality? It must be admitted that difficulties like this will press and be hard to settle, and that on this level of inquiry there is strong reason for saying that man's knowledge of God is not of such a kind as to allow him to decide in favour of the Trinitarian view.

But, if it be true that the Trinitarian account of the Divine nature is simply an expansion and formulated statement of the truth which the Incarnation tells, and true also that the Incarnation has indeed occurred, the argument of which we have been speaking vanishes. For the Incarnation implies certain truths as to the nature of God, and these if they are attainable by the mind at all, must be susceptible of some form of intellectual utterance. Or, if complete and adequate expression be not possible, it will be at least within our powers to notice and point out where the language we use is inadequate, where natural inferences from it are to be restrained, where the truths we have to deal with seem to allow of accurate expression. The Agnostic argument, for this is what we have really had before us, has a great deal to be said for it within the lines of natural religion. When man starts off independently to seek God with the aid of his own faculties only, he may find them inadequate to the search. He cannot tell why or how; but he may know that he cannot criticize them or their utterances sufficiently to make his knowledge worth having. But if his aspirations and hopes are met half way by so powerful and significant a revelation of God's

nature as is involved in the Incarnation, he cannot reasonably object to the Catholic doctrine of God, either as transcending the powers of the intellect, or as dealing presumptuously with the nature of God. For these arguments arise at a much earlier stage; they have nothing to do with Trinitarianism, if that part of the Creed be approached in logical and historical order.

First of all, then, let us gather together some of the passages in the Gospels in which our Lord's words seem to involve a Trinitarian Theology. In the course of His ministry He alludes to the Father and the Holy Spirit in such a way as to establish the fact that He was different from them, and yet in some sense the same. The passages are, of course, most clearly marked in S. John's Gospel, but there are some few in the Synoptists which will be worth consideration. Let us consider first the evidence of the Synoptic Gospels to the existence and separate Personality of the Father: (1) Our Lord speaks constantly of 'My Father' in a special and distinctive sense. This is frequent from the time of His answer to His parents when they found Him in the Temple: 'Wist ye not that I must be about My Father's business?' (S. Luke ii. 49). (2) He makes relationship to Himself depend on obedience to the will of the Father: 'Whosoever shall do the will of My Father which is in heaven, he is My brother, and sister, and mother' (S. Matt. xii. 50; S. Mark iii. 35; cf. S. Luke viii. 21). (3) To the Father He ascribes the ultimate order of all things, especially in matters of revelation: 'Flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but My Father which is in heaven' (S. Matt. xvi. 17), which in a measure excludes Himself. So in the great outpouring of thankfulness after the return of the Disciples: 'I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that Thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes: yea, Father, for so it was well-pleasing in Thy

sight' (S. Matt. xi. 26; S. Luke x. 21). And again: 'Every plant which My Heavenly Father planted not shall be rooted up' (S. Matt. xv. 13). 'It is not the will of your Father which is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish' (S. Matt. xviii. 14). And there is the great passage about the hour of the judgment, of which we have already spoken (S. Matt. xxiv. 36; S. Mark xiii. 32). (4) So our Lord's mission is determined by the Father, and has certain limits: 'To sit on My right hand, and on My left hand, is not mine to give; but it is for them for whom it hath been prepared of My Father' (S. Matt. xx. 23; S. Mark x. 40). But, at the same time: 'All things have been delivered unto Me of My Father: and no one knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him' (S. Matt. xi. 27; S. Luke x. 22). Therefore He is able to say: 'For the elect' sake He shortened the days' (S. Mark xiii. 20); and again: 'I say unto you, that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of My Father which is in heaven' (S. Matt. xviii. 10). So He can assure men that the Father will hear prayer (S. Matt. xviii. 19); that He knows the things we need (S. Matt. vi. 25–34); that He will forgive sin, if the sinners themselves forgive trespasses against themselves (S. Matt. vi. 14, 15). In all these passages our Lord never identifies Himself with the Father, though He claims unique knowledge of Him and unique relations with Him. And there can be no question that the Father of whom He spoke was God. To these should be added the twofold witness of the Father to the Son—at the Baptism and Transfiguration.

On the subject of the Person and Divinity of the Holy Ghost we have a number of passages of which the collective import is not wanting in clearness: (1) The being of the Holy Ghost is brought before us chiefly in His connexion with the Incarnation of Christ. Our Lord is Incarnate by the Holy Ghost (S. Luke i. 35). He comes upon Christ at

His baptism (S. Matt. iii. 16; S. Mark i. 10, 11; S. Luke iii. 22), and from this time forward takes command over the life of Christ. Thus our Lord is led up of the Spirit into the wilderness for the temptation (S. Matt. iv. 1; S. Luke iv. 1 and 14; S. Mark i. 12); He cast out devils in the power of the Spirit (S. Matt. xii. 28; cf. S. Luke xi. 20); He rejoices in the Holy Ghost (ἠγαλλιάσατο τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ, S. Luke x. 21). (2) Further, the Holy Spirit works in the consciences of men, and hence the tremendous peril of sin against the Holy Ghost—the sin against light, by which the moral judgment is destroyed (S. Matt. xii. 31, 32; S. Mark iii. 28, 29; S. Luke xii. 10). This, let it be remembered, is described by Christ as involving graver peril even than sin against the Son of man. (3) Again, the gift of the Holy Spirit is conferred upon the Disciples, especially to be the source of their inspiration on their mission to the world (cf. S. Matt. x. 20; S. Luke xii. 12). This gift of the Holy Ghost is closely allied to His functions in the inspiration of S. John the Baptist (S. Luke i. 15); Elizabeth (S. Luke i. 41); Zacharias (S. Luke i. 67); Simeon (S. Luke ii. 25–27); David (S. Matt. xxii. 43; S. Mark xii. 36; cf. S. Luke xx. 42, ἐν Βίβλῳ Ψαλμῶν). (4) He is one of the three names into which men are to be baptized (S. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). This fixes the conception of the Holy Ghost as personal. Many of the passages above quoted do not certainly compel this view of His nature. It would be difficult to conceive perhaps, what would be the meaning of sin against the Holy Ghost (a phrase which occurs in all three Gospels) unless He were a person; but for the most part a sense of the words such as would satisfy the passages in the Old Testament, where the Spirit of the Lord is mentioned, would be adequate here. It is, however, by no means adequate to account for the baptismal formula. In that, the Holy Ghost is placed on a level with the Father and the Son, and it is difficult to see

how arguments which would deprive the third name of personal significance would fail to produce a similar effect in the case of the Father and the Son. It has, of course, been suggested that the passage is an interpolation,[1] occurring as it does at the end of the Gospel, in a place where interpolation would be particularly easy. But if so, it must have been a very early one. There is no such full and varied evidence, such as there is in the case of the last twelve verses of S. Mark, against this passage. There are signs of the existence of a text from which the Triune Name was absent. But it is not likely that this was the original text. Nor, if the passage were really an interpolation in S. Matt., would this dispose of the question of the baptismal formula, and the personality of the Holy Spirit. The evidence of the Acts and Epistles makes it plain that a doctrine such as the baptismal formula implies must have been prior to those works.[2]

In passing on to the evidence of S. John's Gospel we move, of course, into another atmosphere. Our Lord's earlier discourses, as reported in this Gospel, abound in references to the Father and His relations with the Son; the last discourses immediately before the Passion contain much that bears on the Holy Ghost, both in regard of His nature and personality, and in regard of His temporal mission in the Church. We have already had occasion, in considering our Lord's claims to be Divine, to cite those which bear upon His relations with the Father. It will not be necessary, therefore, to produce them all again. We need only to fix and define the revelation of the Father's nature and character. Three points emerged from the passages in the Synoptists: (1) The Father is the source of all revelation, and especially reveals the Son; (2) it is the province of the

[1] Cf. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, Bd. i. p. 56, n. 1 (ed. 1).
[2] *See below*, p. 151.

Son to reveal the Father in view of His special knowledge; (3) relationship to the Son depends on obedience to the Father's will. All these points reappear in S. John with much greater distinctness and fulness. Thus we read (chap. vi. 45): 'Every man who hath heard from the Father, and hath learned, cometh unto Me'; and again, in the same chapter (vi. 65): 'No man can come unto Me, except it be given him of the Father.' At the same time it is the province of the Son to reveal the Father: 'No man hath seen God at any time; God only-begotten, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him' (i. 18). And again: 'Not that any man hath seen the Father, save He which is from God, He hath seen the Father' (vi. 46). 'I am the way, and the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by Me' (xiv. 6). 'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father' (xiv. 9). 'I manifested Thy name to the men whom Thou gavest Me out of the world' (xvii. 6). The Synoptists, as we have remarked, show the necessity of obedience to the Father's will as a condition of real relationship with the Son: 'Whosoever shall do the will of My Father which is in heaven, he is My brother, and sister, and mother.' S. John gives us the other side of this truth, when he makes the attitude towards the Son the test of knowledge of the Father: 'Ye have neither heard His voice nor seen His form. And ye have not His word abiding in you: for Him whom He sent ye believe not' (v. 37, 38). This is explained by the actual relation of the Father and the Son. 'The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into His hands' (iii. 35). So the life of the Son is derived from that of the Father (v. 26), and the Father is greater than the Son (xiv. 28); but yet all things which the Father hath are the Son's (xvi. 15). This unity of the Father and the Son is to be the type of the unity of the members of the future Church: 'Holy Father, keep them in Thy name which

Thou hast given Me, that they may be one, even as we are' (xvii. 11). 'I am the good shepherd, and I know mine own, and mine own know Me, even as the Father knoweth Me, and I know the Father' (x. 14, 15). The burden of these and similar passages is clear enough. There is no question that the Father means God, and the account of the Son in relation with the Father is such as to leave no room for a distinction in nature.

As to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, there is less evidence in the Gospel, for the Church is the true sphere of the manifestation of the Holy Spirit, and every thing that is said of Him is by way of anticipation or of prophecy. The character of the Holy Spirit is not, however, left in doubt. There is one passage which requires separate discussion, as it is peculiar. In vii. 39 the English version reads as follows: 'For the Spirit was not yet given; for Jesus was not yet glorified.' The best Greek texts omit the word for given (*δοθὲν* or *δεδομένον*), and it seems to have been introduced in order to remedy the apparent difficulty in the words as they stood—*οὔπω γὰρ ἦν πνεῦμα· ὅτι Ἰησοῦς οὔπω ἐδοξάσθη*. The difficulty is, however, only apparent. The usage of S. John proves that *πνεῦμα* without the article means 'a spiritual gift'; whereas *τὸ πνεῦμα* would mean the personal Spirit of God. The gloss, then, which appears in some manuscripts and in our version gives the right sense, though it does not belong to the true text.[1] The meaning of the passage will be not that the personal Spirit of God was not yet in existence, but that those special gifts which belong to the temporal mission were not yet given, as the close of Christ's earthly career had not yet come. At the close of the earthly ministry of the Son the Church is not to be left in an orphan condition, the ministry of Christ is to be followed by the ministry of the Holy Spirit. The departure of Christ

[1] Cf. Westcott's note on the passage.

is a necessary condition to this mission of the Holy Spirit (xvi. 7).

A. The mission is spoken of in two ways: (1) As coming from the Father. 'I will pray the Father, and He shall give you another Comforter . . . even the Spirit of Truth' (xiv. 16). And again: 'The Comforter, even the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in My name' (xiv. 26). (2) As coming from the Son. 'When the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of Truth, which proceedeth from the Father' (xv. 26).

B. The mission of the Holy Spirit is not self-chosen or self-originated any more than Christ's mission was. 'He shall not speak from Himself, but what things soever He hears these shall He speak. . . . He shall glorify Me: for He shall take of Mine, and shall declare it unto you. All things whatsoever the Father hath are Mine: therefore said I, that He taketh of Mine and shall declare it unto you' (xvi. 13–15).

C. His mission will have various purposes, (1) in relation to the Church, (2) in relation to the world. (1) His presence is to be permanent (xiv. 16), and it is to result in further witness to Christ (xv. 26), and in further glorification of Christ (xvi. 14); and in regard to the Apostles, He will remind them of that which Christ had said (xiv. 26), He will declare to them the things to come (xvi. 13), and lead them into all truth (xvi. 13). (2) His presence will be unknown to the world (xiv. 17), but at the same time He will rebuke or convict it concerning sin, righteousness, and judgment (xvi. 8–11). That is, He will reveal authoritatively the true position of the world. The unbelief of those who are on the side of the world will be shown by His presence to proceed from sin. Again, His witness to the ascended Lord will declare that the right is on the side of Christ. And the judgment into which the prince of this world falls by his very attitude

towards Christ and His Church will declare the true nature and principles, and incidence of the Divine judgment. In an earlier passage the dispensation of the Spirit is seen to be identical with the kingdom of heaven, and the baptism of the Spirit is the appointed means of entry into it. There is no passage by mere development from the kingdom of the flesh into the kingdom of the Spirit, nor is the life of those born of the Spirit to be estimated by earthly laws (iii. 5, 6). As in the Synoptists, so in S. John, the Spirit descended upon Christ at His baptism and there abode (i. 32).

A doctrine closely similar to this of S. John is expressed in one verse of the Acts of the Apostles: 'Being therefore by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, He hath poured forth this which ye see and hear' (chap. ii. 33). So the Spirit takes command over the Church as before over the life of Christ. He witnesses to Christ (v. 32). He speaks through the Old Testament (i. 16; iv. 25), and in such prophets as Agabus (xi. 28). He guides the decisions of the Church in particular details, as, for instance, at the Council of Jerusalem (xv. 28), the ordination of Paul and Barnabas (xiii. 2). The gifts are conferred by Apostolic means (viii. 16). In this and in similar passages the chief interest is historical. S. Luke describes the actual occurrences, the actual way in which the promise of Christ was fulfilled.

In S. Paul's writings we find a more or less elaborate doctrine of the Father and the Holy Spirit. It follows in its main outlines the same course as the statements already cited from the Gospels. But the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as might be expected, is more definite and full, seeing that it is approached from the point of view of realization and not of anticipation.

I. The doctrine of the Father in S. Paul is closely bound

up with the Old Testament belief in one God, who is cause and Lord of all. The aspect of His nature upon which S. Paul most frequently insists is His ruling providence. He is the only wise God (Rom. xvi. 27), He is King over the ages (1 Tim. i. 17), He worketh all things according to the counsel of His will (Eph. i. 11). Also, He is the goal to which all things move (1 Cor. viii. 6; Rom. xi. 36). The Incarnation was the effect of His will, occurring in the fulness of time as determined by the Divine wisdom (Gal. iv. 4; cf. 1 Cor. ii. 6, 7; Rom. xvi. 25, 26; Eph. i. 10; Col. i. 25–27; 2 Tim. i. 9, 10). And this purpose expressed itself even in the particular events of Christ's incarnate life, especially in the Resurrection (1 Thess. i. 10; 1 Cor. vi. 14, etc.; Eph. i. 20, 21; Col. ii. 12). It covers also the mission of the Spirit (2 Cor. v. 5; Gal. iv. 6), and the foundation and constitution of the Church (Eph. i. 3–5; cf. 1 Cor. xii. 6; iii. 22), and reaches to the final consummation of all things (1 Cor. xv. 28). The whole rests upon the moral character of God: (*α*) His faithfulness (1 Thess. v. 24; 2 Thess. iii. 3; 1 Cor. i. 9; 2 Cor. i. 18; Rom. iii. 3; cf. πιστὸς ὁ λόγος, 1 Tim. i. 15; iii. 1; iv. 9, etc.); (*β*) His justice (Rom. iii. 6–26; ix. 14, 15); (*γ*) His goodness (Rom. xi. 22; Titus iii. 4; cf. 1 Tim. ii. 4).[1]

II. S. Paul's doctrine of the Holy Spirit appears chiefly in connexion with the Church and the position of the redeemed. The Apostle is less directly concerned with the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son. It is noticeable, however, that He is described as the Spirit of Christ as well as of God (Rom. viii. 9, 10, where both phrases occur in close connexion). Also, the Spirit is said to possess

[1] It is worth noticing that the doctrines here described in many cases run through the entire body of Pauline writings, except the Epistle to the Hebrews, from which references have not been taken. This implies a very important continuity of doctrine.

absolute knowledge of God (1 Cor. ii. 11), and of the inmost mind of those in whom He dwells (Rom. viii. 26, 27). He is the instrument of revelation (1 Cor. ii. 10; Eph. iii. 5: 1 Tim. iv. 1; 2 Tim. iii. 16): and He governs the whole life of the Church, both in its general order (1 Cor. xii. 3–11) and in individual men (1 Cor. vi. 19; Rom. viii. 9–14; xv. 16, etc.), and in Him is constituted the unity of the Church (1 Cor. xii. 13; Eph. iv. 3–6). The gift of the Holy Spirit is the first-fruits of the promises of God (Rom. viii. 23), the pledge that they will be fulfilled (2 Cor. i. 22), the means of the restoration of the true Sonship of God (Gal. iv. 6; Rom. viii. 15, 16), and the witness in our hearts that the promises are fulfilled in us. The Spirit was operative in the Incarnation, especially in the Resurrection (Rom. i. 4; cf. Heb. ix. 14, where the Spirit is represented as the medium of Christ's self-oblation). Lastly, it is the Spirit whose operation is discerned in the Christian life (Gal. v. 22, 23, etc.).

The passages cited here are not proof-texts in the ordinary sense of the word; that is, they are not accidental and isolated utterances which have but little in common with the context from which they came, but they are passing allusions by the authors to truths which they assume to be present in the minds of those who read. The majority of them, especially of the Pauline passages, would be absolutely unintelligible, unless there were some groundwork of common faith in the minds of those to whom S. Paul wrote. The passages here quoted are, of course, but a small portion of the evidence available, but they are sufficient, we think, to show the general consensus of the New Testament writers in their account of God. Starting from the Incarnation of the Son of God, they speak of the Father and the Holy Spirit as Divine. The Father is uniformly regarded as the source of all activity; but the Son, who is the medium of

this activity, as it appears in the world, is also described at times as acting in a manner like that of the Father. This is especially true of the mission of the Holy Ghost. The Spirit of God performs for the new creation what He had done for the old. He dwells in it, and evokes its order. His special home is the heart of man, where He produces the same orderly result.[1] There are few signs as yet of a carefully formulated creed on the subject of the Divine nature. But, as we have already pointed out, the statements about it are of such an allusive character that it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive their appealing to persons whose minds were in an absolutely fluid state as regards the articles of this faith. The Church, we maintain, must at least have reached the position of saying, 'The Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, and yet they are not three Gods but one God.' Though there may have been at this time no effort to explain this, the Three Persons individually were believed to be Divine, and yet the old Jewish Monotheism was not consciously deserted. This unreasoned conviction seems to have held its ground for some time. In S. Clement of Rome, in S. Ignatius, and in the *Apology* of Aristides, there are passages presenting the same idea of God, but without any attempt at further definition.[2] With Justin we come to the period of pure theological speculation, to which we must now refer at sufficient length to make clear the way in which the Catholic Church has defined for itself a Trinitarian Theology.

Before leaving the apostolic witness, it would be well to ask ourselves what information we can derive from the New

[1] To this point we must return later, when we come to speak of the Church and the Sacraments.

[2] S. Clem., *Ep. ad Cor.*, chap. lviii.; cf. chap. xlvi. S. Ign., *Ad Magn.* 13. Apol., *Arist.*, chap. xv.

Testament as to the nature of God considered generally. We have already pointed out that S. Paul traces the activities of God to certain moral characteristics—His faithfulness, His wisdom, His goodness. Are there any similar notices as to the Divine nature which may be regarded as forming a general basis for the exhibition of Trinitarian Theology? Are there any signs of such a view of God as would lead on easily to the Trinitarian conception of Him? There are three phrases in the writings of S. John which we must consider here. The first is ascribed to our Lord Himself in conversation with the woman of Samaria (chap. iv. 24): God is Spirit. The other two occur in S. John's First Epistle: God is Light (chap. i. 5); God is Love (iv. 8 and 16). In each case the predicate describes some characteristic of the Divine nature, metaphorically, of course, and not in technical language, but still with sufficient plainness. The first separates God from all material limitations; it is placed in sharp contrast with those earlier notions of God, which limited His manifestation to particular places and times, and gives, as Bishop Westcott remarks, a metaphysical account of His nature. It is closely allied with earlier Hebrew notions of God. That is, it is in a line with those utterances of the prophets in which the supremacy of God over all time and space and matter is asserted: it would fall in with the dislike to anthropomorphic expressions which was characteristic of the later Jews. So clear an expression of the truth occurs nowhere, we believe, in the Old Testament. Yet there are points of view which are preparatory to it. In the second, which S. John alone of New Testament writers uses in this bare and direct form, we attain to the notion of self-revelation, activity, and purity. Though the phrase occurs only here in the New Testament, there are others which lead up to and suggest it. Thus S. John (chap. iii. 21) points out that 'he that doeth the truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest,

that they are done in God.' The evil-doer, on the other hand, shuns the light, because it displays the real character of his actions. Thus the idea of light seems to convey the notion of revealing the true state of things, of enlightening and of judging. Christ is the light of the world, and His presence in it is a judgment—a separation, a declaration of men's inner affinities. With this may be contrasted S. Paul's phrase about God—that He dwells in light unapproachable (1 Tim. vi. 16). In the third of these phrases we make a very important move forwards For love is social in its very idea, it excludes from the very first any notion of a lonely God without possibility of entering into the concerns and interests of men. A God who is Love is a Person of whom it is possible to think as creating and redeeming the world. By this conception a great advance is made upon earlier speculations, some of the most prominent difficulties which beset them being removed. Thus the principle of movement and activity which some of the Pagan and Gnostic systems found it so hard to introduce into the Divine nature is present from the outset, if God is Love. Love cannot be inactive or exist without a due object; it is a relation between persons, it is expansive, and that not with vague indeterminateness, but with definite and clear aim. All Deism is set aside by this phrase; for Deism thinks of God simply as the artificer who made the world and set it going, and probably interferes with its course no more. God on this showing is merely a mythological expedient for getting the world into action: He has no special character or functions beyond this; and this falls very far short of the idea of a God who is Love. Again, S. John's conception not only sets aside the earlier and more confused notions, but it is in connexion with it that we begin to see the probability of a plurality within the Godhead. It is, we observe, the nature of God Himself to be Love; and if this is so, and if it be true that Love is always social in its character, we

must look for the eternal object of the Divine Love either within the unity of the Godhead or in the created world. But we believe that the created world came into being in time, and will have an end in time. We cannot, therefore, regard it as adequate to be the object of the eternal Love of God; we are not as yet in a position to discuss the point further, but we shall return to it later on. This much, however, we may safely affirm at this point, that the idea of the nature of God reached by S. John is such as to suggest a direction in which the ascription of Divinity to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost may be made partially intelligible.

We must now turn to the history of Trinitarian Theology, and see how the Church was led to define its faith as to the nature of God. Roughly speaking there are three ways in which the relation of the Three Persons may be described. The difference between each Person and the other two may be accentuated in a crude and careless way; this will virtually result in Tritheism—a belief in three Gods. Or, secondly, the difference may be regarded merely as a difference of mode of self-revelation. It may be held that there is an ultimate, unknowable, Divine substance, which reveals itself successively as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in no one of which forms is the revelation complete or permanent. Or, lastly, attention may be fixed upon the process apparently involved in the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Ghost; and then the Holy Trinity will be understood on the analogy of the Gnostic æons as a process by which the absolutely unknown and unknowable Deity is brought into contact with the material world. We shall have, therefore, various interpretations of the unity and Divinity of the three Persons, according to the modes of thought current in various ages. The first and last of these theories are, on the whole, infrequent in their occurrence, at any rate in theological

minds. It is to be feared, perhaps, that Tritheism is the real faith of many uneducated Christians even at the present day; but it can hardly, we think, be worth careful discussion here. There are few persons who would fail to see that it is really a most pagan polytheism; and that it is impossible to worship three Gods. The third of the above-mentioned methods of interpreting the doctrine has less attractions in modern times. Several founders of Gnostic systems found it convenient to adopt the names of the three Persons for some of their æons. This error is virtually the same as that of Sabellianism, and will not, therefore, require separate treatment.

The second type of Trinitarian doctrine is known as Sabellianism, after its founder, a Libyan presbyter named Sabellius (A.D. 257). It was a theory strongly influenced by the Stoic doctrine of the world-spirit. According to the Stoics, the universe was one huge animal in which a soul resided, which was also called the Logos or Reason of the world. The history of the universe consisted in the succession of the periods of the manifestation of this soul of the world. It had, they thought, two states, of speech and silence, of expansion and contraction. When it was in the state of utterance, the world of creation came into being; when it was in the state of silence or contraction, all particular things vanished. So it was believed that there was an endless series of these periods, which followed one another like the rise and fall of a man's chest when he breathes. Now Sabellius adopted a system closely similar to this. To his view, God is the Reason present in and ordering the world. He Himself is for ever unknown, but He passes through three stages of partial self-manifestation, in which He is known by the three names of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The first covered practically the Jewish dispensation; the second the period of our Lord's ministry; the third is the present dispensation.

When this is over the whole will relapse again into silence, to pass again through the same series.

It is clear that from this point of view all Personality vanishes from the notion of God altogether. Not only do the three Persons lose all reality and all true being, but God Himself, the ultimate substance of which these are partial manifestations, passes into the form of a blind force aimlessly repeating merely mechanical activities. No such description of God would be tolerable to the mind of the Church, and we find therefore that Sabellianism was condemned by the general consent of Catholics; we have already noticed that the fear of it was one of the causes of Arianism.

But though condemned, not by conciliar authority, but by the consensus of Churchmen, it was by no means dead. It is attractive always to philosophical minds of a certain order, and is, we may add, not unfamiliar now. It is the form of heresy which is most liable to arise out of two popular lines of thought, one of them the Hegelian idealism, the other the ordinary theory of evolution. Both of them aim at accounting for the present state of things as a gradual process, increasing in clearness and definiteness as it goes on. To this the theory of the Trinity as a gradual self-expression of the One God seems to correspond admirably. The earlier revelation of Judaism, and the Gentile speculations, are regarded as the simpler and more direct intuitions of the Divine nature. The Incarnation of Christ is then represented as the manifestation of the Divine law of right; and the climax of the whole is found in the present state of things. That there has been a real progress in revelation no one seriously doubts: though it is difficult to regard the present century as the climax of any process or even as being capable of suggesting what such a climax might be. But the whole issue of the question turns on the value given to personality in treating of the three Persons in the Trinity.

So long as the Trinitarian idea is regarded as practically final, that is to say, so long as there is no talk or hint of a Divine substance farther back which is revealed in the threefold process, there is nothing to prevent an orthodox sense being given to language like this; but if it be implied that the Trinitarian idea is a mere economy, as it is called technically, a mere concession to human weakness of intellect,—if it be denied that it corresponds with any permanent fact in the Divine nature, it falls under the condemnation of Sabellianism. For the Catholic Church refuses to accept any method of combining the Scripture statements about the three Persons which involves their confusion. It may not be easy to see in what sense They are three and yet also one, but this is the burden of the Christian Creed.

We have now considered the problem which the language of Scripture places before the intellect of the Church, and one or two of the ways in which it has been attempted to settle it. The more serious part of our task still remains, viz., to explain so far as may be what the Catholic position is and means, and what changes it involves in the use of popular terms. It would be easy to say shortly that the Church has decided that the Holy Spirit is no less consubstantial with the Father than the Son. But this is not all that is necessary. Questions which we postponed in our discussion of the doctrine of the Son of God will arise now. We must not only assert that the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one substance with the Father, but explain what we mean by this; in what sense we talk of the unity of God, in view of the tri-personality, and in what sense we speak of God as personal and the Three as Persons. First, then, let us inquire what is meant by unity as applied to God. We have said that the Christian doctrine of God rises straight out of a most rigid and unbending Monotheism, and that Trinitarianism does not involve any radical change

in this. But we must still inquire what particular type of unity is in our minds when we say that God is one.

A. Unity is the name of an idea which does not seem, at first sight, to need investigation—in which it does not seem probable that much variety of meaning will be discovered. It does not, however, come up to the expectations of simplicity which it excites. As a rule when we talk of *one* thing, we mean to single it out from a number of others of the same class. One man, one horse, etc. are phrases which limit the substantive numerically. They exclude at the moment all plurality whatever, and fix the mind on a numerical idea. In the background of our thought, when we use the word "one" in this manner, lies the possibility of other numbers—a class of substantives, each of them *one* and individual in itself, but forming in the aggregate a larger number. To put it shortly, *one* in its ordinary sense means one of a class or lot; it fixes the thought upon a particular individual, and excludes all the others. Now it is plain on the face of it that when we say there is one God we mean much more than this. We mean, it is true, that there are no others, and we say, I believe in one God, on purpose to deny that there is any other God but one. In this case, as before, the word "one" has a *generic* significance, but its implication in regard of possible others depends upon our knowledge of facts, and our experience. When we say, there is one God, we say it with the implication that there are no more, and this, partly, because we believe this to be the fact, and partly because some other people do not. If I say, I see one man coming across that field, I say it with the implication that there might be more, but that the others are not present. In one case we exclude possible other *ones* from existence, in the other we simply deny that they are present to our senses.

B. Besides this *generic* sense of unity in which it always

has reference to possible others, there is another which has wholly different associations. When we speak of an individual man, and say that he is one, we may either mean, as before, that he is not any of the others, or we may refer to his single and self-contained unity: that is, we may look aside from his place in the class with the others, and note the continuity and sameness of his personal life. We have, then, made an assertion of a wholly new kind, although the transition seems so slight. Instead of remarking upon a merely external and accidental fact, we assert an important philosophical truth. We have turned away our eyes from the mere fact that a given individual is different from all the others, and concentrated our attention upon the difference and its cause. We find that the difference between ourselves and all other men lies in a secret strain of incommunicable unity, which preserves itself so long as we last in being. This remains roughly true, in spite of all that has been learnt of multiple consciousness in recent years. We have instances of people who seem to sustain at different periods two incompatible lives. But we have no instance in which one person's experience and memory becomes merged in or confused with the experience and memory of any one else. The experience I have to-day or in my present phase of consciousness is *my* experience, just in the same sense as the experience of yesterday, in virtue of my being the same—in virtue of the fact that I am the same person throughout. How and how far this personal identity throughout all experience can be proved, need not concern us here. We need not discuss here what may be called the inner constitution of the unity which holds together an experience. These are thorny questions, and whatever the result of the theoretical investigation, the practical fact remains the same, that we must assume the permanence of personal identity if we are to talk

intelligently or intelligibly of individual experience. For our purpose it will be enough to inquire what new possibilities are opened to us in the meaning of unity.

It needs but little effort to see that unity in the sense here considered is unity in difference. That is, the variety and complexity of the experiences passed through in no way interfere with the unity of the person. He is one and the same throughout them all, and their variety only serves to fill out and illustrate his own identity and unity. Even in cases of multiple consciousness, each 'self' is constituted by unity of experience. The most monotonous and unvaried life is really full of inconceivable complexities, and when we rise above this level and consider the career of a man of action, it is still more astonishing to reflect upon the chaos of various elements which the unity of his personality threads together into one ordered whole. The real difference between unity in this sense and unity in its *generic* meaning is, that the former is living and concrete, and the latter dead and abstract. In the latter case, unity is an idea, in the former it is a process. We find out the generic unity by abstract thought and classification; we realize personal unity directly, only by incommunicable experience.

It is, however, bounded by two potent limitations—time and space. An individual man can absorb into the unity of his own experience the characteristics of various places and times, but only if he takes them in succession. He imposes the unity of his own life upon all the various events which happen to him; they are bound together in his experience: and they are one because they are his. Even if he knows that various events of which he hears took place simultaneously, he cannot fully realize their simultaneity, he must think of them in succession. And so, to realize what we know to be occurring at another place requires the aid of the constructive imagination, and probably the

stored-up experience of the past; it is not matter which can be absorbed into the unity of the single life. No man can be in more than one place at one time: he can imagine the occurrence of events other than those he witnesses, and believe that they occupy the same time as his own experience. He can picture scenes in the past which coincided in time and not in place. His direct experience is only of one time and one place.

Within these limits, of which much more might be said, the unity which makes one man to differ from another consists in the absorption into himself of all his own special variety of experience. As such the unity of a man's self is intensely exclusive. No other man, however near to us, has ever the same experience. The same event, witnessed by two separate people, is inevitably transmuted as it passes into their several minds. Each notes in it what he is naturally constituted to note in it—puts upon it the interpretation which he is fitted by his special characteristics of mind, temper, and imagination to put upon it. There is no unity so impenetrable as this, so exclusive and so complete. Not only does it admit of no fusion with any other of the same kind, it is not even wholly explicable to another. It goes deep down below the superficiality of language; it can be hinted at, pictured, described, but never reproduced. Buried experiences, half-conscious emotions, and half-forgotten associations go to colour it at any given moment. And if by the medium of language we can raise some central thought in the mind of another, we cannot give it the exact meaning it has for us, just because the experience, the self to which it appeals, is different. Perhaps a simple illustration will make the point clearer. Every one knows how marked a difference in mutual intelligence there is between the members of a family as compared with friends whose intimacy has begun at later periods. Nothing can quite

overcome the lack of community of experience, and yet even this which is the nearest approach to intermixture of personal life does not wholly prevent misunderstandings.

We must now return to the question of the unity of God. We see already that the analogy of individual unity represents a far higher and fuller notion than the abstract unity belonging to members of a class. It is the unity of a living thing, which overcomes variety and absorbs it into itself. But it is a terribly anthropomorphic idea to apply without further ado to God. We may be glad to think of Him as living, and maintaining His unity by life; but the limitations of time and space, the exclusiveness and incommunicable separateness of human individuality, produce difficulties. After all, we do not experience our own unity and identity directly; we know it only as the variety of the events which come upon us reveals it to us. We find ourselves always the same in the midst of a press of changing phenomena, but we do not know ourselves apart from this stream of outward events. And for this very reason, we do not know what part of our conception of unity to omit, or how to omit it, in applying the idea to God. We come to think that each of us is one and the same through all his experience, only by means of this experience itself. And so, though we may be convinced that we are on right lines when we form our conceptions of God on the analogy of our own individual living unity, we cannot tell how far we are anthropomorphic in doing so.

We must, therefore, pass on to the consideration of a fuller idea even than unity—that of personal life. Hitherto, though speaking of individual life and experience, we have concentrated our attention upon its unity and nothing else. We must now take in the other elements of the idea, as we know it, or conceive it to be.

It cannot fail to be noticed that the one characteristic

which most men feel to be essential to the notion of personality is, that it should be sufficient to itself. It must be, in Aristotle's language, *αὐταρκὴς καὶ οὐδένος ἐνδεής* (sufficient to itself and needing nothing). That is, we regard as an encroachment upon its separateness any hint that it requires external assistance to make it complete. We resent the idea that past generations have influenced the special character of a person, as if that tended to destroy his completeness and simplicity, and turned him into a compound thing. We resent the Aristotelian principle that the solitary individual is only called a man by an equivocation, seeing that he falls so far short of the ideal of manhood. We are inclined to ask, Is not the man in the desert island just as much a personality as a citizen of the most populous city in the world? His accidental separation from his kind can have made no possible difference to this. Or again, we object to acknowledging the right and the interest which other men have in our own personal career. Can we not do as we like with our own? What does it matter to others how we live? These very common states of mind, of which most people know the feeling, represent certain anticipations rooted in our minds as to the nature of personality. They do not emerge into full consciousness always in this character; people are conscious of them long before they know or understand anything about personality. But in the end, these and all the desires and aversions connected with self-preservation must be based upon some sense that the reality of personal life is being infringed, if its self-sufficiency is interfered with. It is the presence and the consciousness of this personal life which makes the difference in the form and the intensity of the self-preserving feelings of man as compared with those which we observe in the case of animals. It appears also in the strong hope of immortality which so many peoples retain. They cannot believe that the firm and

certain personal consciousness should go the way of the corruptible body; the soul at any rate, they feel should be immortal.

There are, then, certain expectations connected with man's consciousness of himself as personal, which, nevertheless, experience continually disappoints. When Psychology turns its attention to man's self, it soon reveals all kinds of complications in the personality which seemed so complete and exclusive to the unreflecting consciousness. Gradually the conviction has been slowly worked in upon the minds of men, however individualistic their tendencies, that everyone is by nature social, no man is complete in himself. He requires others, in order to realize his personal powers, and to fill out his own life: and he owes in return certain duties; he must give his labour and time and interest in order to fill out and complete the lives of others, as his is helped and bettered by theirs. Man is a social being, and his best achievement will always be in a social condition of things. He must recognize that his personality, which he thought he owned so completely, and could rule so irresponsibly, depends for its full realization upon the existence of others, and upon their being in definite reciprocal relations with himself. Without these conditions most of man's highest powers would lie dormant; he would, as Aristotle thought, be scarcely a man at all.

But this is not all. Not only is man dependent in large measure upon others for the realization of his personal capacities, he cannot ensure the presence of the needful help. It may so happen, and at times does so happen, that a man is deserted by his fellows, and his life then sinks to the lowest possible level. This means that the external supply of force and friendship which man needs is not given him from the outset. He has to win it by effort and struggle with his environment. Unless he does this he fails by his own fault

or by that of others to satisfy the end of his existence here.

It would seem, then, that the consideration of personality does not help us far towards an analogy with the Divine mode of existence. It seems to involve even more than we supposed of material and earthly conditions. Something of this impression will vanish, however, when we reflect that our investigations of the personal idea have diverted us altogether from the notion of a bare and solitary point, the very existence of which depends upon its excluding all others. Whatever personality may be, it requires for its completeness a full and vigorous life; it is not like a point in space, of which nothing can be said but that it is not any of the others. Personality is filled out and made real and effective only by means of the love which is the bond of all human society. Apart from this, if such a thing were conceivable, a man would fall back into the state of an atom or point in space; he would lose everything which makes his life real.

As we have gazed at the unity of a human individual, we have seen it change under our eyes into a complex relation of various elements. We have seen that the anticipations which the idea excites are satisfied indeed, but not in the way we expect. Man can become complete and self-sufficient, but only through the presence and co-operation of other men; and the law of this mutual self-development is love. Here we may return to the consideration of the personal nature of God. As we have already pointed out, S. John's inspired intuition that God is Love points to an open way towards the assertion of plurality in the Godhead. And now our own analysis of the conception of human personality shows that even this is not complete within the limits of a negative and exclusive unity. The hard exclusiveness breaks up, and shows us how the self in one man needs the presence of other selves, which others are bound to him by the cords

of mutual love. Where man's personality is incomplete, and requires the help of others, the nature of God is complete in itself. For God is Love. The love of the Eternal Father is for ever satisfied in the Eternal Son; the Father and the Son are for ever bound together in the Holy Spirit, who is the bond of the Divine Love.

We have adopted (in a form somewhat more suited to modern ears) an analogy whch has been of old used for the illustration of this mysterious doctrine in the Catholic Church.[1] It appeals with varying force to different minds, and must always be used with caution, and under a strong sense of its limitations. The last thing it pretends to be is a rationalization of the doctrine. What it seems to us to do is to help out thought, but not to subject the doctrine to the limitations of thought. We have already argued that the doctrine of the Incarnation, if true, satisfies the various longings and aspirations of which man had long been conscious, but which he could never prove for himself. The analogy which we have drawn from the personal nature of man does the same thing in another sphere. It implies or suggests rather than proves that the strangely difficult and mysterious conception of God which is the result of the Incarnation does not prevent our continuing to believe that man is formed in the image of God. It throws light upon those phrases in which our Lord has used the unity of the Godhead as a type of the unity among His Disciples—phrases which must always tend to suggest an impersonal absorption into a Divine essence, unless the Trinitarian idea of God be maintained. And still further, it shows that human personality is a pale and piece-

[1] The most elaborate presentation of the analogy between the human self and the Nature of God is to be found in S. Aug., *De Trin.* Bks. ix.–xv. In developing it, S. Aug. speaks of three powers in human nature, memoria, intelligentia, and voluntas; of which the last is the basis of amor. Each of these acts in reflexive manner, and the unity of the self consists in the complete and rightly-ordered activity of the three.

meal copy of the Divine rather than a type upon which we may form our conceptions of the Divine. In other words, the Trinitarian expression of the doctrine that God is Love imposes limits and safeguards upon our old enemy, anthropomorphism. It gives us the threefold relation as really existing in the nature of God; it rejects the limitations of time and place through which man gradually and partially realizes his human personality. This, we think, is what our analogy does for us; but we must not omit to describe its limitations.

We have said that it cannot pretend to rationalize the doctrine. In this we have virtually said all, but it will be well to expand the statement a little further. It tells us nothing more than the Bible tells us. In the Bible we learn to believe in one God. Through the Incarnation we learn to discern in this unity the operation of Three, whom we call Persons. Yet we also speak of belief in a personal God, and we use different terms to describe the relation of the Father and the Son, and the Father and Spirit. Our analogy makes it dimly intelligible to us how Monotheism may be in no way inconsistent with Trinitarianism. But there it stops. To work it out in detail and press the terms of it is likely enough to lead us into false analogy. This is specially true in regard to the Third Person. It is easy to see that the object of Divine Love can be of no lower mode of Being than that of a Person: we cannot conceive the Divine Love satisfied in that which is inferior to this. But beyond this we tread with uncertain steps. Between two men who love one another there subsists a certain relation: within each of them a certain habit of emotion as regards the other. The relation has reality, no doubt: but one is tempted to regard it as a conceptual reality, *i.e.*, a way in which they may be regarded from outside; it is not natural to think of any actual link holding them together. On the other hand, it must be said that this account of the matter assumes an exclusive theory of the

individual, such as we have now rejected: and that it may be, therefore, legitimate to argue (1) that the love of individuals points to a real unity among men, which is more than merely conceptual, though not necessarily subject to physical tests, and (2) that such a bond may be in the highest type of Love conceived as Personal, in the same sense as with reference to the Father and the Son. If it be true that it is ultimately the presence of the unifying Spirit of God that makes all men one in spite of all varieties, we may well think of the Bond of Love as personal, in the unity which is the ideal and type of unity set before us by Christ—the unity of God.

We cannot leave this subject without entering upon a question which has been productive of much dissension in the Church—the question of the Procession of the Holy Ghost. The Nicæno-Constantinopolitan Creed, in its original form, asserted only the Procession from the Father: in the West, first in Spain and then gradually in almost all the Western Churches, the Filioque clause, as it was called, was added, so that the Creed now runs, 'Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son.' This addition, owing to political and ecclesiastical rivalries between East and West, was made the overt occasion of the schism between the churches which has lasted till the present day. Two questions are involved in the discussion, one, whether the addition was canonically made, the other, whether it was dogmatically sound. As to the first point, there seems to be little doubt that the Eastern Church was in the right. The Council of Chalcedon had ordered that the Creed of Nicea should be accepted by all orthodox churches throughout the world in the form in which it then stood (*i.e.*, without the Filioque) and that no addition should be made thenceforward without the decision of a General Council. Now the Filioque clause never possessed such sanction. It is asserted dogmatically for the first time in a Spanish provincial council (Toledo, A.D. 589), and seems

to have been really added by mistake.[1] It was never accepted by the Greek Church at all, and not by the Latin churches generally for about 300 years. It is difficult, therefore, to defend it on canonical grounds.

The dogmatic question is more intricate. The two practices of the Eastern and Western Churches as regards this clause seem to represent two prominently different modes of conceiving the relation between the three Persons. All Christians regard the Son as '*subordinate*' to the Father, even within the Godhead. And they mean by that phrase simply that His Being is derived—that, though He is God as truly and completely as the Father, He is still the Son and not the Father—generated, not the generator. It is true that the Arians laid hold of this point, and attempted to argue that their own account of the Son did not go beyond this: but the answer always remains that, according to Catholic tradition, the subordination of the Son involves no difference in nature; according to the Arians it does. The Son, being subordinate in this sense, is the instrument of all the Father's activity. Whatever the Father does, He does through the Son; the procession of the Holy Ghost is, therefore, from the Father through the Son. This is the phrase which the Greeks have always accepted, and are prepared to accept still, as the Bonn Conference has recently shown.[2] It is a phrase which is used by S. John Damascene—whose authority has largely determined the modern forms of their faith—and it is of importance in that it insists on the unity of the source of deity (μία πηγὴ θεότητος), a truth which, it was contended, was concealed by the Western phraseology. Moreover, it represents the process, if the phrase may be allowed, of the

[1] Cf. H. B. Swete, *History of the Doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, pp. 169, 170. 'Both the King and his Bishops believed [the words] to be a true part of the original Faith.'

[2] Cf. H. B. Swete, *op. cit.*, pp. 238, 239.

Godhead as following one principle, that of subordination. In its history, it seems to be associated more closely with metaphysical points of view than the other, and was attractive, therefore, to the Eastern mind, which rejoiced in accurate and subtle metaphysical definition.

As the subordination-doctrine was especially characteristic of the metaphysical Greeks, so the doctrine of the coinherence was more attractive to the non-metaphysical Westerns. It must not be supposed that the doctrine of the coinherence was absent from Greek theology, or that of the subordination of the Son and the Holy Spirit from the writings of Western theologians. All that is meant is that the one was more calculated to attract thinkers of a metaphysical turn of mind, and the other less. What, then, is the doctrine of the coinherence (περιχώρησις) of the three Persons? It is simply the dogmatic expression of our Lord's words in the last discourses in S. John, where He speaks of the Father as abiding *in* Himself, and of Himself as abiding in the Father. Thus (xvii. 21) we read, 'That they all may be one thing, as Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be in us.' And the passage in which our Lord describes the operation of the Holy Ghost is full of the same thought: 'He shall glorify Me, because He shall take of Mine and shall declare it unto you. All things which the Father hath are Mine, therefore said I that He taketh of Mine and shall declare it unto you.' The thought which these words contain is expressed formally by the doctrine of the coinherence; by which we affirm that the action of one person involves the co-operation of all, so indissoluble is the unity of the Godhead. Some discussion of this point will be found in S. Athanasius against the Arians (*Orat.*, III. xx.-xxii.); but the fullest and most elaborate account of the Holy Trinity from this point of view is that of S. Augustine in the great work to which reference has already been made, *De Trinitate*. The motive of this book is

to put into words somewhat more clearly than had as yet been done the two facts (1) that each Person inheres in the other two, and that the operation of one involves the operation of all; and (2) that, notwithstanding this, the mission of the Son is the work of the Father, the Incarnation the special manifestation of the Son, and the appearances at Pentecost and all that has followed the peculiar revelation of the Holy Spirit.[1]

The subject is discussed at great length, and with the greatest elaboration. The author searches all through nature and human life for analogies by which to make his meaning clearer, and his book has been the source of most speculation upon the subject in the West.

It is easy to see that this way of looking at the relations of the three Persons is far more nearly akin to the phrase added by the Westerns to the Nicene Creed than to that which the Eastern theologians prefer. The phrase 'through the Son' is more definite—enters too accurately into the nature, if we may so say, of the procession for the Western mind. Under the influence of S. Augustine Western theologians have thought more of the indissoluble unity of will and operation in the Holy Trinity than of the precise contribution (to speak in human language) of each single

[1] Cf. Aug., *De Trin.*, I. v. 5.—'But in this matter (*i.e.* the Catholic faith) some are disturbed when they hear that the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Ghost is God, and yet that they are not three Gods but one God; and they ask how to understand this, especially when it is said that the Trinity acts inseparably in everything which God does, and yet that a certain voice of the Father was heard, which was not the voice of the Son; that none but the Son was born in flesh, suffered, rose, and ascended into heaven; that none but the Holy Ghost came in the form of a dove—they wish to understand how the Trinity produced that voice which was the voice of the Father alone; and how again the Trinity created that flesh in which none but the Son was born of the Virgin; and how the same Trinity effected the form of the dove, in which none but the Holy Spirit appeared. . . . Since then men raise these questions, and they are an anxiety to ourselves, let us discuss them as we can, if by the gift of God our weakness has any knowledge on this matter.'

Person. To them, therefore, the indifferent conjunction 'and' is preferable to the definiteness of the Greek preposition 'through.' And the difficulty which the Greeks raised against their phraseology, that it slurred over the unity of the source of Godhead, can hardly have been before their minds. To say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son would not suggest to them a twofold origin or principle of Deity; it would simply affirm, with the indefiniteness of inadequate knowledge, the co-operation of the Son in that which the Father does.

We have entered somewhat more carefully into this matter than may seem quite necessary in a work of the present scale, because it is of great importance to insist that there is no radical dogmatic difference on this point between the Eastern and Western Churches. Both held precisely the same beliefs, and hold them still; but they describe them, as has been shown, in different ways. And a point like this could hardly have been a subject upon which two churches could have suspended communion, if it had not been for the rancour which political disputes imparted to the discussion.

But the question may still be asked, Which expression is preferable? Being in communion with the Western Church, and under Western influences, we not unnaturally prefer the Western use, and see reasons for preferring it. The Eastern phrase, as we have already hinted, is closely associated with metaphysical speculations. It marks the influence of the Greek philosophical types of thought upon the doctrines of the Church. Without in any degree implying any variation from absolute identity of essence between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, it still bears a somewhat striking resemblance to those systems of development which Platonism had devised by way of an explanation of the world. The aim of these was, as we have mentioned more than once, to explain the rise of the world as it is at present, from a Being

absolutely simple and changeless in nature. To this end the changeless Being was supposed to have evolved beings, like Himself indeed, but with a tendency away from Himself towards creation, through which, many or few as the case might be, creation was evolved. The subordination-idea, when applied to the Holy Trinity without qualification from the other point of view, is apt to look painfully like one of these speculations. And directly the phrases which express it become matter of controversy they tend to lose their due qualifications. The doctrine of the coinherence, on the other hand, is the peculiar property of Christian thought. It is impregnated through and through with the specially Christian belief in God as Love; without in any measure blurring or confusing the distinctions between the Persons, it keeps steadily in view the unity of God, and insists upon the co-operation of the whole Trinity of Persons in every act of God. And we believe that the Western phrase has arisen owing to the emphasis laid upon this doctrine by the greatest theologian of the West.

We have been chiefly concerned of late with mysteries. We have spoken to the best of our powers about the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, using as a guide the interpretation of it given by S. Augustine. And we have pointed out that the definition of it involved no presumption on the part of the Church, for the problem was set before it by the words of our Lord; and that no theory about it which regards it as a mere economy or condescension can be regarded as satisfactory. In some sense or another it states what is fact about God (indeed, if it does not, it is hard to see in what sense it is a concession to human infirmity, for it certainly does not make things easier); but we have not yet ventured upon the question what exactly it is that it does tell us, what it is that we regard as fact. To this we must now proceed.

What do we mean by Person as applied to the Father,

Son, and Holy Spirit? We have observed that the analogy of human personality and its complex self-realization fails us here. For men find themselves raised into completeness by means of others no less personal than they, no less independent and self-contained. And all these conditions are human; they belong to beings who are limited in time and space, who are enclosed in the prison-house of the flesh: union so accidental and dissoluble as that between man and man can hardly be applied directly to the indissoluble unity of the Godhead.

Let us ask first how we came to use this word *Person* at all. It is of course an inheritance from the Latin Church, and goes back to the days of Tertullian. In Roman law, from which some have derived its use, it means a holder of legal rights. In this sense it would not be quite coextensive with our word 'person.' For we should call a slave a person, though he was incapable of sustaining legal rights, and we should not call a Corporation or College a 'person,' though legal rights may be vested in one. These differences of usage serve to bring out the central meaning of the Latin word: we may paraphrase it 'one who performs, or is capable of, certain functions.' The term is applied in view of these alone, nothing is said of any other characters he may sustain. If this legal phraseology is the origin of the use of the word, there is no Greek theological phrase which precisely corresponds with it. But there is another theory of its origin which connects it with the Greek *πρόσωπον*. This word and its Latin equivalent mean 'a character' in a play, and referred originally to the mask worn by the actor rather than to the part he played. Whatever be the exact history of *πρόσωπον* and *persona* in the sense of *πρόσωπον*, there can be no doubt that the words are inadequate to the purpose required of them. They tend to mean merely 'aspects' of a Divine substance, and therefore savour of Sabellianism.

On the Greek side there are two words which are of importance here—*οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*. They seem originally to have been almost equivalent terms; that is, it seems to have been equally accurate to say that there is one *οὐσία*, or that there is one *ὑπόστασις* in the nature of God. But by degrees, through a process which we need not describe in detail, *ὑπόστασις* was reserved to express the three Persons, while *οὐσία* was used as before for the Divine Substance. Thus it would become necessary to speak of one *οὐσία* and three *ὑποστάσεις*. This change caused some stir in the West. The Latins had translated *ὑπό-στασις* into *sub-stantia*, and used *substantia* as an equivalent to *οὐσία*. It was, therefore, a great shock to Jerome on going to the East to find theologians there speaking of three *ὑποστάσεις*, which he, of course, translated '*tres substantias*.' In the end *persona* is used where *ὑπόστασις* would be used in Greek, and *substantia* is restricted to the sense of *οὐσια*. The word *ὑπόστασις* was a metaphysical word, for which we have no exact equivalent. Having originally meant the sediment at the bottom of a fluid, it came to mean the substratum or ground of qualities, and so a person, that is, the underlying reality upon which various characters and experiences are based.[1] It is plain that this is too strong a word, as *persona* was seen to be too weak. It goes too far in the way of separation, and inclines towards Tritheism, as the other word had inclined towards Sabellianism.

Let us now ask what it is that we know of each of the three Divine Persons. Of the Father we know that He so loved the world that He sent His Son into it to save it; that He is the source of all that the Son does (S. John v. 19);

[1] It is worth mentioning that in Heraclides Ponticus the verb *ὑφίστασθαι* constantly means to play the part of, to represent, which may possibly connect *ὑπόστασις* with *persona* in the sense of 'mask.' Cf. for instance, *Hom. All.*, chap. lxv.

that He has sent us a Comforter in place of the presence of His Son Incarnate. That is, the Father is the ultimate source of all activity and of the whole scheme of things. To Him also all things are to return (1 Cor. viii. 6); when the Son shall have yielded up the sovereignty which has been delivered unto Him and God becomes all in all (1 Cor. xv. 28). Of the Son we know that He is the Instrument by whom the Father acts: He is the Word of God, His Wisdom, the Person by whom the Father is naturally and properly revealed—both in nature and in the Incarnation. Hence come His functions as Mediator between God and man; this is the reason, so far as we can see it, why it was the Son who was incarnate; there is, to speak technically, a special congruity with the Person of the Son in the Incarnation. And of the Holy Spirit we know that He brooded over creation and evoked its order; that by the Spirit of God the Word came to the prophets and holy men of old, so that they spake as they were moved. But the chief and crowning manifestation of the Holy Spirit is in the Church. Since the day of Pentecost the Holy Spirit has been upon the Church, guiding it and revealing to it the revelation of the Son. And He has a function in the hearts of individuals also—to interpret them, their wants and aspirations, to God. He instructs, consoles, purifies, quickens both the Church as a whole and its individual members. If we put this shortly, the Spirit puts into operation the will of the Father, reflected in the Word. The Son, as S. Irenæus wrote, is the *measure* of the Father (*mensura patris*)—the object of His love; and through the Holy Spirit's agency the will of the Father displayed objectively in the Son is made effectual in the world and in the hearts of men—the Divine Love and the eternal object of the Divine Love are held together in perfect realization.

So far we have merely been expressing in language more

or less technical what the Bible tells us—describing the several functions which the Bible mentions in distinctness but without explanation. And that means that we have been dealing with the Holy Trinity as revealed. From the point of view of revelation, then, we know the separateness of the Persons by their separateness of function. They are revealed as really three, and as performing three separate types of action, and we know their Personality through the separate functions which they perform. For us, then, and within the limits of our knowledge, the Personality of the Father consists in His being the source and fount of all existence and activity, will and love; the Personality of the Son lies just in the fact that He is the objective expression of the Father's will, His Word and His Wisdom; the distinct Personality of the Holy Ghost lies in His separate functions of interpretation and inspiration. These things we know on the authority of Christ in Scripture, and we may well hesitate to insist upon a greater separateness than these Scriptural distinctions imply. The word 'person' with us no doubt suggests a greater distinctness and exclusiveness; but then, it is not weighted with the necessity of preserving absolute unity of *substance*, throughout the difference. On the other hand, we have no right to assume that the distinctions found in Holy Scripture mean less than they say; that is that they are descriptions of different modes of activity, as a man might be said to will, to think, to act. Partly, because, if we do this, we find ourselves with a considerable amount of our Lord's language before us, of which no account can be given at all; and partly because we shall then be driven back upon a conception of the nature of God which we have seen reason to reject. We shall have to return upon the old speculations of natural religion: we shall have to accept a Pantheistic or a Deistic view of God. It will be virtually Pantheism if we think of God as finding the eternal object

of His love in the world, because this makes the world necessary to the completeness of the being of God, and if we deny the plurality in the Godhead the world is the only object left; it will be Deism if we look upon Him simply as creator without further interest or intelligible motive in His dealing with the world.

We are now in a position to sum up the results of our investigation so far as it has gone, and to define the affinities, historical and other, of the Catholic Creed. We have learnt that the Church has been led to formulate the scattered hints and unexplained allusions of Scripture in a definite shape, and that the form which its theology has taken is as follows: Each Person—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost—is Divine; is God as fully and completely as if He were alone—each is ὅλος Θεὸς. This is nothing more than a bare restatement of the Scriptural allusions. But there comes a time when development is necessary, when it becomes necessary to say with precision and accuracy what this statement carries with it, what it excludes, what it leaves undefined. Starting from the words of Christ, let fall, as one might say, at different times, and especially on the last evening before the Passion, the Church has further affirmed that this Tri-personality must not be so construed as either to reduce the distinction of the Persons to the level of mere aspects or modes of an unknown Divine substance, or to accentuate their individuality to the point of separation. Though each is by Himself God and Lord, yet the Three cannot act separately. God is One, although this unity breaks up as we gaze into a Trinity of Persons. We must insist again that this does not mean any independent or self-willed speculation — is no presumptuous pretence of knowledge where knowledge cannot be had; it is simply the necessarily elaborate expression of truths which underlie the Bible language; it is, as S. Augustine often calls it,

catholica sanitas, the sound mind of the Catholic Church.[1] Also, it is a development of Monotheism: it arises out of the consideration of the unity of God. The unity of God does not mean the common element in the Three Persons; that would be Tritheism—a belief in three individuals forming a class known as God. Instead of this, we hold firm the old faith in one God, but accept, too, the light which the Incarnation has thrown upon it. Just as sometimes—to use a faint parallel—a star, which for ages has been known as single, proves under more accurate observations to be two or more, held together in a single system.

We pointed out, some few pages back, that the Trinitarian idea of God comes in to meet and solve certain difficulties arising in connexion with the personality of man. We propose to illustrate now its theological affinities in two other directions. We propose to show that it alone satisfies the idea of God as a moral Being, and that it alone satisfies the idea of God as a personal Being. The first of these points will not take us far beyond positions already attained. So far as the inner coherence of things is concerned, we have already shown that this doctrine offers the best and truest way of dealing with the revelation of God as Love. It enables us to escape the dangers of Pantheism and Deism alike. But we have said nothing as yet very definitely of the historical affinities of the Catholic doctrine. It is necessary to speak of this, because it is constantly affirmed that the primitive Church knew nothing of the doctrine, but that it was passed off upon the Church of the fourth century by means of the influence of purely Greek speculation. We have not ventured to decide the question of the origin of the Logos doctrine, which is the central point of the discussion; the evidence at hand is hardly sufficient, we think, for a decision. Now, however, that we have before us a

[1] Cf. *De Trin.*, II. xiii. 23.

fuller notion of what the Church doctrine really is, something may be said as to its real affinities. It seems to us to stand in the very strongest contrast to anything which Greek speculation produced, in several ways. The Greek speculations, the results of which are offered as parallels to the Christian Trinity, are of a purely metaphysical kind. They have no interest in moral life except in so far as it is a necessary part of the evolution of the world. Morality (to speak chiefly of systems in vogue after the time of Christ) was the method by which an escape was sought from the pains and labours of life—in no sense a method of self-development with a view to another. Stoicism and Neo-platonism were the loftiest of post-Christian systems, and both are motived by despair.[1] Knowledge is the method of virtue, and virtue a method of escape from knowledge—indeed from consciousness at all. It is in harmony with this view of life that the metaphysical account of the world is constructed. The world is referred to God as cause, but it is felt that some reason must be assigned for His allowing the evolution of such a world—where the soul is sunk in matter and needs emancipation in order to be itself, or to be absorbed into the soul of the world. Hence Theology and Physics lie close together; Theology is the explanation of the Divine and physical causation of things.

It is clear that no such systems can have room for an Incarnation. The only remedy afforded by them for the present state of things is to clear it all away and begin afresh; the last thing to be thought of would be the entry of a Divine Person upon the human field. How could such a one be defiled with matter? But the Trinitarian idea, as we have seen, arises out of and depends upon the truth of the Incarnation. A system, therefore, which has no room for an Incarnation has no ultimate affinity with the Christian Trinity,

[1] Cf. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, Bd. I. (ed. i.), pp. 662–680.

however like it some of its speculations may appear in form. Trinitarianism runs back upon a moral conception of God, whereas the Hellenic interest is predominantly metaphysical.

If Greece, then, cannot help us, let us turn to Judæa. We have seen already that the Jewish mind found a very slight attraction in metaphysical questions. The Jews did not feel the Greek impulse to form a connected system of the whole world outside them, a system in which there should be no break and no irreconcileable difference of nature. To their minds God was always separate from the world; revealed through it, indeed, but existing beyond it with an inexhaustible fulness of light and life. He created it out of nothing, by His Word, and it stood fast; and now He rules it with His Wisdom. The existence of the world displays the Divine power, the ordering of it His wisdom. Man comes into relation with God in the mere fact of his existence as a part of the natural world; he is created like the rest of things. But of him God makes the demand to be holy like Himself. It is by holiness of life, by the fear of the Lord, that man finds himself in harmony with the Divine counsels, and therefore with the ordering of the world. It is not the knowledge of any philosophical principle which can give man his true wisdom; it is the fear of the Lord, and to depart from evil, which constitutes human wisdom and human understanding. The point to notice here is that in following out this moral principle man likens himself to God; he becomes wise with the Wisdom of God, whereas the fool fails in all things to attain the measure of a man. Even the ceremonial law, minute and trifling as its provisions appear to us, is a symbol of the purity and separateness of one who lives after the manner in which God would have him live. 'I am the Lord' is the ultimate sanction with which one important section of the ceremonial law is enforced (cf. Lev. xvii.–xxvi.).

It is true that as time went on the familiar intercourse, so to speak, which this conception of God implied between God and man seemed to offend against the feelings of reverence. And by degrees the majesty of God became transcendent. His immediate touch was no longer believed to lie upon the world and man. His Name was never uttered but on the most solemn occasion in the year. His place as immediate Disposer of earthly things was taken by the Word and the Wisdom of God—ideas which tended to take on a personal character. But though withdrawn from the immediate conduct of the world, the God of the Jews remained an active and holy Person. It was not because action, with its suggestion of change; purpose, with its suggestion of choice, of means, and limitation; love and anger, with their apparently material implications—it was not because these were impossible to a vacant and inactive abstraction that God became transcendent. For these were never separated from Him. He acts, governs, loves as before, but these activities are manifested to the world through His Word, His Wisdom, His Spirit. These attributes are, as it were, the portion of His glory—*i.e.* the fulness of His Nature and Character, which the weak eyes of mankind can bear to see. In the Greek speculation the starting-point is bare simplicity, from which a movement is made towards variety and complexity; to the Jew, the Wisdom and the Word of God are but the revealed fragment of the inconceivable fulness of Divine life. As with Moses in the cleft, man could not see the glory of the Lord; the goodness of the Lord is made to pass before him, and His Name is proclaimed before him. He sees the 'back parts of the Lord,' but His face may not be seen.

It would be difficult to imagine any two points of view more diametrically opposed than these two—the Greek and the Jewish. The ideal of their thought is different; they

look for truth in different directions. One finds God in the ultimate result of the processes of thought; the other thinks of Him as partly revealed in nature, partly in the moral life, still more in history. The one trusts simply his own powers of analysis and speculation; the other relies on communicated information, expressly denying that man by wisdom can find out God. The notion of God in the one case is prominently, if not wholly, intellectual; in the other it is ethical through and through.

If this account of the two chief lines of ancient Theology be true, it follows that the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity is continuous with Jewish religious developments and not with Greek. The Jew had learnt certain facts about the action of God in the world and His attitude towards it. The Incarnation reveals these more precisely, and thereby manifests the truth of the Holy Trinity. It is not intended to deny that the Christian doctrine in later days learned to adopt many forms and expressions of Greek origin. But the history of Arianism, as we have already described it, will show the readiness of the Church to adapt as well as to adopt, to modify the language it borrows in order to avoid modifying its thoughts.[1]

One more point remains. We have now to show that Trinitarianism is the necessary completion of Theism. Theism consists in the belief in one God, who is personal, eternal, and capable of self-revelation. It differs from Pantheism in that it maintains a severance of nature between God and the world; it declines to admit any fusion or indistinctness, whereas Pantheism, in one way or another, regards the world as a necessary part of the Divine Being. And it differs from Deism in that it insists upon a close and permanent relation between God and the world so long as the world exists.

[1] Further illustrations might be found in the history of words like εἰκών and λόγος.

It must not be supposed that Deism and Pantheism have not many arguments in their favour. There are many reasons which can be alleged in favour of these positions and against Theism, which is their negation. Our point here is, then, that these anti-Theistic arguments only lose their force completely when Theism perfects itself in Trinitarianism. The difficulty of Deism is that it involves a mechanical view of the world's order. God is practically excluded from it. Regarded as its necessary cause, He is excluded from any further relation with the world. Deism takes away with one hand what it gives with the other. It starts with the assurance that God made the world; but it so limits this notion of cause as virtually to separate the world and God. On the other hand, it escapes many of the difficulties which arise out of the present state of things when compared with the nature of God. It avoids any semblance of making God responsible for evil; He made the world good enough, and then it deflected from this standard on its own account. Whereas evil is the great crux of Pantheism. For the tendency to identify God with the world, or to regard it as a necessary condition of His being, is to take evil right into His nature; since all must admit that evil is here. The great advantage of Pantheism is that it avoids the mechanical consequences of Deism, and brings God near to man. It appeals to the consciousness of art and poetry, and gives to all nature and all modes of life a dignity and beauty which have in them something of the Divine. These are the superficial characteristics of the two points of view. They run back upon certain theoretical positions which give them their particular character. Deism depends upon a particular view of cause. A cause, according to it, is the effectual occurrence or act by which a certain result is called into being. The cause and the effect are considered quite separately, the cause being supposed to leave off when the

effect begins. This is probably the popular and ordinary view of causation. When we look at the difficulty of Deism, just mentioned above, in this light, it is seen to be a much more serious one than was supposed. God, according to the Deist, was cause of the world, after which His functions were over. But in the light of what we have just said, this will mean, that God is no longer necessary at all; there is no place for Him in the world. He appeared in answer to a necessity of thought, which is satisfied when the world has come into being. The religious associations of the word God may lead us still to talk of Him as existent, but everything would be just the same if the effort of creation had annihilated Him. The difficulty of Deism is, then, that it means practical atheism. It cuts at the roots of all positive conceptions of God—His personality, His eternity, His goodness.

Pantheism also has its notion of cause lying at its root, and it is diametrically opposed to that of Deism. Causation, from this point of view, is an immanent process, as it is technically called—that is, it consists in the balance of two related forces. The effect is as necessary to complete the cause, as the cause to bring the effect into being. They stand and fall together. When one ceases the other ceases too. This explanation, as in the other case, tends to bring the difficulty of Pantheism into clearer light. God is still cause of the world, but He is immanent cause. The world (evil and all) is the correlative of His existence. Without the world He would have no means of self-expression. He would vanish into blank nothingness.

Theism, in the Unitarian sense, tries to cut between these two difficulties. It endeavours to believe in God as separate in nature from the world, yet *necessarily* living and eternal. Instead of accepting the Deistic view of Him as merely a cause, it endeavours to find Him functions in the world as

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created. It inclines to allow that He occasionally interferes with the progress of the world—alters its movement to suit a special occasion, works a miracle here and there. It accepts the Bible account of revelation, thinks of God ruling in history, believes in the special mission of Christ, as a godly man, and so on. But then it comes into violent collision with all orderly speculation about nature. It is not at this stage philosophical at all; it is eclectic; it aims at combining and selecting out of a variety of possible positions, and its collision with the man of science reveals its weaknesses only too clearly. The occasional interferences by which it had hoped to keep up a divine influence upon things are shown to be impossible, to render all serious scientific effort hazardous and liable to disappointment. It is shown, too, that they must imply weakness if they are, as is contended, occasional. They must mean that the original plan of the world was found not to answer, and was patched up as occasion required. Slowly but surely it is driven over by this kind of criticism into a more or less Pantheistic position. It loses hold of the idea of a personal God; for it becomes more and more difficult to think of a lonely being with no object for His love or interest. Or perhaps it finds its chief trouble over the idea of eternity. How can this lonely solitary Being while away the endless years till the creation dawns upon it? The whole theory becomes repulsive, and the warmth of life which Pantheism brings becomes attractive. For Pantheism never leaves God alone. The world is always there, always expressing the will of the Spirit, from whose will it springs, or rather, whose will it perpetually represents. In one case, and, as far as we know, one only, space is made to play the part of the object of the Divine activity. This is in Dr. Martineau's *Study of Religion*, Bk. II. ch. i. We do not propose to discuss it at length, because we do not think that the theory as it stands is likely to be popular.

We only mention it in order to illustrate the straits to which pure Theism is driven in its endeavour to avoid Pantheism and Deism alike. Dr. Martineau, of course, is a philosopher, and the form of Christianity which he represents so ably is credited with being the most philosophical type of it. We are inclined to think, on the other hand, that Unitarian Theism is rather a compromise between a philosophical belief in God and the theory of His nature which depends on revelation. The philosophical theory is bandied about between the two tendencies of Transcendence and Immanence, and Theism tries, ineffectually, as we think, to mediate between them.

Trinitarianism, however, satisfies the conditions which Theism fails to satisfy. By its assertion of a plurality of persons in the Godhead it avoids the dangers which are fatal to Unitarian Theism. There need be no talk of space or of a world co-eternal with God upon a Trinitarian theory of His nature. We have already shown that the Word and the Holy Spirit answer every condition which we can require of this kind. And the identification of the nature of God with love enables us to shadow out the motive which may have been at the root of the world's existence. It enables us to shadow it out and no more, for we are not so far masters of the ultimate purposes of God as to see how the original counsels are being carried forward to their attainment. What we can see is consistent with the motives that we know.

But it may be asked, Is not Trinitarianism, then, after all, a mere matter of philosophical speculation, a means of satisfying philosophical problems, and not a matter for a Creed? The answer is, that it is nothing of the kind. The fact that it satisfies, or appears to some to satisfy, certain philosophical questions is not part of its essence, as it were. In itself, as we have so often argued, it is the

amplification, the explicit statement of the fact of the Incarnation. Its first appearance is made in the most unphilosophical region of the world. But, once grasped as a matter of fact, it is seen to involve a certain attitude towards questions of philosophy. It does not hold aloof from all these. It carries with it an answer to them. And in order to make this plain, the Church may and will use the language of philosophy. It will express its answers to the philosophical problem in the terms which philosophy employs at the time, just as it teaches its Creed, in contents if not in form, to various nations in the language which they speak.

This fact will define the limits within which restatement of the articles of the Catholic faith will be possible. The philosophical language changes from age to age. The philosophical questions are asked in different ways at different times. At all times men have sought to bring into system the three great facts in experience—the soul, the world, and God. But the problem has been expressed in different forms. In Greece little was said about the soul. It was assumed that man could know the world and God, and the problem was to order and systematize the knowledge he had—to build up a scheme of thoughts which should correspond with and reproduce the scheme of things outside. And the Church entered upon this question and gave its answer. Its doctrine of God, besides everything else that it was, offered a solution of this question, which could be expressed in the technical language of the day. Some modifications had to be made, some associations had to be set aside. But, for the most part, the philosophical language of the Church was the language of the Greek philosophic schools, just as the ordinary language of Alexandrian Christians was Greek. In the present day our problem is differently expressed: it is to explain the possibility of our knowledge of God and of the world. Here,

again, the old doctrines may be translated into the language which this new aspect of the matter requires, just as the Nicene Creed may be translated into English. The new light, which the investigation leading to the new problem brings, will aid us in restatement. If we may use a portion of the present chapter as an illustration, the peculiar form given to the analogy of human personality to the Holy Trinity is one which does not occur in S. Augustine, but is suggested by more modern speculations. To have recited the Augustinian parallels pure and simple would not, we hope, have involved any departure from our present point of view. But to have done so would have made it necessary to introduce a dissertation upon the psychology of Augustine's day in order to make it reasonably intelligible that there was an analogy at all. It is not quite the same with articles of the Creed, such as the famous Homoousion. This also requires translation; it must be expressed in the language in which we think. But it is the formal definition of the Church of one age, continually accepted by successive ages, of the Catholic belief as to the nature of the Son. It expresses the conviction that Jesus Christ is Son of God. We may translate this into any *language* we like, but we cannot explain it away without a total departure from the ancient faith of Christendom. To say, therefore, that it has only a historic interest, as representing the point of view of that day, does not quite correspond with the facts. It is the Nicene form given to the thought that Christ is Son of God, just as ὁμοούσιον is the Greek word expressed in English by the phrase "of one substance." The real matter is one of fact, of truth or falsity, and not of expression merely.

We have now concluded our account of the Christian doctrine of God. We contend that it is the result of revelation, by which we do not mean that it was thrust in upon the mind of man without any relation to his own

method of thought, or that the Word of God had no influence upon the minds of thinkers outside the lines of the Jewish and Christian faiths; but that its certainty is greater than any which can be reached by merely human methods. The nature of this certainty consists largely in certain coincidences. It consists in the coincidence of the Christian doctrine of God, as flowing from the Person of Christ, with the highest and best aspirations of man's heart and mind. But more than this, it satisfies questionings which, but for it, could never have arisen. It is not, therefore, a human solution of the world's problem, more successful than others, but it comes from a knowledge of the actual conditions of things which is wider than any that man can boast. All human speculations, so far as they are true, find place under its shadow, and yet there is room.

This fact justifies the method which we described in the Introduction. So far from being an advantage to the Creed to be capable of demonstration by ordinary speculative methods, such an event would be the demonstration that its claim was false. The method proper to Theology will not be that of a science of which human experience supplies all the subject-matter. In Theology we shall have done our utmost, and done, too, all that any one has a right to expect, if we show the coherence of the Articles of the Creed with the ultimate needs of man.

The Doctrine of God.—Sabellianism, etc., *Tert.*, Adv. Praxeam. *S. Ath.*, Or. adv. Ar. IV. *S. Bas.*, Ep. 210. Trinitarianism, *Didymus*, De Trin. *S. Basil*, De Spiritu Sancto. *S. Aug.*, De Trinitate. *S. Thom. Aq.*, Summa, Pt. I. Quæst. xxviii.-xliii. *Waterland*, On the Trinity. *Lux Mundi*, Essay ii. *Martineau*, Study of Religion, Bk. II. ch. i. *Moberly*, Atonement and Personality. *Illingworth*, Personality.

For the Relation of the Doctrine to Greek Thought.—*Cudworth*, True and Intellectual System. *Morgan*, The Trinity of Plato and Plotinus. *Hatch*, Hibbert Lectures.

General History of the Doctrine.—*Baur*, Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit.

For Theories and Experiments as to the Human Self.—*James*, Psychology. *Ency. Britt.*, art. Psychology, by J. Ward.

CHAPTER V

THE DOCTRINE OF MAN: CREATION—FALL—ATONEMENT

TILL recent years Creation would have seemed an easy subject to describe. It would have been enough to cite the evidence of the first chapter of Genesis, and then it would have been assumed that the meaning was plain; that God made separately the various kinds of animals, as a man might make various kinds of figures in wood or stone. The exact analysis of the idea of Creation was practically ignored. It would have been thought sufficient to mention it as a fact. But the doctrine of evolution has changed all this. It is no longer possible to speak of Creation and suppose that its meaning is clear; the exact sense in which God is believed to be in contact with the created world has to be explained.

Two ideas seem to be essential to the notion of Creation: (1) that God was really and exclusively the agent in the production of the created world; (2) that the process occurred in time. We must consider both these points somewhat carefully.

I. God is really and exclusively the agent in the production of the created world. In the last chapter we said that the Trinitarian view of God relieved us of the pantheistic necessity of conceiving the world as a necessary condition of the completeness of the Divine Life. The Holy Trinity

is eternally complete, needing nothing from without; the world has no necessary existence, it depends for its being simply upon the fiat of God. It is sometimes argued that this theory of Creation really involves a degradation of God, since it contradicts His attributes of changelessness and infinity, and implies the operation of motives of desire and want, thus suggesting material limitations. The argument that the changelessness of God is affected by Creation turns on the assumption that before the created world started into being, God must have meant not to create, that He then changed His mind and brought the world into being. We are not in a position to discuss this fully as yet, because it raises the difficulty of understanding *time* in connexion with the Divine purpose. We may, however, answer provisionally that though God cannot change His will, He may will a change,[1] and that we have no reason for saying that the will to create was the fruit of a sudden or accidental motive.

The question of infinity is more serious. It seems to involve a real limitation upon the infinity of God, that He should fix definite laws for created existence and allow a thought to take shape, as it were, outside Himself in an independent fashion. Moreover the existence of a motive for creation, a desire to embody an idea in a created world, seems, of itself, an infraction of the Infinite. How, it may be asked, can an infinite Being be said to be conscious of anything like a desire without contradiction? It is true, that if the desire arose from without, and was caused, as in the case of men, by some change occurring independently of the subject of it, such a position would be in contradiction with the idea of Infinity. But it is quite different if the desire depends solely upon the will of the Infinite, and if the realization of it, even though it may involve limitation, is

[1] S. Thom. Aq., *Summa Theol.*, Pt. I. Quæst. xix. Art. vii.

self-chosen. It is quite possible that Creation may mean in some sense a self-limitation on the part of God, though we cannot fully understand in what sense. But it will be remembered that in the last chapter we quoted an ancient doctrine mentioned by S. Irenæus, that the nature of God is self-limiting; the Father, writes S. Irenæus, is unmeasured, the Son is the measure of the Father.[1] And we cannot but think that this thought is far truer, we believe, and more suitable to the notion of God than the popular epithet infinite. This word is purely negative in its associations; it means literally nothing but the absence of all limits. And there is nothing in it to show that it does not include the absence of all positive existence. Positive existence involves limitations of a certain kind; it is impossible to imagine a being who has not some definite character, *i.e.* who is not also necessarily without certain other definite characters; and if all positive characteristics are equally derogatory to an Infinite Being, there is nothing for it but to deny His existence.[2]

Moreover, such a conception of God leaves out of account any idea of personal activity and life which we have seen to be vital to Christian theology; for these are no less unworthy of a Being conceived negatively as Infinite than actual limitations. And thus the notion of God will tend to belong to an atmosphere, as it were, which is beneath personal being; for a dead, motionless, and characterless person is incon-

[1] 'Pater immensus, mensura Patris Filius,' *Adv. Hær.* IV. iv. 2.

[2] It has been maintained, as we mentioned above, p. 94, by a certain class of theologians that the truest form in which we can conceive of the existence of God is a negation—that non-existence is as true of God as existence, because His mode of Being must be so widely diverse from anything of which we can have experience that every account of Him must be wrong. We are inclined to think that the strong insistence in modern times upon the conception of infinity has some survival of that negative point of view still remaining in it, and that it is open to the same objections. Cf. Philo, *Leg. All.* I. xv. S. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* V. xi. 72, 82, 83. Plot., *Enn.* VI. ix. 3. Dion. Areop., *De Div. Nom.* i. 1, 3, 4. Scot. Erig., *De Div. Nat.* i. 14.

a new purpose or idea. God being, as S. Athanasius expresses it, the source of all goodness, builds a world in which He may set forth His glory. There is no thought here of an incitement from without; the act of Creation is a flowing-out and a new expression of the Eternal Law of the Divine Being. In the words of the song of the four living creatures in the Apocalypse, 'Thou didst create all things, and because of Thy will they are and were created.' What is obscure, and must, at present at any rate, remain obscure, is the entry of this act into time. If we have been right in saying that the world is no necessary element in the Divine Life, then Creation must have taken place in time; that is, the self-manifestation of God which *is* Creation is not to be regarded as eternal, though the Love of God resting upon the Son, and conveyed through the Holy Spirit, is to be so regarded.

II. These preliminary difficulties being thus provisionally discussed, we may take for granted that Creation implies that God is really and exclusively the agent in the process by which the world came into being. We must now consider the other idea which appears essential to the notion of Creation, viz., that the process occurs in time. This point is by no means an easy one to discuss. We may express the truth which the phrase above conveys by saying that neither the world nor the matter of which it is composed is eternal. In so saying, we place ourselves in antagonism with the position of Plato and many others who have followed him. According to these thinkers, Creation consists in giving form to a pre-existent matter, co-eternal with God. God, according to Plato, finds matter floating in a chaotic condition, and, having no envy in His nature, gives it form and order, thus producing the world. This resembles in some respects the theory which we regard as the true one; at any rate, it seems to admit that the world is a product in time.[1] But it

[1] Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 29E-30B Philo Jud., *De Opif. Mundi*, chap. v.

is open to objection on other grounds. It reduces the action of God from that of a creator to that of an artificer; it makes Him dependent upon the character of His material; and when taken in connexion with the Platonic doctrine of the superior reality of the soul and its degradation by inclusion in matter, it ceases to explain the world at all. No purpose is served by the inclusion of the soul in matter, and the act seems to remain a manifestation of aimless benevolence.[1]

We maintain, then, that creation implies that the world came into being in time, and at this point a huge crop of difficulties arises. For, as we have already seen in part, we find ourselves at all points applying the form of time to the actions of God. We have argued that there is nothing derogatory to the nature of God in willing a change, though we cannot believe that He can change His will. We have endeavoured to show that the Creation is an act of God manifesting no new law of being, but carrying out that which we believe to be His nature. But still, we cannot avoid the admission that in some sense Creation implies a new movement, a thought, eternal perhaps in itself, which yet takes shape and is externalized in time. Certainly we are here engaged on the most perilous ground; we are dealing with a subject where the danger of anthropomorphism in its worst sense is strongest. Let us consider how the action of God is described in Scripture in this regard. Nothing is clearer than that God, in some sense, waits for *moments*—the due moments for action. The promise to Abraham waits for its fulfilment till the iniquity of the Canaanitish peoples is filled up (cf. Gen. xv. 16). So in the New Testament it is when the fulness of time has come that God sends His Son (Gal. iv. 4). And during that Son's incarnate life the same principle is at work. Christ acts and suffers when His hour is come (S. John xiii. 1). The powers of darkness must wait

[1] Cf. S. Ath., *De Inc.*, chap. ii. §§ 3-5.

for the hour when the Divine counsels permit their doing their worst upon the Son of God (S. Luke xxii. 53). Till then they are powerless. There is, then, on its human side, a sense in which the purposes of God express themselves in time.

But it is never easy for us to express or conceive the connexion, for the simple reason that we know so little about time. For us, it is a necessary condition of our experience that we know things in succession; it is the only way in which we become sensible of our personal being. We recognize ourselves as the same through a long series of varied experiences, and are thus aware of ourselves. Our plans, our hopes, our desires take time to realize. However rapidly they may become effectual in the world, there is an interval between the moment when we form them, and the moment when they take shape outside of us. This law of temporal succession is, as we have already noticed, an ultimate condition of our life; more almost than anything it is a sign of our bondage to the external world. And it has already shown itself to be a fatal principle to apply to the Divine life. It was this rock upon which Arius split. He attempted to force the form of time upon the generation of the Son, and ended by denying that the Son was God at all. Must we confess, then, that we have reached the insoluble — that there is an irreconcilable contradiction between the language of Scripture and the laws of our thought? Before we admit this absolutely, let us ask the question in a somewhat different way.

What exactly is the consequence of the two alternative answers? If we say that the world is eternal, what is the result? What is the result again of trying to think of its coming into being in time? We have already pointed out the result of the former hypothesis. It binds God to the world, as if it were a part of Himself, or at least a necessary

condition to the fulness of His life. That is, it raises material existence to a position of equality with Him; or, to say the same thing in different words, it brings Him down to the level of the material world. If He requires the help of material existence as a fulfilment of His own, however great and important some of the interests may be which are developed upon this world's stage, yet there is no longer the gap between God and the world which our religious instincts lead us to retain. It is the religious element in us which feels a shock, if this hypothesis be maintained. On the other hand, the attempt to understand the appearance in time of Creation, and the progress of its history before the eyes of the Eternal where nothing was before, produces a shock, but this time in the intellectual region. We feel a difficulty of which we can explain the cause. We are trying, when we make this attempt, to rise out of the conditions of our experience; we are trying to conceive how things looked when time began, and how the temporal order looks, so to say, from the outside, when all the while time is the indispensable condition of our thinking at all. Thus it is not surprising that the effort involves us in contradiction. When we realize the building of some great cathedral, we imagine it growing up by degrees where there was nothing of the sort before; we think of a process of which the steps could be observed, and which would last over a considerable period of time. In the same way, when we picture to ourselves, or even try to express to our intellect, the process of Creation, we attempt to use the same methods; and the absurdity of this is, that in attempting to describe the act of God in Creation, we are attempting to express intelligibly, as it were, from without, the birth and system of time—the very condition of our knowing anything at all.

When the intellectual shock is of this kind, and is the alternative to a strictly religious difficulty, there can be no

question which is the course to be preferred. We must adopt that position which leaves our religious instincts intact, even at the risk of a permanent intellectual conflict; and there are two considerations which we may mention here, as we think they will tend to consolation in this somewhat depressing result. The one is, that time always involves us in a permanent conflict of this sort, whenever we attempt to do more than arrange our experiences in order in it. The moment we try to go beyond order, and express in thought real change, we break down. We can conceive easily enough a series of fixed states: we can reduce the distinction between to an infinitesimal point; we believe that there is such a thing as continuous movement, the stages of which we arrange in order of time, but we can never directly express this movement in thought. We shall have to speak directly of the theory of evolution, but we may, perhaps, anticipate by way of illustration one point which may have to be repeated. The theory of evolution consists, as every one now knows, in the denial of the absolute permanence of the various kinds of living things. The classes are arranged, no longer in pigeon-holes as before, but in one long series, which, it is believed, is a continuous series without break. Man, for instance, is regarded as the final result of a long process of change passing through the forms of lower animals. Now it seems easy enough to place the various classes of animals in a row determined by their structure, and then regard this order as a succession in time; but the effort really to conceive in imagination the passage of one class of animals into another breaks down, however many and however slight the intermediate changes may be. It is easy to place two types of creatures together, and compare them; and it is easy to represent one as the outcome of the other: but to conceive the moment when the transforming change took place passes the power of

human wits. So we can understand the difference between the presence of the created world and its absence and the absence of any hint of foreshadowing of it. And we must necessarily express the idea of Creation in the form of a series, longer or shorter, of fixed points in time. But this is a form of expression and does not necessarily clear up for us the real import of the change.

This is one reflection from which we think comfort may be derived; and the other is this, that the difficulty of understanding how God can express His external purposes in time, is precisely of the same nature with the difficulty of understanding how God can be known at all. Always, when He reveals Himself, some condescension is necessary, in order to meet the capacities of our minds: and though we may know that there is such condescension, we cannot estimate the degree of it. So in this case, we may know that if God expresses Himself in the form which the constitution of our mind renders necessary, there is condescension: but it does not follow that we should be able to explain the nature or the degree of it. If we are capable of knowing God at all it must be either because our minds are competent to apprehend Him, or because He can express Himself in terms of our minds. And this shows the strength of the appeal to our religious instincts. No one maintains that we can apprehend God by the mere strength of our own minds: a particular case, therefore, of failure to formulate our knowledge of God is not a matter for surprise. But religiously, we are sure that God is to be known by us, and the whole of religion becomes an absurdity if this is not the case. Unless, then, we can trust our religious instincts in the ultimate questions of religion, we must resign all hope of reaching God. And the question, whether God is independent or a mere correlative of material being is an ultimate question of religion. In the latter case, we need not trouble

ourselves much about knowing Him, for it means that there is nothing much to know.

When we say, then, that God created the world, we imply that He is exclusively the agent in the process from one end to the other, and that the world is not eternal. We must now ask whether this obliges us to assume the whole system of things sprang into being in a moment, or whether it is conceivable that a gradual emergence of the Divine plan took place. In other words, we have to decide between the theory of evolution and that of special creation. Some years ago, this would probably have been the longest and most perplexed section of our subject; but the movement of thought, both on the side of science and theology, has made the position much less strained.

The popular idea of Creation is probably a pictorial rendering of the literal meaning of the first chapter of Genesis. A week of days of twenty-four hours each is devoted to the work, and each day is filled with the production of one thing or a class of things. This is not, of course, an elaborately detailed picture, even in Milton. It leaves uncertain the question what became of the rest of the time in the twenty-four hours supposing Creation was momentary; and the idea of gradual movement towards completeness is already admitted. Moreover, it is to a great extent a modern view. The ancient writers on the Catholic side were deeply influenced by the notion that the Logos dwelt in the world, and gradually carried it onwards to completion. They thought of Creation in close connexion with the phrase about the Divine Wisdom that 'it reacheth from one end to the other, and sweetly ordereth all things.' The idea of a gradually achieved act would be wholly in accord with their point of view, and it is not probable that the method of special creations would appeal to them very strongly. Nor, again, would their principle of interpretation experience any

difficulty in extending the length of time covered by the words 'day and night.'

That God should employ many means to compass His ends, and that the movement of His purpose should cover vast numbers of centuries, is not inconsistent with the mind of the ancient Church—still less that His action should be even and smooth without abrupt shocks. If, then, evolution means only this, that the purpose of God in the formation and peopling of the world was effected gradually—that the laws of matter and life were used to carry out this purpose—and that the idea of Creation, as it passed slowly and continuously from inert matter to life, and from life to mind and will, received clearer and clearer expression—there is nothing that we need fear to accept cordially in the theory. It involves no departure from the belief in God as Creator, it only defines and improves the meaning of the idea of Creation. But, of course, this is not all that is meant by the theory of evolution. In many cases it is so construed as to exclude directly all creative or even directing activity on the part of God. In this case the whole process depends upon chance. A chance-occurrence is full of significance for the subsequent history of the world; a chance-variation causes the acquisition of a power which in time produces a new species. All things are endeavouring to keep alive, to maintain themselves in being. But their interests are not identical; they are largely conflicting. Everything depends, therefore, on readiness to seize and turn to advantage any hold which chance may give over the competitors in the race of life. The species to which chance supplies these advantages will survive, if the gain arising from them and the capacity to use it be handed down by hereditary transmission. The advantage and success of the individual kind is the only principle at work, and it is in the hands of each individual kind to carry this out. The general success or advantage of

the world as a whole does not enter upon this view of things; the present condition and the present population is the bare result of the balance of conflicting forces; the world is occupied by the individuals forming the classes which have contrived to exclude the others.

In considering a theory of this kind one cannot but be startled at the place occupied in it by chance. Chance does not enter in to eke out the deficiencies of a more formal theory; it bears the burden of the whole. All the movement, and all the determining circumstances which set the process in motion and keep it going are the gift of chance. At every stage chance enters when a step is to be taken, and a new species brought into the world. The intermediate action of the creatures themselves, by which they make use of the gifts which chance has brought them, are, of course, governed by the general law of the desire for self-preservation. The chance-variation is like a straw floating past a drowning man; the species needs no exhortation to do its best with it, on pain of dropping out of the race.

Now, if we have been right at all in our theories as to the nature and aims of reason,[1] the adoption of chance as the regular determining principle in the world's movement is a confession of irrationality. Chance has neither positive meaning nor is accepted as a solution of any question, unless when men are in a state of ignorance. To say that chance is the cause of any event is only another way of saying we do not know how it happens. And the whole effort of scientific thought from beginning to end is to exclude chance, and to substitute orderly, methodical, calculable laws of change. Those who are skilled in these matters have sometimes endeavoured to calculate the chances against the occurrence of an individual variation sufficient to form the starting-point of a step in evolution; and they are, of course, millions to

[1] See p. 24.

one against it.[1] But we do not, at this point, lay great emphasis on this argument, because so long as there was any probability at all in favour of the event, it might still occur, however high the numerical estimate of the chances against it. The numerical estimate would only represent *our* view of the conditions present, and tending to produce the two alternative results: and so we still fall back upon deficiency of knowledge. The whole idea of chance, one way or another, numerically estimated or not, simply means deficient knowledge.

If, then, we reject evolution in that form of the theory which bases it all upon chance, in what sense can we accept it? We accept it when it does for us what every theory about the origin of things must be expected to do—when it gives us a rational and orderly account of their existence. It is only in this sense that it is comparable with the idea of Creation at all. Creation explains the existing facts about the world as the expression of a personal Will. This may be a rough and ready explanation, or it may be an elaborate and philosophical explanation, according as it is used with or without a sense of what the problem demands. But chance explains nothing. Like the moral sophistries against which Socrates protested, it makes men idle and disinclined to inquire, because it suggests that it is a solution of the difficulty, and implies that there is no other. Evolution is freed from these objections when it is dignified by the thought of conscious purpose. When the various changes through which matter passes are regarded as expressing a rational idea; when the successive steps are represented as steps moving towards a rational end, then it becomes a rational explanation of things, and not before. Then it satisfies the conditions of a philosophical problem by excluding chance.

And it also saves itself from a great perplexity. It pre-

[1] Cf. Martineau, *Study of Religion*, vol. i. pp. 278–282 (ed. 1888).

tends to be a historical account of the way in which the world has come into being. Its aim is to be more than a mere classification of facts, or a rearrangement of our knowledge as it stands. It claims to be historical. As in looking back over the history of mankind we take documents and buildings and records of events as representing the life of the men of old, so the evolution theory claims to use fossils and rudimentary organs as signs of vanished life, and the growing definiteness of structure. The world must have passed historically through the stages of which we can trace the remains. But, so long as chance is allowed to reign over the process, it is almost inconceivable that it could have happened. For the only way of translating chance into history is to suppose that all possible variations had their day, were tried and flung aside, until the right one was found.[1]

But such a process is not within the bounds of rational imagination. No numbers that we can conceive would at all cover the number of possibilities, and no imaginable time would be sufficient to run through them all. Evolution, under such circumstances, would be impossible as a historical account of things, and we have seen that chance is valueless as a theoretical explanation. Unless therefore we may regard it as an organic teleological process—a process guided by rational purpose at every step, determined in every detail by the consciousness of the end in view—we need not discuss it, even as a probability.

Let us return, now, to the theological aspect of the question. God, we believe, is cause of the whole process

[1] The *historical* form of the phrase, The chances are nine to one against a given possibility, is, that out of ten occasions only one will happen in the particular way. Whether this can be defended as a true account of the meaning of numerical probability is a question which we cannot stop to discuss. We need only remark that if this is not the *historical* form of the probable statement, it has no historical form at all, but is simply an expression of our private opinion on the relative strength of the conditions on both sides.

from beginning to end; it expresses by slow degrees His idea. The thought of God which the Word reflects is made effectual by the Word through the operation of the Spirit. This, through the self-limitation of the Divine Love, occurs in time. Gradually, and by slow progress as we think it, the presence of the Word in nature becomes clear and certain, until, at last, after long development through stages of being, in which the mechanism of life becomes gradually complete in the variety and success of its correspondence with the world, the creature in God's own image enters upon the scene, and returns with full consciousness the glory which is his Maker's due. Through the Word were all things made, and that which was made was Life in the Word—Life in its original idea and purpose;[1] and the Life which appeared in the world was to be the light of men, to point them to the Maker of it all, to show them the eternal power and godhead of the invisible God. In any case, whether in man's conscious worship of God, or in the perfect adaptation of the simplest order of creatures to their environment, the creative Word of God is revealed, and revealed through matter. The difference is one of degree, and not one of kind. Man cannot complain, then, if he has to act and think with a body and an organization which has a purely animal ancestry, since at every point in the development the Word of God is present and revealed. His answer of praise to the love of God may well come through the medium by which the love of God has approached him.

Man stands, in virtue of his prerogative of self-conscious worship of God, at the head of the natural world. It is for this reason that he has 'dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.' Being, as he is, in the image of God, and bearing

[1] S. John, i. 3, R.V. margin.

in himself the conscious inspiration and consecration of God, he is, as it were, the priest of nature, the representative of nature before God, of God before the natural world. And we may believe, not without reason, that this inspiration and consecration was to have gone on growing more and more intense till it was concentrated at last, when the Word should take flesh, and the revelation of God's will should reach its consummation through the Incarnate Son. To this point it will be necessary to return.[1]

We have said that the ancient writers of the Church thought of the history of the world in terms of gradual evolution: but it should be remembered that they did not conceive of nature as having been left to itself, to follow its own laws, and gradually make room for the spiritual being, man. They held that the process was controlled by spiritual beings of a different sort to man, called angels. There is no doubt that Christ and His Apostles believed in and taught the existence of these superhuman, spiritual beings, to whom the general name of angels or messengers had been given. Not only does our Lord, as we have already seen, recognize the existence of Satan and other evil spirits; He also speaks of the angels who are not disobedient, but are ready to execute the will of the Father. The angels are the reapers at the harvest of the world (S. Matt. xiii. 39). Christ Himself can summon to His aid more than twelve legion of angels (S. Matt. xxvi. 53). Again, He says the angels of young children 'do always behold the face of My Father' (S. Matt. xviii. 10). In the Gospel of S. Luke and in the Acts we find them sent to minister to men, and to carry out the will of God. In S. Luke i. the name of one is given—Gabriel. In the Apostolic writings, especially in Revelation, we find similar allusions to them, and one other name, that of Michael, the Archangel. That they are many, and are

[1] Cf. p. 280 *seqq.*

divided into various orders and ranks, seems to be implied in the Pauline expressions—thrones and dominions, principalities and powers. That there are some who kept not their first estate is definitely asserted in the Epistle of S. Jude (ver. 6).

As so often, the Bible account of the angelic hierarchy is neither dogmatic nor complete. It leaves undetermined many details upon which we should gladly have information. It tells us simply that the angels exist and are organized in some sort of hierarchy; but the character of this is not stated. It tells us also that the angels act as administrators of the Divine Will, and for the succour of men under certain conditions, but again no more. In the Old Testament we find added to these functions (possibly) the operations of nature, as, for instance, in the phrase, 'He maketh winds His angels, and flames of fire His ministers' (Ps. civ. 4).

The history of this belief in angels is very obscure. They play but a small part in the earlier literature of the Jews, and come first into prominence in the writings which follow the Captivity. From this it has been inferred that the Jews brought back the belief in angels from the land of their captivity, and that this fact accounts for the rejection of the belief by the conservative Sadducee. If this be true, as it may be, it does not follow that the belief was a false one, though it came from a suspicious source. The fact that the Spirit of God working upon the minds of those who wrote the later Psalms, upon Daniel and Ezekiel, admitted this doctrine into the Judaic creed, would be sufficient warrant for its truth.

The doctrine once admitted was found highly convenient by the Alexandrine interpreters of Holy Scripture. The angels were made by Philo to correspond with the ideas of Plato; that is, he regarded them as the archetypes and originals of the various things which we find in the world. They acted as intermediaries between the inaccessible God and the world. Moses, for instance, when God refuses to

reveal His face to him, is shown instead a host of angels—beings which, though spiritual or intelligible, have yet a side which can be manifested to an earth-bound man.[1] And it was a firm conviction of Philo's (repeated in S. Paul (Gal. iii. 19) and in S. Stephen's speech (Acts vii. 53)) that the law was given by angels. In the apocryphal writings we have more names, Raphael and Uriel, and later Jewish tradition fixed the number of archangels definitely named at seven.[2] The Essenes, who were an ascetic Jewish sect considerably influenced by Oriental mysticism, laid great emphasis upon the doctrine of angels, and are said to have possessed a system of names.[3] It was probably a form of Essenism which appeared in the heresy at Colossæ, was denounced by S. Paul in the Pastoral Epistles, and again by S. Ignatius. The worship of angels (Col. ii. 18), the foolish genealogies (Tit. iii. 9), the oppositions of knowledge falsely so-called (1 Tim. ii. 20) are signs of an incipient Gnosticism of an Essenic character.[4] And it is heartily and unmistakably condemned.

In the later history of the Church, the most important name in this connexion is that of Dionysius the Areopagite. In his work, called *The Celestial Hierarchy*, the hints and indefinite allusions of Holy Scripture are worked into a complete and definite system with the aid of the neo-Platonic philosophy. This treatise has exercised an extraordinary influence over the Church, doubtless owing to the name which it bears. A writing by a companion of S. Paul would naturally have the greatest authority. The works of Dionysius were translated into Latin by Scotus Erigena, and were known in this translation throughout the Middle Ages. S. Thomas Aquinas derives his doctrine of angels largely from Dionysius, and he, in his turn, has been the chief power

[1] Philo Jud., *De Monarchia*, I vi. (vol. ii. pp. 218, 219 M.).
[2] Luckock, *The Intermediate State*, pp. 165, 166.
[3] Josephus in *Zeller Gesch. d. Griech. Phil.*, Bd. I. Abth. ii. p. 298.
[4] Lightfoot, *Colossians*, p. 89 (ed. 1879).

in moulding the doctrine of the Roman Church, and in part of our own. It is, therefore, somewhat melancholy to find that the works of Dionysius must be regarded as a forgery of the fifth century at the earliest. The evidence for this judgment may be found in Bishop Westcott's volume of Essays,[1] and with this decision their authority in large measure disappears. They lose even the reflection of apostolic light, and drop down into the position of anonymous speculations. We need not, therefore, discuss at length the various points which are decided by Dionysius and by S. Thomas after him. We do not propose to determine what special functions belong to each choir of angels. It may be, as Dr. Newman conjectured,[2] that they are the moving forces in wind and storm, and the powers of nature; that a nation or a period has its ruling and guardian angel like an individual man; but we cannot pretend to regard these as articles of faith. The doctrine of angels belongs to the idea of Creation as a spiritual order. That they exist there is no doubt; that they perform service to God and man is certain too. They are higher than man in one sense, for they are nearer to God, and sinless; but they are also lower, for human nature with all that it has of fault and failure was the chosen sphere in which the Word of God entered upon the world of His creation. 'Not of angels doth He take hold, but He taketh hold of the seed of Abraham' (Heb. ii. 16).

Creation, then, according to the belief of the Church, is a vast system in which the Purpose of God was to have been expressed, and of which the aim was the intercourse between the Creator and the spiritual beings, human and superhuman, whom He had created. The actual world is widely different from this, for it is degraded and maimed by sin. We here

[1] *Religious Thought in the West*, pp. 147–155.

[2] *Parochial Sermons*, vol. ii., Serm. xxix.; cf. *University Sermons*, pp. 346–7.

reach the most profound of all the problems of human life. It is one also which seems to be of peculiar interest in the present day. We must therefore give considerable space to its discussion. It will be considered, then, under three heads: (1) evil in the universe; its origin; and as a consequence its place in the scheme of Creation considered as the result of Divine Omnipotence and Love: (2) evil in man, and hence its bearing on the nature of man, his body, soul, and spirit; its hereditary character, its effect on the idea of freedom, and its use: (3) evil in the world of nature; with especial reference to pain and death.

I. Evil in the universe. The Scripture account of each day's work in the process of Creation ends with the statement, 'God saw that it was good'; and the whole story closes with the blessing of God upon the work which He had finished. The evil that has arisen since had no place in the world on the day of Creation. Upon the world as it was God passed His verdict. He saw that it was good. In dealing therefore with the question of evil in the universe, we have before us a real question of origins; and we have to account for the entry of a new factor upon the world.

The answer which Christian theology gives to this problem may be stated simply: evil arose by means of the rebellion of created wills. In the Epistle of S. Jude[1] we read of angels who kept not their own rule, but forsook their proper habitation (*τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχὴν μὴ τηρήσαντας, ἀλλὰ ἀπολιπόντας τὸ ἴδιον οἰκητήριον*); and the implication is, that some angels were rebellious and refused the service which had been assigned to them. These are they whom Michael overcomes in war and exiles from heaven. A similar history is given in Gen. iii. of the Fall of Man. Persuaded by the serpent, man aspires to a position which is not his; and he too falls. In both cases, evil is the result of a lawless

[1] Jude v. 6.

spirit, and is expressed in an act of rebellion against God. This, then, is in Holy Scripture the ultimate character of evil; it is a personal refusal to obey the Divine Person; not a mistake or an accident, but a personal rebellion against personal rule. That means that it lies entirely in the moral region. Kant begins his treatise on the Metaphysic of Ethics with the words: 'There is no absolutely good thing in the world, a good will alone excepted'; and we may add as a pendant to this, There is no absolutely evil thing in the world, an evil will alone excepted. The root of all the evil that there is lies in the will of the beings whom God created and planted outside Himself, if we may so speak, to do Him honour and service. Moral evil is prior both in time and in importance to physical evil. In time, for the sin of Satan is prior to the existence of the physical world; in importance, for physical evil is, we believe, one of the results of moral disorder.

This point of view has not always been popular, in fact it has never held the ground without a rival. In every age, on one principle or another, the moral nature of evil has been denied, and evil has been ascribed to one or other of the necessary conditions of human life. The favourite method of accounting for evil is to refer it to the interference of matter with the powers of the soul. Manichæism is the name by which such modes of thought are described—after the name of a conspicuous supporter of the dualistic hypothesis, Manes or Manichæus, who flourished in the East in the third century. His peculiar theory, which was combined with much confusion and stupid mythological speculation,[1] came practically to this, that the world is the scene of the conflict of two powers, a good and an evil one, typified by light and darkness; that the good power made the soul or the spirit, this being indeed a fragment of his substance; that the power of darkness made

[1] See S. Aug., *c. Faustum*, Bks. V. XV. XX. XXI.

matter, and had caught and imprisoned certain fragments of light. The province of the Redeemer was to free them from their enthralment. This heresiarch (for he was so regarded by the Church of his day) was of Oriental origin, and his scheme suggests strongly the Persian dualistic theory of the two powers Ahriman and Ahuramazda. It was probably influenced from this source. With its origin and mythological characters we have fortunately nothing further to do. It reappeared in a more or less similar guise in the sect called the Priscillianists in the fourth century; it is possible that it became rife amongst the Knights of the Temple; and it is said to have been the really serious charge against the Albigenses and Waldenses. Any one who cares to read the publications of the Theosophical Society or of the Rosicrucians will find that it is not dead, even in its mythological and crude form, at the present day.

In an age of ordinary culture the mythology of Manichæism will be to most minds revolting and absurd; but the principle which underlies it is of permanent significance, and is never without its followers. It appears in all those systems of philosophy which regard evil as an intellectual error, due to the imprisonment of the soul in matter; and in all those in which evil is regarded as a *necessary result* of Creation. For all these leave out of sight the fact that evil is abnormal and depends upon an act of will; it is from their point of view merely a fact which is in the world, and must be supposed to have had the same origin as the world. The conflict of which the soul is conscious in the event of sin is sufficient to suggest some external cause for evil;[1] and the material character of many temptations, the real limitations, confusions, and impediments which the soul owes to the body, are sufficient to decide that matter shall be the seat of the opposing forces.

[1] See above, p. 132.

Quite apart from the fact that this prevalent theory is in conflict with the authority of Scripture, there are reasons for holding it to be unsound.

A. In the first place, it is at variance with the facts of conscience. Conscience convicts not of mistake, not of inevitable delusion, not of an ill-judged attempt to resist the mechanical laws of nature—but of sin. No person who knows what it is to sin, feels in the same way about it as about a mistake in a calculation, a false note in music, and the like. These may proceed from careless indifference, and so partake of the nature of sin, and, when that is the case, conscience is aroused. Otherwise it remains perfectly unconcerned. No one who knows what it is to sin, feels in the same way about it as about the natural deficiencies of his eyes. He may know that the eye is so formed that it does not give an absolutely true impression of what is seen. This is a part of its nature, and any delusion which may result from this is inevitable: but it is accepted and must be put up with; it differs *toto cœlo* from sin. Once more, no one who knows what it is to sin feels about it in the same way as about an attempt to ignore the laws of nature. We do not condemn *morally* the man who tries to square the circle, unless we know that he ought to be doing something else with his time. We pity an unsuccessful aeronaut, unless we think he has been culpably careless of his life. We honour the man who risks his life for high moral ends, even though the task he has undertaken may be interfered with and brought to a disastrous close by the unbending laws of nature. The breach of these, or the attempt to resist their incidence, is morally indifferent; moral considerations arising in connexion with such acts may turn them into sin, but nothing else. The conscience, then, when sensible of sin feels something wholly different from any of the states of feeling just described. It is sensible that a personal being

has been outraged and insulted, to whom reverence and love were due. And it is secretly convinced that this might have been avoided, that the will is responsible for the rebellion, or for listening to the enticement to rebel. This, as a matter of fact, is the content of conscience when a sin has been committed. And it cannot be analyzed down into the sense of mistake or the like. If it be indeed true that there are men in whom the feeling of conscience is wholly dead, who have never felt anything approaching remorse or sinfulness, they cannot be taken as normal or typical characters; they are like persons who have no sense of music or poetry. It may be doubted whether any people exist who *ought* not to be capable of the consciousness of sin. As a matter of common experience, then, sin appears as a revolt against a person by a personal will; and Manichæism in all its forms, by concentrating attention upon the physical side of evil, or regarding it as inevitable, fails to touch the real point of the question.

B. Manichæism is nothing if not a scientific theory of things. However involved in mythological associations at times, it is always at least this. It always professes to explain and co-ordinate the facts. We have already argued that it leaves out of account some which are of vital importance to a true theory; we now contend that it fails upon its own assumption. As so often with speculative theories, instead of accounting for the facts with which it has to deal, it simply reasserts that they are there. Confronted with the fact of evil and disappointment and the like, it asks how and why is this? Why is there this taint of failure and pain and disaster upon the world? And the answer given is, It is there; it is inevitable; it belongs to the constitution of things. Which is the same thing as saying, There is no answer; we cannot get behind the fact; good and evil are at war; we cannot tell how they came to be so; we cannot see how they should ever leave off. This is the answer of pure

Manichæism—that kind which ends in an unreconciled dualism of the good and evil spirit. But there is another type of answer, differing from this considerably in form, not at all in fact. This point of view consists in denying the reality of the opposition between good and evil. Evil? it answers; there is no such thing; what we call evil is just the fact of our limited knowledge; if we saw more clearly, we should know it to be good. Though different in form, this is in fact simply the old assertion that evil is the necessary result of our connexion with physical nature. It is upon this theory an intellectual muddle that we are in, rather than a state of physical evil: but the cause is the same, viz. the inevitable pressure of the facts. And this, as we have seen, is no answer at all.

Corresponding with these two forms of the ultimate assertion that evil is inevitable are two attitudes towards life in general; one, a vehement and angry pessimism, the other a complacent optimism. In the former the mind labours under a sense of inevitable misery for which there seems to be no remedy, to which there is no exception: all action, all effort, and all life seem to rest upon pain and wrong and sorrow. For man is imbedded in a material surrounding which blinds him, and thwarts his calculations, and brings his plans to ruin. The fear of pain and the desire to avoid it sting him into action, but he finds that he has only added to his sorrow. There is an inevitable and endless conflict, which is the law of man's existence here. The philosophy of Schopenhauer is a conspicuous example of this point of view.

On the other hand, the optimism of which we speak consists of bland and complacent assurances that this is the best of all possible worlds. It brings forward conspicuous instances of great apparent disasters, which turn out afterwards to be the greatest possible blessings. It calls attention to the vast complexity of interests involved in the creation of

the world, and bids us acknowledge that, all things considered, the work of creation has been very fairly done. It is a mere deficiency of knowledge which makes us complain of being injured by the larger movement of the world about us. If only we could see the other possibilities, from which this world relieves us, we should recognize that this is the best possible under the conditions of finite existence. This theory of life (than which it would be difficult to find one more irritating) is characteristic of the eighteenth century; and belongs in tone to the maudlin and pagan laments over the transitoriness of earthly joys in which that age rejoiced. It found striking expression somewhat earlier in the *Théodicée* of Leibniz, a work which aims at justifying the ways of God to man. This work concludes with a myth somewhat in the style of Plato, in which a man is allowed by Jupiter to see realized in a series the various corrections which he had wished to make in the existing state of things.[1] Of course, he finds that they are always for the worse: that if this world is less comfortable than it could be wished, it is nothing to what it might have been.

We have classed both these points of view under the head of Manichæism because they both present the characteristic features of that theory. Both alike ignore the moral character of evil, and both assert its inevitableness; one howling and bemoaning itself, the other consoling itself with the thought that things might have been worse. The real mischief, the really constituent character of Manichæism lies in its assertion of the inevitableness of evil. The effect of this belief varied in ancient times as it varies now: some found in it a reason for the sternest

[1] Leibniz, *Théodicée*, Part III., § 414.—Vous voyez ici le palais des destinées dont j'ai la garde. Il y a des représentations, non seulement de ce qui arrive, mais encore de tout ce qui est possible ; et Jupiter en ayant fait la revue avant le commencement du monde existant, a digéré les possibilités en mondes, et a fait le choix du meilleur de tous.

asceticism, others, for the most boundless license. It depends mainly upon temperament how an inevitable fact like this is met: some will look on the bright, others on the dark side of things. But this will not differentiate them from those who hold the Christian view. Within the Church, these differences of temperament and mental habit exist and take effect. The determining difference between Christian thinkers and all others whom we may class under the head of Manichæism is that the Christians deny and Manichæans affirm that evil is inevitable, and involved in the very structure of things.

We return, then, to the theory of evil which the Scriptures offer us; and ask how could such a thing arise. How was it consistent with the purpose of God? Did He allow it, or create it; and, if so, why? The time-honoured method of approaching this question is by the statement of a dilemma. If God is omnipotent He could have prevented evil, if He were all-good He would have done so; either, therefore, He could not or would not prevent it; therefore He is either not good or not omnipotent. The answer to this argument involves us first in a discussion of the exact meaning of omnipotence. The meaning assigned in popular language to the word omnipotence is both negative and materialistic. It is formed on the basis of our conceptions of force, and it means that there is no resistance which an omnipotent being cannot overcome, no line of action that he is not free to take. It is then available for use in the above dilemma. If it be the meaning of omnipotence that God *must* necessarily destroy any power which opposes His will, that He *must* necessarily perform any act in which His power would be displayed, the first half of the disjunction will hold good. So long as the question is merely one of conflicting forces, which cannot choose but conflict, there can be no doubt that evil cannot stand against omnipotence:

it must be swept away the moment it appears. But the objection to this argument is that it leaves out of sight all other considerations except those of mere power. It isolates God's attribute of power to the detriment, even to the exclusion of His loftier prerogatives. This retort may be illustrated by the analogy of human life. If it be asked, Who is the most powerful man in England at the present moment, no one would mention the name of the man who is physically the strongest—whose power of resisting mere force is the greatest. The most powerful man would be he whose will was most often effected, and in the most weighty concerns—the Prime Minister, say, or one of our merchant princes. And he would be most powerful, not because he destroyed all opposition, but because he has the largest means of using it; of converting the interests of others to his own ends, of forcing their wills into the service of his own. So, the weakest and least effective of men is he whose will attains least, and is least often successful, not he whose physical force is least. The essence of rational personal force is effectiveness, not the abolition of resistance.[1]

But it will be said, This comes to precisely the same thing: the resisting power is overcome just the same, by diplomacy if not by force; it does not matter whether it is absolutely destroyed or not. On the contrary, it matters a great deal. In the case we are considering, God has not obliterated evil wills from the pale of creation, but He rules their powers to the effecting of His own will and the discomfiture of their ends. He gives them freedom, without relinquishing His own ends. They are allowed to go on attempting to resist, seeking their own rebellious ends; but in the very hour of their success they are thwarted. The most conspicuous instance of this is the Crucifixion of our

[1] Cf. Westcott, *Historic Faith*, pp. 217-221.

Lord. The Death of Christ was the moment of the triumph of all the powers of evil which were opposed to Him; but it was also the moment of their signal and final defeat. In that lay the manifestation of the Divine omnipotence. He overruled the free choice of the opponents of Christ to His own ends and to their complete discomfiture. And this is the meaning which must be given to omnipotence in Theology; it is the power of unfettered sovereignty, not the habit of destroying all possible resistance. The existence of evil, then, in view of the actual dealing of God with it, implies no contradiction to the Divine omnipotence, because the rebellion is converted in spite of itself into subservience.

But the question of the goodness of God is more serious. It is complex and raises several very important difficulties. In the first place, let us consider this point: how is a creation in which evil is a possible ingredient reconcileable with Divine goodness and love? We must be careful, in dealing with this matter, to restrict ourselves to the facts before us; mere speculation is apt to be both futile and dangerous. What have we to consider? We have the spectacle of a world brought into being out of the love of God, meant to display the glory of God, and to repay His love with praise. The Word of God might have expressed the Divine idea accurately and unerringly in the regularity of nature, the perfectness of instinctive life: but creation was not to be complete until there arose a higher thing than any of these, a being in whom the Word resides; who voluntarily and consciously worships and loves his Creator. In our experience, the peculiar virtue of this form of worship depends upon its being voluntary, upon its being given in response, indeed, to an invitation, to an impulse from within, but still as the free answer of the created will. We have said that creation involves something like a self-limitation on the part of God. That He should have

constituted the world in this way rather than in that, means a definite decision, a definite withdrawal from certain courses which we may provisionally assume to have been equally possible. And this limitation to a decisive course of action, so far as we can see, would carry with it the consequences of that course of action. If then God in His goodness and love has decided to create beings to whom is to be given the power to return His love freely, that decision, loving and good though it be, will involve the possibility of a refusal of this response. As we see things, the difference between blind instinctive perfection to the creation of free spirit carries with it this possibility. As we see things, the only way to avoid it would have been not to act at all. The measure of the goodness of God, in this matter, will be the amount of risk run, to speak in human words, by such a creation, together with the degree of superiority of voluntary self-submission over mechanical perfection. These things we can only imperfectly estimate.[1]

But there is a further difficulty behind. It may be argued, indeed, that God in His omnipotence does overrule evil to His own ends: that in His goodness, His passion for self-sacrifice, if we may so speak, He was prepared to run the risk of this huge indignity to Himself, and piteous ruin to His creatures; but how can all this be reconciled with His foreknowledge? If He had not known the event, we might contend, we could understand; we could appreciate the love with which He comes forward to help when the unforeseen misfortune has occurred; but He must have known from the beginning; His wisdom reaches from the one end to the other; the beginning and the end are simultaneously present to His thought. Are we not wrecked upon this rock of foreknowledge?

It is certainly true that this is the point where the difficulty is most acute. Let us again pause to clear up

[1] Cf. S. Mt. xviii. 7, xxvi. 24.

our terms. First of all, let us consider this attribute of omniscience; what does it precisely mean? how are we to represent it to ourselves? Our own knowledge falls under various heads. There is what is called necessary knowledge, and there is contingent knowledge. Necessary knowledge depends ultimately on the very nature of the mind and the ultimate conditions of the world. Pure mathematics, for instance, is necessary knowledge. It may be that we do not all realize it, we do not all carry the powers we possess in this matter to perfection. But every one has the premisses upon which mathematical knowledge is based. Every one, for instance, who has any intellect at all, understands something about number. The laws of arithmetic or algebra may be unknown to a given person, but all the knowledge he possesses about number is of a piece with the exact knowledge of the mathematician. An uneducated man will adopt various clumsy methods of calculation; but if they are true and right the results he obtains will be the same as those of the mathematician with his rapid and certain expedients. The results are necessary; they cannot in the present state of things be otherwise.

Contingent knowledge is that which is acquired accidentally and by external means. The knowledge which a man obtains by experience depends upon the accidents of his birth and education. Different men have capacities for different types of knowledge, and have different chances, as we say. This kind of knowledge differs from the other also in the fact that it can never be complete. The other is potentially complete from the first; the first steps have the promise in them of all that is to follow. Contingent knowledge depends for its completeness on the energy of the individual as well as his opportunities, and both these are variable quantities. A man who from the accident of his birth has little education, and lives in a narrow and monotonous region of life, will

know little of all that there is to be known, however great his energy. And again a man may lose, by lack of energy, the most brilliant chances, and fail to acquire a tithe of what might have been possible to him. But no man can acquire everything in the way of knowledge, because every man's experience is limited: and contingent knowledge is attained not by the exposition of consequences from premisses already attained, but by the slow collection of empirical facts. When we say that God is omniscient, do we imply that the whole scheme of the world lies open before Him more clearly even and more certainly than the whole science of geometry before a mathematician, or do we leave room for contingent knowledge? Are there things which God has to learn by the event? Is it possible that there remain any open alternatives of which God does not know the issue? The latter of these two theories seems to us to become increasingly difficult the more carefully we look at it. The question depends on the degree in which human life and history is regarded as a single whole. There are two regions of human life in which the appearance of real contingency remains. Every one will admit that the decisive moments in history cannot have been left to determine themselves; they must have been foreseen, prepared for, and guided. But round these, there is an endless number of unimportant events, of which we can never see the necessity, and which to our eyes might as well have happened in one way as another. Then again, men perform actions, to all appearance, by an entirely capricious exercise of will: they might just as well have done exactly the opposite. It is a tempting hypothesis to reserve all this for the operation of pure contingency, and to restrict the foreknowledge of God to the events which we can see are decisive. The right to do this, however, depends absolutely on our being able to say that our impression of the indifference of these smaller events is valid. If, as is

most probable, the difference of great and small is largely due to our limited outlook, and our incapacity to trace the connexion between the important and unimportant events, the distinction we seek to raise breaks down. On the whole, then, we must say that God foreknows human free action, within what limits we cannot know. It may, however, be suggested that the omniscience of God follows the law of His self-manifestation in Creation; so that however clearly the end may be present formally the actual manifestation of omniscience as of the creative thought is in time. As Creation comes into being in time, and realizes in time the eternal counsels, and as this involves a self-limitation on the part of God—a withholding of the full effectiveness of His will: so there may be some analogous self-restraint in regard of the Divine knowledge, such as would give more than a rhetorical value to Tertullian's famous phrase, that Christ in the Old Testament theophanies was learning to be incarnate.[1] This, if it be possible, is a principle which may be of use: but it cannot be proved, and must be used with the greatest caution.

Secondly, there is the certainty of redemption coming in to remedy the defect of the entry of evil, at any rate, as regards man. We have said that the superiority of conscious to instinctive service throws some light upon the reasons which may have accounted for the venture involved in the creation of free beings. If, then, we may believe, as there is much reason to do, that the Word was prepared, as it were, to become Incarnate quite apart from the question of sin, it would follow that the beings created free would not necessarily fall wholly from God, even if sin did enter. The progress of the world would be carried out, although not without the pain and suffering that self-will had produced. The prospect of the Incarnation would provide a way out of the difficulty: it would justify the venture involved in

[1] Tert., *De Carne Christi*, cap. vi.

the creation of free beings. This suggestion, which is made by Martensen,[1] though somewhat a bold one, has seemed worthy of mention. But it may still be a question whether such a theory is not open to two objections: (1) that it draws attention to the good, and minimizes the evil of physical pain; for pain is an evil, though it does good: and a world in which it is, seems necessarily a worse one than a world without it; (2) that it starts from a purely human stand-point, which is inadequate, as there was sin in the universe before man came into it.

There is, moreover, a reason for expecting that this mystery will prove excessively hard, if not insoluble. The question of foreknowledge is one of the points at which the time-difficulty reappears. In speaking of Creation we pointed out that this always must press hardest upon man's mind, because the solution of it falls necessarily outside the range of his experience. God, we believe, in Himself does not enter into time at all; His nature is eternal and changeless. Yet in some way, necessarily unknown to us, He determines to express His Purpose of Creation in time. But what this exactly involves, or how it can be expressed, the resources of human thought and language are unable to set forth. Evil is a fact as things are now, but we believe that it was not a *necessary* part of the scheme. We see how God overrules it for good, how He uses it in the education of mankind; we know that through His Son He saves us from it; and the possibility of it seems to our minds to belong to the exercise of free choice. Further than this we doubt whether the human mind can go. But the mystery which remains insoluble is after all a metaphysical or intellectual mystery; there is no room for doubt either as to God's Hatred of evil, or His Power to overcome it: the Incarnation is the measure both of His Hatred of evil and of His Power.

[1] *Christian Dogmatics*, Eng. Trans., p. 170.

II. We must now pass on to the second stage of our inquiry, viz., the presence and significance of evil in respect of man's nature. It will necessarily be more concrete than the wholly theoretical discussion just concluded, and may be expected to throw some light upon some points still obscure. We shall have to consider (1) the nature of man; (2) the effect of the taint of sin upon it and upon its development. (1) Man, according to the Creation-story, is made in the image of God. Our first task will be to extend and define our interpretation of this expression. The ancient method of exegesis, attracted by the fact that the Word is also called the image of God, explained this statement as implying an indwelling of the Word of God in men. Thus S. Athanasius writes:[1] God seeing that the race of men 'was not sufficient, according to the law of their own production, to remain for ever, granting them a special gift, created men not exactly after the manner of all the irrational beasts upon the earth, but He made them according to His own image in order that possessing, as it were, shadows of the Word (τοῦ Λόγου), and becoming rational (λογικοὶ), they might be able to continue in a state of blessedness. . . .' Strictly interpreted, this would mean that the possession of reason is the quality by which man is in the image of God; and this has been, and is, a very popular interpretation of the words. Though this is true beyond doubt, we do not think that it is the whole truth. Reason itself is a result—the result of the possession of self-consciousness or personality; and it is this gift from which flow out all man's highest endowments. It is this, as we have said more than once, through which man becomes fitted to make a conscious return of glory and praise to God who made him. It is this upon which depend his religion, his moral development, his intellectual grasp of the world around him. Moreover, we have found in the

[1] *De Inc.*, iii. 3.

personal life of man some far-off analogy to the nature of God. In what sense, let us ask next, does this connect man with the image of God—the Word? In the Word 'dwells all the fulness of God'; His Glory, even in the days of His humiliation, is 'glory as of an only-begotten from a father'; it is complete, without flaw or omission. Further, the Word of God pervades creation; all that the will of the Father intended from highest to lowest is expressed through the Word in the created order. The Personality of the Word is, therefore, always a catholic personality; it is the unity in which all particularity is combined. But each man is a particular individual; his tastes, capacities, character are limited and narrow; he acts in a limited environment. Yet even in this limited way he carries out some fragment of the purpose and revelation of God—displays, or would display were he sinless, some aspect of the Divine intention, as the Word reflects it whole. And he does all that he may ever succeed in doing simply by allowing himself to be the medium of the Word's activity, the home and temple of the Holy Ghost. It is, therefore, true to say that the Word is revealed in man, and true also to say that man does or ought to reveal the Word of God within the limits and under the conditions which his place in the world imposes upon him. It is the fact that man possesses a personality, and so too a consciousness of his high privilege and duty, which marks the difference between him and the brute creation. They too show forth the glory of God; they too are created by the Word; but man knows this, and the revelation which he should make of the operation of God within him is conscious, and not blind instinct.

Man is, then, in the image of God; of what character is the nature through which he is to effect the display of God's power and glory? It is, in the first place, a dual nature. On the one side, man shares the material organization of the

lower creation; but on the other, he has a higher nature of a spiritual kind. He is in ordinary language body and soul. But the loftier nature of man is represented at times in Scripture as divided into two—the soul, properly so called, and the spirit. This threefold division appears in S. Paul, and probably underlies much of the New Testament language. But it must always be remembered, in any attempt to define the psychology of S. Paul, or of the Bible generally, that the authors are not primarily philosophers, nor do they use language with any great degree of technical accuracy. Any statements, therefore, upon the subject must be taken as approximate only. S. Paul only once (1 Thess. v. 23) mentions the three parts of man's nature together (compare 1 Cor. ii. 9). But it is clear from his language in many places that he distinguished the spirit from the soul, as well as the soul from the body. The body is, of course, the material part of man, that which he has in common with the brutes. This factor in man's nature is alluded to by S. Paul under two names, *σάρξ* and *σῶμα*—the flesh and the body. Of these the former emphasizes the material, the latter is the organized product of the flesh. So he says, 'There is one flesh of man, another of beasts,' etc., in 1 Cor. xv. 39, and not one body; and the word *σάρξ* is never used of the Church. The Church is one body—Christ's Body, not one flesh.[1]

The flesh, then, being the material part of a man, subject to mortality and weakness, comes to imply a certain measure of feebleness. So S. Paul contrasts the confidence in flesh (*πεποίθησιν ἐν σαρκὶ*; Phil. iii. 4) with that in Christ. It does not here necessarily involve any suggestion of evil, but

[1] There is an apparent exception to this usage in Eph. v. 30, where the Authorised Version and the Greek text upon which it is based read, 'We are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones.' But the words after 'body' do not occur in the best MSS., and probably do not belong to the true text at all. They are omitted in the R.V.

simply marks a contrast between a trustworthy and a feeble ground of hope.[1]

Starting from the sense of weakness σάρξ assumes a moral significance; that which was simply opposed logically to God is now opposed morally. So it is that 'in me, that is, in my flesh, there dwelleth no good' (Rom. vii. 18). The body, though most often used when the idea of organization requires to be brought into prominence, now and again has the moral associations of the flesh. 'We are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh. For if ye live after the flesh ye shall die: but if by the Spirit ye mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live' (Rom. viii. 12, 13). But in spite of this close association of the words σάρξ and σῶμα with sin, the connexion of sin with the body is not necessary or final. S. Paul is no Manichæan. This is proved by the way in which the Incarnation and its relation to sin is described. Christ is 'born of the seed of David according to the flesh' (Rom. i. 3; cf. ix. 5), and 'condemns sin in the flesh' (Rom. viii. 3). He who is 'the image of the invisible God reconciled men in the body of His flesh by means of death' (Col. i. 2). So again in 1 Tim. iii. 16 we read of His being manifested in flesh. These statements would have been as impossible to S. Paul as they were to Philo and the Alexandrine Platonists, if he had held with them that the flesh was intrinsically evil.

The *soul* is sometimes used in contrast with the body or the flesh, and then stands for man's higher nature as a whole; sometimes it is used in distinction from πνεῦμα as well as σῶμα. In this sense it is somewhat rare. We have already noted the passage in 1 Thess. v. 23, where all three elements are mentioned together. The use of it in contrast with

[1] In a similar way σάρξ stands for the created world as opposed to the Creator, so that 'no flesh may boast before God' (1 Cor. i. 29). Coupled with αἷμα it means man's corruptible nature: 'flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God' (1 Cor. xv. 50; cf. Gal. i. 16; Eph. vi. 12; and Heb. ii. 14).

πνεῦμα occurs several times in 1 Cor. The man 'of the soul' (ψυχικὸς ἀνήρ, A.V. carnal man) is contrasted with the man 'of the spirit' (πνευματικὸς ἀνήρ; 1 Cor. ii. 14). The first Adam, it is said, with obvious reference to Gen. ii. 7, 'became a living soul, the last Adam a quickening spirit' (1 Cor. xv. 45). So in the same chapter there is a contrast between a body 'of the soul' and a body 'of the spirit:' σῶμα ψυχικὸν and σῶμα πνευματικὸν (1 Cor. xv. 44). With this may be compared the phrase in S. James (iii. 15): 'This wisdom cometh not down from above, but is earthly, sensual (ψυχικὴ), devilish.' The ψυχὴ covers more than our word *soul*: it means, first, the vital principle and probably it includes the emotions, and all those intellectual activities to which the senses contribute. It would seem that νοῦς or reason belongs to this part of man; it is, at any rate, opposed on different occasions both to σάρξ and πνεῦμα (cf. Rom. vii. 25; 1 Cor. xiv. 14).

The spirit (τὸ πνεῦμα) is in strongest contrast with σάρξ; it is that part of man which 'ends him Godward,' by which he holds nearest to God. It has thus a moral significance opposed to that of the flesh: 'Having begun in the spirit, will ye now finish in the flesh?' (Gal. iii. 3). 'The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, for these are contrary one to another' (Gal. v. 16, 17). Closely allied to this contrast is the opposition of the spirit to the letter, that is, the material and external embodiment of the Divine will (2 Cor. iii. 6; Rom. ii. 29; vii. 6). But the real importance for the psychology of S. Paul of the word πνεῦμα lies in the use of this word for the self-consciousness of man, that is, the seat of his inmost self-knowledge, the centre of all his being. 'What man knoweth the things of a man save the spirit of man which is in him?' (1 Cor. ii. 11). And in this character it offers an analogy to the Spirit of God (*ibid.*). It would seem that it is from this sense of the word that we

must explain the use of the phrase 'in the spirit,' when it means in a state of inner illumination. It is the withdrawal of the man from the external excitements of material things, and the experience of spiritual facts in this state of remoteness (cf. 2 Cor. xii. 2-5: 'Whether in the body, or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth'). The spirit of man is capable of mysterious intertwining with the spirit of God: 'The Spirit Himself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God' (Rom. viii. 16; cf. *ibid.* ver. 26). The word is also used in a way which is probably derived from the Old Testament for a course or line of conduct; thus 'a spirit of weakness' (1 Cor. iv. 21; cf. 'a spirit of deep sleep,' Isa. xxix. 10). Not infrequently we find the word *καρδία*—the heart—standing for this part of man. In Rom. ii. 28, 29 the two words occur in parallel positions, where their close connexion may be seen: 'He is not a Jew which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh. But he is a Jew which is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter.' So all sincere action emerges from the heart, 'with the heart it is believed unto justification' (Rom. x. 10); but evil may reach to this central self; 'they were made vain in their reasonings, and their foolish heart was darkened' (Rom. i. 21; cf. 2 Cor. iii. 15). Here and in Phil. iv. 7 the intellectual and moral nature are spoken of together, *καρδία* being used for the latter—'peace . . . shall keep your hearts and minds.'

A similar usage of the words *σάρξ* and *πνεῦμα* is found in S. John. The flesh is the material side of man, which, when dominant, or used as a principle of action, becomes sinful. The kingdom of the flesh is opposed to, and exclusive of, the kingdom and principle of the spirit (iii. 6). In S. John the phrase 'the world' expresses more frequently the created order which is opposed to God (cf. Bishop Westcott's note on

chap. i. of the Gospel). The soul (ψυχή) generally stands for the life, the vital principle which energizes the flesh. In one passage in the Gospel (x. 24) it is used for the mind.[1]

The Old Testament psychology, as is natural, falls under very similar heads, and is closely allied with that of the New Testament writers. But the language of the Old Testament is less technical even than that of the New. The words for 'soul' and 'spirit' cross more perplexingly: and, though both ideas are present, their line of difference is hard to determine. It has been well, however, to say thus much because it is of the highest importance in considering the Fall, to know how the nature was conceived upon which the taint of sin came.

In the account of the Fall in Genesis there are certain salient features to be noticed. (1) The incentive to evil comes from without; (2) it appeals in the first instance to the desire for sensual pleasure; (3) it promises intellectual satisfaction beyond; and (4) it aims at breaking the link of confidence between man and God. The appearance of the fruit and the desire of knowledge co-operate with the dissatisfaction already excited by the serpent's denial of the warning of God. In this aspect, the act which separated man from God is typical: it involved nothing less than a transfer of allegiance, and a disruption of the harmony of the various elements of man's nature. The desire of the eyes and the lust of the flesh were preferred to the command of God; the motive for action was sought outside through the flesh, and not within in the spirit. We must now set forth the effect which it was believed to have had, as described in the Bible, and then proceed to the discussion of the general questions arising out of it.

First, let us set down the evidence of the Old Testament.

[1] We have not thought it necessary to do more than indicate the outlines of the psychology of S. Paul and S. John—the most constructive of the New Testament writers.

It seems to be admitted that the *heart* is regarded in the Old Testament as the seat of the moral life and the conscience. It is from the heart as the source that all personal action proceeds. Hence the prominent mark of the condition of sin may be found in the phrases: 'They set not their heart aright'; 'Their heart was not whole with God' (Ps. lxxviii. 8 and 37). On the other hand David is a 'man after God's own heart.' It is from this point that the position of man after the Fall is viewed. He is not in his proper relation to God: the central force of his being acts independently, and therefore wrongly. Nor can he win his way back into full communion: he is conceived in sin. Partial reunion may be attained through sacrifice: but the complete restoration of confidence between God and man lies in the future, and is part of the Messianic hope.[1] Next let us return to the two New Testament writers whom we have considered before, S. Paul and S. John. S. Paul marks a strong and decided difference between the history of the Jews and the Gentiles. Both are involved in the consequences of the Fall, but the difference lies in the revelation of God through the law; the Jews had this and the Gentiles had not. (1) The nature of the sin was disobedience, *παρακόη* (Rom. v. 19); and it involved all men, as is shown by the prevalence of death (Rom. v. 12–14). It produced by its presence actual sin both in those who had the law and those who had not (Rom. ii. 12), and involved mankind in a special *δούλεια*—an enslavement to lust and passion (Rom. vi. 16–19). (2) Further, the order of the several constituents of man's nature was subverted; the flesh came to be the dominant element in humanity. This is the meaning of the frequent occurrence of the expression *ἐν σαρκὶ*, in (the) flesh (Rom. vii. 5; Eph. ii. 3; Col. iii. 5–7). (3) Consistently with this disarrangement of the true

[1] See Delitzsch, *Biblical Psychology*, chaps. iii. iv. § 12; Oehler, *Theology of the Old Testament* (Eng. Trans.), pp. 210–241.

order of human nature, the higher powers of man are degraded: 'Though they knew God, they did not glorify Him as God, but were made vain in their reasonings, and their foolish heart was darkened; saying they were wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God for the likeness of corruptible man,' etc. (Rom. i. 21–23; cf. 1 Cor. i. 18 *seqq.*; Eph. iv. 17, 18). It was in part an intellectual degradation, to which a parallel is found in the case of the heretics at Ephesus and in Crete (1 Tim. vi. 5; Titus i. 15). (4) Moral degradation followed and increased; sin was punished with sin (Rom. i. 24–26, etc.). (5) Death obtained a peculiar sting and force, its previous existence in the world being admitted by S. Paul (Rom. v. 12–14): sin is the 'sting of death' (1 Cor. xv. 56). Sin reigned in death (Rom. v. 21). The disorganization of nature involved it; for the flesh is corruptible, and those who are according to the flesh think the things of the flesh. By sin men are estranged from God and subject to His wrath. The weakness of nature which results from sin cannot be changed by man's efforts at all; it is permanent and irrevocable. Even the law which is 'spiritual and holy and just,' a revelation of the will of God, failed to produce a change for the better; 'it was weak through the flesh' (Rom. viii. 3). What it should have done was to have made increasingly clear the impossibility of holiness on man's side, and so made way for the Anointed One, through whom moral life was again to be possible (Gal. iii. 19). The Gentiles, who were without the law, had only the voice of an enfeebled conscience to prevent their falling away into the most abject degradation.

The account given by S. John of these matters varies in no essential points from that of S. Paul; though there are characteristic differences in expression. The difference may perhaps be described by saying that S. Paul deals with overt acts and historical periods, whereas S. John thinks of prin-

ciples and the ultimate condition of things. Thus while S. Paul speaks of the transgression of the one man (*παραόκη τοῦ ἑνὸς*) S. John defines sin as lawlessness (*ἀνομία*). So the universality of sin is expressed distributively by S. Paul: 'all sinned,' 'death reigned over all,' and the like; whereas in S. John we read of 'the world lying in the evil (one)' (1 S. John v. 19); the 'sin of the world' (S. John i. 29), and so on. The evil-doer embodies sin in act, *ποιεῖ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, and having done so 'has sin,' *ἔχει τὴν ἁμαρτίαν* (1 S. John i. 8). The state into which men have come through sin is 'death': 'we know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren' (1 S. John iii. 14); and men may so sin as to be involved in it and in death permanently (S. John viii. 21–24; 1 Ep. v. 16). The law was preparatory and could not save; 'grace and truth came by Jesus Christ' (S. John i. 17). The sin-principle is embodied in the world, and those who are of the world do not accept Christ's offer: 'But to those that receive Him He gave power to become the sons of God, which were born, not of blood, or of the will of the flesh, or of the will of man, but of God' (i. 12, 13).

There are four points in which this theory of sin comes in conflict with modern thought. Of course, the ingrained tendency in man to make anything responsible for sin except his own will has produced various theories as to the nature of evil, which we have already considered. Quite apart from these, the view of sin expressed in the Bible is criticized on the following grounds. It is objected (1) that man cannot be proved to have come from one original pair of human beings, and that unless this be so, the scriptural idea of a transmitted taint must break down. (2) The whole doctrine of original sin is assailed as unjust, as inconsistent with what is known of the state of primitive man, as depriving men of any real freedom. (3) The Pauline notion of sin gradually increasing till Christ came, or the still more

unqualified statement of S. John that 'the whole world lies in the evil one,' is held to be contradicted by the actual state of things, by the progress in culture and civilization which had already gone so far in the days of Christ. (4) The irrevocable and deadly nature of sin is regarded as a frightful exaggeration; especially its natural consequence, viz. permanent exclusion from the vision of God. The discussion of these four criticisms will, it is hoped, make the positive theory of Scripture clearer.

(1) The first point need not keep us long. The question is one of fact. As yet no decisive judgment has been given either by naturalists or anthropologists as to the origin of the human race: indeed, it may be doubted whether any finally conclusive evidence is ever likely to be obtained. There is some considerable weight of opinion in favour of the view that the human race originated in one district of the world: this is a point on which it is less difficult to reach a conclusion; but it is hard to see how the other point can be decisively settled. In the meantime it would not be reasonable to call for a restatement of the doctrine of the Fall, to harmonize it with what may prove to be only a conjecture, if it agrees with experiences—moral and spiritual —which are more easily verifiable. It will, perhaps, be time enough to restate the doctrine of the Fall in this connexion when the tradition of a single pair as the origin of the human race has been, once for all, rendered improbable or disproved. Till then we may reserve our judgment.

(2) The criticism on the doctrine of original sin is far more serious. It really involves an assault upon the whole standpoint of Christianity. It is said that to involve a whole race of men in the sin of one is an act of monstrous injustice; that each man can alone be held responsible for the actual sin he has committed, and that good works under whatever conditions done must be equally pleasing to God. Hence it is impos-

sible to say that a world in which good works are capable of being performed is under the displeasure of God.

This criticism upon the Scriptural doctrine of sin implies and starts from a particular theory of individual life. It assumes that each individual is absolutely separate from all others; that his individuality is wholly exclusive and hems him in all round from any infringement on the part of any one else. Touch these barriers, it is argued, and there will be no individuality left; unless you separate a man, and make him an independent centre of force and action, there will be no meaning in ascribing actions to him. Of course, if this is the true notion of human individuality, it is true that the doctrine of original sin will be unjust. But it is not the view which Christianity takes of the question, nor is it tenable in face of recent scientific investigations. If it be true, as is now commonly held, that progress is made by some kind of hereditary relation between generations, it follows that the key to all development lies in a non-exclusive doctrine of individuality. However truly the individual is a new centre of force and activity, and there is no doubt he is this, he is also a product of past forces and activities. There has entered into his environment as well as into himself the cumulative result of past activities and experiences. He is what he is, in part, owing to what has been. His connexion with the previous history of the race is, therefore, the key to all his progress; he cannot reasonably complain then, if he feels the effect of the less profitable acquisitions of his ancestors.

The modern conception of individuality includes hereditary transmission. We say this in face of Weismann's *Essays on Heredity*, partly because the theory embodied in that book does not seem to be gaining ground among scientific men; and partly because it does not necessitate so radical a change of mental attitude as might appear at first sight. In some

way, even on Weismann's theory, the acquired habits work themselves in, and gain a place in the transmitted protoplasm. The difference between this and the ordinary account of things is only that Weismann in his efforts to explain the facts of heredity is obliged to allow more time for the production of a permanent effect. The central fact, that in the end a race is modified through a series of generations, remains untouched, and this is all that we want.

But what is it which the Church affirms to have been transmitted? There is, first, the disorganized nature. Man, by sinning, put himself to service—engaged himself as slave to the flesh. He chose the immediate and handy suggestions of his material nature, instead of the more subtle appeals of the spirit. And this gave a wrong bias to his whole being; it set him looking for guidance in the wrong direction; it damaged his criteria of truth and falsity. And this was like a tendency to drinking, or a liability to disease which affects the chances and the promise of a man's descendants: except that the bias towards sin—the wrong order of his nature—was developed with terrific rapidity. Every act would give it force and additional hold upon the nature of man. There would be no periods of partial reform, as there often are with drunkards; no modifying and restraining influences, as there are often in the case of disease. But the whole would pass—the whole nature wrongly biassed and wrongly ordered—to the descendants.[1]

[1] The whole question here considered is rendered difficult by the fluid character of speculation at the present day, and the limited space of its operations. (1) The wide theory of evolution seems to depend on the accumulation, in some form, of experiences won by successive generations; but, as we note above, the method of such accumulation is not yet certain. (2) Recent Psychology has shown the close relation of psychical and physical phenomena, and the consequent importance of this relation in all ethical discussions. So long as the soul was conceived as a separate substance intruded upon an alien organism, this difficulty was not felt; but it is no longer possible to hold such a theory of the relation of soul and body, and hence all questions of personality, sin, moral advance and the like, are newly complicated. But (3) it

The sinful nature, then, is handed on, but what more? Is the individual when he is born the victim of a blind destiny? Is it true that man was only free once, when Adam chose between God and self; and that, since then, he has never had even the chance of freedom? Does the original sin imply transmitted guilt? This is in some measure a merely verbal issue. Every overt act of sin necessarily involves guilt; if then the condition of original sinfulness necessarily implies overt acts it cannot be understood that sin should exist without producing guilt; and then original sin would seem to imply original guilt. On the other hand, guilt implies a reference to the moral judgment expressed upon sin—upon the moral temper which overt sin has displayed. Hence, unless there is overt sin, it would seem that the opposite result must be asserted, that guilt cannot be assigned without actual personal sin. Thus far there is no prospect of a solution. And it is possible that there is in fact no problem. The case contemplated would only arise if a person lived through his life without ever identifying himself with sin—submitting to his fate, alienated from God by destiny, but never once sinning with his own will. This would be a case of an innocent person suffering wrongfully: such a man would be sinful, but it would be difficult to call him guilty. But this case does not occur. The disease of nature is, in fact, always converted at once into actual sin. The will is not only biassed in tendency, but it expresses its bias at once. It contains the seeds of the universal disease, which are individualized, as it is individual. There is, strictly speaking,

must be remembered that all these speculations are strictly physical in origin and character: they deal with the world of sense, and conceive of man on that side of him which looks towards the material world. Christianity, on the other hand, looks upon all this physical history as an incident in the movement of a spiritual purpose. It is, therefore, to be anticipated that some divergence would appear between the two points of view, and that the reconciliation lies with the wider one. And this seems the more likely when the religious view of life corresponds, as is urged above, with the deepest moral consciousness.

no time in which it is governed purely by a destiny which it abhors. Each individual inherits the nature, defect and all, and voluntarily displays it in his acts. It is in this sense that we can talk of hereditary guilt. Whether it is necessary to do so—whether it is not better to distinguish original sin broadly from actual sin, and leave undecided the moment at which this latter makes its appearance, is a point which might yet be debated, but it does not concern us. We pass on to consider the state of primitive man; and to the question whether Adam alone can truly be said to have been free, and in what sense the slavery to sin leaves human freedom still possible.

There are two widely different views of the state of Adam before the Fall. According to one he was a lofty heroic soul, knowing intuitively all and more than all that the long experience of the race has now taught men; full of high thoughts and rejoicing in the communion with God which belonged to him as unfallen. This view has been deeply incised upon the English mind by the genius of John Milton. Its counterpart in ancient times was the theory that Adam enjoyed the blessedness of the saints in Paradise.[1] According to the other view nothing of this sort is held to be necessary. It is not necessary to suppose that Adam existed long in the unfallen state, or that he had realized its full blessedness when he fell. Still less is it necessary to suppose that in him was to be found the firmness of purpose and clearness of insight which, according to all analogies, comes by trial and experience. If we have been right in our interpretation of the Pauline doctrine of man, it would appear that S. Paul, at any rate, did not place Adam above the level of the natural life. He says (1 Cor. xv. 45) 'the first Adam became a living soul' (*ἐγένετο εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν*); the last 'became a

[1] This is found, for instance, in a work we have already had occasion to quote, S. Athanasius, *De Incarnatione*, chap. iii. § 3.

quickening spirit.' Now (ψυχὴ) the soul seems to cover the intellectual and moral life so far as it is mediated through the body; this account, then, of Adam excludes at once the higher spiritual faculties with which the genius of Milton has clothed him.

How then are we to conceive his exercise of his freedom? We must suppose that in Adam there had arisen the consciousness of himself and of God; it may have been a very unreasoned and simple mode of consciousness, but it must have been there; its presence must have been the difference between the merely animal life which had occupied the world before, and the new thing which had now come into being. Whether this Presence of God within the soul of primitive man had meant that a new creative act had occurred, or whether it had appeared, as we say, in the natural course of evolution, makes no difference. Enough that it was there; and man goes forth in the light of it to the work of his life. He had no hereditary disposition to self-will; the harmony of his nature is undisturbed: but, on the other hand, there is no stored-up tendency towards obedience. He has to show forth and confirm the harmony of his nature by his action in the world. He is innocent but untried; perfect but not perfected. Then comes the suggestion of evil—the appeal to the immediate gratification of sense, to the natural curiosity of the intellectual powers, neither of these wrong in itself, but fatally wrong when set in motion by an inner distrust of God. Neither of the motives given in the story of the Fall was in itself a wicked thing; but the desire for food and the desire for knowledge both took their colour from the attitude with which the soul regarded God. This spring of action, rising in the inmost self, where God is nearest, converts the pleasure of the senses into sensuality, and the intellectual curiosity into the inquisitive insolence of pride. The sin comes from the higher self; the disunion with God has touched the

higher self; the spirit of man has entered into bondage to the creature rather than the Creator. The powers given for man's advancement prove to him an occasion of falling.

Any one who understands the nature of moral probation will not find it necessary to deck out the history of the Fall with pomp of circumstance sufficient to represent adequately our sense of the consequences of the act. If we accept, as we are inclined to do, the view of many ancient writers that the scenery of the story is allegorical, it will not be because the pictorial setting is in any way unworthy. There is nothing intrinsically out of keeping in the supposition that Adam's fate turned on the acceptance or rejection of an apple. The point of the story lies in its presentation of a moral collapse: and in this respect, whatever may be its historic character, its value is permanent. There is never any real proportion between the thing chosen and the thing rejected in a case of sin. However strong the temptation, the man who falls under it knows when his conscience wakes up that he has simply repeated the old story—surrendered a thing of infinite value for that which perishes in the using. The story of Paradise is said to have been influenced by Babylonian legend in some respects, and it is possible that this is true. But there is in the story as it stands a keen perception of moral distinctions and processes which is continuous with the best and loftiest elements in Jewish literature. Criticisms based on the triviality of the story are, morally speaking, quite irrelevant. The determination of the will is the essential feature, and this can be made plain whatever the medium. There is nothing absurd or incredible or immoral in supposing this fateful temptation to have taken a form such as would be intelligible to man in his earliest and least enlightened days.

If this, then, represents at all accurately the conditions of man's fall, how does it affect the question of freedom? What

is freedom? The answer most readily occurring to the mind on this subject is, that freedom means the absence of all determination from outside; absolute personal choice without reference to, or interference from anything or anybody. Such a notion of freedom resents even the operation of motive or reason—it is simple undetermined choice. It is a melancholy fact, perhaps, but such freedom does not and cannot exist. It is not possible even in the nature of God, so far as we can see; if it were, it would mean that God could be false, or lustful, or put an end to His own existence. That He is not, and cannot be any of these things, follows from the laws of His being, that is, from His being what He is. If He is holy and true, He cannot be unholy and untrue; if He is eternal, His existence can never end. His freedom, then, lies within the limits of His nature; He is limited thus far because He exists; to ascribe to Him the absolutely undetermined freedom of which we have spoken, would be to deny that He exists at all. The same thing is true of man: he is free within the limits of his nature; he is free, if at all, to carry out the laws of his being, and no more. His choice is circumscribed by the fact of his existence; existing as man, he is not free either not to exist at all or to exist in any other form. We must be prepared, then, to resign the rough and ready definition of freedom which we think most natural, and search for another which does not carry with it the complete abolition of all existence.

This we shall obtain by falling back on the idea of human nature, and inquiring in that light what it is which we expect man to be free to do. Shortly speaking, he must be capable of acting on his environment. He must enter into the world as an original force, not be merely a short name for a combination of forces already there. His action must really represent him; it must be human will expressed in terms of physical fact. This will not, necessarily, mean that

the stream of physical causes is interrupted or diverted by his action, but that he must be able to utilize them for his own ends; just as he uses a stream to turn his mill, but does not alter its laws or prevent its carrying out its own purposes. He is himself, and acts so as to manifest his human nature. He cannot fly, or change his own character in its ultimate laws. But he can look round him, see for himself what he wishes to have that nature can supply, and set nature's laws to work to attain the result he requires. For this end his own physical and moral constitution imposes its own laws upon him, as well as the world outside. It is part of the complex of conditions under which he acts. It limits and defines his range. Just as the hang of his arms limits his reach, so the moral character which he possesses helps to guide his aims—the means he adopts to secure them. Without arms he could reach nothing; without a moral character he could neither will nor choose anything.

Adam, at the moment of the Fall, acted without two of the elements which now enter into the composition of any human act. He was without hereditary bias in the direction of sin; he was without the assistance of the successes of his predecessors. The one was a gain, the other was a loss. To be free of the slavery to sin, to act with an unspoiled nature, was a gain of which we can only conceive the value. But, on the other hand, to be without any help from example, or any strength of confirmed habit, is no small loss. He acted, as we all act, in his own historical position with the surroundings which belong to it. His act, whatever it might have been, would have added a new factor to the conditions of future actions. It was a momentous and fatal decision; more free than any that have followed in that it was without the most important restriction under which the action of man has taken place since—a restriction which has removed the possibility of his fully attaining the ideal of his nature in this

world; less free in that it was without the help and guidance which past experience would have supplied towards the attainment of that ideal; not free at all in the ordinary negative sense of freedom. We shall have to return to this point later. Our answer, then, to the second of our objections[1] turns (1) upon a particular view of individuality which modern investigations tend to support; and (2) upon a more exact statement of Scriptural doctrine about Adam's unfallen state; (3) a truer insight into the nature of moral freedom.[2]

It is time now to consider the effects of the Fall in this world and the next, and to meet the last two criticisms upon the whole doctrine, which turn upon what is called an exaggeration of its importance.

(3) It has been argued that the theory which we find in Holy Scripture carries with it the consequence of a general degradation of mankind, an increasingly precipitate rush out of communion and sympathy with God, and that this is in conflict with recently ascertained facts as to primitive man and his condition, but still more with the actual history of civilization. So the first chapter of the Romans, for instance, is explained as the gloomy and fanatical picture of the Gentile world, which would be characteristic of a Pharisee. It is the more important to discuss this, as the gospel of culture is just now professing itself a rival to Christianity. First as regards the facts about primitive man. It is not maintained, we believe, by any competent anthropologist that the true primitive state has yet been discovered: though it is one of the commonest and most fallacious accusations brought against anthropology that it pretends to do more than it can in this matter. The interest which it really claims to find in the condition of the savage lies in the evidence supplied by savage life towards the explanation of the history of civilization, and the proof that every known race of men has passed

[1] See p. 236.

[2] See pp. 293 *seqq.*

through a stage more or less resembling that of the savages of the present day. Why this should be a position which Christianity cannot hold we have never been able to see. Unless we weight ourselves with Milton's conception of Adam there is no reason, as we have seen, why the state of primitive man should not have been of the most elementary type; and the introduction of evil into such a condition of things would bring about barbarism immediately. Sensuous desires and selfish motions, unrestrained by the experience of a succession of ages, is precisely savagery of the most unmodified kind. The only thing requiring explanation would be how mankind could ever get out of such a condition.

But now comes the question, What about progress? After all man did progress, though S. Paul sees nothing in his history but degradation. What is the explanation of this? The explanation lies partly in the exact nature of the Fall, partly in S. Paul's method. The whole doctrine of the Fall has been complicated by the exaggerations of Calvinism.[1] According to this theory, man after the Fall was simply a seething mass of wickedness. There was no element of good, and no real survival of the true nature of man left; he was without all hope and without any seeds of moral self-development. The merit of this scheme is its simplicity—it deals with firm one-sided principles of good and evil. After the Fall there is nothing but hopeless, irremediable evil; after the Redemption by Christ there is nothing but good for the elect; their actual lives are irrelevant—Christ has done everything. The objections to it lie in the moral sphere; it destroys morality, and it is, besides, untrue to fact.

The Fall, though it fatally disorganized and broke up the order of nature in a way which the will of man could not repair, did not destroy out of him the image of God, did not abolish all the good that had been in him. High aspirations,

[1] Calv., *Inst. Theol.*, Lib. II., chaps. i. v.

high thoughts about God, remorse and penitence for sin were still within his compass, for God had not utterly withdrawn His presence; though fallen, man was still man, and not a devil. It was, then, the remaining tendencies of good within him which formed the groundwork of his progress. He progressed, and he progressed towards a certain end, the revelation of the Word of God in flesh, and through this, the establishment of the kingdom of God. For the promise of restoration is given in the Scriptural account at the same moment as the condemnation, and repeated at intervals with increasing clearness. The final object of all his history was, we believe, fixed for man, even when the Fall had not happened: the Fall made no difference in God's will; it affected the manner and the realization of the Incarnation. God dealt with the evil in man on the same principles as He always is seen to use; He did not alter His plans to suit it; He carries them out through and in spite of it, but to the detriment of those who identify themselves with evil. Man progresses, but on lower levels; with pain and difficulty, not easily and with increasing joy.

Moreover, his progress, though real and true, is less broadly distributed over mankind as a whole than it should naturally be. And this is where S. Paul's description has its truth. The progressive races, that is, those among whom civilization has grown up, are by no means the whole of the human race. Those peoples whose conditions we take, not quite accurately, to be primitive must have had a history of some sort, and it can hardly have been a progressive one, except within very narrow limits: it may have been largely the reverse. And even in the races which have attained civilization, progress has been partial and in most cases unstable. It was carried on through the efforts of individuals, whose influence, as a whole, upon their own time and their successors was comparatively slight. In Greece philosophers succeeded often in throwing

a cloud of doubt over the popular religion of their day and race, but they rarely succeeded in attracting anything like a proportional degree of interest and confidence in their own substitute. Men accepted gladly and, in most cases, rightly, principles which gave them firm ground for rejecting the crudities and absurdities of popular paganism. But the constructive side of philosophy is far too hard for the vulgar mind—demands too much special education, time, and study for busy men to pay any attention to it. We who depend for our knowledge of Gentile antiquity chiefly upon the writings of those who were the loftiest and most inspired thinkers of their day, are naturally apt to forget the other side of Greek life. Yet the motives at work in the Greek wars, their method of carrying them on, their politics—even in their best age—do not suggest a condition of things in which a modern Christian would feel at all at his ease. And later on, when they had lost hold of their higher ideals and their freedom, there was still less in their life that we could envy. We may not fully believe the descriptions which a satirist later still would give of the moral state of the cities of the Roman Empire—we may candidly acknowledge that there are regions of our own civilization which will not bear the light—but even with these admissions, the account of S. Paul would not seem exaggerated. It is true that he isolated the baser elements of the pagan life of his day, and made no allowance, as his manner is, for the lofty productions of pagan genius, but still we doubt whether it can really be maintained that the picture is overdrawn. Moreover, it cannot be said that attainments in the way of civilization are altogether a test of progress on the stage of history. Egypt attained, perhaps, the most elaborate civilization of all the ancient Empires, but this did not protect it from ruin. The barbarian hordes which destroyed the Roman Empire were not *at the time* superior to it: it fell before what seemed to be an intrinsi-

cally less advanced mere brutal force, and with it went a great deal of what had really enlightened and charmed the world. S. Paul as we have said ignores when he is speaking of the pagan world its achievements in the direction of art and literature and refinement: but it may be questioned whether he has not the teaching of history on his side.

And we may even go further, and point to definite notes of weakness in the history of man's progress. In Genesis the founders of art and mechanics and agriculture are grandsons of Cain; they appear in the line which was tainted with the first murder. In contrast with this apparent condemnation of art and mechanical invention, the Greek religion inspired poets and sculptors with an almost unrivalled fulness. The Hebrew religion produced poetry which will never die; but with this exception, that of music (though of this comparatively little is known), and we may possibly add such a building as Solomon's temple, it was inartistic. Greek religion adopted all art as its province, and under its patronage all forms of art grew and flourished. Science and philosophy, no less than art, are raised to the loftiest pitch by the Greeks. And with them we must not forget to mention the great Oriental systems of religion which produced and encouraged an art and a philosophy of their own. We might, perhaps, point to the special moral insight and religious genius which were characteristic of the Jews, and maintain that in this they had the good part allotted to them; but still it remains true that the pagan nations have achieved more brilliant results in a variety of ways, which are still impressive, than the chosen people of God.

Is there, then, any note of the influence of the Fall upon art and science? Apart from the fact that peculiar gifts belong to individual nations, is there any moral aspect of the question which we can illustrate here? Is there any special moral or religious peril to which the intellectual and artistic

faculties are peculiarly exposed? We think there is. In speaking of the Fall we pointed out that its primary result was a disturbance of the true order of man's nature. He accepted without reserve the suggestions of his lower nature, and his spirit did not cleave steadfastly to God. The consequence of this is that the intellect and the sensuous powers assume the command where they ought to have been servants; they dictate to the spirit instead of receiving its guidance. It is the lack of guidance which leads to evil in them: they usurp functions for which they are not fitted, and by the result of their usurpation they declare in an accentuated form the ruinous discord into which the whole man has fallen. Let us suppose, first, that the speculative intellect assumes the reins of government. It revels along, rejoicing in its freedom, owning no responsibility, and caring for nothing. It pursues arguments and dialectic for their own sake; it is careless of results, is interested merely in its use of its powers. Moral truths, religious truths, are criticized recklessly, without any thought of the effect of such criticism, but largely because they afford so excellent a subject for it. The intellect has in such cases as this wholly thrown over any sense of moral responsibility. It cannot be said that such states of mind never occur. The sophists in Greece, not to mention any more recent thinkers, would be a case in point. It is one of Plato's conspicuous merits that he saw the peril of this attitude of mind, and denounced it in the interests of moral truth. Though such a defect as this belongs in no sense necessarily to intellectual speculation, it is a perpetual danger to it, and the fact that it is so is a sign of the unguided and self-willed position of the intellect in fallen man.

The case of art is, in many ways, more difficult. The products of art, if they are beautiful (and those of Greek art are so more than most), seem to have little or no connexion with ethics at all. It does not matter, to all appearance,

whether the artist is morally right or not. Art partakes in large measure of the character of executive skill, to the excellence of which moral qualities contribute but little. Yet it is difficult to be wholly satisfied with this account of it. Its products, besides manifesting skill, are go-betweens between the soul of the artist and his critic. There is more in them than their mere form; they depend in part on the spirit that is in them. And it is here that their moral significance and their moral peril are to be found. They may extend the halo of beauty over things which are not good, and thus give evil the benefit of the emotional attractiveness of art. And this use of art will start from a will that is deficient in the sense of moral responsibility. Such an artist will be a sophist in art. He will use his powers recklessly with untrammelled freedom, careless of the impression he makes upon others, and of the moral deterioration in himself. He will delight in dressing up moral paradoxes and moral disorders in attractive guise, and spread in a subtle but penetrating way moral ruin around him. This is done as a rule more successfully, because more directly, by means of literature than by the arts of painting and sculpture; and it is perhaps a course more frequently pursued in modern than in ancient days. On this subject also Plato's moral insight served him well, in fact, too well. His firm conviction that art could be and was used in the interests of moral evil, combined with a want of proper criteria between art of a good and of an evil tendency, led him to banish it altogether from his ideal state. This was perhaps a strong method of dealing with it, but it was based on a true insight. Here again, then, we may note the effect of the Fall. The artist proceeding exclusively upon his own lines lacks the guidance of conscience, and this expresses itself in lack of moral responsibility in him.

It is not true that these characteristics are inevitable in

intellectual and artistic progress; but they are perils which lie close at hand. From the point of view of religion, and even of mere non-religious morality, the moral condition of the will—the moral result of the life—are the only things worth caring for in the world. And there is nothing which will supply the place of moral motives and a moral interest in life. Intellectual self-development, artistic success may help out the moral efforts of men, by clearing their minds from delusions or embodying their ideals in an artistic form. But neither of these supplies the proper and immediate satisfaction of the human spirit; if it seeks them there it must end by being disappointed and wrong.

There is, therefore, a serious import in the moral and religious genius of Judaism. It deprived the Jews of lofty triumphs which other nations won, but it also saved them from serious troubles—helped to keep them separate from the Gentile world, and to receive the revelation of the Incarnate Word. Thus, to sum up, the Fall did not prevent progress, it only made it painful, and established it upon lower levels; and the taint of it, the disorganization caused by it, was upon the whole.

(4) We now pass to the consideration of the effects of the Fall in the world to come. Here too we have sharp criticisms to meet. For the effect of sin is represented as involving eternal separation of man from God: and there is no question in the whole range of Theology on which discussion is so passionate as this of the eternity of separation from God. Nor is there any question which lends itself so readily to emotional appeals and to caricature. But when we abstract from all this, and ask what the real point at issue is, as a matter of fact the discussion will be found to lie within a comparatively small compass. The whole question turns on the nature of sin. If sin is a mere mistake in structure, an inevitable result of the material environment, then it is a

contradiction to the whole moral character of God to suppose that He visits this accidental error in so terrible a manner. But if sin is a matter of will, then the result of it depends on the power of the will to continue in defiance of the will of God. God never forces compliance with His laws; that He should not do so is involved in the fact of His having created independent wills. And the doctrine that the separation consequent on wilful sin is eternal, is the combination of these two facts: (1) that God has created independent wills; (2) that on that account He does not compel obedience. We have already pointed out, that a mystery, probably an insoluble mystery, hangs over the origin of evil. It is difficult for us to understand how it can conceivably have been allowed at all. The further difficulty of the eternity of the separation is a particular case of the general difficulty about evil. Granted that evil has come into existence, under whatever mysterious and unknown conditions, its existence remains a fact, unless it can be shown on other grounds that it must necessarily be destroyed.

It will be answered, of course, that this is mere logic, and that the idea of Fatherhood enables us to correct its onesidedness; that our conscience rises in revolt against a mere stern analysis of logical ideas, and suggests a more flexible, more *moral* conception of God. There is no question that when the conscience really finds itself in conflict with logical analysis, the logic must give way; but we must submit that this is not the case here. On the whole conscience is a severe judge, and the more developed it is, the more vividly it realizes the horror of sin. Forgiveness rather than separation is the real difficulty, because, though it be true that evil is a negative thing, a failure to correspond with the truth of human nature, it is an act of will, an act of wilful separation from God, wilful rejection of His Grace. It takes place in time, and is, like all other accomplished

facts, unchangeable; it is a part of a man's history which can never be altered. It is a choice of self and selfish ends in deliberate preference to the Love of God. It destroys the link which bound man to God; and, like all acts of destruction, is permanent. The soldiers of Cromwell destroyed many a fair building under the influence of a principle which they thought right; and England is permanently impoverished. So with sin; the destructive act which severed the link with God permanently impoverishes the race. We go along still, but under worse conditions, with less hope and more fear, maimed and poverty-stricken, just because of it. In like manner, every act of sin is, in itself, irreversible. The whole need for redemption rests upon the fact that it is so, and that man cannot save himself.

There is in the moral temper of the day a dislike to admit the finality of human action and the inevitableness of its consequences. And in harmony with it, we are apt to construct our view of the love of God upon a somewhat flexible model. We think of a rather weak human father who is annoyed with his children for a certain act of wrong, who threatens all kinds of penalties, and offers a plan for escaping them; but then when he finds that his children prefer running the risk of his penalties to accepting his method of escape, he relents and forgives all alike. It is a long time since the act was done, he thinks, and there may have been faults and misunderstandings on both sides; but seeing that permanent discords are very trying in families, let us forget and forgive. We cannot but think that this is the plain English of much of the criticism rife nowadays upon this doctrine. Such a father is certainly benevolent and kindly, if rather weak and unwise; and we do not wish to deny that such a temper might save much family trouble. But it is suited only to the concerns of this life, where

wrong often is on both sides, and mutual forbearance is necessary to make life move at all. It falls entirely outside the whole region of conscience and ethics; it shows no sense whatever of the meaning and reality of sin. When we think of the relation in which man stands to God, of the allegiance which he owed, the choice which he took, and of the whole atmosphere in which sin takes place, it is surely difficult for the conscience to understand any remedial scheme which does not correspond to the full significance of the situation. The Love of God would not be enlightened by the Wisdom of God, the scheme of Redemption would not be continuous with and expansive of the plan of Creation, if the full meaning of sin were ignored. And it would seem that it is ignored, if a conscious and wilful separation, such as sin involves, is simply set on one side, and treated as having never occurred. God will intreat and plead with the will, but not compel it. The word separation has been used throughout this discussion rather than punishment, because the latter involves us in various forensic associations, whereas the word separation accentuates the fact that eternity in time is simply another way of expressing the permanence of the sinful moral temper.[1]

We have now covered almost all the ground which we laid out as belonging to the question of evil in man. There is one more point which we must discuss shortly, viz., the use of evil. We have already hinted the explanation which we propose to offer in speaking of the Omnipotence of God. Evil, as we see it in the world, is the means of man's probation. Its presence enables him to declare his inner affinities. Every man has before him an alternative of good or evil; not the mere alternative of the two courses, but

[1] The reader is referred for further analysis of the ideas of Punishment and Forgiveness to Dr. Moberly's profound and elaborate treatise, *Atonement and Personality.*

an alternative lying open in the circumstances and accidents of life. He has the natural animal desires, intellectual aims, and moral aspirations on his side, and without him a world offering various means of self-satisfaction. Evil takes advantage of this. It arrays itself in the outward semblance of good, and forms its fashions on those of good. It casts aspersions upon its rival, laughs at its seriousness, exaggerates its sternness. And this is the form of man's probation. For no person who in himself has affinities with the good will be deceived for a moment by the pretences of evil, even though Satan himself should appear in the guise of an angel of light. The comfortable old doctrine that vice is merely lack of knowledge is not applicable to the conditions of the case. It is too abstract and simple to meet the concrete complexities of human life. Man gets the knowledge required for his probation, not by merely inquiring into the nature and consequences of virtue and vice, but by acting straightforwardly with his conscience; by letting it decide moral questions on its own grounds, however feeble its light, and however easy it may be to argue that there is much to be said for the course it condemns. This process corresponds to the conditions in which man is.

This probation, by which action reveals the inner character, is the meaning of the word judgment so frequently occurring in S. John. It ought not to suggest any machinery of judge and jury and evidence: it is the declaration on which side a man stands, whether for God or devil, and it is being worked out day by day in the things which he does. The Day of the Lord, the Day of Judgment, is the day when the principles at work in the world will be revealed in all their nakedness, when the probation of men shall be finally over, and the choice of men irrevocably made. By the day of death each man has decided the bent of his spirit, the success or failure of his life; but there intervenes a state

before the Day of the Lord, in which the spirits of men await the fulness of the times. The Day of Judgment marks the close of the plan which we now see in part—Creation and Redemption: it ushers in the consummation, when 'the Son shall yield up the sovereignty to the Father, and God shall be all in all.'

III. We have spoken theoretically of the existence of evil, and of its special significance in the nature of man. There is a third stage in our inquiry, the presence of evil in nature. This involves questions of peculiar difficulty owing to the very narrow limits of our knowledge. We do not know the exact connexion of man with nature; we do not know fully how nature was organized before man came upon the world. But there is a general probability that the moral condition of man would have some effect upon the natural world as a whole. The difficulty is to say what effect.

The Scriptural view of nature marks this point firmly but not very frequently. From the day of the Fall the earth is said to be 'cursed for man's sake.' The prophets include in their picture of the Messiah's kingdom a renewed and peaceful nature. But the strongest statement of all is found in the Epistle to the Romans, chap. viii. Here we read that 'the creature,' *i.e.* the created world, 'was subjected to vanity'; that this was not in accordance with its own will, but was due to the act of another, 'by reason of him who subjected.' Its groanings and travailings, however, are not without hope; their explanation will be found when the creature is freed 'from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.' With this clear and definite statement other more obscure hints are in harmony; as, for instance, the statement in the Colossians (i. 19) that it is the good pleasure of God 'to reconcile all things unto Himself . . . whether the things on the earth, or the things in the heavens'; or, later on in the same

chapter (i. 25), the statement that the Gospel is preached 'in every creature under heaven.' S. Paul, then, clearly traced a relation between the entry of human evil and the existence of corruption and pain in the world. The idea would seem, however, to have lain rather on the fringe of his thought than in any central region of it; there is but one positive statement on the subject, and the scattered hints are few in number.

For us, the problem centres round the existence and meaning of pain and death. It would be an easier matter to settle if we were convinced that both had entered after sin—as a direct punishment for it. But it cannot be proved that it was so; the facts, are, indeed, all in the other direction. The earlier strata of the earth's crust are full of the fossil bones of animals of various kinds, all of which must have lived and died before man came upon the earth, unless we are prepared to accept the unpromising theory that the fossils were created in the strata. And we may fairly argue that these prehistoric animals did not like death any more that we do. It was pain to them as much as to any one else. Moreover, the succession of the specific types found in fossiliferous strata suggests that species died out under the pressure of the competition of others; so that there was war in nature, conflict of interest, murder. There are one or two considerations which may be urged by way of mitigation of this difficulty. One is that the horror of pain and death lies largely in anticipation, that, therefore, creatures which do not indulge, from their nature, in anticipations are free from this special horror.[1] And further, pain is in many cases protective. It warns against the approach of danger, and serves to lengthen life. But these are rather summary statements of advantages seen to result from pain, or mitigations of it while it lasts, than explana-

[1] Cf. Wallace, Darwinism, pp. 86–40.

tions of its presence. Still less do they account for its preceding the appearance of sin.

Leaving this for a while, let us return to the death and pain involved in the Fall. Man is, of course, a creature compounded of two elements—body and soul. That which is compounded may be resolved into its factors; its character as compound deprives it of any intrinsic right to immortality or permanence. We do not necessarily suppose, then, that man was destined to remain in the state in which he was started upon his course of probation—that the conditions in which he found himself were to suffer no change. S. Paul, if our interpretation of his words be right, calls sin the 'sting of death,' as if there might be a mode of departure from the conditions of this world which would be without a sting. Nor again does it follow, even if death existed among animals before, that the same close would have been ordained for the career of the being in the image of God. A certain degree of additional confusion is added to our question by the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. This proceeds upon the assumption that the body is a thing to be got rid of, and that only through deliverance from it will the soul realize its full powers and privileges. To this point of view death is necessary, and the death which we know, the death of corruption. But the additional difficulty which this doctrine brings with it need not weigh heavily upon us; for the immortality of the soul alone is not a Christian but a pagan doctrine. That is, it is a human speculation based on and governed by the facts of life and death as observed by human minds,—the facts, that is, of fallen human nature. The Christian doctrine of immortality appears in the Creed as the resurrection of the body. Not the soul alone is to appear and dwell before God, or away from Him, but the soul enwrapped in a body which reflects it and obeys its behests. This doctrine coheres with the

Scriptural view of physical death. Death, according to Scripture, is the penalty of sin; the resurrection of the body is the consummation of all the Creative scheme. Under other conditions the ordinary life of man might have led onwards towards a different close—when the spirit would have made good its dominion over the earthly instrument, and the body would have been transfigured into its heavenly form. God attains still His eternal Purpose, but not without break and confusion and sorrow. And the subjection of man to physical death with all its accompaniments of horror and degradation is the inevitable consequence of substituting the dictates and the desires of the flesh for the law and the spirit of God. Death is in a real sense the penalty of sin; the natural fate of a being who has chosen an earthly life.

Then what of pain? There is in human life a vast mass of pain and misery which is certainly not preservative. It may be the result—it is in great cities, for instance—of the defiance of God's laws, moral and physical, and is, therefore, so far, the penalty attached to such disobedience, the warning against repeating the offence. But it falls, in many cases, chiefly upon persons who have had no share in committing the offence, and have no chance of evading the punishment—upon children, for instance. Here there is no kindly hope possible that it may be preservative; it is simply misery.

It should surely seem less difficult in the face of phenomena like this to adopt S. John's description of the world—'The whole world lieth in the evil one.' For this fact of the immense area of undeserved sorrow shows how the burden and sin of evil lies not on one or more—the people who commit the acts of sin—but on a whole nation or age whose atmosphere is poisoned by the presence of sin amongst them. The indifference or obstinacy or dishonesty of one man may involve countless people in ignorance or pain or

sorrow, from all which things sin is apt to spring anew. That it is so, is the sign of our human brotherhood, no doubt; it shows how closely we are all bound together; but this is poor consolation to those whose lot it is to suffer. They know in a very direct and unmistakable way what the penalties of sin are here; and may well wonder why their lot is so hard.

But though pain is thus conspicuously the physical expression of moral ruin, when considered in the mass, and is evil, therefore, through and through; it does not follow that this exhausts its meaning. Like evil it is the means of proving men. It draws out their selfishness or their self-forgetfulness; it shows where their heart is set. It invites sympathy and love in others, and gives room for mutual help. These things it may do even in its most unlovely, most helpless and hopeless guise. In the mass it is a sign of radical evil; to the individual it may be the means of good. It is important to insist upon the power of pain in this direction; for there are few truths which are so unpalatable just now. What with the extension of the various means for avoiding pain, and what with a semi-pagan tendency to adore unrestrained natural impulse, it has become difficult to allude to the moral value of pain without the risk of being classed with fakeers and mediæval ascetics. Notwithstanding this, however, it remains true and is verified in daily experience, that, though pain has no business in the world at all, ideally speaking, it is overruled to the subversion of the principle of sin which brought it here.

But it will be said, and with reason, that the mere fact, that pain is overruled for good does not carry us far, if it be admitted that it has no business in the world, and that there ought to be some clearer indication of its position than this. We have on several occasions referred to Christian doctrine as modifying in some degree the difficulties which

arise from reflexion on the world. We think that this may be done once again in the present connexion. The clearest light which comes upon the problem of pain flows from the Cross of Christ, if that be considered as a sacrifice for the whole world. That was a case of undeserved avoidable suffering brought upon an innocent Victim by sheer wickedness, and available for all of us in virtue of our union with Christ Himself. Christ's own sinlessness, and His failure on that account to avoid sharing the suffering which belongs to the created world, shows how deeply the law of pain is woven into the fabric of things, and how largely it is vicarious. No man can stand aside from the rest of the world, and claim to avoid all pain because he is comparatively free from sin: he may claim to take his place by Christ, and fill up, by his share of the world's sorrow, that which is lacking in the vicarious sufferings of Christ. His union with Christ makes it reasonable that he should.

We are able in these very few words to throw out hints as to the place and meaning of pain and death in the human sphere. The reason why this is possible is that we have certain facts within our knowledge, about man's moral state and so on, which can be pieced together into something like a coherent theory. But since, in regard of the animal world 'as a whole,' we have no such facts we cannot reach even this degree of clearness as to the meaning of their sufferings. For, after all, though they are so near us, and our intercourse with them is so familiar, we know strangely little about them. We can interpret their wants, in some degree, and are capable of emotional relations with them; but, as yet, we know little else. We can never be sure that we are not reading into their acts a meaning of our own of which they are innocent; we are always liable to a sort of inverted anthropomorphism. Pain and death are certainly a horror to them, as to us; and we have no reason, at present, to

suppose that they have any moral nature, such as to learn the lesson which pain teaches men. Yet, though we are in a more difficult position as regards the pain in nature than as regards the pain of men, there do seem to be some signs that nature herself is not in an ideal state at present. With all its success in the way of order and harmony, there is much that indicates another principle at work. The enormous waste of individual life, and the destruction caused by convulsions of nature are hard to bring into any orderly teleology. They may, perhaps, have beneficent results, sometimes; but still these look more like the collateral advantages arising from pain than the natural and regular course of things. And the war in nature is bitter and hard and merciless. It weeds out the weak, of course, and that is doubtless its physical explanation. But it is impossible to rest finally in a merely physical explanation, unless we are prepared (1) to regard nature, as a whole, as merely physical, the mere scenery for the drama of man's existence, without necessary connexion with man at all; and (2) to eradicate from it any interest in individual life—to deny all reality to all individuals lower than man, and to look upon the particular animals as 'mere points of transition in the life of the species' (Martensen, p. 210). The Scriptural view of nature, as one system bound together in one destiny, though hard to understand, seems to be more reasonable, more like God, than this.

Creation, Gnostic Theories.—*S. Irenæus*, Adv. Hær. *Clem. Alex.*, Strom. VI. xii. *Origen*, De Principiis, II. i.-iii., ix. *S. Aug.*, De Genesi ad litteram, Bk. IV. and V. *Gore*, Bampton Lecture, II. *Westcott*, Essay on Gospel of Creation; Epistles of S. John.

Evil.—S. Ath., *C. Gent.*, i.-x. Lux Mundi, Essay V., 'Pain.' *Origen*, De Princ. II. xi. *S. Aug.*, Anti-Pelagian Treatises, ed. Bright—these deal with original sin, grace, and freedom also. Cf. also De libero arbitrio. *Aubrey Moore*, Science and Faith. *Manichæism.*—*Robertson*, Ch. Hist. *Beausobre*, Hist. du Manichæisme. *S. Aug.*, c. Faustum. *Dial. Archelai*, Routh. Rell. vol. v. *Tennant*, The Origin and Propagation of Sin.

CHAPTER VI

THE FALL AND THE ATONEMENT

We have now discussed at length and, we fear, tediously enough, the question of evil. It has been impossible to do so without reference from time to time to the fact of the Atonement through Jesus Christ. We have now to explain and expand this fact. Previous chapters have already laid the foundations for our present inquiry, and we shall therefore be able to use the information collected in them. It will be well to recapitulate our conclusions as to the position in which man was placed at the time of our Lord's coming, and as to the nature of our Lord Himself. We shall then be able to see how the doctrine of the Atonement flows out from these.

Man was in a condition of irrevocable alienation from God. He had severed the link which bound him to God by his own act, and the breach could not be healed from his side. God had threatened him with various penalties in case of disobedience, and it would not have been consistent with His changeless Love and Wisdom and Justice to let these threats fall to the ground—even supposing that it were practically possible. Moreover, the condition of alienation was transmitted hereditarily to the descendants of the first sinner. All men shared his condemnation. They were, by nature, children of wrath. They had lost the harmony of

their being and fallen from its ideal. They progressed in science and art, and even morality, but their progress was partial and chequered, and lacking in definite guidance. They were not sure of themselves, only the fewest realized in any way to what ideal they were moving, and these only in an inadequate way. They needed to have put before them anew the ideal of manhood; they needed to be reconciled to God by obedience and sacrifice; they needed to be reunited with Him in the old close communion which they had lost.

The Person who came forward to effect these changes was none other than the Son of God. In some sense, not very clear to us, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity took upon Himself this work. He was from all ages the Son of God—the Eternal Object of the Father's Love. He it was in whom was reflected the Father's purpose in Creation, by whom all things were made. He came to earth in the form of man; He took man's nature upon Him. In so doing He lost none of the essentially Divine attributes; He was, in the flesh as before the Incarnation, in the bosom of the Father. He was, in the flesh no less than before, incapable of sin; He never lost the perpetual communion with the Father which was His of right. Yet His humanity was no less real. He took it all—entered fearlessly upon the family of David in spite of all its sinful history; He was completely man with body, soul, and spirit, with human Will no less than with Divine. And He took it for good, His Humanity was joined for ever to His Divine Personality. So He came upon the earth. Our present task is to describe His work, and to discuss some of the questions which arise all round it.

I. The first point which we must discuss here is the sense in which Christ was the representative Man. We have already treated of this point in some measure in connexion with the creation of the world. We then saw that the

gradual expression of the Divine Purpose in the creation of the world might be expected to lead up to the manifestation of the Incarnate Word. Man, we said, was the priest of nature. In him converged the various lines of development existing in the lower world. In his conscious return of praise and glory to God the instinctive homage of the world was to be completed and made sublime. Further, man enjoyed full and free communion with God. Not that he was not to develop, to walk nearer to God and know more and more of Him; but at least there was in the beginning no obstacle which would interpose and check his freedom. Thus far man's capacities and position were complete; they only required carrying out in fact. But at the same time there were limits to them. Each man is but a limited thing—a vehicle for a limited manifestation of the Presence of God. This does not belong merely to his fallen state. The conflict and the embittered competition of individual interests is the result of the Fall; the fact of individual limitation is simply the consequence of finite existence. But so long as humanity was made up of limited individuals, so long as the Word of God was partially revealed in some one aspect in each, the ideal of humanity was not yet realized. For this the world was to wait till the Fulness of God should dwell among men bodily, till the Word should be Incarnate.

The progress towards this consummation (if indeed we are right in thinking that it belongs to the nature of things) was broken in upon by the Fall. It was interfered with, but not changed. The character of it was altered, as the conditions of man's life were altered, but the essential features of the Purpose of God were displayed. The Word became flesh in the fulness of the times. The truth of humanity was to be seen in Him. But just because sin reigned in the world, Christ, ideal man though He was, was 'despised and rejected' of men. This followed by an inexorable law. The world

as it was at Christ's coming, was thoroughly soaked through with sin. Its best and highest products were tainted. It had not wholly forgotten the claim of God upon its service; nor were justice and wisdom ignored as ideals. In various ways human society strove to regulate itself, and achieve the purpose of human life. Priesthood, kingship, the exercise of brilliant gifts had all of them indications of what might be possible to man, but were all infected by sin: Christ could not take up His representative position in any such state of life as would suggest His acceptance of worldly ideals as they had come to be. High position in the world's order was no guarantee for moral or spiritual excellence. Earthly sovereignty was, as often as not, the most convenient basis for license and oppression: it was won, often enough, by reckless disregard of other men's interests, by war and violence. In its origin and conception kingship had been united with priesthood; the king was the intermediary between God and man. But kingship was a failure; it oppressed the poor and the fatherless, it had lost hold of its ideal. The ideal of humanity could not accept the position of a human king: His kingdom was not of a world where sin reigned. His theory of sovereignty could not correspond with anything in the practice of the world. Nor was the priesthood any better. Even the Jewish High-priesthood, which had the sanction of the Divine Law, and was specially founded to keep alive communion between God and man—even this had become degraded and worldly. The true High-priest—for this if for no other reason—could not come in Aaron's line. And human genius was infected too. It had become carnal and lost its way, and was uncertain in its presentation even of the human ideal. Brilliant talents were no guarantee of special Divine Inspiration. All human gifts, in fact, and positions where man might have been expected to be at his best, had become impossible as

means for the manifestation of God, so thoroughly had they been corrupted by the presence of sin. And besides they were not catholic enough. They were individual gifts, distinguishing one man from his fellows, not the general conditions of human life: and for the Word to have appeared under such special conditions would have concealed the source of His strength. He would have seemed, if He had used them, to rely on some external and adventitious help in the performance of His Work, and not to be living in communion with, and dependence on, God alone.

Not only, however, are the loftiest and most powerful conditions of man corrupted by sin, but sin is ingrained in the whole race. Every man who comes into the world in the ordinary way starts with an inborn tendency towards sin. His very flesh is the seat of an impulse which expresses itself in wrong action as soon as action becomes possible. It would seem natural, then, that the ideal Man should come into the world by a new way. Humanity He must have, real and complete humanity, but it must be free from the hereditary sinful strain. There must be a break in the succession. It is here that we see, after the fact, the theological necessity of the Immaculate Conception of our Lord. It was by this Immaculate Conception by the Holy Ghost, by His birth of a pure Virgin, that the old flow of tainted life was dammed up, and a new stream of life let in to corrupted humanity. The essential feature of Christ's Birth is, that it should involve a break in the sinful succession; this necessity was, we believe, translated into fact by His conception by the Holy Ghost without sin.

The same arguments and principles at work in men's minds have resulted in the development of the idea of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin. The questions which arise concerning it are of less moment dogmatically, though controversy has given them a special importance. That the

Virgin was pure with all the purity of womanhood cannot be doubted. That, though born like other people, she was miraculously preserved sinless during life, may be true, but we have no direct information upon the subject. It is a pious conjecture, which some hold as a pious opinion. That she was conceived without sin, miraculously, like our Lord,—that she had no taint of original sin, and stood in no need of salvation, seems to us to be not only a conjecture for which Scripture gives us no warrant, but also to contain a profound and pernicious error. The Bible, as we have said, tells us nothing of the Blessed Virgin's earlier life—gives no hint of any peculiarity of nature. She has grown up to womanhood in quiet and holiness, and has contemplated marriage with Joseph, who was possibly her cousin. Beyond this we have no information. But this is not because the Bible does not insist upon a breach in the sinful succession. It does recognize and insist upon the law that, 'That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which was born of spirit is spirit.' It assures us that the new birth which we obtain through faith in Christ was 'not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.' And these moral necessities are directly illustrated and enforced by S. Luke's account of the Birth of Christ. In other words, the evidence of the Bible is certain and clear (1) upon the necessity of a breach in the old connexion; (2) on the fact that this breach actually took place. And in spite of this, there is not a word even upon the sinlessness of the Blessed Virgin. We may surely infer from this that there is no dogmatic or moral necessity in the conjecture that she was conceived without sin.

But though there is no moral necessity, the doctrine answers to a philosophical difficulty. It may be plausibly argued that if a breach of continuity was necessary on one side, it was necessary on the other. If it were unfitting that

the Word of God should enter the world by the instrumentality of a human father, it was equally necessary that sin should be excluded from His mother. Though not an unnatural conjecture, the argument does not appear conclusive as it stands; and it lies under the fatal objection that it proves too much. If it is applied to prove the sinlessness of the Son of the Blessed Virgin, it should be applied to her own birth. She, too, would require sinless parents, and these again the same. And so the whole notion of a break in a sinful line would pass away, and we should have to conceive Christ as born not in the regular human conditions, but in a special sinless family kept sinless from the first. Such a theory would practically get rid of His humanity altogether; it would be either Docetic or Monophysite. We have said that the philosophical difficulty is not an unnatural one; it is indeed an extremely common one. It is the difficulty which arises always when the mind has to contemplate an actual breach in continuity, and the theory which has been adopted to satisfy the problem is of a piece with many another philosophical speculation. It is an attempt to disguise the breach in continuity by breaking it up into two stages. It is, then, we believe, not only deficient in the moral necessity of which dogmas are usually the expression, but it is also a case of philosophical tendency which has caused some of the most startling heresies with which the Church has had to cope.[1] Anglican theology, we may add, has excluded it from the first.

It is not, perhaps, to be wondered at that the doctrine of our Lord's Birth has been the object of vigorous assault in recent times. The very fact of its dogmatic importance lends colour to the charge that it is a product of the dogmatic imagination. And it has many difficulties against it. It asserts a miraculous event: the event is and must always be beyond the

[1] The æons of Gnostic thinkers depended on this principle.

reach of physical verification: it does not occur in all four Gospels, nor form part of the common tradition that seems to underlie the first three, nor are the two accounts of the birth absolutely in agreement. We must admit that these are formidable difficulties. It is plain that the question will present a different aspect according as we do or do not believe in miracles, and the particular miracle of the Resurrection. Those who deny miracles altogether must necessarily reject this; those who accept the particular miracle to which the historical evidence is clearest, viz., the Resurrection, will depend mainly on the historical evidence for this. Admitting as we do that the accounts in the Gospels are less convincing than in the case of the Resurrection, what historical evidence have we? To this we would answer that the Virgin-birth does harmonize, and the alternative theory does not, with the account of the Life of Christ in all Four Gospels. The Fourth Gospel is, perhaps, the one from which the absence of this doctrine causes most surprise. Yet it is S. John who lays most emphasis on the exceptional character of Christ, and by whom the need of a breach with the old order is most emphatically asserted. Nor can it be said that all that was created was the idea of moral change. The worshippers of Isis had this, and even used the word *παλιγγενεσία*. But it was the followers by whom the reality of new birth was verified.

Christ came, then, to display the ideal Manhood; and owing to the sin-laden state of the world He could not adopt any of the conditions which the world might expect. He came by a new form of birth, and lived a life which would cut across the most cherished convictions of worldly minds. How, then, would the world receive Him? It could receive Him only in one way, with rejection and contempt. That this is so requires little more than ordinary observation; it is not so much a theological fact as a fact

of experience. Evil and good are perpetually at war, and it is a war of extermination that they wage. Moreover, the presence of the good stings up the self-respect of evil, and rouses it to acts of violence. It does not require any positive offensive action; the reproach of the mere presence of good is sufficient. This is a perfectly familiar experience in any mixed form of life—in a school as well as in a nation. And the struggle is, of course, the more intense the greater the powers engaged on either side. Let us apply these ordinary principles in the case before us. Sin has had a long and successful reign; it is in actual occupation of the throne of the world. It has entered into and corrupted the most lofty of man's achievements; it has affected his standards of good and evil, of success and failure. In this state of things Christ enters—rejecting the current standards, dispensing with this world's good, censuring and exposing unerringly the faults and fallacies of those who claimed to be on the side of right, as well as rebuking by His Life of holiness and service the sinful conscience. There could be no reconciliation between such a Life and the powers of darkness. The battle must be fought to a definite issue. The victory must remain with one side or another. And so the powers of sin collect themselves for a decisive struggle. They offer Christ the temptations beneath which any other son of man would fall. And as He continues to reject them, they inflict upon Him the shame of a public death. For by so doing they seem to identify Him with themselves. He hangs between two thieves, suffers a malefactor's death. And death itself has long been held to be a penalty due to sin. That He should suffer this open and public death would seem to stamp His pretensions not only with the mark of failure, but also with the brand of God's displeasure. 'Cursed is he that hangeth upon a tree.' Such was the inevitable nature of the warfare, waged as it was under certain conditions of time

and place. That Christ was crucified and not put to death in some other way was due in part to the peculiarities of the age in which He lived; but that, if He undertook to come to earth and show forth to the world the true life of obedience, He had nothing better to expect than this, depends upon the general laws which obtain in the moral world.

This is, as it were, the mechanical view of the Death of Christ. It shows the necessity of it from the point of view of the conditions of the world into which He came. It does not in any sense exhaust the significance of Christ's Death. But it is important to keep it in view, because it throws light on a difficulty which is sometimes felt to be a serious one. The Death of Christ, it is argued, is represented by the Church as the vengeance of an angry God. Some one must suffer for the guilt of mankind, and God apparently was indifferent whether the person was innocent or guilty. According to this method of representation, the Son is the Person who appeases the wrath of His Father, by the sacrifice of Himself, and the Father is satisfied to have it so. Of course this theory of the Atonement is fearfully inadequate. It tends to introduce a division into the Holy Trinity itself, and sets up the Son as an independent agent. And it puts a false colour upon the whole process, by representing the necessity of death as coming from the Father and not from the world. But in truth the certainty and necessity depended on the will of the Father and Son alike. It was the Father's good pleasure that the Son should come into the world; it was the Son's choice to come. And death was certain to be the result as soon as ever man fell. The world then came under the dominion of sin and the devil, and there could not be a restoration of the original condition of things unless the strong man armed was subdued by force. Hence the Death of Christ must not be regarded as an act meant to pacify an offended person; it was involved in the long-suffering of God,

when He determined not to destroy the world, but to redeem it.

We must look for the marks of the ideal manhood (1) in Christ's complete Sinlessness; and (2) in His constant and close Communion with God. For the Sinlessness of Jesus reversed the Fall. There was presented before God a life of continuous obedience instead of a life of rebellion. And such a life involved continuous effort and sacrifice. Our life rapidly comes under the dominion of habit, and so far as it does so, it gets to be unconsciously carried on. Habits grow upon us, and we mechanically reproduce the actions which they suggest. We do not have to think and decide anew on every special occasion. And the reason is that we are naturally placed in our present conditions; the soul and body move naturally together, they are naturally suited one to another. But with Christ it was rather different. He was in a condition which He had to make an effort to attain. To be imprisoned in the flesh with its sin-wrought consequences upon it can only have been, if we may dare to use the phrase, a tremendous strain. And throughout His life, as we have seen,[1] there was a conscious reserve, a holding back of His Divine powers and prerogatives, that He might enter in full into the limitations and imperfections of our humanity. We cannot look upon this act of self-abnegation as done once for all, and suppose that its effects only lasted throughout Christ's life. For that would deprive our Lord of all His divine consciousness during His life on earth, and this we have seen to be impossible. The act of submission, therefore, must have been continuous, the obedience a constant strain. Hence the sacrifice upon the Cross is the crown and consummation of the whole life. It is not separate from it, but continuous with it. His whole life was one perpetual act of sacrificial submission, carried out even

[1] See pp. 124 *seqq.*

unto death. Thus Christ as Son of man reversed the Fall, presenting a life of ideal obedience. (2) In the other respect, viz., His communion with God, He presented a higher type of humanity than Adam, or any one since Adam. We read that man before the Fall was allowed familiar intercourse with God; but in the Person of Christ that unity of will and thought which belongs of necessity to the Word of God was carried out in human flesh. Here a new thing had occurred, a new possibility had been realized. By this humanity had gone in fact beyond any of its hopes—

> a higher gift than Grace
> Did flesh and blood refine,
> God's Presence and His very Self,
> And Essence all-divine.[1]

So Christ represented humanity. He recapitulated it, in the language of S. Irenæus. He brought it back to its old ideal and renewed its shattered hopes. But He did so in the widest and most general fashion. He exemplified the true relation between God and man. This is the centre of His position as our Pattern. It is not the fact of His poverty *as such* which we are called upon to imitate; that, in itself, has as little bearing on His example as a regal throne would have had, if He had chosen to come in that fashion. It shows, indeed, that He was not willing to run any risk of being supposed to depend on outward position for the success of His ministry; and it shows the proportion of esteem which outward advantages are to have as compared with spiritual things. But His poverty no more excludes the rich from His kingdom than the fact that He learned the trade of a carpenter excludes those who follow other trades. The central point of His claim on us as our Example lies in the fact that He represented ideally the true and proper relations in which man should stand to God. This is independent of

[1] Newman, *Dream of Gerontius*.

all conditions of wealth and station; but it will be found to determine very precisely our attitude to worldly things, if we make any effort to follow it.

It is this universal character of our Lord's work which distinguishes His teaching from that of one of the prophets. The prophets in Israel were men specially illuminated by the Holy Ghost, men who had a peculiar insight into the counsels of God. This knowledge enabled them to predict. Enlightened by the revelation they saw the true drift of things, as it were, from the point of view of God; they saw what a crisis demanded, how it looked in the spiritual world. Their insight did not always tell them the exact way in which God would deal with a position; they were not always permitted to know the time when God would act. The mission of S. John Baptist, for instance, included, at first, only the summons to prepare. The greater prophet who was yet to come was not known. But a sign is given to the forerunner whereby he may know the person who is to supersede him.[1] Thus prophets were men of their age. They looked upon the life around them with a gaze quickened by the inspiration of God, and they read off from it the laws of God's Providence, and predicted on its basis that which was to come. We rarely, if ever, find them speaking from a historic stand-point not their own. In this way they revealed much of God's general method, as the circumstances of their day displayed it to them.

In contrast with this, Christ stands before us in the New Testament as the ideal Prophet. He speaks authoritatively and in His own name, where the prophets had merely transmitted a message entrusted to them. Where they say, Thus saith the Lord, Christ says, I say unto you; and His words are more significant than theirs. They call to repentance, warn against idolatry or unfaithfulness to God, against lust

[1] S. John i. 32-34.

or dishonesty, and they threaten punishment upon those who neglect their warning. And Christ does the same, but with a difference. He calls to repentance, but He explains what it involves, He relates it to His own Person. He demands faith in Himself, no less than in God. He represents Himself as the motive for all self-sacrifice. And what is more than all, He reveals elaborately the nature of the Father. If the prophet is properly the interpreter of God to man, his functions are fulfilled indeed by one who is God only-begotten, and can declare the Father authoritatively unto men. In His Nature and the range of His Mission Christ gathers up into Himself all that a prophet was, and presents the ideal conception before men.

II. But it is not enough to represent the Work of Christ in this manner. He fulfilled the ideal which governed the creation of men, but that is not all that He did. There were certain functions which He performed which cannot be explained out of His character as ideal Man—as the ideal embodiment of God's original purpose, though it was this character which enabled Him to perform them. He was Himself the sacrifice for sin. Here we touch upon the central part of the whole question of the Atonement. In what sense was He the sacrifice for sin? How was His act made available for mankind? How is the Cross the means of our salvation?

A. In order to the full discussion of these questions we must say a few words as to the nature and meaning of sacrifice. Sacrifice is a practice (as we have had occasion to observe)[1] which obtains all over the world; and therefore points to the probability that there are certain permanent religious convictions belonging to all men which sacrifice expresses. The universality of sacrifice did not escape the notice of writers in the ancient Church: and Gregory

[1] See pp. 18 *seqq.*

Nazianzen deliberately explains it amongst the Jews as an ancestral practice which God had legalized and improved.[1] For our present purpose, of course, Jewish sacrifices are the most illustrative; but it will be worth while to take note of the religious ideas at work in ethnic sacrificial rites as well. It is maintained, as we noticed before, by Professor Robertson Smith, that the primary notion of sacrifice, especially in Semitic heathendom, is communion. Sacrifice is the method of maintaining a normal communion with the god, or of renewing it when interrupted. Hence in early stages it almost invariably takes the form of a feast, in which the god partakes together with the man. Out of this there arises the idea of an expiatory sacrifice (it is not particularly easy to see how), and with this we are specially concerned.[2] The central notion of expiation seems to be that the life of an animal is offered to the god in order to discharge the liabilities which the man has incurred. The point was to connect the sacrifice of the animal with the life of the man who offered it. This was done by some symbolic action. The skin was worn by the worshipper, or he laid his hands upon it, or killed it, while the priest offered it. In Semitic heathendom as amongst the Jews, the blood was poured out upon the ground, for it was believed that the life was in the blood.

The relatively narrow and late distribution of expiatory sacrifice is explained by the deficient sense of sin under which most of these nations laboured.[3] The offences requiring atonement were not always or even predominantly moral offences: they were more like breaches of etiquette, transgressions of some of the elaborate ritual laws with which the approach to the presence of the god was hedged round. And in many cases purification was an elaborate

[1] Cf. *Lux Mundi*, p. 329, and note.
[2] Cf. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 379-382. [3] *Ibid.*

ritual process, into which sacrifice entered, but of which the real virtue lay in the operations of the minister. But with the Jews it was very different. Expiatory sacrifice with them assumed a far more definite meaning, and a much more predominant place in their religious system. Indeed, it may truly be said that though they recognized the idea of communion by means of sacrifice, though God admitted them within certain limitations to a partaking of His table, yet the general character of their sacrificial rites was expiatory. Though not definitely appointed for moral crimes, it must be remembered that even some of the minuter portions of the Levitical legislation claimed to rest upon the nature of God—upon His Holiness—and to symbolize His separateness from the unholiness of men. What then are the principles of expiatory sacrifice among the Jews, and how do they bear on the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ?

The Levitical law, and all the sacrificial order which is based upon it, is sharply distinguished from the sacrifices in the pre-Mosaic days. The sacrifices of Abraham and Jacob and others in this period were voluntary and occasional; they were not based on any definite code, and show strong affinities with ethnic rites. The Levitical sacrifices all depend upon the Covenant, and the special relation with God which that implies. The sacrifice which ratified the Covenant was preceded by burnt offerings and peace offerings, and followed by a sacrificial feast. That is, the impurity and other obstacles were first of all removed from the people, the Covenant was formed, the blood was partly poured out upon the ground, and partly sprinkled on the people, and the representatives of the people then ascended the mount, and saw the God of Israel, and ate and drank in the mount (Ex. xxiv.). Here the sacrifice was used as a means of establishing a close and special relation with the God of Israel. After the Covenant was established, any violation of it which arose from time to

time was got rid of by a sacrifice. The ritual of the sacrifice included again the pouring out of the blood, the burning of the fat upon the altar, and the burning of the rest of the body in a clean place outside the camp (Lev. iv. 12, 21). Here there was no communion. The blood was poured out, the fat and inward parts (which, according to the Semitic view, were specially the home of the life) were burnt upon the altar, symbolizing the dedication of the individual for whom the sacrifice was made; and the rest of the body was burnt outside the camp, symbolizing the removal and destruction of the pollution. The principle of this legislation is clearly set down in Lev. xvii. 11–14, where it is absolutely forbidden to eat the blood of any animal. The provision is made to include the animals slain in hunting, concerning which it is enacted that the blood shall be poured out and covered with dust.[1] The passage runs as follows: 'Whatsoever man there be . . . that eateth any manner of blood, I will set my face against that soul that eateth the blood, and will cut him off from among his people. For the life (soul) of the flesh is in the blood: and I have given it to you upon the altar, to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood that maketh atonement by reason of the life (soul).' The point then of the use of the blood is that by it the life of the animal is set free for a new use. The blood atones not in itself, as though a mere vindictive demand for death were the meaning of the sacrifice, but in virtue of the life which resides in it (cf. Westcott, *Epistles of S. John*, p. 34). This circumstance determines other points also in the ritual. The animal is slain by the offerer, or at least he is in some way identified with it, *e.g.* by laying his hands on its head. But the blood

[1] This reminds us of the very common conviction among undeveloped nations, of the enormous importance of killing an animal. It was hardly ever done at all except with a sacrificial intent. Cf. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 223, 224.

is offered by the priest, the proper intermediary between God and man. The death of the animal seems to have typified the voluntary submission of the offender. This fiction was carried out in heathen sacrifices by decking the victim with garlands.

B. There seem, then, to be three prominent ideas lying at the root of Jewish sacrifice, and, in a less definite degree, of heathen sacrifice as well: (1) the sacrifice is a means to communion; (2) the worshipper is identified with the victim; (3) the victim is presented before God. The whole conception is satisfied by the Sacrifice of Christ, and the various aspects of it are developed by various New Testament writers. The Epistle to the Hebrews is chiefly concerned with the sacrifice of Christ as fulfilling and setting aside the ancient sacrificial system; and this thesis is developed in a twofold way. Christ's Sacrifice is represented as the initiation of a new covenant and as availing for the removal of moral separation from God. The Pauline conception of the Work of Christ centres upon our identity with Him; the fact that we are in Christ, and are therefore no longer to be confronted with an external condemnatory law. S. John emphasizes more often the sacrifice of life culminating in the Death upon the Cross. We will illustrate these various aspects of the work of Christ, and then consider some of the questions arising from it.

(1) The Pauline treatment of the question depends upon the special view taken by him of the results of the Fall, together with the peculiar condition of the churches to whom he wrote. The elaborated doctrine of the Atonement as held by S. Paul is to be found in the Epistles to the Galatians and Romans, but collateral ideas are frequent in other Epistles also. Christ, according to S. Paul, is the second Adam; that is, He initiates a new stage or period in the history of humanity. His acts are representative, like the acts of the

first Adam (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 45-49; Romans v. 12-21). The special aim of Christ's Sacrifice is to reverse the results of the Fall. The Fall had involved all men in slavery to sin, and to the flesh, the seat of the activity of sin. From this slavery Christ freed us, bought us back. Further, while in sin we were under the Divine wrath: the Blood of Christ's Cross reconciled us again. These ideas must be illustrated in detail. The contrast between freedom and slavery is seen clearly in the allegory of Hagar and Ishmael (Gal. iv. 21-31). For the Law was a sign of the bondage of sin. It is true that it was 'spiritual and holy and just' (Rom. vii. 12, 14), but it was external to mankind. It was the 'letter' as opposed to 'the spirit' (2 Cor. iii. 6, 7). It represented by its external and condemning attitude the separation of man from God. It certainly revealed the will of God, but in such a way as to excite the opposition of the human spirit, and to bring home to it the impossibility of obedience (Rom. vii. 7-12; Gal. iii. 19-22). Thus, though it was a privilege to the Jews to be 'entrusted with the oracles of God' in this way (Rom. iii. 1, 2), the Law condemned the Jew no less than his own feebler light condemned the Gentile (Rom. ii. 12, 13, 25-27). The giving of the Law, therefore, was not only a privilege separating the Jews and honouring them above all nations—a stage in the redemptive Purpose of God, but it was also a sign of enmity between God and man. All men were enemies when Christ came, even though the Law had been given years before. Moreover, the Law was given to the Jews only, it separated between nations; the Gentiles were outside its operation, without hope or promise, fenced off by a partition wall. But Christ abolished this distinction, which never fully represented God's true position as regards mankind; and through Him we all have access in one Spirit to the Father. The universal Fatherhood of God emerges in the reconciliation of all His children (Eph. ii. 11-18).

S. Paul had to deal with a large class of persons who regarded Christ's work as leaving the Law in much the same position as before. Christianity in their view was a developed Judaism,—a Judaism with the Messiah come. To S. Paul's mind this was a complete mistake,—an utter want of appreciation of the real state of things. His effort, therefore, is to show that the Law is of a piece with man's condition of enmity with God; that so far from undoing the work of the Fall, and making men just where they were sinners before, it belongs closely to the sinful order of things. Its form of external command and its effect alike prove this. Thus he gives the Galatians their choice between the Law and Christ, and tells them that if they return voluntarily into the old position of enmity and sin, and submit to circumcision, Christ avails them nothing (chap. v. 2). With the Romans he is less vehement, but no less certain, that in Christ men are delivered from the bondage of the Law. The effect of the atoning Work of Christ, therefore, is to transfer men from one position into another,—to re-establish the communion between God and man which sin had broken, and to give them freedom to carry out the will of God in their lives. The Death of Christ is not merely a historic event of which we learn indirectly,—it is one which we positively share by faith, by the grace of God through baptism. The old life of enmity—of the flesh—of the world comes to an end as truly as if we died, and baptism is the moment and the means of this death (Rom. vi. 1-8). And as by God's grace we are permitted to share the Death of Christ, so we share His risen Life. 'I live, yet no longer I, Christ liveth in me' (Gal. ii. 20). Of this and of the meaning of faith we shall have to speak more at length in another connexion. What is made plain by this account of S. Paul's doctrine is this, that in his mind there is present a broad contrast. Two pictures of the condition of mankind in the sight of God are present to him.

In one he sees man before the Sacrifice of Christ, an outcast from the favour of God, weak and sinning, confronted with a Law which he can never fulfil. And in the other he sees him absorbed into unity with Christ, the Son of God, the Mediator, living a new life under the inspiration of the Spirit, dead to the old through the Death of Christ, with which he has been identified through faith and in baptism, realizing in Christ his Sonship of the Father, freed from the spirit of fear and bondage and enmity and impiety in which he had spent his worldly life. Communion with God is restored, therefore, through the Sacrifice of Christ; and those who are in Christ are partakers of the Table of the Lord. The emphasis in S. Paul lies on the contrast of the two conditions.

Though in these Epistles the contrast between Judaism and Christianity is most persistently before the Apostle's mind, there are notes and expressions which show plainly that he connected the change with the idea of vicarious sacrifice. Christ's Death was a vindication of the majesty of God's Law,—an assertion of the terrible consequences of infringing it. The long-suffering of God in suspending the penalties of sin might have seemed to imply that He was not so deadly a foe to sin as He claimed to be: hence the Death of Christ was 'for a manifestation of God's justice, by reason of the passing over of the sins done aforetime in the forbearance of God' (Rom. iii. 25, 26). And Christ, although He ended by admitting us to share His triumph, had to begin by entering upon our degradation. 'Him who knew no sin He made to be sin on our behalf; that we might become the righteousness of God in Him' (2 Cor. v. 21). So, again, 'Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us' (Gal. iii. 13). So it was *for* us—on our behalf —that He died 'while we were yet unrighteous' (Rom. v. 6). All these phrases convey the thought of vicarious sacrifice and prove that, though for special reasons S. Paul's object

was to contrast the two states of man, he was familiar with and accepted the sacrificial doctrine.[1]

(2) The conception of the vicarious Sacrifice of Christ is brought forward and treated in detail by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Here, too, the writer is providing against dangers from the side of Judaism,—dangers which could best be met by showing the typical and transitory nature of the Law. Hence in this Epistle also we meet with a discussion of the position of the Law, but from a widely different point of view to that in S. Paul. S. Paul had argued from the place of the Law in the scheme of Divine Providence to its inferiority to the Christian dispensation. The author to the Hebrews, by showing in detail the fulfilment by Christ of two prominent assumptions of the Law,—the Covenant with God and the Atonement,—draws the same inference that its day is past. The two arguments are complementary to one another,—the one applies general positions to particular cases, such as circumcision; the other draws principles of interpretation from the facts supplied by particular cases.

Roughly speaking, the parallel lies between the acts necessary to conclude the first Covenant and temporary atonement, and the Sacrifice of Christ. Under the old conditions sins had occurred in spite of the existence of the Covenant with Israel. The first thing necessary, therefore, was that sacrifice of purification should be made for this sin (Heb. ix. 15). Christ made this perfect Atonement. He voluntarily surrendered His own Life instead of using the lives of involuntary victims. He appeared before God bearing His own Blood, in heaven—not in the Holy of

[1] The word translated 'propitiation' (ἱλαστήριον), and the words connected with it, seem not to mean to 'propitiate' in the sense of appeasing an angry Deity; but rather to reconcile oneself to God by covering, or getting rid of, sin (cf. Westcott, *Epp. of S. John*, p. 87; Gifford on the Romans in the *Speaker's Commentary*, pp. 96-98; Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, note on ch. iii.).

Holies,—in a tabernacle not made with hands (ix. 24): and for these reasons His offering was final,—it not only cleansed the flesh, but it abolished sin. The yearly entry of the High Priest once a year had typified this Atonement, but not more than typified it. The removal by this means of the obstacle of sin enabled Christ to become the Minister of a new Covenant. The Blood which He shed was His Blood of the new Covenant, by participation in which men enter upon a new and closer relation with God (see chap. ix. 11–28, and Westcott's notes). And lastly, His Sacrifice admits those who participate in it to an altar, 'of which they have no power to eat who serve the tabernacle.' These are the general lines within which the author to the Hebrews sets forth his conception of the Sacrifice of Christ. They lead on immediately to the thought of Christ as our High Priest, which serves still further to illustrate the doctrine of the Atonement.

The conception of priesthood both in pagan and in Jewish religions implied a person who stood between God and man and maintained satisfactory relations between them. In the more primitive forms of religion this intermediary action consisted in keeping the traditions of the right way of approaching the Deity, giving advice when the Deity was offended, and reconciling the offender.[1] In Judaism all these elements of the idea were present, but they were dominated by the sanctity of the whole Jewish people. As the Levites were the means by which the first-born were redeemed, so the priests were those members of the chosen people whom God specially set apart for His own service; and by this separateness they emphasized the idea of the covenant between God and man,—they were a permanent memorial that the Lord had chosen the people of Israel for His own. The High Priest represented the whole people before God; he bore

[1] Cf. Robertson Smith, pp. 18, 19; also cf. p. 404 *seqq.*

their names upon his dress, and in his person once a year the whole people made atonement for their sins before God.

Christ, as we have seen, performed all these functions with fuller effectiveness and finality. But He was more than the antitype of the Aaronic priesthood. Not only was He a man as we are, and therefore capable of sympathy with our infirmities (iv. 15); not only was He appointed directly by God, as also was Aaron (v. 4), but He was a priest after the order of Melchizedek (v. 6), according to the oath of God (vii. 21). The various points in which this priesthood gave Him a superiority over the Levitical priesthood are described at the end of the seventh chapter. The rule of His priesthood was 'the power of an indissoluble life,' not 'the law of a fleshly commandment' (vii. 16). This implied an eternal priesthood (vii. 15-17). Further, His priesthood, unlike that of Aaron, was constituted by an oath of God; He was therefore 'a pledge of a higher covenant' (vii. 21, 22). He remains for ever, whereas the priests of Aaron's line died and were succeeded by their descendants (vii. 23–25); hence His Intercession is ceaseless. Again, He is a Son perfected for ever, while they were mere men liable to imperfections (vii. 27, 28). He sits upon the throne of the Majesty on High, and ministers in the true tabernacle which God set up, and not man (viii. 1, 2).

Christ, therefore, is the true High Priest. He truly and ideally represents mankind. He offers sacrifice like other priests, but His Sacrifice does not consist of irrational animals; it is Himself, offered through the Eternal Spirit to the Father by Himself. Thus, in virtue of our connexion with Him, we are partakers in the true sacrifice for sin,—the way is opened freely between us and God. The fragments of truth scattered about in ancient theories of sacrifice are recapitulated and unified in Christ.

The thoughts of priesthood and kingship lie near together.

Kings, like priests and prophets, stood in the place of God, if they did not combine the functions of priest and ruler. They were, like fathers, the natural media of Divine communion. Sometimes, as in the case of our own word *king*, the name expressed the kinship which they were supposed to bear towards their people. The Jewish kingship, as described in Scripture, was a deflection from the ideal of their polity. It was not the natural expression of their national existence; it was the result of a materialistic desire for a visible head, such as other nations had, instead of the invisible Sovereign Jehovah. Even so, however, it was made into a channel for the further revelation of God. The choice of David, and his anointing by the prophet—the proper interpreter of the will of God in history—pointed to the day when the Son of David should reign, after God's own heart, over a spiritual kingdom. The fulfilment of this hope is found in the Church, visible and invisible, and as yet lies outside our immediate purpose. Here we need only note in passing how the High Priesthood of Christ contains within it the satisfaction of the natural ideal of human kingship. It is through His Priesthood that He is the true King. He rules as the Jewish high-priest should have ruled—in virtue of His special union with the Father.

(3) Christ's Death[1] was an atoning Sacrifice for us in the following sense. It removed the positive barriers which sin had erected between man and God, and it also was the crowning act of a life of obedience and fellowship with God, in the power of which we must act; and thus it renewed the broken ideal of manhood. We have by this time abundantly seen that the idea of sacrifice which was applied to the Death of Christ was not completed in the idea of death, but held

[1] We have already spoken (p. 281) of the sacrifice of Christ's Life—S. John's special contribution to the account of the Atonement—and need not repeat it here.

within it in the notion of life liberated and availing. So it is by participation in the life of Christ, and not merely by believing that He died to save us, that we fulfil the true object of the redemption-scheme, and regain the right of access to our Father which is in heaven.

Still Christ's Death, though it satisfied the ancient idea of sacrifice, did more also: it was required as the punishment for sin.[1] Death had been the sentence passed upon all sin, and death reigned over all humanity. It was not consistent with the plan of God to reverse this sentence simply; it had to be carried out. Apart from Christ's action death must have carried with it eternal separation from God. But this effect was due—not to the mere fact that this life had to close—but to the permanent state of alienation in which men lived and died. Christ, therefore, transfigured human conditions by entering upon them. He presented the ideal life of obedience and fellowship under the very conditions in which disobedience and alienation from God were dominant. He passed through the horrors of physical death—the violent separation of the soul from the body, and by so doing overthrew death. He, as guiltless, passed voluntarily through

[1] In using the word 'punishment' it is important to guard against forensic associations. The prevailing theory of punishment at the present time regards it simply as remedial and deterrent. It is inflicted in order to deter the offender from repeating,—and others from committing,—a given offence. Whether this is all that could be said of human punishments we cannot here inquire; but it is obviously inadequate as an account of the Death of Christ. For Christ was Himself innocent: and the spectacle of an innocent Man suffering for the guilty is neither remedial nor deterrent. It could, at most, if this were its object, unsettle men's convictions as to the righteousness of the Moral Law. We must, therefore, get rid of these associations from the word 'punishment'; we must see in the misery and despair of death the inevitable moral entail of man's self-assertion:—a 'punishment' which no attempts at repentance or reformation could avail to set wholly aside. Yet there is no *vengeance* in it. It is a law written in the nature of things as they were created that sin should bring misery with it: a law which took origin in the Counsels of the Father, and was carried out by the Son to its utmost consequences, in the Sacrifice which He offered through the Eternal Spirit (cf. p. 285, above).

conditions which were rendered foul and hateful by sin, and for that very reason death could have no true hold upon Him. His submission, which the Jews might think would stamp Him with the mark of human failure, was the moment of His victory, because at that point He assaulted the very stronghold of sin and the devil; He triumphed where all other men most dismally failed. They might do as they pleased in life, strive to compass the highest ideals, deny themselves, restrain their lusts; but always at the end the penalty of sin seized hold upon them, they had to face the 'arch-terror' of humanity. At that final pass, when the world fell away from them, and their bodily organization grew weak and useless, when they had to pass into an unknown condition, and leave behind all that had filled up their life, then the alienation from God made itself felt. Only the sense of fellowship with God could keep them secure in such an hour, and that they had in a vague and uncertain way. In some sense which we can never fathom, Christ became conscious of this alienation from God. In the terrible cry upon the Cross, before the darkness cleared off, 'My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?' He gave this consciousness expression. It is easier perhaps to say what this ejaculation does not mean than to define it exactly; but we may feel sure that in it lies hidden the central mystery of the Atonement. It is this that makes us sure that no rationalistic accounts of the Death of Christ are satisfying, but that He in some sense tasted death as sin had made it. And this would be merely the carrying on to its complete result the effort of the Incarnation. All through the days of His flesh He had borne the burden of humanity with the sorrows and the weaknesses which were, in it, the effect of sin. And as in life, so in His Death, He did not refuse the conditions of humanity as it was. Death, through sin, had taken to it this conviction of alienation, and Christ passed through death as He found it.

But by His passage through it, death was overthrown, and the devil who had the power of death. One human soul had then suffered the horrors of death, though innocent: and triumphed by endurance, as innocence must always do. Death could have no power over such a One; the perfection of His Humanity asserted itself inevitably, and He rose again in a spiritual body, such as man was formed to wear. Christ's Death was complete. Not only was His Soul severed for the time with His Body, but He passed into the abode of departed spirits, and there brought the news of His victory. The belief in this fact (which rests on 1 Peter iii. 18–22) was not explicit in the Christian Creed at first. Its first appearance is in a creed of Aquileia, in 390. It emphasizes, however, these important truths: (1) that the Death of Christ was real and complete; (2) that there is an intermediate state for the souls of men, which is not a condition of silence and unconsciousness, but one where spiritual intercourse is possible. The descent of Christ into hell is the last scene in His ministerial career—the last act which He performs before His triumph. The twofold process of endurance of human conditions and the presentation of an example of perfect obedience and fellowship with God closes with the Resurrection, which is the seal and warrant of His victory. After the Resurrection Christ no longer uses the same familiarity of intercourse with His Disciples. He appears to them now and again; but his earthly work is over, and He soon reassumes the Glory which He had with the Father before the world was. But the Ascension has a meaning for man as well as for Christ. In it humanity rises in the person of its Head to the position which was contemplated from the beginning: it returns into due relation with God. Already, the life of Christian men is hidden with Christ at God's Right Hand; and through His Grace some portion of the human race may come where He has gone before.

III. We have now set forth as best we can the Scriptural statements about the Atonement from the side of Christ. It remains to explain the way in which man participates in the atoning acts of Christ.

It has come out clearly from our investigations so far that the atoning Work of Christ requires to be apprehended by man. It is not done outside of him, as it were, so that he is saved in spite of himself. It requires the co-operation of his will, a definite act on his part, by which he enters into the plan and counsels of God. The old doctrine of simple substitution fails in every direction. It fails, in that it offers no explanation of the morality of God's action, and it breaks down hopelessly beneath the analysis of the idea of sacrifice. It contains the bare truth that Christ died for our sins; but it is grievously short of the fulness of the Bible teaching upon the subject. Its merit and the reason of its failure are, alike, its simplicity.

But when we come to enter upon the question of man's share in the process, we are at once confronted with some of the most abstruse questions in Theology, those which are associated with the ideas of grace, and predestination, and election. For we have to take into our consideration two circumstances: (1) that the will of man is vitiated by the Fall, and therefore it is a question in what way it can act at all in the direction of holiness; (2) that the effects of Christ's life are strangely limited in range. Christianity is not perhaps, even numerically, the strongest religion; and it must be confessed that among the numbers who would call themselves Christians a certain proportion are nothing of the kind. These two facts are met, roughly speaking, by the doctrines of grace and of election. The will of man acts in response to grace; those are Christians to whom in accordance with the Purpose of God the offer of Christianity has been effectively made. And these

solutions of the difficulty are in themselves the hardest of problems.

A. It is certainly true that the will of man was injured by the Fall. It was deprived of the unerring guidance of the Spirit of God, and buried in the flesh, governed by carnal suggestions and motives. There was a definite breach between God and man; and one of the signs of it was this wrong direction of the will, the fact that the will needs conversion, or turning towards God. The question then arises, Can the will turn of its own accord and by its own strength, or does it need grace to do so? The Pelagians answered, Yes; the Catholic Church answered, No. The real ground of the Pelagian position was to be found in their denial of the hereditary taint of evil. They maintained that every man started afresh like Adam, but that he followed Adam in his rebellion. This is not a point of view which is likely to obtain much countenance in the present day, seeing that science is so firmly convinced of the opposite conclusion. We need not, therefore, discuss it. It would be waste of time now to argue in favour of hereditary influences passing from generation to generation.[1] The Pelagians were consistent in denying the influence of previous conditions upon the will, and in resting the first movement towards salvation upon the will too. For them the whole matter was an independent question for the individual will, and the will alone. But when this theory is set aside a far more subtle and perplexing question arises, viz, concerning prevenient grace. In the fifth century this question arose as follows:[2] Granted that man requires grace at every stage of his progress, must not the initial move towards God depend upon the will alone? Otherwise how can we talk of it as the man's act at all? Where is his self-surrender? Where

[1] See above, pp. 238–40.

[2] Cf. Bright, *History of the Church*, A.D. 313-451, p. 307.

is the moral value of his act, if it is merely the result of prevenient grace, *i.e.* the supply of power to make the move? Is not this coercion of the will?

All questions which concern human action are easily made confusing and insoluble, if they are approached apart from exact observation of the facts. And there is nothing which so curiously conceals the facts as the popular common-sense associations with the idea of will.[1] There are two ways in which this common-sense treatment may set the whole question wrong. One is when the Fall is supposed to have reduced man's will and character to a condition of unmixed evil. This is the point of view of Calvinism, and we have already seen its impossibility. Its attractiveness lies in the fact that it assumes the rough-and-ready account of the state of man which an unreflecting acceptance of the doctrine of the Fall might seem to suggest. And the other is when the will is treated *in abstracto*; when it is regarded not (as it always is when we know it) in action for more or less definite reasons, but as it is presumed to be before all action; in face of an alternative which it can decide quite independently, without any influence from other things or other wills. Such positions can always be supported by excellent arguments. As regards the first it may be argued as follows: If man was good before the Fall, and had no initiative capacity for goodness afterwards, he must have been all evil. And the other will be equally well supported: If a man is free, he acts freely; if he is in any measure subject to constraint, he is not free. Both are excellent but irrelevant arguments; they do not belong to the set of facts of which we have experience.

It will be seen at once that the application of the above pleas to the question will produce two definite theories as to the process of man's salvation. The first results in

[1] See pp. 243–5.

absolute predestinarianism. Man being evil through and through can have no affinity at all with any of the Divine action. Certain specimens of the human race elected by the arbitrary fiat of God will be saved; the rest are doomed. The moral condition of the saved cannot be taken into consideration, because that would mean that they had won their salvation by their works. The result, therefore, is that, provided men are elected in the Divine predestination, their life matters nothing—*theoretically*, at any rate. The result of the other arguments produces semi-Pelagianism. It is felt to be intolerable that the Decree of God should act irrespectively of moral character; and at the same time it cannot be maintained that salvation is given as a reward for a moral life. Hence by a sort of compromise, the initial movement towards God is assigned to the will alone, and grace allowed free play over the rest of the life. In a word semi-Pelagianism denies prevenient grace.

Our question has now expanded. We have to endeavour to find an explanation of an act in which three factors are engaged—the human will, the grace of God, the predestinating purpose of God. (1) Let us begin by considering the human will. We have already explained what we do and do not mean by freedom in man. We mean such freedom as his nature admits; freedom to make himself felt upon the world around him; freedom to use the laws of nature for his own ends. The one thing we never mean by freedom, is independence of outward suggestion or motive, arbitrary action without rational ground. For the simple reason, that such a thing cannot be. An act of will is a composite thing. It implies the action and reaction of two forces—the man's will and the world outside him. It is something like a work of art, *e.g.* a sculpture. A thought which the sculptor possesses in himself is imposed upon some alien

and external matter—marble or rougher stone. And the idea of the artist is regulated in some degree by his knowledge of the material with which he has to deal. He will not attempt to express in stone ideas of which it is not capable. No wise sculptor, for example, would attempt to represent in marble, driving clouds, or a shower of rain. He might wish to express his notion of these in some artistic form, but marble does not bear such treatment. So with the will. There are some things which can be imagined and desired but not translated into act, some which may be attempted, but will probably fail, some which the nature of things readily and easily permits. In every case the act or the attempt involves two elements: the agent—the human will, and the reagent—the surrounding world. A will acting without any reacting environment would simply be *chimæra bombynans in vacuo.*

(2) At first sight the grace of God might appear simply as one of the elements of the man's environment. It is, as it were, one channel through which motives may be supplied to the will—a short name for the higher courses open to him. But this is not an adequate account of it. The grace of God is not merely a name for a possible line of action, like holiness or impurity. It is not, that is, the common name of those actions which are seen to fulfil the Will of God, but it is a positive and real element in the situation. And the difficulty of it is to know where to place it, in the man or in his environment. For the life of man is the result of the grace of God; it is God's prime gift to man, the very starting-point and basis of his whole moral history. The power by which man resists or follows the Will of God is God-given. At no point, therefore, does the man, when he acts and lives, get outside of the power which God has given him. His whole action and life are permeated with the Divine grace. This will exclude at

once any treatment of the forces of the will and of God as absolutely separate.

How, then, does grace act? It acts through the affinity between the Spirit of God in man and the appeal of God from without. For man and the world are both the handiwork of God, and we have already explained creation to mean that He has created and sustains the world and dwells in it. Now this is more than a mere fact of history or metaphysics; it is a permanent element in man's consciousness, a permanent condition of the external world. The course of the world, the suggestions of action or thought it brings to man, are the vehicle of the manifestations of the Spirit of God. Apart from the thought or the knowledge of God, the history of the world is but a mechanical physical sequence. From the point of view of the knowledge of God the whole world, physical or moral, is full of the Presence of God. And as the whole is thus instinct with the Life of God, it is not possible that the appeals which come through the outer world should fail to be construed as the grace of God. One deep calleth to another. The highest part of man, unless it becomes deadened by sense, learns to recognize the voice of God in conscience, in thought, in the order of the outer world. Man is, therefore, in a sense, never without prevenient grace; he is never without some such feeling and knowledge of God as ought to enable him to recognize any new manifestation on the part of his Father in heaven. The mere fact of the presentation of Christ's life to a man's soul, in correspondence with the moral and spiritual elements in him, is an appearance of prevenient grace.

This view of grace prevenient conflicts seriously with an extremely popular theory, which is based on a clear and firm distinction between the action of God in the external world and His spiritual manifestations. It is expected that grace should be a wholly special appeal, not expressed in the

ordinary 'natural' ways. The call to conversion which is regarded as typical is that of S. Paul. That there are sudden and miraculous conversions the example of S. Paul sets beyond all doubt, but it by no means follows that this is the ordinary method. In far the most numerous cases the process is gradual, not sudden; natural and smooth, not abrupt and startling. The ordinary process would be for a child brought up in surroundings redolent of holy things, and trained in the discipline of the Church, to find by degrees his conscious hold on the spiritual world, and his conscious filial love of God becoming more and more a part of the fibre of his life—his will gradually relinquishing the tendency and habit of self-assertion, gradually waiting more faithfully for the guidance of God. Such a person would be responding to grace both prevenient and co-operating. It might be that he had never felt anything like the experience of S. Paul, or of other Christians whom God has saved suddenly by might and by power. But it would indeed imply fanatical adhesion to a theory, if such quiet leading were denied to be the work of God's Spirit, just because it was so quiet.

But it may be said, This is true enough for those brought up in the bosom of the Church, though it is not always true of them; but for those to whom the claims and the salvation of Christ are presented comparatively late in life, some sudden inspiration will be needed. Even this admission must be declined. Our point is, that no man is wholly without motions of the Holy Spirit within him, and that to these the appeal of God's Grace is made. They are called, from other points of view, religious and ethical ideas in a comparatively early stage. And they are rightly so called; but they are, nevertheless, signs that the Presence of God is not wholly departed from fallen man, and pledges that the handiwork of the Father may still be recognized by the son. Moreover, it may fairly be questioned whether the voice of God ever

speaks to man except through some medium. If it be a sound inarticulate to some, but vocal to those whose ears are ready, it is still shrouded in outward form. If, even, it be an inward admonition, so clear and certain as to be unmistakable, it will almost inevitably take the form of speech, of some clear and imperative command; for it is only through such means that it would come into consciousness at all. It must use the laws of mind: and the difference between the laws of the mind and the laws of nature in this connexion is comparatively slight. Both alike are the product of the Thought of God: both may be means of attaining knowledge of God. If God speaks through the one, He may speak through the other. The whole world is full, if we choose to recognize it, of spiritual significance.

Grace, then, prevenient, or the special Grace which determines man to take the first step towards God, may and does work in the coincidence between the natural thoughts of man as a spiritual being, and the spiritual presence in nature, and life, and in the Christian creed. There is no need to suppose a blank mind and will stirred, as it were externally, by a new force. Such a conception in reality diminishes the freedom of the man's action, and is not true to fact. Man is never, so long as he lives, without the Presence and Guidance of the Holy Spirit, unless he has deliberately sinned it away: and to possess this is to possess the seeds of all further spiritual development.

Thoughts like these will, perhaps, throw light upon a question which often gives much trouble. What has become of all the heathen, if it be true that man, apart from the Christian revelation, is in a state of alienation from God? Are they lost? through circumstances which are no choice of theirs? This question, like so many, has felt the disturbing influence of the problems surrounding the will. So long as grace is regarded as an intrusive force entering upon

a perfectly blank mind, it follows that there is no possible connexion between the unenlightened heathen and the Christian. But if it be admitted that all men possess, in however limited and rudimentary a form, grace, which is the seed of all spiritual development, the heathen falls into a position which is not without analogy to that of the Christian. Both have certain religious gifts, which they are responsible for using; and the Christian is the more guilty if he fails, because his privileges are the more special and clear. Both cases turn on the use of opportunities; both are saved, if saved at all, by the merits of Christ, who died for all; both are seen in Christ, as Christ would make them, if the response they have made by grace to His appeal were carried out in full. Both apart from Christ—standing alone as bare individuals with the moral law to keep—are full of failures and sin. But neither has sinned away his grace, neither has quenched the Holy Spirit's Voice: but each has given his heart in his own way, and in his own conditions, to the highest leading that came to him; each is, therefore, on the road to spiritual perfection.[1]

(3) The question of the incomplete distribution of the faith of Christ brings us to our third point, the predestination of God. We have now seen that the human will works in close correlation with the world around it, and that in it and outside it the Presence of God is continually at hand, and that this correspondence is called technically grace prevenient. But there is a third factor to be considered, the Purpose and election of God. We have already rejected by implication the Calvinistic theory of arbitrary decrees. This does not, however, carry with it all doctrine of predestination. The

[1] To decline, on the ground of these facts, to support missions to heathen, is like any other way of improving the constitution of the world as laid down by God. It is a revolt against Christ's methods of saving the world as described by Himself. Cf. S. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.

objection to the Calvinistic theory which most concerns us here is, that it practically excludes God from the conduct of the world by drawing an absolute line between the world's order and the decrees of election. These last are wholly special, wholly arbitrary determinations; they cut across all earthly, physical, or historical order We have already seen that this absolute distinction introduces more complications than it can possibly be expected to solve. It prides itself indeed on this, on the fact that the Counsels of God are thus vindicated as mysterious. But we think that they will be found to present quite difficulty enough without the addition of immorality and apparent irrationality. Let us ask again what are the facts about God's ordering of the world? Do we know enough about it to know when His Will is expressed, and what it is?

We find, then, as a matter of fact, that every man is fixed within a certain set of circumstances; he has a narrow area within which he moves. He lives at a certain place and time, and these help to determine the thoughts which he will think, the particular moral standard which he will follow, the religion which he will profess, and so on. We call these the accidents of his birth and education, and from our point of view they are accidents—we see no reason for them. But this, we need hardly remark, is not an adequate account of them. The accidents of a man's condition are the expression of the Purpose of God—the predestinating Thought of God—concerning him. The area within which he moves is given him by God: it is the Will of God concerning him, the sphere of his probation. The only alternative to this account of the matter is, that men are where they are by accident—that what is accident to us is accident to God—that God knows nothing about them: which is intolerable. The Will of God, therefore, is expressed in the circumstances of a man's life considered generally. Can we say, then,

knowing this, whether a man is predestinated to eternal life or not?

(i) The question of eternal life arises directly and primarily in the case of Christians. Now, from the fact that one man is born in a Christian home with Christian surroundings it is clear that he is to be saved, if saved at all, through Christ, as the Christian Church proclaims and presents Him. And it is equally clear that, so far as this world is concerned, the heathen who is out of hearing of the Gospel is to be saved, if saved at all, through Christ in some other way. Their several positions are the expression of the Will of God as regards them in this world.

(ii) But is either to be saved necessarily at all? Is the Will of God expressed in this world valid for the next? This question simply raises another, which is this: Are the decrees of God irreversible? Can evil have no power to thwart or modify them? This is the real heart of the whole subject. It seems, at first sight, simple. It would be a monstrously immoral doctrine that those who lived in the atmosphere of Christianity, who bore its name, and yet trampled on its Master and its faith all their life long, should be held to have done no wrong—to be saved by virtue of the Christian surroundings in which they lived.

But, then, what are we to say about the intention of God? We shall be able to make our position clearer by the use of an analogy. Let us consider the course of history as a whole. It is generally believed to be alive with a purpose of some sort, though it is not always easy to define what the purpose is. And the difficulty of knowing this is always greatest at a period of crisis. Looking back, we can see, to take one instance, that the verdict of history was against the old *régime* in France; that it lay within the purpose of history to destroy the old state of things. The circumstances in which this purpose was expressed were visible

alike to the nobles and to the revolutionary party. The former missed, the latter realized the demands of the age; and owing to the misapprehensions of the former, the purpose of the age was not indeed hindered, but carried out at the frightful cost of those who resisted the leading of the spirit of the age. Looking back, then, now, we say that the ancient *noblesse* was doomed to ruin by the set of things—the movement of the purpose in history. We have purposely made abstraction in this particular case of all moral questions on one side or the other, and simply compared the attitude of two prominent parties in a famous crisis. Let us now look at the purpose of history as the Purpose of God, the conditions of each individual as representing the Will of God for him, and take moral phenomena into consideration. And we shall see that a man may resist or comply with the expressed Will of God. He may reject God's call, he may be indifferent to God's admonitions, and yet he does not prevent God's will being carried out; it is carried out, but to his eternal loss. He goes on resisting, throwing away opportunities, rejecting offers, and dies, let us suppose, in this frame of mind. Then he has turned that which was to have been to his advantage into an occasion of fall and ruin. The circumstances which God ordained to guide him right he has used wrongly. His ruin is his own act, and yet the Purpose of God is carried out in and through it.

It must be plain by this time that the account of predestination here suggested, which connects it closely with God's natural Providence and ruling in history, is by no means free from perplexing mystery. But it is always an advantage, in dealing with a mystery, where intellectual explanations are likely to fail, to know at what point speculation is blocked, and where the insolubility begins. There are two moments in the position we have just

described at which we think that intellectual failure is probably to be anticipated; but neither is without an analogous case. (1) In the first place it is difficult to see how the march of the Divine Purpose is consistent with the due freedom of the individual. Let us go back to our historical illustration. We have said that subsequent events have proved that the old order in France had become obsolete, and that its day was therefore past. The acts by which it was set aside were individual acts, however necessary they may have been to the fulfilment of the historic purpose; can we conceive it possible that events of such tremendous moment should be entrusted to the action of wills free within a certain area of choice? Would not a slightly changed moral temper have given a very different aspect to the whole affair? It does seem at first sight that we must answer unconditionally, Yes, to both these questions. But we soon find that this would only give us half a truth. For, on the other hand, we find the wills of the individuals acting, as on ordinary occasions, from motives which belong wholly to their age—which they can express in their own language, intelligibly to themselves and others. These actions are no more forcibly determined than any others; they are free and conditioned in precisely the same sense. It does not seem, therefore, as if a perfectly complete theoretical combination were possible of these two lines of historical action—the general conditioning purpose and the individual will. Something of the same sort may be said of the predestination of God. It cannot depend for its success upon the accidental compliance of certain individual wills; that is one side of the truth; yet the wills are in themselves guided and motived by personal and narrow considerations. It may, perhaps, be suggested that in one respect predestination has less difficulty than the other, because it operates in the moral sphere, and there

are never more than two real alternatives, the right and the wrong—compliance with the Will of God and resistance to it. Hence the Purpose of God might *conceivably* determine what is to occur in the world, and leave uncertain the individual's attitude towards His Will.

(2) But this becomes hopelessly difficult when we take in, as we must, the idea of foreknowledge. For that seems to involve the prevision of the way in which the alternative is to be decided. It seems to involve a knowledge of the individuals saved and lost, obedient or rebellious; and then the difficulty recurs in an intenser form. We must confess that at this point an insoluble antinomy—a permanently intractable opposition, seems to arise. But even though this may be so we are not wholly without resource. For it is a new form of a difficulty which has pursued us throughout the whole account of Creation and the world—the difficulty of understanding how the eternal Purpose of God expresses itself gradually in time. It is, we repeat, some advantage to know where the centre of a mystery lies—where and how our faculties are limited. It is, perhaps, some consolation to find that the form of time—already found to be a danger in dealing with Theology—is here again the cause of our failure.

The further difficulty of the geographical distribution of Christianity is comparatively slight. It may seem, no doubt, a remarkable fact that the Christian faith, though so vitally important to mankind, should be known to so few people, comparatively speaking. We might have supposed that it would have been proclaimed broadly over the world in such unmistakable fashion that no doubt could be entertained of its truth. Of course, if it had been so, there would have been an end of all moral probation: it would have been a forcible alteration of the ideal condition of men. This, however desirable in our eyes, is not, as Butler long ago pointed out, the method of God in nature or in the kingdom of grace.

He always works by human means—sows a seed, as it were, and puts it in men's power to foster and bring it to perfection. Thus the natural conditions of men's life upon the earth, their social tendencies and the like, are used as means for the spread of the truth.

This fact suggests a few words upon the general character of our account of predestination and grace. It may not unnaturally have the appearance of reducing the whole process to a merely mechanical and physical one. We have certainly insisted on the revelation of God's Will which nature and history afford. We do not wish to exclude any other methods (such as direct intimations, and so on) which God may use. But it should be remembered that these also are natural methods. They depend, as we have noticed, upon the laws of mind, if they are to be intelligible. The laws of consciousness and the laws of nature are all natural laws; they may all be made vehicles of supernatural meaning. To the person who really believes in the Omnipresence of God, the whole world is supernatural. He does not pursue the investigation of nature and mind as dead mechanism, and then build outside a kind of theological annexe; but he begins with God, when his thoughts are duly ordered, and sees in the uniform laws of nature and the inevitable movement of history the manifestation of the changeless Nature of God. Such an account as is here given of the relation of God to the human will is not, strictly speaking, a naturalizing of the supernatural, it is rather a supernaturalizing of the natural. God is not reduced to the level of natural law but natural law has a place found for it among the self-manifestations of God.

B. We have now considered the conditions under which the will of man operates in the apprehension of the atoning Work of Christ: our next subject will be the acts which the will of man thus conditioned is enabled to perform; in

other words, we come now to the discussion of faith and justification.

This subject also has been considerably bewildered by controversy. Faith is certainly in Scripture the subjective cause of justification: that is, a man is justified before God, not by reason of any mass of good work which he has produced, not as a payment for labour, but by his faith in Christ. This is the meaning, roughly, of the contrast between faith and works in S. Paul. And as a consequence of this meaning the law is the typical form of justification by works. By circumcision a man entered into a definite covenant with God. God promised him certain blessings, conditionally, on his obeying the whole moral law. If he has done so he would have been justified, but, through the weakness of the flesh, righteousness did not and could not come by the law. In the Epistle of S. James the contrast between the words faith and works reappears, but with a different meaning. In this case faith means a mere cold, intellectual apprehension of a fact. 'Thou believest in God,' that is, believest that He exists; 'thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble' (chap. ii. 19). The faith here described is simply the appreciation of a fact; it is not directly moral at all. And the author goes on to say that faith apart from works is idle (*ἀργή*, chap. ii. 20); faith must be displayed by means of works (*ἐκ τῶν ἔργων*, *ibid.* 18).

The difference between the two is more upon the surface than in the heart of things. Both writers imply that God holds no communion with man over mere results of human activity in which the moral nature is unexpressed. The mere intellectual conviction, and the mere catalogue of works done, have not necessarily any moral significance whatever. Intellectual conviction may coexist with the most hopeless moral wickedness; the execution of the law

may be mechanical, without moral purpose or motive. In both writers a demand is made for a real manifestation of moral affinities, a real moral type of character. It would be difficult to express the combination of the two points of view better than in the words of our Lord in S. John (vi. 28, 29). 'They said therefore unto Him, What must we do that we may work the works of God?' They ask the question from the legal point of view; their inquiry seems to anticipate a list of positive precepts. But Christ's answer changes the whole atmosphere of the discussion. 'This is the work of God,' He says, 'that ye believe on Him whom He hath sent.' All works are swallowed up in the one work, faith in Christ.[1]

We have mentioned this passage in S. John because it draws attention to a fact often overlooked in the controversy, viz., that faith is a work. It differs in no essential particular from any work that can be named. It is an act of will, a free act, for which the agent is responsible, and it is nothing else at all. Much enterprise and labour has been spent to no purpose in trying to erect a firm distinction. The difference lies not in the method by which faith and works are severally brought into being, but in the character from which they severally spring—the attitude towards God which they severally imply. But faith is more than a work: it is a rule of character, a principle which will determine all the work that is done. That is the significance of the change in Christ's answer from the plural to the singular. He gives no list of works which must be produced in order to satisfy God, but He names one act of will—one work—which is to be the rule of all life—the constantly renewed and habitual faith in Him whom the Father hath sent.

Let us ask, then, what are the principles of the two

[1] Cf. Bishop Westcott, *ad loc.*

characters described respectively by the words faith and works? The latter is the character of the hired labourer (ἐργάτης), the man who for a certain covenanted wage performs a certain work. The fulfilment of the contract closes the relation. The other spirit is widely different. It consists in absolute dependence on the promises of God—committal of will to God; it excludes curious questioning as to His power or His will to carry out His designs; it produces a spirit of ready and exact obedience to God's commands. The example of Abraham is quoted both by S. Paul and S. James in illustration of their meaning. In S. Paul the attitude in which he stood to the promises of God is the special point noted. God had made promises to him relating to his descendants at a time when there was no reasonable likelihood of his having descendants at all. But yet, though the circumstances of himself and his wife were fully in his mind, he did not waver—'he staggered not at the promises of God through unbelief,' but was confident that what He had promised He was able also to perform. This was the spirit of absolute reliance upon God, which is of the essence of all proper dealing with God, and 'it was counted unto Abraham for righteousness' (Rom. iv. 18-22). The occasion chosen by S. James is the action of Abraham in the sacrifice of Isaac. Here the confidence of Abraham in God was submitted to a tremendous test. Against hope he had had born to him a son according to the Divine promise; and then there came the call to sacrifice him to God. He does not shrink from this act of reliance any more than from the other; he shows his faith by his works; he takes Isaac and is prepared to offer him, prepared to rest wholly on God for the fulfilment of His promises. So it was counted unto him for righteousness, and he was called the friend of God (S. James ii. 23).

How does this temper show itself in regard of the sacri-

fice of Christ? Let us recall some of our previous conclusions. The essential character of sacrifice was that the worshipper should be identified with the victim; the sinner's need is to be identified with Christ. Under the Jewish law the man who offered the victim laid his hands upon its head, or in some other way identified himself with it. Under the Christian dispensation the sinner identifies himself with the sacrifice of Christ by faith. That is, he places himself wholly in the hands of God; accepts His promises; commits himself to Him who raised up Jesus from the dead: and this faith is reckoned unto him for righteousness. For in it are the seeds of absolutely free and full communion with God. The barriers are already removed by the presentation of the Blood of Christ. The sinner renounces under the appeal of the Holy Spirit the world which holds him fast; he accepts the Spirit's guidance and casts in his lot with Christ—puts out his hand, as it were, to lay hold of the help which Christ extends to him. He believes, no doubt, that Christ died and rose again for us; but that is not all. He feels his heart stirred with love and gratitude at the condescension and self-sacrifice of our Lord; but this again is not all. Beneath the intellect and the emotions is a direct act of will, which the Spirit enables him to perform: an act in which he throws over for ever, in promise, the allegiance which he pays at present to the world, the flesh, and the devil, and places himself for ever, in promise, under the command of Christ. The moment that this union is consummated the man is justified; he appears before God no longer in the helpless isolation in which he stood before, trembling under the menace of an impossible legal demand, but he is seen as one with Christ; he is seen as he will be when Christ has fully made His abode in him.

Following close upon justification comes sanctification.

The words have not always been carefully distinguished; and, indeed, when they are so separated it is by an arbitrary distinction. Justification, strictly so called, is a momentary process; it is the response of God to the self-devotion of the will by faith in Christ. Sanctification is the normal result of it. For the person who is justified by faith should begin to express his renunciation of the world in action. He will expect to receive gifts of the Holy Spirit for the work of life, and these cannot be inoperative. He will not expect any longer to go his own way in the world, live his own life, and please himself; and the power to escape all the various pitfalls round about him is conveyed in sanctification. Hence justification and sanctification are stages in one process, to the initial moment of which the word justification should be confined. But in no case can one occur without involving the other. Were it possible that justification could take place, and be followed instantly by a relapse into old ways, it would be a sign that a retrograde process had begun which might end in the loss of grace. There is no remaining in the condition of peace with God without movement. And the movement, which *must* come, *must* be in one of two directions, either forwards, towards fuller communion with God, a state of fuller grace; or backwards, towards a more terrible state of ruin than that from which the sinner accepted the offer of Christ. Still less can sanctification occur without justification. Till a man is justified, he is outside the new Covenant—under the ban of the Law.

We must not leave this subject without a word on the connexion between salvation and justification. Strictly speaking, the man who is justified is in a state of salvation. Were he to die on the instant he would die in a state of grace. And if the gift of justification follows its normal course, sanctification will begin at once. Hence the man

who is once justified needs no further process of conversion. The fact that he has already repented himself and turned to God, so as to receive His offer by faith, is itself an act indicating the presence of the Spirit of God, and the conversion of the will; for conversion *is* the change of the drift of the will, from following after sin to following after God. To talk of conversion after this seems like an anachronism. At the same time, men do at times relapse into evil ways even after a very definite and conscious conversion, and then it becomes a difficult question to know what to say about them. If the relapse has been really complete, that is, if the man has wholly detached himself from the influence of Christ and the Holy Spirit, it is difficult to argue that he can return again and again at pleasure. And there are very stern words in the Epistle to the Hebrews about such men (x. 26-29). Indeed, so long as we connect the whole process with the will of man expressed in faith, it is difficult to understand clearly what may be the effect of one deliberate sin. For a deliberate sin consists in the assertion of the individual will against the will of God—a thing doubly wicked when done after the justification of God, in the face of Christ's Sacrifice. And it means that the will is, for the time, absolutely identified with the evil alternative presented to it. It may have a lurking conviction that Christ deserves better treatment, but it chooses its own worse way. Yet the Church has always ruled that the Grace of God is not lost immediately when sin is committed from the position of the believer. From our present point of view it seems impossible to explain this. If the process of redemption is merely an individual relation between the soul and God, determined by the attitude of the human will towards the offer of Christ, and by nothing else, it must depend, so it would seem, upon the varying motions of the human will.

And either we must suppose that a man passes in and out of a state of grace according to the condition of his will, or that a certain amount of sin does not infringe the union with our Lord, while a greater amount does. The first of these suggestions is impossible in the face of Scripture; it is never contemplated that the process of justification can occur more than once. And the other is a return to the doctrine of works in a kind of inverted way. Salvation is made to depend upon a quantitative proportion of work done, and not upon the moral direction of the man, which is the essence of faith. We cannot, therefore, explain such sin at our present stage. The reason of this is not far to seek. We have confined ourselves to stating, as clearly and accurately as our limitations would permit, the personal effort required of men in order to effect the apprehension of Christ's offer of salvation. It is truly stated, we hope, as far as it has gone, but it is not the whole truth. We have as yet made no allusion to the sacrament of Baptism. This, with the doctrine of the Church, to which it belongs, is necessary to complete the account of the redemptive plan. To this we shall come in the next chapter.

The Atonement, *S. Iren.*, Bk. III., IV. *S. Ath.*, De Incarnatione. *S. Aug.*, as above, p. 277. *S. Anselm*, Cur Deus Homo. *Newman*, Lectures on Justification. *Dale*, On the Atonement. *M'Leod Campbell*, The Nature of the Atonement. *Lux Mundi*, Essay i. "Faith." *Moberly*, Atonement and Personality.

Predestination.—*S. Aug.*, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio. De Correptione et Gratia. De Dono Perseverantiæ. De Prædestinatione Sanctorum. These should be read in the light of the Psychology in De Trin. ix.-xv. *Cassian*, Collation. xiii. *Hincmar*, De Prædestinatione ad Gothescalcum. *Mauguin*, Vindicatio Prædestinationis et Gratiæ. This work contains the history of the Gottscalk controversy, with some of the works concerned. *Calvin*, Inst. Theol. Lib. iii. De Æterna Prædestinatione Dei. *Mozley*, Augustinian Theory of Predestination.

CHAPTER VII

THE EXTENSION OF THE INCARNATION IN THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS

When a great thinker or reformer passes away, the world at once begins to form an estimate of his career. It inquires into his motives, discusses his designs, balances his success and failure. Till his death there was no final close of his activity. He has been still able to make new departures, and add to the list of his triumphs, or spoil them all by some disastrous step. But when he is dead, there is no room for this hesitation. All that he will ever do has been done, and those who are left may begin to appraise its value.

If he has been a politician he will probably have excited violent animosities and violent enthusiasm. The political world will be divided by his name. At his death his followers will rise to a pitch of greater enthusiasm even than in his lifetime, because their feelings will be touched with sorrow at his loss, and the disposition to ignore the defects of the dead will be strong upon them. His opponents will feel this influence in a certain degree; and, if they are generous opponents, they will recognize the gap which he has left, and discover that they always respected him, even when they were most widely at variance with him, and were calling him by the hardest names.

But the world will go on as before. Those who have been

under the influence of the reformer's ideas will found societies and clubs in his name, and so keep it before the world for a time. But the situation will change, and new names will arise; the sound of the great reformer's will become unfamiliar, and take on the venerable historic crust under which so many of the great names of the earth are handed on from age to age.

On the whole, politicians are those whose fame lasts longest and spreads widest at the time of their death. Artists are hardly parallel cases. And as for philosophers, if we think of the greatest of them all, we can hardly feel that their followers have done them much service. A philosophic school starts by being a somewhat small body of men—men of the intellectual stamp, which is necessary to make them a fit audience for the originality and power of the philosopher's thought. But when he is gone they are apt to become a clique. They are apt to miss the true functions of philosophy, in their efforts to maintain their master's system intact. They make changes grudgingly and of necessity; they discuss the minutest details; they heap up paraphrase and comment, and wander farther and farther from the world which their leader sought to explain. The politician's successors can at least point to changes in his country's laws, to social or political reforms which he has executed; but the philosopher's school has but a narrow public to appeal to, at best, and ceases to appeal even to this as it becomes more and more reflective and less and less original. The dead master in his works laughs his living followers out of the field.

The comparison between the work of Christ on earth and the work of men great in the world's concerns is a well-worn one. But it continually reasserts itself whenever we have to consider the question of the Church. It is impossible to deny that the Church has had defenders who have possessed

all the faults of the second-rate followers of great men; the work of Christ has been parodied; isolated features of it have been exaggerated; its scope has, at times, been narrowed down so as to be the possession of a clique. But it has lasted; and this is the great difference between it and many of the things with which it has been compared. Or perhaps we should rather say that something has lasted to which the name of Christ is still attached. For it has become customary to assert that the Catholic Church was the last thing which Christ ever contemplated; that He aimed at most at a reformation of manners: and that clumsy and timorous disciples heaped up over His simple structure a vast fabric of doctrine and practice, together with a complex external institution, in which free thought and free discussion were forbidden. We have already pointed out (Chap. II.) that, *if* the story of our Lord's claims recorded in the Gospels is a true one, as we believe it is, and if our Lord's claims as there described were justified, a body of men accepting them would have no alternative but to decide what they meant by so doing, what language was consistent and what was not consistent with their acceptance. We must, therefore, take for granted here, that a Church, if it had a right to exist, had a right, was even under a compulsion, to define its faith. The question of the existence, character, and constitution of the Church has now to be considered.

It is obvious to enquire first, Did Christ intend to found a visible society in the world, or not? Let us consider, first of all, what the Gospels actually say. The Gospel of S. Mark, after a short preface on the work of S. John Baptist, goes on as follows: 'Now after that John was delivered up (into prison) Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of God, and saying, The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe in the Gospel' (chap. i. 14, 15). So far there is a close resemblance between the

opening of Christ's mission and that of His forerunner. S. John Baptist is described in S. Matt. as having begun to preach, saying, 'Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand' (chap. iii. 2). S. Mark then gives an account of various miracles and the call of certain followers, together with a passing hint of the effect of Christ's preaching and works. He has retired into a desert place for prayer, and is found by Simon Peter, and those with him; they say, 'All are seeking Thee,' and He says to them, 'Let us go elsewhere into the next towns, that I may preach there also; for to this end came I forth' (chap. i. 36–38). So far He has not sought notoriety, but does not exactly decline it. He works miracles, and though He refuses to allow the devils to speak (S. Mark i. 34), He does not as yet retire from the enthusiasm of the common people. Moreover, His teaching is largely ethical, though He has already mentioned a kingdom of heaven. S. Matthew places the Sermon on the Mount almost immediately after Christ's first appearance, this being the longest connected ethical discourse in the Gospels.[1] So far, there has been no note of opposition to His work. The appearance of this is the signal for a change of policy. As the opposition grows in vigour and passion, Christ withdraws more and more upon the chosen few who follow Him, till in the end these are the last that remain.[2]

The account in S. John, though so widely different from the Synoptic tradition in form, does not differ in any essential feature as to the policy of our Lord. On the contrary, the gradual separation of the Apostles from the multitude is

[1] As it stands in the Gospel, this Sermon is manifestly intended to define the nature of Christ's preaching of the kingdom, just mentioned in chap. iv. 23. The question of the historic character of the Discourse *as it stands* does not affect this point. It represents an abstract of the teaching of our Lord on the subject, and the relation of His Gospel to the Law.

[2] Cf. Latham, *Pastor Pastorum*, pp. 188–195, also pp. 24, 25. Holland, *Creed and Character*, Sermons IV. and V.

more clearly and unmistakably marked. S. John notes moments of critical importance in the development of the Apostles' faith—the miracle at Cana, the discourse at Capernaum, the discourse at the feast of Tabernacles (chaps. vii. and viii.); and again, the final division of faith and unbelief after the raising of Lazarus (chap. xii.). Throughout the whole period our Lord holds back from unbelief. He does not seek to force or convince it. His presence judges men, displays what their character and affinities are.

Still more striking is His treatment of faith in individuals. On the whole, the Apostles were by no means the strongest cases of faith. The centurion who saw so clearly our Lord's authoritative rights over disease and evil; the Syro-Phœnician woman who refused to be put off by our Lord's apparent repulse; the woman with the issue of blood—were all cases in which faith of the most unswerving kind was displayed in our Lord's Person. It is difficult to avoid comparing them with the lack of perception and spiritual obtuseness displayed occasionally by the Apostles. And yet the Apostles were the body of men who were drawn most closely around the person of the Master, to whom He committed His fullest revelation of Himself. The others, in spite of their great faith, vanish out of the Gospel story; the mere individual faith which believes and is healed was not the stuff upon which Christ would build His Church. For this Christ used the far more hesitating and timorous faith of S. Peter. He blessed and healed the simple faith, but He did not give to it His highest commission.

Moreover, the mission of the twelve and of the seventy, the exhortations as to the future conduct of the Apostles and such like actions, seemed intentionally directed towards the preparation of the Apostles for a missionary life; and this impression is confirmed by the records of the final commis-

sion before the Ascension.[1] In S. Matthew's Gospel and in the last twelve verses of S. Mark the commission to preach is coupled with a command to baptize; and in S. John the power to bind and loose is given to the Church.[2]

These actions, positively and negatively considered, seem to point to the fact that our Lord contemplated something more definite than a change in the ethical code of the day, and the mitigation of some of the physical evil of His time. It is the crowd to whom He offers His moral teaching primarily: it is upon those whom the crowd bring before Him that He works His miracles. The inner training is reserved for the Apostles, and the small band of people who were most nearly connected with Him.

All this was done, if we may believe the Gospel record, in full consciousness that the time would shortly come when He must return to the Father's Bosom, and a new era dawn for the world. The Master Himself, though He apparently contemplates a universal kingdom, deliberately holds back from publicity, and spends His time instead in preparing men to spread His faith after He has gone. He uses, in fact, the Divine method which we have already noticed in other connexions. He plants a seed which He leaves men to irrigate and develope. So long as He is on the earth He keeps His Apostles back from free contact with the world, and draws them close to Himself. They are not to go forth as missionaries till after He has left them. These facts are clear upon the face of the Gospel, and they prove that our Lord did not regard His work as complete, or His own life as comprising the whole of His purpose. His work was preparatory; it was laying the foundations for another state of things.

There is no elaborate description of this future kingdom,

[1] Cf. Latham, *Pastor Pastorum*, chap. ix.
[2] Cf. S. Matt. xviii. 15–20.

but there are certain highly significant hints upon the subject. It is to be under the rule of the Holy Spirit, and is to carry on the manifestation of Christ: in the new order Christ promises to return. 'I will not leave you comfortless; I will come unto you' (S. John xiv. 18). It is to explain and recall His life and work: 'The Spirit shall teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I said unto you' (xiv. 26). 'He shall bear witness concerning Me' (xv. 26). 'He shall take of Mine, and shall declare it unto you' (xvi. 14). It is to be governed by a law of love and obedience: 'If a man love Me, he will keep My word: and My Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him' (xiv. 23). 'This is My commandment, that ye love one another, even as I have loved you' (xv. 12). Lastly, the band of followers thus constituted will be an object of hatred and misunderstanding to the world; for it is not based on principles which the world recognizes. 'If ye were of the world, the world would love its own: but because ye are not of the world, but I chose you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you' (xv. 19). The Presence of the Holy Spirit, who is to be given them as their Guide for ever, is the real source of the world's hatred. For the world cannot receive Him, 'because it beholdeth Him not, neither knoweth Him' (xiv. 17); and He convicts it of sin, of righteousness, and judgment (xvi. 8). But this separation from the world does not mean that they are not to live their lives in the world like other men 'I ask not that Thou shouldest take them from the world, but that Thou shouldest keep them from the evil' (xvii. 15). They are to live there, and make converts: there will be those who will believe on Christ through their word; and for them Christ's prayer is, 'that they may all be one (thing), as Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be in us, that the world may believe that Thou didst

send Me' (xvii. 20, 21). The body of Disciples is to be banded together into one, and though permanently unintelligible to the world as such, is to be a visible reproach and warning to it. The whole of this depends on Christ's Ascension: 'If I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you' (xvi. 7); 'but now I go to Him that sent Me' (xvi. 5).

These are the bare facts given us in the Gospels. The action of Christ in separating the Apostles from the shifting masses of the people, and training them by themselves, is supplemented by His prophecy of their mission in the world. The language of His last Discourses, in which this mission is sketched, belongs in character to the period before the Passion. Like the words of the prophets of old, it deals with outlines and general principles rather than fills the picture with precise details. It speaks of a band of men united in love, and in conflict with the world; but it says nothing of the external garb in which the hatred of the world and the love of the brethren will be expressed. There is no hint of common property, even of mutual assistance. Earlier in the evening, it is true, Christ had said that 'ye ought to wash one another's feet'; but this is a command based on a symbolic act rather than a definite direction. And in the same way the method in which the hatred of the world is to develope is left undescribed. There is no hint given as to intellectual unity, save that the Spirit is said 'to convict the world of sin, because they believe not on Me'; and this, coming in a context in which Christ lays claim to equality with the Father, may perhaps not unfairly be taken in this sense. Beyond this there is nothing. So far, then, as we have any record of it in the Gospels, the revelation of Christ on earth was strictly prophetic as regards the future. The society which was to bear His name before the world was based on certain principles of love and unity, was to be externally present in the world, and governed within by the

Holy Ghost, the Comforter; it is left to express its principles externally as the Holy Ghost should determine.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the picture drawn by Christ is more naturally fulfilled in a society or corporation than in a horde of individuals. The simile of the Vine, the Fold, and still more the parables of the Kingdom in the Synoptic Gospels distinctly suggest this. We seem to look forward to a condition of things such as is recognizably parallel to the ordinary experience of human society: in which men unite together for various ends, and have dealings together, and do not live in isolation. We should look to find division of labour, and the zeal which men show in connexion with earthly employments—a varied and articulate order such as secular society presents. It is, of course, a spiritual order: but there is no evidence that the spiritual order excludes expression in some outward form.

So much for the general directions as to the character of the Church. Beyond these there are three definite instructions, of which we must speak shortly. Two positive institutions are traced to our Lord's definite command—Baptism and the Lord's Supper; and besides these there are rules laid down for communion with God in prayer. First, let us consider Baptism. Christ Himself was baptized by John the Baptist. The institution, in itself, therefore, was not a wholly new departure. Moreover, the Baptism of John was connected with repentance, so that this association with the rite was not new. The Baptism of Christ differed from others ministered by John in the fact that it was followed by a descent of the Holy Ghost upon our Lord. This, to John the Baptist, was the appointed sign that his mission was over, and that He had come who would baptize with the Holy Ghost (S. John i. 32–34). S. Matthew alone records our Lord's institution of the Sacrament of Baptism: it is implied in the last verses of S. Mark: it is not

mentioned in S. Luke's Gospel, but the Baptism of the first converts is recorded in the Acts. In S. John the final commission to the Apostles contains no allusion to Baptism, but the Holy Ghost is given to them, together with the power to bind and loose. In the third chapter of S. John's Gospel there is a very strong assertion of the necessity of regeneration: 'Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.' And again, 'Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God.'[1] There is no mention of Baptism in this passage, and no account of its institution in this Gospel, but Baptism from the first occupied the place of the initiatory rite, and this chapter has always been interpreted of Baptism. Though the scene in which it occurs belongs to the earliest stage of Christ's preaching—His announcement of the kingdom of God—yet its imagery can only be explained through the rite of Baptism in the Christian sense. It goes a stage beyond the Baptism of John, and describes a rite in which the Spirit is given through an outward form, and a new birth really effected.[2]

Secondly. Four accounts are given us of the institution of the Holy Eucharist—by the three Synoptists and by S. Paul (1 Cor. xi. 23–27). They do not differ in any essential particular which it would fall within our scope to discuss here. There is no account of the institution in S. John: but there is, as in the case of Baptism, a discourse which explains and is explained by the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. This, as in the former case, rises out of definite historical circumstances described in the chapter; it is a comment upon the significance of the feeding of the five thousand. The bread given miraculously in the wilderness corresponded with the feeding of the children of Israel in their wanderings, and pointed to the Food which should

[1] iii. 3–5. [2] Cf. iv. 1–2.

maintain the true life—the Flesh and the Blood of the Son of man. Thus, as the Sacrament of Baptism appears in the Church as an initiatory rite, so by the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper the spiritual life of the Christian is maintained.

Thirdly. Our Lord commands His Disciples to use prayer in His name. 'Hitherto ye have asked nothing in My name: ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be fulfilled' (S. John xvi. 24). Five times in the course of the last discourses is this instruction given, and an unerring efficacy is attributed to such prayer. In the Gospels of S. Matt. and S. Luke our Lord gives a type of prayer to the Father, which the Church has never ceased to use. Also He assigns a special value to united prayer (S. Matt. xviii. 19, 20).

We have now set down the chief passages in which our Lord has left on record His will as regards His future Church. The points defined are simply these: (1) there is to be a society; (2) it is to be under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, who will both extend the revelation of Christ and lead on into all truth; (3) love, expressed in obedience to Christ's commands, is to be the bond of the society, Baptism and Lord's Supper its central rites, prayer in Christ's name its constant habit; (4) it is to meet with the hostility of the world. It will hardly be disputed that the Church described at the beginning of the Acts (chap. ii.) corresponded with the first three of these characters, and that with a directness and simplicity never again realized. The Holy Ghost came upon the Apostles on the Day of Pentecost, and they went forth at once to the work assigned to them by Christ. The first missionary speech wins many converts, who were all baptized; and then we read in the next verse, 'And they continued stedfastly in the Apostles' teaching and fellowship, in the breaking of bread and the prayers' (ii. 42). Moreover, they express their sense of Christ's command to love one another

by community of goods. 'All that believed had all things common' (ii. 44; cf. iv. 32).

The Society initiated by the Coming of the Holy Ghost is fully conscious of itself and its own responsibilities. The narrative of the Acts assumes its presence and activity. A number of events are described which, taken alone, may seem to be isolated and disconnected, but which are really connected as several acts of the Society founded by Christ. S. Luke does not turn aside from his narrative to point this out, because the presence and activity of the Church are so certain to him: but it is only by the use of this unifying principle that the events described can be held together.

The course of the history in the Acts presents us with several cases in which the Church took definite action in view of special circumstances: (1) The hostility of the world displays itself in open persecution: the Apostles are summoned before the Sanhedrin, and cautioned first (iv. 21), and then, when they refused to give up preaching, they are beaten (v. 40). Later still, there is a persecution in which Stephen is martyred; this leads to an extension of the activity of the preachers of Christ from Jerusalem over Judæa and Samaria (viii. 1). The hostility of the world is, therefore, a spur to renewed and extended action. (2) There arises a necessity for further organization—(*a*) Seven persons are ordained to serve tables, one of whom was Stephen, the Apostles restricting themselves to prayer and the ministry of the Word (vi. 1–4). (*b*) Later still, Paul, who had been already preaching the Word and performing various commissions, is definitely ordained by laying-on of hands, with Barnabas, at the express command of the Holy Spirit (xiii. 1–3). Of this nothing had been said in the instructions of Christ: it was an act which the Church performed under the direct revelation of the Holy Spirit—its promised guide. (*c*) The Seven have power to preach and baptize, but not

that of laying-on of hands (viii. 12–17). (3) This movement in organization was a serious step to take, and could only have been taken upon the basis of a very strong authority; but a crisis of a still more serious kind was to come. There was a division of opinion as to the position of the Gentiles. Christ had said, 'Go, and make disciples of all nations' (S. Matt. xxviii. 19), but He had said nothing as to any changes in the relations of Jew and Gentile, and nothing as to the continuance or discontinuance of Jewish legal rites. He had given the general command, as always, and left the Church to work out its own way of complying with it. The first step was taken by S. Peter, and it was taken in response to a vision. Thus guided he went and preached to Cornelius. Through this vision S. Peter learns that God is no respecter of persons, and the result of his preaching is that the Holy Ghost falls on all who were present. S. Peter draws from this fact the inference, not that Baptism is unnecessary, but that it may be administered to the Gentiles (x. 47, 48), and he justified his act before the whole Church (xi. 1–18).

But the crisis was not over yet. The admission of the Gentiles was conceded, and that they should be admitted on equal terms; it was not yet decided whether they should be compelled to keep the law. This problem arose not in Judæa but in Antioch. It was forced upon the Church by the more conservative of the Christian believers, who represented their view as emanating from S. James. Though apparently a question of external observance, it was in reality, like so many questions of externals, of vital importance in the spiritual region. We have already seen in another connexion what its importance was—how the enforcement of the law virtually destroyed all Christ's work, and reversed the order of history.[1] The question caused great disturbance at Antioch, and is carried for discussion to Jerusalem. A meeting is held,

[1] P. 284.

for the purpose, of the Apostles and elders (xv. 6); S. Peter refers to his experience in the matter of Cornelius; S. Paul and S. Barnabas describe the results of their work in the Gentile cities; S. James gives his vote against the imposition of legal burdens, quoting the prophets in support of his opinion, but naming certain things from which all Gentile Christians should abstain. So the question was decided, in S. James's sense. A short circular letter is then written to the Gentile Churches embodying the decision. It is sent from the Apostles and elders, and is based upon the authority of the writers, together with that of the Holy Ghost. Thus upon a critical question, which our Lord had not formally decided, the Church takes action independently, relying upon the guidance of the Holy Spirit, to whose Inspiration our Lord had entrusted His Church on His departure.

It is possible, of course, to treat all these events in isolation. The appointment of the Seven, the mission of Paul and Barnabas, the Council, will then be accidental and disconnected features, from which nothing can be gathered beyond the mere facts described. It would seem, however, that this is a most paradoxical method of interpretation. It is true that S. Luke tells us just these facts and offers no comment: but the order in which they appear, the connexion of the history, relates them to the life of some continuous body. In no other case but that of the Church would it be possible to read a series of events such as this, and to argue after all that there was no permanent society conscious of itself, whose principles were expressed in the events described.

Several points become clear from this history. The Church had accepted its responsibility, and was prepared to determine its position upon any point that arose, whether of doctrine or of discipline; and further, our Lord's instructions had left it free for such decisions. He was no less silent upon the position of the Gentiles than upon the dogmatic basis of Church unity.

We must come now to consider the view entertained by S. Paul of the Church, and we must remember in so doing that the Epistles embody in a large degree what he was in the habit of teaching orally. (1) The Church is a body of believers who have one faith (Eph. iv. 5). This faith is partly historical, as in the case of the Eucharist, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection—that is, S. Paul commits to them 'that which he also received' (1 Cor. xi. 23; xv. 1–11; cf. 1 Tim. iii. 16). The faith, taken as a whole, is absolutely unchangeable, even by the authority of S. Paul. This is strongly affirmed in the Epistle to the Galatians: and it must be remembered that the 'Gospel' there referred to includes certain statements and doctrines about the Law upon which a difference of opinion was possible and had occurred: 'I marvel that ye are so quickly removing from Him that called you in the grace of Christ unto a different gospel; which is not another: only there are some that trouble you, and would pervert the gospel of Christ. But though we, or an angel from heaven, should preach unto you any gospel other than that which we preached unto you, let him be anathema. As we have said before, so say I now again, If any man preacheth unto you any gospel other than that which ye received, let him be anathema' (Gal. i. 6–9). It is to be noticed that S. Paul blames those who departed from the primitive tradition, either by denying the facts of our Lord's life, which formed part of it, or by dissenting from the view of the law which he had preached, or by adding, as happened at Colossæ, other objects of worship and other mediators besides Christ; he has no excuses for them, and admits no compromise with them. They are wrong, and that is all.[1] (2) S. Paul is no less definite upon questions

[1] It is worth noting that in 1 Cor. vii. there are two different words used by S. Paul in his authoritative utterances—παραγγέλλω, which means to transmit a command from a superior, and λέγω, which is used for an assertion

of organization. He insists on a proper order in the Church assemblies—a proper division of function—and lays down the general principle, 'Let everything be done decently and in order' (1 Cor. xiv. 40). He claims reverence for those who 'labour among you and are over you in the Lord and admonish you' (1 Thess. v. 12), and he severely condemns those who make divisions (Rom. xvi. 17). Also he claims Apostolic authority, which extends over more Churches than one: 'So I ordain in all the Churches' (1 Cor. vii. 17). He exercises the power of binding and loosing (1 Cor. v. 3–5; cf. 1 Tim. i. 20), condemning offenders to be delivered to Satan. (3) The Church is based on the Sacrament of Baptism (1 Cor. x. 1–4; Eph. iv. 3), and its unity is expressed in the Lord's Supper (1 Cor. x. 17).

The view of the Church held by S. Paul has developed in immediate connexion with the circumstances of the times through which it passed. It is now an organized body with definite faith, and a definite visible order, which its extension and its stability had rendered necessary. It will be seen how boldly the Church carried on its work under the guidance of S. Paul.

It may be worth while to add that a change is traceable in S. Paul's own attitude towards the Second Coming of our Lord. In the Epistles to the Thessalonians it occupies a very large place in his thoughts and those of the Thessalonian Church, while comparatively little is said of organization. As the time of the Second Coming recedes, and it becomes clear that the Church has an earthly career before it,

on S. Paul's own authority: 'This I say by way of permission, not of commandment' (1 Cor. vii. 6). 'But to the married I give charge (παραγγέλλω), yet not I, but the Lord' (1 Cor. vii. 10). 'Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give my judgment, as one who has obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful' (1 Cor. vii. 25). 'But she is happier if she abide as she is, after my judgment: and I think that I also have the Spirit of God' (1 Cor. vii. 40). There is no such reserve as this in dealing with doctrine.

organization takes a more prominent place, as in the Epistles to the Corinthians, and still more, later, in the Pastoral Epistles.

The attitude which we have found in S. Paul is carried out in the other New Testament writings. There is no shrinking from a dogmatic test of Church unity either in the Apocalypse or in the Epistle to the Hebrews, or in the Epistles of S. Peter and S. Jude, or in those of S. John. It would be hard to find a stronger dogmatic test than in the following words: 'Every spirit which confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God: and every spirit which confesseth not Jesus is not of God: and this is the spirit of the antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it cometh; and now it is in the world already' (1 John iv. 2, 3); and again, in verse 15 of the same chapter, 'Whosoever shall confess that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, God abideth in him, and he in God.' So in the second Epistle: 'Whosoever abideth not in the teaching of Christ hath not God: he that abideth in the teaching, the same hath both the Father and the Son' (ver. 9, cf. ver. 7). Words such as these were called forth, if we may believe ancient tradition, by heretical theories of the nature of our Lord.[1]

We have said enough now, we may hope, to mark the position which the Church as a visible organization occupied in the early days of Christianity. That it developed in definiteness of organization and doctrine we do not dream of denying. Nor do we deny that the external conditions through which it passed had much to do with this development. We believe that the Creed was implicitly involved in the acceptance of Christ as God, as we have already

[1] The Epistles of S. John, and especially the second and third, are of questioned authenticity. We do not think them spurious, any more than Bishop Westcott does, or Zahn. And we claim that the language here is not out of harmony with the attitude on similar topics of S. Paul in his undisputed Epistles, or of the Church generally in the letter of the Council of Jerusalem.

abundantly shown.[1] We do not believe that there ever was a time in which the Church confined its operations to advocating the practice of the moral virtues, or that there ever was a time when moral virtue alone was the bond of the Christian society.

It is important, in dealing with the question of the intention of Christ as displayed in the Gospel, to avoid the temptation of trying to prove too much. This temptation has not always been avoided, and the fact that this is so has seriously complicated the whole discussion upon the Church. It has been argued that S. Luke's expression in reference to the great Forty Days, that our Lord spake to His disciples the things concerning the Kingdom of God (Acts i. 3), points to precise instructions on the subject of organization and order. We may think it likely that these matters received attention in the course of such teaching as is here referred to: but the words do not positively affirm it, and it is not reasonable to treat them as if they did. On the other hand, it is legitimate, and, indeed, is the only scientific way of construing the facts, to allow the procedure of the Apostles full weight in inferring from our fragmentary records what the purpose of the Lord really was. The Apostles had a commission, couched, so far as we know, in general terms, and they dealt with circumstances as they arose on the strength of it. Whether their action was in accordance with Christ's Will or not, so as virtually to carry His authority with it, depends on its relation to Christ's Will and on this alone. If He fixed absolutely beforehand every detail of the order of the new Society, then nothing but what He fixed could have authority: but if not, then His authority is involved in actions done under the guidance of His Spirit, in pursuance of His general instructions. The neglect of this fact has led

[1] Of the particular character of the organization we shall have to speak again shortly.

to much unnecessary controversy. People have sought to prove or disprove, by rigid interpretation of the text of the Gospels, the claims of the Church and other similar points: forgetting that a prior question always must be, Were the Gospels intended to be used in this way? Underneath this tendency is probably the belief that God requires some other means of expressing His Will than the use, by His ministers under the guidance of His Spirit, of the circumstances of history. And this belief is another form of the untrue distinction between the natural and the supernatural. We shall find this continually reappearing as we go on.

It reappears in a whole series of objections currently brought against the conception of the Church as the natural expression of the Christian idea. It is said, for instance, that Christianity is a spiritual religion: and the idea that it would naturally express itself in a visible society contradicts this fundamental principle.

An outward order must necessarily infringe on this freedom. Spiritual religion, it is argued, is a thing which frees us from the trammels of outward form, and leaves each man to seek God in his own way. But then, we have to ask, Is this true? Does 'spiritual religion' exclude all outward forms? The indications of religious history are not in favour of it. (1) The religion of nature is certainly not spiritual in this sense. Man feels after God, if haply he may find Him, in nature: he discerns in the things that are made the eternal power and Godhead of Him who made them. At no point does he ever get quit of the material veil, which at once hides and reveals God: he comes to believe in the end that God, like himself, is in nature but not of it, but he never surprises Him, as it were, without his material vesture. He knows God in nature by conjecture and hope rather than by any certain process, for the material shroud leads to many errors, and never permits of absolute demonstrative certainty.

(2) Nor again does this principle rule the revelation of the Bible; that does not free us from mediation and externality. The Bible is the Word of God, certainly, but it requires interpretation. It speaks to every age and every soul, but not directly. It has to be explained and applied, and the message from God which it brings becomes intelligible only by this application. This is especially true of the Sermon on the Mount. Our Lord uses throughout language which has something of the character of proverbs. The metaphor of the mote and the beam, or the command, Cast not your pearls before swine, only become maxims of general value when the particular details of the picture are dropped. If they are restricted to occasions when two brothers have a mote and a beam in their eyes respectively, or when there is a real inclination to throw pearls to swine, they are made ridiculous. And if they are not so restricted they are treated as being the outward form of a general maxim: that is, the message which they convey from God is to be found in the general moral precept which is hidden in them, and not in their outward form. And again, the Bible consists of a collection of books written at various times and under widely different conditions, in tongues of which the form has since suffered a complete change. It is impossible to interpret it fully without realizing these conditions and doing what we can to enter into them, and so bring home the meaning of the words to our minds. Once more, supposing the Bible had been written in our own language, it would still have been only the outward form of an inward message. That is part of the very idea of a written book. It stands between the mind of the man who wrote and the man who reads, and conveys to the reader some part of what was in the author's mind. Some part, we say, and not all, for the reader interprets according to his capacity and intelligence, and the nature of the knowledge already in his mind; while the

author expresses more or less clearly only a certain proportion of what he is thinking, according to his skill and clearness. Language, written or spoken, is always a barrier as well as a bond between mind and mind; it is a means of communion, but is very far indeed from being a perfect means. The Bible, then, is the outward form of a true message from God, which those who have the spiritual capacity and intelligence will be able to understand.

(3) Nature and the Bible pointed on, as we have seen, to the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. Before that time men had learned of the presence of God, hesitatingly in nature, more certainly in the Old Testament Scriptures. The moment when He of whom Moses and the prophets wrote—the Creative Word—appeared in the flesh, was an era in the history of the world. The broken lights of earlier days were concentrated in the Light of the world. God was now declared with certainty, by God Only-begotten. At the same time, the revelation of God was still through an external medium. The flesh of Christ was the outward veil of the presence of the Only-begotten, and it concealed as well as revealed. Men conferred with Christ as man with man. They were subject to the same doubts and confusions and misunderstandings as in their ordinary human dealings. The Apostles learned to see in all the sorrow and humiliation of His life, that the Son of God was there; but it was always possible to ask, 'Is not this the carpenter's son? And are not His mother and His brethren with us unto this day'? And even the Apostles were capable of making serious mistakes. Their thoughts were liable to be entrapped in the Human Nature and become laden with human associations, and so fail to reach the Divine. To the last they looked for an earthly sovereignty; on the very day of the Ascension they ask, 'Wilt Thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel'? The material veil hindered even the

Apostles in their closest intercourse with Christ from perfect spiritual intercourse. The Incarnation is the crown of the objective revelation of God, but it requires completion.

(4) Can we regard the revelation of the Holy Spirit as fulfilling the demands of a purely spiritual religion? It is certainly subjective; that is, it comes not only to the Church as a whole but to each individual soul. It supplies to the soul within what it needed to interpret the revelation of God without. Men had gone wrong in their treatment of the revelation of God in nature and in the Incarnation, because they had not the gift of Pentecost. The Spirit of God was not present in sufficient force to enable the mind to note His quiet leadings and manifestations in the world. The difference is seen most clearly by comparing the attitude of those who rejected Christ with that of the Apostles before and after Pentecost. At the very lowest point in the scale are the Pharisees, who ascribe the works of Christ to the powers of darkness: Christ accuses them of the unpardonable sin. And then there come those who recognize His power and goodness, but are thrown off by His human surroundings; they cannot conceive that God should appear in so lowly a form. Then there are the Apostles, who have grasped Christ's Messiahship and His Divinity, partially and with considerable hesitation; they have not realized the importance of the revelation they have accepted. But after Pentecost the whole atmosphere changes. They are no longer weak and hesitating; they have attained a clear knowledge of their own belief, and a philosophy of history. They understand who Christ was, how it was that He suffered and rose again; they see the fulfilment of prophecy in all that had happened. They are prepared to take the lead, to explain difficulties, to define their position. They have received the promised power from on high. Their witness to the Incarnation of the Son of God—to the Resurrection—is still the central point of

their preaching; but the mission of the Holy Ghost enables them to realize and apply it. Christ has not left them comfortless; the Comforter is already bearing witness of Him, taking of His and declaring it to them.

This, then, is one very prominent function of the Holy Spirit in His temporal Mission—to interpret Christ to the Church, by dwelling in the minds of Christ's followers, and enabling them to understand what the revelation of Christ conveyed. The revelation of the Holy Ghost joins on to and is continuous with the revelation of Christ. It prevents the work of Christ falling back into the dead historical position which the work of ordinary reformers is apt to occupy; it keeps it alive and adapts it to the changing circumstances of life. It puts us to-day as directly in connexion with the Christ Incarnate and Ascended, as the Apostles. Guided by the Holy Spirit, neither the Church nor the individual whose home is in the Church should be wholly at a loss as to what the Will of God is at a given moment. For the conditions in which we dwell are the means by which God guides us through life, and the Holy Spirit's Presence in us is the power by which we recognize the call of God. If, therefore, we consider the revelation at Pentecost in the light of God's previous manifestations of Himself, we do not find ourselves in the position required: we are not separated from the outward, and thrown in upon our own individual aspirations alone. But we have the key to the whole scheme of God's revelation so far as it has gone. Where the surviving fragments of the image of God in men had led them to recognize the presence of God partially, the grace which comes to those who receive the Holy Ghost inspires them with certainty. We are not so much delivered from the necessity of the outward manifestations of God as enabled to use them properly. The coming of the Holy Ghost does not render the whole previous education of the world profitless and pointless, it illuminates it, and shows

whither it was tending. It is only under the influence of one of those unfortunate disjunctions, over which we have already mourned, that the inward revelation of the Spirit can be construed as excluding outward manifestations altogether. Only if we must necessarily assume that the natural world is not a proper vehicle for Divine revelation, does the principle of a 'purely spiritual' religion prove valid. At no point in the history of the general revelation of God to men do we find any stage in which God dispenses with external means. He reveals Himself through the affinity between the motions of the Spirit in our hearts and His larger operations in the world.

We have already pointed out that the work of the grace of God does not exclude the intervention of ordinary events and natural laws of mind and conscience. There is, however, one passage in the Epistle to the Romans which should be discussed here; as it seems to us to make the nearest approach to the purely spiritual religion of which we have been in search. The passage is Rom. viii. 26, 27: 'The Spirit also helpeth our infirmity: for we know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit Himself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered, and He that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is in the mind of the Spirit, because He maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God.' The meaning of this passage seems to be, that at the point where language fails to express our desires to God, or where for lack of knowledge we dare not give definite form to our desires, our blind and inarticulate motions are not wasted, but are taken up by the Holy Spirit and interpreted according to the Will of God. Every man, perhaps, is conscious at times of

> 'Thoughts hardly to be packed
> Into a narrow act,
> Fancies that broke through language and escaped'—

and this verse of S. Paul shows the value which the Holy Spirit can put upon them. And mysticism has always loved to encourage a state of silent ecstasy in which the human spirit passes, as it were, out of itself, and is only conscious of being lapped round by the love of God.[1] This too has its justification here in the words of S. Paul. The ideal of silent individual communion—the simple contact of the soul with God—is recognized in Holy Scripture in this very clear way. But it by no means occupies the whole ground which the faith of Christ covers. It does not necessarily imply more than the barest sense of God's existence. Musing before a quiet landscape or over a calm sea will produce that condition of high emotion in which the Spirit of God may move and intercede, or it may be produced in the soul by music or even by strictly intellectual activity. It is not specially Christian. It must have come in all probability to hundreds of people who never heard the name of Christ; it must have been the seed-ground from which many a legend of god or hero has been grown. It takes us back to the very dawn of the religious sentiment in men. The Christian knows that the Spirit of God is in it, and this knowledge consecrates what is in itself rather an undeveloped religious state. It is by rising up to his full power that man touches his highest point in religious things; by an aspiration in which his powers of thought, limiting and earth-born though they be, are engaged no less truly than his emotions.

But though such individual communion finds its place in Scripture, it could not have been made the goal of a stage in God's self-revelation. Not only does it leave us upon levels which may be less than Christian, it also is in conflict with one of man's essential characters, which the outward Church especially meets and satisfies. Man is a social being; and this conception of religion isolates him from his kind. He

[1] Cf. Dinah Morris in *Adam Bede*.

reaches his highest development in every direction in communion not only with God but with his fellow-man; this bare individualism would put him in relation with God alone. That man is a social being is seen most clearly in his secular life. It is obvious that he becomes less and less capable, less varied in his accomplishments, less human, the more the society in which he lives falls short of the due standard of complexity and variety. The ideally inhuman man is found at the stage of barbarism, where the work of supplying material comforts exhausts his whole time. He becomes more distinctly human the further he moves from this undeveloped stage. And that means that the presence and co-operation of his fellows is necessary to bring out not only the capacities of a State, but also of the individuals that compose it. It is not that a number of perfect individuals combine and produce a civilized society by their combination; their perfection is latent, and their individuality unexpressed, until the principle of co-operation is at work and the kindliness upon which society is ultimately built touches them and puts life into their frozen limbs. Society ideally constructed would not destroy individuality, it would develope and preserve it.

The same things are true of man in his religious character. He does not leave off being social when he becomes religious. His religion consecrates and dignifies his social character, and is enlivened and intensified by it. That which is *esprit de corps* and patriotism upon the civil level, is the mutual love of the Communion of Saints when brought into contact with the faith of Christ. As the sense of fellowship in a great cause and in the inheritance of great traditions quickens the enthusiasm of a people, so the fellowship of Christ's religion is the source of a fuller religious life than any which individualism could possibly expect to produce. It is not that social religious acts are more impressive in

their volume than the prayers of a solitary human being, the difference lies in quality not in quantity. The religious life of individuals banded together in a society is greater and better than it could be if they were solitary. Life in society gives more room for individual development, and allows a freer interchange of mutual service. As men rise out of barbarism through combination and division of labour, and grow more vigorous in individual life, so the mutual protection and sympathy of the Communion of Saints makes each man's individual religion fuller and stronger. Individualism certainly maintains a truth which Christianity brought before the world for the first time, viz. the absolute value of each human soul. And therefore it would be a contradiction to the spirit of Christianity if an external church-life destroyed individuality or interposed a barrier between the individual soul and God. But it does not naturally do anything of the kind; it provides the environment in which the individual attains his fullest and highest development.[1]

We may now sum up our position as regards the outward and visible Church. It is the congregation of all those who believe in Christ as Son of God, and strive to live the Christian life. It is a society in which the Spirit dwells, and in which He manifests the Purpose and the Life of Christ. This is the meaning of the phrase, 'The Church is the extension of the Incarnation'; it is the continued manifestation to the world

[1] This is not, of course, the same as saying that the State and Church are merely varying aspects of one common human fact. Men are members of a State by birth: they enter through the family into the conditions of the society in which their life is cast. If, for any reason, they wish to make a change in this respect, they are engrafted on a new body politic by legal process. And there is no power behind the State: within its sphere—the secular life of man—it is supreme. But this is not true of the Church. All Churchmen, whatever their nationality, are members of the same Church: and the Church rests on a basis of truth, which cannot be relinquished without apostasy. These two facts differentiate it sharply from any State, however comprehensive and enlightened.

of the Christ-life through the agency of the Holy Spirit. It is the mystical Body of Christ, and He is the Head of it. This name, which comes ultimately from S. Paul, marks its externality, its unity, the complexity of its organization. It is holy, because it is the Body of Christ, and ruled by His Spirit. It is governed upon the ideal of the old theocracy, Christ is its immediate Ruler. It has its place, at present, in the world; but it is not of the world: it is not directed to the attainment of worldly ends, or governed by worldly ideals. It has had in it from the first the right and the power to adapt itself to the conditions which its place in the world has produced. It defines its creed, that is, it expresses its mind, when its language and beliefs are questioned. Under the guidance of the Holy Spirit it has decided upon the organization best adapted to its ends, although it does not appear that Christ left any definite instructions upon the point. It is Catholic,[1] not (in the purely modern sense of the word) as being vague in aim and inclusive of every kind of contradictory opinion upon the highest subjects of its faith; but as preserving the whole tradition from the beginning, neither adding speculative possibilities as articles of faith, nor shrinking from definiteness when articles of faith are assailed. So it is the permanent witness in the world of the whole truth which Jesus Christ came to earth to proclaim, and it is necessary to the full development of the individual religious life.

[1] The history of the word καθολικός may be found in a note in Bishop Lightfoot's Commentary on S. Ignatius (*Ep. ad Smyrn.*, chap. viii.). He there points out that the original meaning of the word is 'universal,' as opposed to 'individual,' 'particular.' It then comes to mean 'orthodoxy as opposed to heresy, conformity as opposed to dissent.' . . . 'The truth was the same everywhere. . . . The heresies were partial, scattered, localized, isolated.' By S. Cyril of Jerusalem it is explained to mean also 'that the Church teaches universally and without deficiency all the doctrines which ought to come to the knowledge of man' (*Catech.* xviii. 23). This is, of course, a derived sense of the word; a transference of association from geographical extent to doctrinal completeness. The one thing which the word never meant, till recent years, is doctrinal vagueness.

We have said that the unity of the Church does not crush, but developes individual character. This is true not only of individual men but also of nations. There are certain central dogmas which all nations hold in common, so far as they are members of the Church at all. But in the way of ritual and other such details of organization different nations will express themselves in different ways. It is not essential, for instance, that the Holy Communion should be celebrated in precisely the same form all over the world, although certain conditions are necessary to a valid Eucharist.[1] There is room for national character to develope within the unity of the Catholic Church.

We cannot leave the question of unity without discussing briefly one or two difficulties which arise in defining this idea. We have contended that within the unity of the Church there is a limited area of possible variation.

Does this area of justifiable variation include the non-recognition of a visible Head? Or must the unity of the Church be symbolized by its allegiance to one spiritual ruler?

This question, which is of very great importance in the existing circumstances of the English Church, turns on the exact meaning of unity—the exact nature of the necessary organization of the Church. The unity of the Church had certain special ends. It avoided the uncertainty and waste of effort involved in mere individualism; and it typified 'the one Lord, the one Faith, and one Baptism,' which are at the foundation of the Church. The Church was to be œcumenical in its extent and organized throughout. It was not, as the old Jewish religion had been, centred in one place; but it sprang up in various places, always preserving the same general features. The new Churches founded in different places resembled in many ways the colonies sent out from

[1] On this point reference may perhaps be permitted to the author's work on Authority, in Longmans' series of Handbooks for the Clergy.

Greek cities in ancient days. They took their sacred fire from their old home; they had a founder who was responsible for their laws and their settlement; and they repeated with considerable accuracy the constitution of the mother state. The colony owed a certain allegiance to the mother state; but this did not prevent the younger city deciding burning questions in a different way to the older, and even taking up arms against it.[1] The colonies were independent copies of the city from which they were sent: if they were Dorian colonies their constitution was probably oligarchical, if Ionian their constitution was probably democratic.

A condition of things somewhat resembling this was produced in the first centuries of the Church's life. The various Churches planted by the missionary labours of the Apostles held to the same faith, and soon, if not quite at first, were organized on the same principle. They were held together in large measure by community of trouble in persecution; members of one Church passed readily into communion and fellowship with those of a foreign Church; there was an interchange of friendly relations between the various Churches. But their real bond of union, besides these externals, was their common membership of Christ—their common partaking in the Sacrament of His Body and Blood. Thus their spiritual unity was greater than anything which the analogy of the Greek colonies would suggest: they had a common Head, but it was the ascended Lord.

There was one advantage belonging to this somewhat loosely organized unity which was vitally important in early times. The witness of the Churches to the common tradition was strengthened. It was the witness of a number of independent and consentient voices, and not the dogmatic assertion of one central authority. Hence in cases of innovation of doctrine or practice, or in questions of the canonicity of books, recourse

[1] Cf. Freeman, *Greater Greece and Greater Britain*, Lect. i.

could always be had to a various and independent testimony. This was the authority to which Irenæus appeals against the Gnostics; it was the authority which the general councils of later days expressed. It was never thought necessary that there should be one decisive voice over and above that of the consensus of the Churches.[1]

The mediæval Papacy represents a different conception of unity to this. It aims at substituting infallible authority for consentient testimony: it demands a visible ruler as well as the invisible Head. Doubtless this was a natural and useful claim in the unsettled days in which it arose. It was natural, for the Church doubtless did to a large extent present before men's eyes the ideal of unity of which the Empire had ceased to be the expression. The Donation of Constantine, though its documentary evidence is valueless, represented an idea which had reality. And the Papal centralization was useful, too. It must have contributed greatly to strengthen the religion of Christ against the confused barbaric forces all around it, to have had such a central temporal head as the Bishop of Rome claimed to be, from whom the whole Christian system could take its direction. But it became a misfortune when the Popes began to include in the theory of Church unity the centralized view of the Church which depended on transient circumstances; when they began to demand, as a test of communion, the recognition in them of the rights and powers which properly belonged only to the Church at large. By doing this they not only failed to carry the whole Church with them, but they also permanently injured the thought of the Church—they produced open schism and intellectual error; they gave a meaning to unity which the earlier Church had not known, and they raised expectations as regards the authority of the articles of the Creed which were wholly unchristian.

[1] Cf. Puller, *The Primitive Saints and the See of Rome*, Third Edition.

In this matter there are, roughly speaking, two conflicting claims to absolute and exclusive authority—Reason and the infallible Voice.[1] And men have a tendency to divide according as their natural bias leads them in one or the other direction.

There are those who expect to reason the whole matter out from their own brains, and own no authority at all except their own speculative reason. And there are those who expect to be told dogmatically what is true, and are then willing to receive it without criticism. The former corresponds to the state of mind by which men attain a sort of religion through philosophy, the other to the state of mind in which men inquire at an oracle. Neither attitude belongs, properly speaking, to Christianity at all; of the two the latter is less in harmony with it than the former. For the mere acceptance of dogmatic assertions implies the complete surrender of all intellectual activity, which is a condition below that which a Christian ought to reach. His intellectual activities, like the rest of his nature, should be consecrated and quickened, not crushed. And it is one of the most common but least true anticipations of mankind, that the supernatural breaks in violently and irrelevantly upon the natural order—intrudes upon it and does not use it.

[1] The question is frequently pressed in the form of a dilemma. It is urged that there is no alternative between absolute surrender to authority and absolute scepticism, or, at least, individual and irresponsible choice of creed. This is the modern form of the old sophistic puzzle about the nature of knowledge, which we find in Plato's *Meno*, p. 80 E. There the sophistic argument aims at denying the possibility of all learning. 'Either you know a thing, or you do not know it: if you know it, you do not need to learn it; if you do not know it, you cannot find it out, because you will never know when you have found it.' Socrates rightly denounces this quibble as immoral in tendency; in that it makes men idle and indifferent to the search after truth. And we may say the same thing of the modern form of the argument. The belief in the absolute incapacity of the intellect for truth is no less truly an immoral position, even though it leads in modern times to the acceptance of an infallible authority. It is merely a difference of detail, that the Pope offers absolute truth, while the sophist left men in blank ignorance. And the sophistic

This is the result of the absolute claims of the Papacy; it destroys and does not use the natural reason. On the other hand its sceptical opposite leaves no room for the exercise of any faculty except reason; it, too, acts upon a maimed conception of human nature. And it is open to this criticism, as we have already maintained, that if it were successful in proving by the mere exercise of reason the existence of God, or any other of the ultimate facts of a religion, it would be a sign not of success but of failure; a sign that the God whose existence was thus subject to proof was not in any real sense God at all.

Revelation is far too closely bound up with the whole scheme of things, and especially with history, to depend for its authority either upon the assertion of a single voice or the speculations of a single faculty. Its evidence on the theoretical side lies in its coherence with the whole sum of things, considered in its widest extent, and on the historical side in the consentient witness of many voices. The Papal claim, then, must be regarded as an eccentric phenomenon arising out of a transient condition of things, and abnormally continued in operation, owing to the strong temptation it offers to the natural indolence and scepticism of the human mind. It is not, properly speaking, connected with the question of unity at all. The unity of the Church consists in its acknowledging one Head, viz., Christ, and one faith as to His nature, together with the doctrine of God which is implied in that. And this unity is outwardly expressed by the continuity of organization in the various Churches. They are, as we said above, colonies sent out from the mother Church, and display in their constitution their affinity

argument is not even relevant; it could only be valid if the mind started on the search for knowledge as a perfect blank. Under such circumstances, it is true, learning would be impossible; and, we may add, authority, however infallible, would be unintelligible. But the circumstances do not and cannot, occur.

with their original home. It may be worth noting, as we pass, that this was Jerusalem and not Rome. Here again we must recall what was said above on the intention of Christ and the necessity of outward order. The sharp division between the extreme theories arises by reason of the neglect of the close connexion of the Church with the order of the world. The supernaturalists, if we may call them so, demand that a Spirit-bearing Church shall act and speak across the lines of human thought and life: its voice shall be intrusive and unaccountable. The naturalists, on the other hand, will allow nothing that does not surrender to purely natural tests. And both are wrong: because both ignore the teaching of history as to the way in which God works His will in the world, and the exact value He puts upon natural order.

The picture we have drawn of the unity of the Church is, of course, an ideal one: and it requires to be continually kept in view that it is so, when we consider the practical consequences of the failure to realize the ideal. We cannot ignore the fact that the world has had only too deep an influence on the progress of the Church. It has failed to preserve its original unbroken union, and presents now a divided front to the world. There are two ways in which Church unity has been infringed—heresy and schism: and, in spite of much opinion to the contrary, we must admit that both imply a serious lapse from the true ideal of the Church. The former breaks the inward unity, the latter its outward counterpart. Heresy consists in the denial of one or more of the fundamental doctrines of the Creed—the Divinity of our Lord, for instance, or the Triune Nature of God. Denials of this sort produce schism, or should do so under the ordinary conditions of Church life. For the reality of all Christian worship and communion is brought into contempt when it is openly declared that it means nothing whatever. And this is the result of inter-communion

between societies differing fundamentally on the gravest subjects. By such action communion is reduced to a friendly gathering with an undefined and indefinable religious object. There is no more real unity in such meetings than in any other accidental gathering of men. This has never been the idea of Christian communion: nor is it really satisfactory in itself. Free and friendly discussion of points of disagreement is one thing: this really tends to produce unity, by clearing up misunderstandings, and bringing out points of agreement. But outward profession of a unity which does not exist inwardly, only tends to preserve real disunion: because it definitely diverts attention from the points in dispute. This can only be seriously justified on the assumption that the points are unimportant.

Schism is a suspension of outward unity, not necessarily the result of the propagation of a heresy. It may occur as the outcome of differences upon less fundamental questions than those of the Creed. Thus the Donatists were in a state of schism with the Catholic Church upon the question of post-baptismal sin, the Donatists denying that the Church had power to absolve it. This was not, strictly speaking, a heresy, though it involved suspension of outward communion. The Eastern and Western Churches broke into schism partly upon the question of the Filioque clause,[1] and partly owing to political rivalries. The question of Episcopacy divides the English Church from the various bodies of Nonconformists. Where these hold the Catholic Creed there is simply a suspension of outward unity: for, though we maintain that Episcopal organization is the outward sign of complete Church-life and valid Sacraments, the rejection of Episcopal orders does not amount to a heresy. At the same time the recognized evils of schism do not justify the restoration of communion, while the Church continues to

[1] See above, pp. 169 *seqq.*

hold the ancient theory of Episcopacy; still less do they justify independent individuals in unauthorized transgressions of the order of the Church. It is not denied that schism and heresy alike point to the existence of evil in the Church, and a failure to correspond with its ideal of holiness. At the moment when a breach occurs there will probably be selfish and obstinate passion displayed on both sides, and this may help to make the suspension of unity permanent.[1] But it is contended that the ultimate responsibility for the disturbance rests with those who introduce innovations upon ancient thought and practice: and that no form of unity can truly claim to represent the ideal of Christ, that is not inward as well as outward.

If we have been right in our account of the visible Church as the normal and natural expression of the inward character of the revelation of the Holy Spirit, it will follow that our theory of Sacraments will correspond with this. For the Sacraments are the regular acts in which the Church displays its character, they belong to it necessarily, both in theory and in practice. Those persons to whom the whole idea of a visible order is repugnant, who rest upon the notion of a purely spiritual kingdom, and construe this as excluding any material counterpart, will, of course, see in the Sacraments mere ceremonies, which do not themselves convey any spiritual efficacy. As the Church, from their point of view, is an accidental collection of individual souls, so the acts of the Church will be only accidentally expressed in any special outward form. The Sacrament of Baptism will be merely an entrance ceremony, which it is regular to go through, but which is perfectly indifferent. The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper will be again a ceremony, by which a general sense of fellowship is kept up, and a historical event commemorated;

[1] A signal instance of this is the case of Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorians.

as members of a college commemorate their foundation by feasting together. For all the essential elements of the religious life will lie outside the range of common and concerted action; they will belong to the private individual life alone.

On the other hand, if the outward order of the Church be regarded as the extension of the Incarnation of the Word, that is, as the continuation in the world of the Divine revela tion through material means, it will be inconceivable that any act of the Church should be without its definite spiritual meaning. The presence of the Church in the world is the commission to earthly soil of a seed of spiritual life, which is in time to make its way and dominate the world entirely; and it would be simply impossible that this spiritually governed organism should display material activity without real spiritual significance. The outward and inward move as inevitably together in the life of the Church as the soul and the body in the case of an individual. The Sacraments, therefore, will necessarily have spiritual efficacy and significance, they will be events in the spiritual no less than in the material world. The discussion of the Sacraments consequently falls within our province. We shall consider both their outward form and spiritual significance.

The first Sacrament is, of course, the Sacrament of Baptism. This was ordained by our Lord after His Resurrection and before His Ascension. It was a rite which already existed, and had been practised by John the Baptist. Its character as a ceremony and the meaning it was to have were, therefore, well understood. As practised by S. John it consisted of an immersion in water, symbolical of the removal of moral impurity. Similar purificatory rites obtained in other nations besides the Jews. What Christ did for it, when He ordained it in His Church, was to change it from a symbol into a Sacrament. He ordered that Baptism

should be 'into the Name (εἰς τὸ ὄνομα) of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost' (S. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). It was to carry with it restoration to the fellowship of God. Since that day its outward character has remained fixed. The material of it is water, and the formula of administration is the Triune Name of God.[1]

The spiritual significance of the Sacrament of Baptism is stated easily enough. It is the outward sign of the transference of the baptized from the position of enmity and isolation from God into the unity of the Body of Christ, and so it is the sacramental means of regeneration. It is the process by which the sinner identifies himself with the atoning Sacrifice of Christ. 'Are ye ignorant that all we who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into His death? We were buried therefore with Him through baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life' (Rom. vi. 3, 4). So in the Epistle to the Colossians we read: 'Being buried with Him in baptism, wherein ye were also raised with Him through faith in the working of God, who raised Him from the dead' (ii. 12). Before this, man stands outside the work of Christ and has no part in it; at Baptism he renounces the world, puts off

[1] It is frequently asserted that a shorter formula than this was used in the earliest days—into the Name of Jesus. This would, of course, come to the same thing dogmatically, the Triune Nature of God being an expanded statement of the revelation of Jesus. The N.T. evidence for the shorter formula is found in four passages of the Acts, ii. 38, viii. 16, x. 48, and xix. 5. The second of these describes the condition of the Samaritans, after Philip's baptism, and before the Apostolic laying-on of hands. The third refers to the Gentiles who received the Holy Ghost after Peter's preaching, and were then ordered to be baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus. The fourth describes the baptism given to the Ephesians who had already received John's Baptism. That is, it would seem to refer in each case to an incomplete ceremony, rather than the complete Sacrament of admission. In the first only the phrase seems to refer to the complete Sacrament. It will not, therefore, be wise to rest too much upon these indications, in view of the very early and certain prevalence of the longer formula.

the old man and puts on Christ. He is crucified to the world, and the world to him, for he is *in* Christ. He is dead and his life is hid with Christ in God. This is the effect of transference by means of baptism into the Church of Christ; that is the meaning of calling Christians, as the Apostles do, the saints. Similar statements are made by S. John with regard to those who are in Christ. 'Whosoever is begotten of God doeth no sin, because his seed abideth in him: and he cannot sin, because he is begotten of God (1 John iii. 9; cf. Gospel, i. 12–14; iii. 5–8). The process of transference is a momentary one.[1]

And the risen life must be regarded as going on now, and not be transferred to a future sphere. 'These things have I written unto you, that ye may know that ye have eternal life, even unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God' (1 John v. 13). 'The witness is this, that God gave unto us eternal life, and this life is in His Son' (v. 11). The same point of view is to be found in the office of Holy Baptism in the prayer-book of the English Church.[2]

There can be only one general objection to this doctrine of Baptism, viz., that outward forms cannot convey spiritual changes. And we have already discussed this point by implication. The whole conception of the Church is, we believe, sacramental; it is fundamentally spiritual, and aims at affecting the spirit of man. But it expresses itself naturally in acts which have a material side, and are perceptible to man in his present condition. As the Holy Spirit, dwelling in the outward form of Church order and constitution, interprets and presents Christ to the world, so we believe that the act of initiation by which a new member

[1] Cf. 1 Cor. vi. 11.—And such were some of you: but ye were washed, but ye were sanctified, but ye were justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God. 1 John iii. 14.—We know that we *have passed* from death unto life. . . .

[2] See especially the Thanksgiving at the end.

is received into the Church's fold is not a void and meaningless ceremony, but is the effectual sign of the spiritual changes which the transference implies. The Sacrifice of Christ is applied to the redemption of a new soul every time that the Sacrament is administered. We need not, therefore, spend further labour upon the discussion of this point. But there are a series of questions which arise out of this doctrine of Baptism which we must not pass by.

1. In what relation does faith stand to the Sacrament of Baptism? Faith is the subjective or personal element in the act of Baptism. The man who is to be baptized places himself in that attitude of will which we saw was necessary to the due acceptance of the atoning Work of Christ. He renounces the world, the flesh, and the devil, and declares his belief in the Divine prerogatives of Christ. With this mental resolution he enters the font, and his human intention is sealed by his reception into the company of the redeemed. Faith is necessary on the side of the recipient of Baptism, in order to salvation; it is crowned by being accepted and its hopes realized. It is not, of course, the independent and original product of the man. It comes in response to the prevenient Grace of the Holy Ghost; but, however produced, it is there, and it is the mode in which the convert surrenders himself to the gracious Work of God. Just as in Christ's miracles, when He dwelt among men, an answering effort was necessary on the part of the recipient of the miracle to the act or word by which Christ set His power in motion. It is faith that liberates the power of God, which is always ready to achieve His saving work; faith which surrenders itself freely to the application of the Divinely chosen means.

2. A question then arises which has been sufficiently important to be a cause of separation between believers: If faith is thus necessary, what is the use of baptizing infants?

How can they produce the necessary conditions on their side, when they are incapable of mental effort of any kind? We may admit that there is no answer to this difficulty if each individual soul is conceived as acting absolutely alone before God. If the matter is between God and the soul, and the society of the Church has no concern in it, no doubt the faith must be provided by the individual, or nothing can be expected to happen. But then the sacramental acts are also inexplicable and unnecessary. It is different if the Christian is admitted on initiation into a society of the faithful. The new member is received within the society, and brought into that relation to God in which the whole society stands. If he is an infant, this means the atmosphere of faith will be around him all his life. It is the faith of the whole Church which liberates the power of God to work upon him: and it is the business of those who are responsible for him to see that the seed of new life implanted in him is fostered and developed in the atmosphere of the Church's faith, hope, and love. The fact that this is so is expressed symbolically, according to the existing rubrics of the English Church, by the presence of sponsors. Their presence is not necessary to the validity of the Sacrament, but they convey the assurance that the child will be brought up in the Church's faith, and that certain persons will be responsible for him. The changes of the outward conditions of Church life have greatly obscured these facts, and the functions of sponsors have been reduced, in practice, within very narrow limits. It must be admitted that, though the practice of requiring sponsors is very ancient, it is not absolutely necessary: but it is of the highest importance that the part of the whole society in every act of Baptism—which the sponsors symbolize—should not be forgotten.

There is a parallel to this vicarious exercise of faith in the story of the raising of Lazarus. Lazarus was dead, and had

been dead four days: he was probably, therefore, incapable of exercising the faith which liberates the power of Christ. At any rate, our Lord appeals for this faith to the sister Martha. Martha meets our Lord on His arrival at Bethany with the words, 'Lord, if Thou hadst been here, my brother had not died; and even now I know that whatsoever Thou shalt ask of God, God will give Thee' (S. John xi. 21, 22). The words contain a hint plain, though unexpressed, that Christ will even yet exercise His power on her brother's behalf. Our Lord, in answer to this thought, says, 'Thy brother shall rise again.' Martha answers with a confession of faith in an ultimate resurrection at the last day. Then Jesus concentrates this hope upon Himself: 'I am the resurrection, and the life; he that believeth on Me, though he die, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth on Me shall never die. Believest thou this?' And Martha can only answer with a profession of absolute faith in Christ: 'I have believed that Thou art the Christ, the Son of God, even He that cometh into the world.' So again at the tomb, when Martha objects to the removal of the stone, our Lord says to her, 'Said I not unto thee, that, if thou believedst, thou shouldest see the glory of God?' And the narrative goes on, 'They took *therefore* the stone away.' The demand for faith was made and answered: but it was made not to the person who is the subject of the miracle, but to his sister Martha.

So, in the case of Baptism, the Church requires the expression of faith from those who are already members of the Body of Christ; and in strength of the faith of the whole Body the child, unconscious though he may be, is accepted. Strictly speaking, therefore, no person who is not in full communion with the Church is capable of acting as a godfather. The connivance, if we may so call it, of a person who is outside the Church's pale, at the Sacrament of Baptism affords no guarantee that the Sacrament will be followed up

in the child's education. And it is not of the essence of the Sacrament that it should be administered to children. They are not, or should not be, baptized recklessly without regard to the circumstances in which their lot is cast. The privilege and the peril of Christian Baptism are both too great and serious to admit of its being bestowed without due guarantee; as was done, for instance, by S. Francis Xavier.

3. The thought of the efficacy of the faith of the Church in general leads to the discussion of the question of post-baptismal sin. In describing the process of justification in the last chapter we were confronted with the difficulty of sin after the saving offer of God had been accepted—after the hand of faith had been extended to lay hold on the means of salvation offered by Christ. The source of the difficulty lay in the changeful character of the will, which identifies itself wholly now with one thing, now with another. The external and final character of Baptism is in a measure an answer to this trouble. For Baptism places the baptized, once for all, in a new spiritual position: he is, in the words of the Prayer-book, regenerated,—the adopted child of God,—incorporated into His Holy Church; he is dead unto sin, and living unto righteousness,—buried, risen with Christ. Hence his life begins anew with a new element in it; his actions start from a new basis. Like Adam, however, though starting free from positive sin, he is not perfect; his new life requires to be developed and strengthened by probation. And he may still, as he goes on, prefer to follow the old life, prefer the lusts of the flesh which he has renounced: he may still choose the world and reject Christ. But this does not occur in a moment, he does not break in a moment the link by which he is attached to Christ. If it lasted simply so long as his will lasted in one direction it would be gone very soon. But it does not. The Spirit of God is not so easily driven out of the heart of man. He remains so long as He

can find any hold upon the will—so long as the whole man is not given over entirely to the devil.

And all the while that the struggle is going on, the outward ordinances and the faithful life of the Church are on the man's side. He is free to share all the holy influences which the unceasing activity of the Church provides: the ideal which he is born to realize is continually displayed before him; and, more than this, the faith of the Church is a guarantee for him until he finally breaks loose from it. It does not excuse his sin, or palliate it; when its disciplinary system is properly organized it demands penance for his lapses from its law: but still, so long as he remains in communion with it, it is a perpetual assurance, it embodies a perpetual hope that he will ultimately return and reap the fruits of his baptismal gift. The existence of the Church and its outward signs of communion, its ordinances and Sacraments, are all a constant assurance that the baptized man, though erring, is not yet beyond the grace of God, and a constant appeal to God to give the unprofitable tree yet more time, in the hope that it still may bear fruit.

4. The Church, we say, is a permanent assurance by its very existence of the presence and activity of God in the world. And it is in this connexion that we come across the question of the validity of Sacraments. It will be better to define this point generally before indicating the tests which are recognized for the validity of Baptism. Quite broadly, then, the Church lays its *imprimatur* only upon Sacraments performed in connexion with its own organization and usage. It claims to be the normal channel through which the grace of the new Covenant is given to men; and in this capacity it defines certain methods for the bestowal of its benefits. Sacraments, then, if they are to be administered in connexion with the Church, must conform to the conditions laid down. Otherwise, the Church guarantees nothing. Hence, in the

case of the Eucharist as administered by societies which have broken off from the common tradition in organization, there is a deficiency in the conditions of validity demanded by the Church, and therefore the Church can give no assurance about its character. It does not necessarily deny that those who partake in faith receive blessing; but it absolutely withholds any assurance that such Sacraments convey any grace at all. As regards Baptism, the conditions of validity are not so stringent as those for the Eucharist. It is not necessary, *in cases of emergency*, that this Sacrament should be administered by a priest. It is valid when administered by a deacon, or by a layman, or by a woman, provided that the element used is water, and the formula containing the Threefold Name is employed. But, in all such cases, it is necessary that the person so baptized should afterwards be presented and received in the Church—unless, of course, the Baptism was administered at the approach of death. So, Baptism even by heretics is valid, unless there be reason to suppose that the proper formula was not used. Under these conditions the Church gives her assurance of the effectual performance of the Sacrament. The question of the validity of Sacraments is frequently, and most unjustifiably, treated as a matter of mere ecclesiastical pride. It is a matter of ordinary practical certainty. The mysterious intertwining of outward and inward in man's life makes it necessary that there should be some sign or evidence when the powers of the Church are exercised and when they are not. God is not bound to the Sacraments, and it is by no means to be argued that He does not bless efforts made independently of them. But unless it is maintained that He has given no indication of His Will, and has left all religious efforts entirely to the taste of individual men, it cannot be that those who take and those who leave the methods He has enjoined have an equal right to certainty in spiritual things.

We have spoken of the spiritual meaning of Baptism and explained it as conveying the gift of regeneration. There is a question of some difficulty connected with this, viz., the question whether the Holy Ghost is given in Baptism. In the Apostolic age, from the necessity of the case, Baptism was usually administered to adult persons. They were previously instructed in the faith, and immediately or soon after the Sacrament of Baptism came the laying-on of hands, through which process the Holy Spirit was given. The Acts of the Apostles show the position which the two ceremonies held clearly enough. At the outbreak of persecution in Jerusalem the Gospel is preached in Samaria by Philip the deacon, who baptizes as well as preaches. Then, when the Apostles hear that the Samaritans have received the Word, Peter and John are sent to follow up the work of Philip. 'They came and prayed for them (the new converts) that they might receive the Holy Ghost: for as yet He was fallen upon none of them; only they had been baptized into the name of the Lord Jesus. Then laid they their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost' (chap. viii. 15–17). There is one exception to this rule, in the case of Cornelius the centurion and those whom he had collected to hear S. Peter. The Holy Ghost came upon them as S. Peter spoke, and it was this fact which led the Apostle to admit them to Baptism. This is, however, an exceptional case, and may be explained by the critical character of the situation. The ordinary rule is that the Holy Ghost is given through the laying-on of hands after Baptism has taken place.

We are then in front of a two-fold question: (1) Is the Holy Ghost given at all in Baptism? (2) What is the special grace of Confirmation? As regards the first, it must be remembered that the whole Church system runs back upon the operations of the Holy Spirit. It is the

regular sphere of His activity. The Apostles remained inactive till the Holy Ghost came upon them, and their inspiration with power from on high is the birthday of the Church. It cannot be, then, that distinctive acts of the Church, such as Baptism, can take place apart from the activity of the Holy Ghost. Moreover, it is the distinctive character of the man who has accepted the offer of Christ, that he has a wholly peculiar assurance in dealing with the revelation of God, and this, as we have seen, depends upon the presence of the Spirit in his heart.

The question is very fully discussed by Dr. Mason, in a work dealing specially with the relation of Confirmation to Baptism. This author alleges abundant evidence from ancient writers to establish the following two points: (1) that Baptism and the laying-on of hands were regarded in ancient times as parts of one Sacrament; (2) that the gift of the Holy Ghost was held to be given through the laying-on of hands, and not through the baptismal washing. It follows, therefore, that, though the Holy Ghost is the Instrument of the regeneration which takes place in Baptism, yet the gift of the Indwelling of the Holy Ghost is given in Confirmation. If this view be maintained, there is certainly a difficulty in defining precisely what is, in regard of the Spirit of God, the result of the Sacrament of Baptism alone. Dr. Mason's contention is, that this difficulty is due to the fact that the language of the New Testament writers, and the Fathers, who have discussed the subject, relates to the complete process of which Baptism and Confirmation are parts, and cannot, therefore, be restricted to Baptism alone. It is not denied that men are regenerated by Baptism and made members of Christ; and that in consequence 'a new relationship' is formed 'between us and the Holy Spirit.' This relationship differs from that which is implied in the grace which leads

men to seek Baptism. 'It is a habitual grace which enters into the very composition of our being.' Men who are simply baptized are, therefore, really under the guidance of the Holy Spirit in a way in which the unbaptized are not; but the special gifts and graces for the conduct of life which come from the Indwelling of the Holy Spirit are yet to come in Confirmation. It is in this sense that Confirmation may be called the layman's ordination; it is the dedication of his life to spiritual purposes at its outset,[1] when the years of half-unconscious training are over, and men begin to make their own choice, and determine the line which they are going to take in the future. From the moment when they receive the Holy Ghost, they are committed to the definite and active service of God, and begin to use the powers which the Holy Ghost supplies for this end. So it is the natural preface to the reception of Holy Communion—the Sacrament in which the spiritual life is continually renewed.

The question whether Confirmation is a Sacrament or not, is one of nomenclature.[2] It is a solemn act of the Church conveyed through the bishop by means of outward forms, and such acts are, as we have seen, sacramental. It was not, so far as we know, definitely ordained as a ceremony by Christ; it is not, we believe, generally necessary to salvation. It therefore does not occupy the same position as Baptism and the Holy Eucharist. But it is sacramental in character; and the question whether the name Sacrament be applied to it or not, is, as we say, a question of names.

We come next to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the Eucharist. This is the second of the ordinances which were instituted directly by our Lord. It was established at the supper immediately preceding the betrayal and arrest; prior

[1] When administered as in the English Church.

[2] Confirmation is excluded by the English Articles from the category of Sacraments of the Gospel.

in time, therefore, to the Sacrament of Baptism. Four accounts are given us in the New Testament of the first Eucharist, which present various differences of detail. All four contain the words, This is My Body. And all four connect the cup with the blood of the Covenant. S. Matthew and S. Mark give the words, 'This is My Blood of the covenant, which is shed for many for remission of sins' (S. Matt. xxvi. 26–29; S. Mark xiv. 22–25). S. Luke and S. Paul use a somewhat different phrase, 'This Cup is the new covenant in My Blood, that which is shed for you' (S. Luke xxii. 16–20; 1 Cor. xi. 24–26). S. Luke and S. Paul only add the words commanding the repetition of the ordinance; and S. Luke only adds similar words to the delivery of the bread. S. Paul gives his account of it as the tradition of his day—the version of the story which he had received on becoming a Christian. It would be difficult to get beyond so early a piece of evidence; and we may safely accept it as historical, although it shows differences with the account of two Synoptists, S. Matthew and S. Mark. These are not of decisive importance.

Our Lord then instituted a rite which He commanded His followers to observe. It was a simple rite, consisting only in the participation of bread and wine, the simplest of the fruits of the earth. His command defines absolutely the matter of the Sacrament, and His Church has never recognized any departure from this definition. There have been, at times, efforts made to substitute some other substance for wine. Encratites and Manichæans, to whom wine was an abomination, proposed to offer water and even cheese. And the more extreme partisans of temperance in the present day have wished to adopt the unfermented juice of the grape instead of wine. But the Church has never recognized any of these expedients.[1] The question of mixing water with

[1] Cf. Report of Lambeth Conference, 1888.

the wine has nothing to do with this. It seems to have been the survival of the ancient custom, according to which wine was very rarely drunk unmixed, and is thus, if anything, a more close following of our Lord's probable action than the other plan.

The matter of the Sacrament being thus defined, we inquire next what is its spiritual significance. The answer is not perfectly easy or clear. Our Lord's words make an assertion, 'This is My Body': 'This is My Blood of the new covenant.' What is the meaning of 'is'? He connects the Sacrament with the new covenant; what is the bearing of this relation? He commands the continuance of the observance 'for a memorial of Me'; in what sense is it a memorial? Let us consider first any allusions to it in the New Testament. There is, first, the great sixth chapter of S. John, which lays down the principle that the true food of every man is the Flesh and the Blood of the Son of man—'My Flesh for the life of the world' (vi. 51). The Flesh of the Son of man is, therefore, made available for spiritual food by sacrifice: and participation in it is an absolute condition of spiritual life. Our Lord affirms this in the most solemn terms: 'Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the Flesh of the Son of man and drink His Blood, ye have not life in yourselves. He that eateth My Flesh and drinketh My Blood hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day: for My Flesh is meat indeed, and My Blood is drink indeed' (S. John vi. 53–55).

Next we have a passage in 1 Corinthians x. where S. Paul discusses the importance of the Sacrament. After speaking of the spiritual food and drink which Moses gave the children of Israel in the wilderness, and connecting it with Christ, he passes on to the Christian Eucharist: 'The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the Blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion

of the Body of Christ?' (x. 16). S. Paul then argues from this to the unity of the worshippers through the Sacrament, illustrating it by the practices of Hebrew ritual: 'Seeing that we, who are many, are one bread, one body; for we all partake of the one bread. Behold Israel after the flesh: have not they which eat the sacrifices communion with the altar? What say I then? that a thing sacrificed to idols is anything, or that an idol is anything? (No!) But I say, that the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God: and I would not that ye should have communion with devils. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils: ye cannot partake of the table of the Lord, and of the table of devils' (1 Cor. x. 17–21). This is an important passage, because its language shows that the associations of the communion-element in the Eucharistic service were with the ancient sacrificial system. The ancient sacrifices, as we saw above, were closely connected with the idea of communion, and S. Paul appeals to these well-known facts in support of his argument. In some sense, it is clear, he regarded the Eucharist as taking the place of a sacrifice.

In the following chapter the Apostle deals with the scandals which had arisen in Corinth in connexion with the Eucharist, and is thus led to remind the Corinthians of the occasion on which it was instituted (we have already cited the words), and to deduce from the historical circumstances of its origin its significance as a Church ordinance: 'As often as ye eat this bread, and drink the cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death till He come. Wherefore whosoever shall eat the bread or drink the cup of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and the blood of the Lord' (1 Cor. xi. 26, 27). From unworthy reception judgment falls upon the receiver; he eats and drinks, 'not discerning the body.' 'For this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and

not a few sleep' (xi. 27–30). The turning-points of this passage are the proclamation of the Lord's Death, and the warning that the unworthy receiver is liable in respect of the Body and Blood of the Lord. The first determines the sacrificial reference of the previous passage; the Communion places men in union with the Sacrifice of Christ, as Gentile sacrifices brought men into union with the gods they worshipped, and as the Israelite after the flesh was partaker of the Altar of God. It is the Communion of the Body and Blood of Christ. This explains the otherwise indefinite word 'proclaim.' Further, the unworthy recipient is guilty of an outrage upon the Body and Blood of the Lord. He commits not merely a breach of order or decency, but he insults Christ; he definitely declares that he is not on the side of Christ. He judges himself by his action; he eats and drinks judgment to himself.

These passages, which are the chief references to the Sacrament in the New Testament, give the Holy Eucharist a threefold significance—it is a memorial; it conveys real communion with Christ; it is associated with the Sacrifice of Christ. The Sacramental principle, which, as we have seen, rules all the action of the Church of Christ, forbids us to regard the memorial made in the Eucharist as a mere commemoration of the Death of Christ. It is a memorial which includes participation in the Body and Blood of Christ; it declares and reasserts the union which exists between us and God and our fellow-Christians, through the new covenant. It is a continual proclamation of our identity with Christ in His sacrificial Work; a continual source to us of the renewal of that spiritual life which we obtained first at the moment of our Baptism. The several points which we have indicated here are not in fact separable. It is a communion with God, because it is a participation in the atoning Sacrifice; and it is a memorial, because it continually reasserts our

right to participate in the Sacrifice, which can never be repeated.

We shall not, then, be afraid to accept the words of Christ just as they are. We believe that the sacramental Elements, duly consecrated as the Church directs, *are* the Body and Blood of Christ. The manner of our participation is certainly spiritual, but it is not on that account less real; it would be truer to say that it is on that account the more real. The Elements suffer no external change; they convey, in obedience to the Word of Christ, their spiritual burden: as the Humanity of our Lord was, to all appearance, like the humanity of all men, and yet contained within it the fulness of the Godhead. Those whose consciences were not acute or sensitive saw only the carpenter's Son, and their moral unworthiness made them guilty of the Blood of Christ. The Divinity of Christ was there, and they should have recognized the fact. Their lack of faith and impurity of conscience blinded them so that seeing they could not see. In a somewhat similar way the wicked, 'although they do carnally and visibly press with their teeth . . . the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ, yet in no wise are they partakers of Christ, but rather to their condemnation do eat and drink the sign or sacrament of so great a thing.' (Art. xxix.) The fact that they see nothing in the Sacrament, and gain nothing by it, is their condemnation: it declares only too plainly what their condition is. Faith is required in order to obtain the merits of this Sacrament no less than to appreciate the Godhead in the Son of man, and to be grafted into His Body by Baptism: wickedness is incompatible with Faith.[1]

So far we have dealt merely with facts, and offered no theory or interpretation of them. We believe that the Body and Blood of Christ are really given and received in the

[1] Cf. Mozley, *Lectures and other Theological Papers*, pp. 204, 205.

sacramental Elements; that is the Promise under which the ordinance is continued; we have said nothing as to the mode in which they are conveyed. But this reserve has not always been exercised. Philosophical speculation has been allowed to work upon the subject, and the most important result of it is the theory known as Transubstantiation. This is, strictly speaking, an attempt to account philosophically for the statements of our Lord and the belief of the Church, taken together with the fact that the sacramental Elements present no external change. Christ says, 'This is My Body,' and the bread when consecrated remains as before. How is this? The answer was found in a philosophical theory of existence prevalent at a certain period in the history of thought. The material objects around us, it was observed, appeal to our senses through their attributes. We note them and class them by their hardness or softness, their colour, and so on. How are these attributes to be regarded?—as qualities inhering in a thing—a substance—which we do not see, but which is the connecting link between various aggregates of qualities; or does substance simply mean that a certain number of qualities occur together? To take an instance, bread excites the senses of man by a collection of definite qualities; it has a certain hardness, colour, taste, etc.: are these qualities held together by an invisible reality or substance which we do not see, or is bread simply the name which we use for those occasions when our senses are excited in a particular way? The answer to this question was not unanimous—a fact which need not cause us any great surprise. But, on the whole, the orthodox part of the Church accepted the former alternative, and decided that there is a real substance in things in which their attributes inhere. A further question was now asked, Can the attributes of a thing be dissociated from its substance, and appear either alone or as attributes of some other substance? In the special

case before us, Can the attributes of bread and wine be made to inhere in the substance of the Body and Blood of Christ? This question was decided in the affirmative, and it became heresy to deny it. Hence the miracle which is held to take place at the words of consecration consists in the vanishing of the substance of the bread and wine, the attributes remaining unchanged, and the substitution of the Substance of the Lord's Body and Blood.

This is the fundamental doctrine of Transubstantiation, but it is true, of course, that it has had an extended history. Its philosophical convenience did not do away with the fact that the attributes of the species remained unchanged after consecration: and a considerable part of the history is concerned with finding some intelligible account of these attributes. But in whatever form the theory may be cast, it must be clear to any one that this is, properly speaking, a philosophical speculation, and not a theological statement at all. It arises and can be discussed only amid philosophical associations; and not only so, the philosophy to which it belongs is an ancient, half-forgotten philosophy. It is possible by reading up the subject, and by a process of intellectual sympathy, to get back into the frame of mind in which the question was a real one. We have attempted to do so in some measure here. But it is very hard to think that this is really the meaning of Christ's ordinance, or that this philosophical expedient explains the difficulty of it. In the words of the English articles, 'it overthroweth the nature of a sacrament.' A sacrament consists in the conveyance through certain outward forms of an inward and spiritual grace. It requires two parts, therefore, a visible and material, and an invisible and immaterial. Hence, any theory which destroys one side or the other destroys the sacramental character of the service. The theory of Transubstantiation, by denying the permanence of the substance

of the bread and wine, really cuts off the material side of the Sacrament. It is parallel to that view of the Incarnation by which the Humanity of our Lord is merged in His Godhead, and it is probable that it arose under Monophysite influence.

It is sometimes argued that this charge lies only against the strictest forms of the doctrine, and it is true that various attempts have been made to avoid the natural conclusion from it. The distinction of substance and accidents is intended to distinguish in the aggregate of perception between that which is real in it, and that which is not; and it implies that accidents separated from their substance have no reality; when the substance disappears the accidents have a merely illusory reality. This consequence has been drawn by many thinkers in regard to the Bread and Wine, and when it is drawn, the doctrine undoubtedly overthrows the nature of a Sacrament. But the objection is not really met by saying (as has been said) that the accidents are real things. For thus the distinction itself upon which the whole position is based becomes otiose and meaningless. Changes of this sort will not make tolerable an unsound theory of reality.

There is, then, very good reason for rejecting the doctrine of Transubstantiation; it attempts to give an explanation of that which lies beyond human faculties to explain, and in so doing it destroys the nature of that which it professes to explain. Moreover, it involves us in philosophical discussions which are no longer within the range of modern thought. We have in it, to speak quite openly, a piece of obsolete philosophy. It is, therefore, a misfortune that it should be regarded as an article of faith by any portion of the Christian Church. Consubstantiation is the name given by his enemies to Luther's theory. If it be pressed, it is, of course, involved in philosophical associations not unlike those of the Roman doctrine. And it was connected also with Luther's peculiar

view of the ubiquity of our Lord's human body. It is, therefore, a theory which has unsatisfactory associations. In its special reference to the Eucharist it is not liable to this sort of criticism. For it does little to explain the simultaneous presence of the Body and Blood of Christ, and the bread and wine. It simply asserts as a fact that both are there, and this is strictly within Scriptural limits.

The doctrine of the real Presence—that is, the doctrine that Christ is really and objectively present in the Sacrament after the consecration—is held by a large number of English divines. It is popularly but quite wrongly confused (1) with Transubstantiation; (2) with a belief that Christ is present in material and corporeal guise. There can be no reason whatever for the first confusion, for the doctrine of the real Presence avoids what the doctrine of Transubstantiation elaborately does; it gives no account whatever of the mode of Christ's presence, it simply asserts it as a fact. And the only reason for the second confusion is the belief that real always means material. This is probably not always a consciously held opinion, but the course of controversy upon the subject shows that it is really at work. It cannot, however, be defended. For spiritual reality is, after all, the true reality which we apprehend through the material veil: and it is a curious inversion of the true order of ideas to suppose that the word real can only be used in a material sense.

The tests of the validity of the Holy Eucharist, that is, the conditions in which the Church will guarantee that the action carries the weight of its authority, are somewhat stringently defined. It must be celebrated with the proper matter, of course: but it is not valid if celebrated by any person other than an ordained minister of priestly rank. Neither a deacon nor a layman is competent to celebrate it, though a deacon is allowed to administer the Chalice. It is probable that the reason for the difference between this

sacrament and Baptism in regard of the character of the minister is due to the different relation they bear to the life of the Church. It is competent to any person, who is himself a member of Christ, to use his right as a member to bring another person within the fold. The Sacrament is performed once for all, and the Church, on receiving the newly initiated member, will rectify any defects. Such a method of administration is not the ordinary usage, but in case of an emergency it is possible. On the other hand, the Eucharist is continually repeated, and must be so if the life of the believers is to be properly sustained. Any laxity in the conditions would therefore produce, in practice, widespread confusion and general uncertainty. It is not unnatural, therefore, that the celebration of this Sacrament should be reserved to those accredited ministers upon whom the charge is laid of maintaining the spiritual life of the Church generally. We must repeat that this does not necessarily deny that the sacraments used by other societies bring blessing with them, but it asserts that the Church knows nothing about them. The Church has defined the method of carrying out our Lord's command, in exercise of its due rights, and beyond this it cannot go, it can give no assurance of any kind.

A question closely allied with that of validity is the question of the moment at which the consecration is complete, and the acts by which it is achieved. The difficulty of this question, and the divergent answers which would be given to it by the Eastern and Western Churches, shows how essentially practical rather than doctrinal the import of validity is. What men want practically to know is that they may trust the Sacraments administered to them, and feel sure that the power given to the Church is operative in all its fulness when they receive. In the West, the tendency to precise definition has resulted in the view that

the moment of consecration is that in which the Words of Institution are recited. These form the potent formula which effects the miraculous result. But the Eastern view is by no means so precise. The setting apart of the elements from the oblations gives them from the first a sacred character: and the operative moment, so far as any moment can be so described, is that in which the Holy Spirit is invoked upon the elements as they lie upon the altar. This comes, in the Liturgy of S. Chrysostom for instance, after the recital of the Words of Institution, and the Great Oblation. If the question were mainly a doctrinal one, it would be impossible that this divergence should be tolerated; but the difference is unimportant, so long as the assurance is given that a true Eucharist is being celebrated. We may, perhaps, add that much difficulty and dubious philosophical discussion has arisen from the endeavour to define too precisely the exact moment of the change.

This Sacrament, bringing as it does the Presence of Christ into such close relation with men, has been specially connected with prayer and intercession. From the earliest times, intercession for the whole Church and for individuals has been associated with it. And from this point has started the custom of offering it with special intention for the living or the dead. There is nothing contradictory to its character in this use of it, but the practice of saying masses for the dead has led to much abuse in another communion. It has led to the practice of solitary masses, and to the notion that immorality in life can be atoned for by masses after death, which has had a seriously damaging effect upon morality. There is, however, nothing wrong theoretically in the belief that intercession both for the living and the dead is rightly joined with the Eucharist: the mistake lies in the practical abuse of the true principle. There is no ancient precedent for solitary masses. The Eucharistic service is essentially a

service in which the whole Church joins, and the priest, though he represents the Church, performs a function in which the laity has a part. Hence it is a maimed and incomplete service when the laity is unrepresented.

We must now pass on to consider the other acts in which the Church expresses its collective will, and performs spiritual functions. The theory of the Church, which we have here laid down, represents it as a spiritual organization existing and active in the physical world. There is no part of life which it does not touch and consecrate by touching. It is anything but an occasionally intrusive element in life. For those who really and *ex animo* belong to it, it is a constant presence, its influence is felt in every region of their being. There is no part of life which has not its spiritual side, and therefore no part of it which cannot find a home in this spiritual organization. This general spiritual activity of the Church receives special expression in connexion with all the most solemn moments of life. The Church deals in an especial manner with sin; it reconciles and absolves the sinner. It consecrates wedlock, and it is at hand to fortify men against death. Further, it sets apart certain individuals to perform its spiritual functions. Corresponding with these four occasions are outward ordinances through which the will of the Church is solemnly conveyed, and all of them are of sacramental character.

These, with Baptism, Confirmation, and the Holy Communion, make up the seven Sacraments recognized by the Roman and Greek Churches. Though sacramental in character the other five ordinances do not occupy quite the same position as the two Sacraments instituted by our Lord. Confirmation, as we have said, is closely allied to Baptism, and expresses the self-devotion of those who are baptized. Holy Orders expresses a further self-devotion to a special work, needing a special call and a special gift of the Holy Ghost.

These two stand alone also. The other three—Penance, Matrimony, Unction—are connected with ordinary life; the occasions for them arise in the ordinary course of things; the sacramental ordinance which belongs to each is defined by the Church in the exercise of its ordinary prerogative. We will briefly discuss these three first, and then pass to the consideration of Holy Orders, which has so much to do with the administration of all the others.

1. The administration of penitential discipline is rendered necessary by the occurrence of post-baptismal sin. The Church requires renunciation of the world and of all its ways as a preface to the Sacrament of Baptism; and, from the moment of Baptism, the newly regenerated person should do no sin at all. But the facts fall far short of the ideal, and, in practice, men sin in a variety of ways, although they are members of Christ's Church. Such sin does not of necessity separate a man finally from the unity of the Church; but it raises a serious obstacle to his use of the ministrations of the Church. It makes him unfit for communion until he is reconciled by confessing his sin and receiving the forgiveness of God. Here begins the controverted portion of our question. It is maintained by some that the Church has no necessary part in reconciling offenders, but that such reconciliation is purely a matter between the soul and God. On the other hand, we have constantly before us a system in which reconciliation by a priest is necessary, before the Sacrament of the Holy Communion is administered—a system which is backed by a complex code of written precedents and laws. Between these lies the practice of the English Church, according to which special and private reconciliation is possible; but the adoption of this method is left to the choice and the conscience of each individual man.

a. Let us inquire, first, what it is claimed that the Church does. Supposing an English Churchman being unquiet in

his conscience goes to the minister and opens his grief, what is the meaning of the 'benefit of absolution' which the Exhortation in the Prayer-book promises him? Briefly, we may say that the minister declares the absolution of God: assuming the presence of real repentance. In other words, the Church exercises the power of binding and loosing which unquestionably was given to it. And it exercises this power, as in every other case, so in this, by means of appointed ministers. That is, so far as it performs a formal act, it performs it in a formal and regular way. This is part of the security of an organized body, that it exercises its functions under definite conditions; it does not leave them to be taken up accidentally and casually by any person who may feel himself so moved. The absolution of the Church, then, is a clear and firmly defined act, occurring under firmly defined conditions. The sinner repents and confesses; the Church, accepting his penitence as real, declares the absolution of God to him, and receives him again into the full exercise of his Christian rights. The Church does not and cannot claim to absolve apart from its commission from God; still less to absolve of its free will, apart from the moral and spiritual conditions of the sinner. The whole process is strictly confined within its limits as a society: it belongs to the internal organization of the Church, and has nothing to do with any other person. No one can, strictly speaking, avail himself of this power, except so far as he submits himself in general to the discipline of the Church, and lives as one of its members. All such practices, therefore, as those of which we read, by which men make the Sacrament of Penance a means to a wicked life, are parodies and caricatures of a very serious and solemn thing. Absolution is not for those, the tenor of whose life is consciously immoral, whose life persistently defies the code of the society to which they belong; but for

those who, having fallen into sin, are anxious to be reconciled and have the assurance of forgiveness, of which their participation in the Holy Eucharist is a sign.

b. We must next ask, whether such formal absolution is necessary at all, and then whether it is necessary that it should be administered privately after private confession. S. Paul lays down the rule clearly enough, that a person who is living in sin is unworthy to come to the Holy Communion.[1] Sin, then, committed within the Church, must be removed somehow, if the sinner is to remain in communion with the Church. In virtue of their membership of Christ, men have free access to the Father by Jesus Christ the righteous; they have an Advocate with the Father, Who is also a propitiation for their sins. There is, therefore, no formal reason why every sinner should not confess his sins to God, and receive by his repentant confession the assurance of absolution. At the same time, the Church has a right to protect itself against false claims to partake of its mysteries; and, therefore, it has always placed a form of confession and absolution before reception of Holy Communion. In the earliest days, individuals publicly confessed their sins, and publicly received absolution for them. Then followed a period in which private confession and absolution took the place of this public act; and now in the English Church a form of general confession and absolution precedes the prayer of consecration.

In all these varieties of usage there is no real variety of principle. The necessity of confession and absolution at all depends not only on the individual's relation to God, but also on his relation to the Church. He is a member of a society, and his character affects the character of the whole. If he comes to Communion with sin upon him, he not only insults God, but he diminishes the force of the common

[1] 1 Cor. xi.

worship: he communicates the infection of his rebellious or enfeebled will, and the whole service is the worse for his presence. It is a mere matter of reason and right that the Church should protect itself to the best of its ability against situations like this: and it cannot be claimed as an individual privilege to destroy the unity of the worship by coming without due preparation of the heart.

The whole subject of confession, however, is usually treated under the influence of a certain confusion: two causes of which we may mention here. (1) It is commonly supposed that there is something wholly and essentially separate in the act of private confession and absolution, so that while the public and general confession is legitimate, the other is wrong. This is an inconsistency. In the one, exactly as much as in the other, the power of the keys is exercised. This is proved by the restriction of the words of absolution, wherever they occur, to the priest, to whom the power of the keys is given at his ordination. In the one case as in the other the Church has one object in view—the preservation of its purity. It is, therefore, merely a question of expediency, and not at all of the general theory of the Church, whether this function should be performed by it in one way or in the other. In the general confession, each individual who seriously means anything by his attendance at Communion applies the words to the sins of which he is conscious, and the absolution which follows frees him from them as completely as if he had recited them one by one in the hearing of the priest. (2) The question is further confused by an attenuated conception of Church unity. The union of men *in* Church is not supposed to carry with it any close connexion outside. The differences of class, private quarrels, and social reserves, all begin again at the Church door as soon as men pass back into their secular life. The feeling of family or class unity among Churchmen, which

was so strong in early days, is very largely lost, and it has become almost an axiom that religious differences should not be allowed to influence any other part of life. There are, of course, exceptions to this state of things, and some part of it, where it exists, may be accounted for by the very large numerical extension of Christianity, the far greater hold it has upon society as a whole, and the complexity of society in itself. But there can be no question that the prevalence of individualism, and the consequent severance of religious from other interests, is very largely responsible for the condition of Church feeling. With the loss of a family feeling among Churchmen goes the sense that the Church is the true home, where men can afford to be natural, to show themselves as they are, where their faults and failings are sure to meet with sympathy and help. They are on their guard against their brethren, are distrustful of them, and are afraid to put themselves so completely in the power of any one else, as they must if they are to confess their sins. It was, of course, the presence of all that is most opposite to this in the early Church that made such a thing as public confession possible at all. If, then, we shudder at the very thought of public or private confession, and regard it with indignation, we should remember that in coming, rightly or wrongly, to this frame of mind, we have lost something which once existed in the Church, and which lies very near to the heart of Christianity.

The recognition of this change of tone amongst Churchmen leads us to the second of our questions: Is private confession necessary to all men? We have already pointed out that this is a question not of theory but of expediency. The use of private confession implies no change whatever in the general relation of the penitent to the Church. In the public services of the Church, the priest declares the absolution of God over the whole congregation, and must trust to

individuals for the completeness of their confession and the reality of their repentance. He does, and can do, no more in private confession. He can, indeed, by questions or exhortation aid the sinner in confession and in penitence, but in the end the responsibility for its reality falls upon the conscience of the man who confesses. This being so, we cannot regard private confession as being theoretically obligatory upon any one.

Is it, then, expedient to make it practically obligatory? Like all the other questions concerned with this subject, the expediency depends very largely upon character. It is easy to find cases of people who have lost their hold on spiritual realities by trusting to the outward ceremony too freely. The common statement that contrition is deepened by confessing in the presence of man probably contains some such imperfectly spiritual implication. And the necessity of frequently formulating a list of lapses from the way of holiness is likely to lead to scrupulosity and spiritual valetudinarianism. Also there is no doubt that the practice of confession has been at times grossly abused. But it is also true that the unrestrained vehemence with which these real dangers are discussed, has led to a very unfortunate depreciation of the practice.

Side by side with the experience of those who condemn the practice there is a body of experience no less valid and certain in its favour. It is hardly possible to doubt that there are many lives to which the use of habitual confession is a security and a blessing. Anyone is at liberty to hold that it would be better if it were not so: but it is unreasonable to endeavour to prevent such souls having the help which they find necessary. Still more often there are souls to whom the occasional use of confession, at critical times in life, would be an inestimable advantage. It is true that some people are damaged by the exposure which confession involves:

it is no less true that many are damaged seriously and permanently by the reticence which the present depreciation of this practice imposes on them. A morbid condition of will or conscience may come just as easily from undue reserve as from undue candour. Evil things grow up in the dark, which probably might have been eradicated if they had not been allowed to grow beyond control. The Church fails as grievously when persons like this have to go without the help they require as when harm results from the misuse of confession. The mischief of either plan is at its height when confession or abstention from confession is made compulsory or even virtually compulsory. Because in both cases the soul is forced into an attitude, and forbidden to take its natural course of growth; and a forced attitude is always bad for true spiritual life. The Christian Church always aims at extension by securing individual souls, and it is too practical to shrink from supplying the treatment which individual souls of every kind require.[1]

We think, then, that the English method by which the use of confession is left to the individual conscience is greatly to be preferred. Besides the public acts of confession at morning and evening prayer, and in the Communion Office, there is a definite rubric in the Visitation Service, ordering the priest to *move* the sick person 'to make a special confession of his sins, if he feels his conscience troubled with any weighty matter,' and appointing a form of absolution to follow the confession. Further, the exhortation to come to the Holy Communion (appointed to be read 'when the minister giveth warning for the celebration of the Holy Communion, which he shall always do upon the Sunday, or some holy day, immediately preceding') contains a recommendation to come to confession, if there be any 'who cannot quiet his own conscience.' He is to receive the benefit of

[1] Cf. *Fulham Conference*, 1901, pp. 73–79: 93–103.

absolution together with ghostly counsel and advice. A practical commentary on the effect of these words may be found in the preface to Jeremy Taylor's *Ductor Dubitantium*. This work is a treatise on moral theology, dated 1660: and its object is to furnish priests with trustworthy guidance in hearing confessions, which the author thinks a serious want in the English Church. Taylor admits that confession is less frequent than it had been, but he attributes this, not to the special point of view of the English Church, but to the troubles consequent on the Rebellion. The return of Charles II. will, he hopes, restore order again. Thus the English Church throws the responsibility upon the individual of choosing whether he will satisfy himself with the public and general confessions and absolutions, or seek the private assurance of absolution. It is no doubt better that it should be so: better for the Church and for the individuals. But it is not without danger. For the methods of an individual with himself are not wholly unlikely to be lax, and it is probable that communion is very often administered to persons who are very far from being worthy to receive it.

2. In dealing with matrimony the Church consecrates a relation which is in itself natural. Men and women have lived together in the bonds of wedlock loyally and faithfully, quite apart from any benediction from the Church of Christ: and, beyond question, they can do so again. The marriage ceremony, therefore, in itself has nothing to do with the contract between the man and his wife. The solemnity of the act, in the secular life, is the reason why the Church lays its hand upon it, and takes it into the range of its operations. And what is more than this, the closeness and permanence of the union is used by S. Paul as a figure to express the bond between Christ and His Church.

It is probably the influence of the Latin Translation of S. Paul's words in the passage in question (Eph. v. 32) that has

led to the classing of matrimony among the seven Sacraments.[1] It is not easy to see any reason—apart from the general desire to have seven Sacraments—why this particular event in life should be singled out and dignified by inclusion in the category of Sacraments. It certainly cannot take its place with the two Sacraments ordained by our Lord. In them the material symbol conveys, owing to the ordinance of Christ, a spiritual result. At the very most S. Paul's words can only mean that the lifelong union of husband and wife is parallel to the union of Christ and His Church: it would be absurd to say that it conveyed, or constituted, or was an efficacious sign of, this higher union. It is true also that Christian matrimony derives from its consecration in the Church of Christ a peculiar blessing: but this is of the same kind with the consecration of any other factor in human life by Christianity. The solemnity of marriage, and its importance to the whole moral being of man, have led to the special dignity which it holds in the Church order. It is sacramental, because under the Christian dispensation all life is sacramental, but it cannot be forced under any technical definition of a Sacrament.

Before Christianity true marriage was the highest thing in man's experience, the most truly permanent, the most vividly suggestive of the supremacy of man's spirit over all material nature. Under the Christian dispensation it is seen to be an image in time of the indissoluble union of God with the souls of men who are redeemed in His Son.

It is the spiritual value and importance of marriage which lies at the root of the austere conception of it that belongs to Christianity. And it may be noticed that laxer views of it are invariably based upon what is ultimately mere passion. The history of mankind shows clearly enough the value and reasonableness of the strictest view: and arguments

[1] Hoc est magnum sacramentum: where sacramentum is the Latin for *μυστήριον*.

against it derived from the strain of a lifelong vow, and the difficulty of restraining wandering desire—and these form the stock-in-trade of writers of problem-novels and plays—are simply picturesque representations of crude passion. It is in this region that the Church is most likely to come into collision with the law of the State, and it enters upon any such contest with less than the usual advantages. Behind it lies the definite command of Christ, What God hath joined let not man put asunder, and the interpretation given by S. Paul of the indissoluble character of marriage. The State is also concerned in preserving the purity of human life, and is inclined to resent the intrusion of a positive command upon what it conceives to be a legitimate region of free debate and decision. Probably the least satisfactory condition of things is the present, when the State endeavours to do part of its work through the Church, but shows signs of objecting to the stricter ideals of the Church. As the Church cannot surrender these ideals without disloyalty, it may well be that serious changes will be necessary in the existing arrangements. The State could rightly insist on a civil marriage for all: it has no right to insist that ministers of the Church should bless unions which the Church condemns.

3. As the Church by consecrating marriage puts its own impress upon the most solemn act in life, so, according to the present Roman practice, the dying Christian is anointed with oil, and departs thus fortified to the world beyond this life. The practice of anointing prevails also in the Greek Church, but with a somewhat different significance. Though unction is no part of the regular ministry of the English Church, it is counted as a Sacrament by both the Roman and Orthodox Churches; and a few words may well be spent on its history and meaning.

There is no serious doubt as to the Scriptural basis on which the practice is rested. In S. Mark vi. 13, the Apostles

on their trial mission are said to have anointed many sick persons with oil and healed them, and S. James in his Epistle (ch. v. 14, 15) enjoins unction of this kind, definitely for the purpose of healing. There is nothing in either of these passages connecting the rite with death: it is to secure bodily health. This is the meaning assigned to it in patristic references to it; and the Greek Church still regards its purpose as being confined to the restoration of bodily and spiritual health. In Origen[1] unction is closely connected with absolution. Chrysostom cites the verses from S. James to prove the power of the priesthood to deal with post-baptismal sin.[2] So far there is no specially sacramental language used in regard to it, nor any close connexion assumed with the time of death. The change of significance in the rite seems to have been due to a gradual concentration or emphasis upon its spiritual side. The more exclusively it was supposed to be directed towards spiritual health, the more decisively its use for bodily disease tended to pass out of sight. It was still a rite aiming at the restoration of health, but at the health of the soul infected with the disease of sin. Its position as a Sacrament for the dying was assured when it was believed that it secured absolution, but could not be repeated. The names *sacramentum exeuntium* and *extrema unctio* became prevalent in the twelfth century: though the first person to use the term *sacramentum* of the rite in the case of the sick was Innocent I. (A.D. 416).[3]

It cannot be maintained that the disappearance of this rite implies a serious divergence on the part of the English Church from the rule of Catholic antiquity. As a Sacrament for the departing the rite has very imperfect historic attesta-

[1] *Hom. in Levit.*, ii. 4.

[2] Chrys., *De Sac.*, iii., tom. i. pp. 384–5, ed. Bened.

[3] *Ep. Innoc. ad Dec.*, xxv. c. 11; Migne, *Petr. Lat.*, xx. p. 559. The phrase used is genus sacramenti.

tion: it is difficult to bring it within the lines of the other Sacraments, if it is to be used in its old sense as a process leading to restoration of bodily health; no other Sacrament consists of an outward sign antecedent to a material result. As a process intended to restore spiritual health it is related in an uncertain way to penance: and it is difficult, as in the case of marriage, to bring it within any technical definitions of the form and matter of Sacraments. But it cannot be denied that unction for the sick is a Scriptural practice, which, however, the modern conceptions of sickness will probably not permit to be revived.[1]

4. We now come to discuss the ordinance upon which the whole visible order of the Church turns—Holy Orders. The first question to be asked in relation to it is, What is the idea of an ordained person? An ordained person is one who is commissioned to perform certain work, and to whom there is given a certain special power towards the performance of it. The power by which he acts is the power of the Church, as a whole, concentrated and specially conveyed to the ordained minister. That is, the power which the Church bestows belongs ultimately to it, and because it so belongs to the whole Church, it is conveyed to the particular minister. In a very real sense there is a priesthood belonging to the whole Church, shared in by every member of it; and it is in virtue of this general priesthood, in the exercise of the Church's right to define its own organization, that the special commissions are given. At the same time, the power which the Church gives is from God; it confers, as in Confirmation, so in Ordination, gifts of the Holy Ghost.

The exercise of this power dates back to the beginning of the history of the Church, as we have already noticed. The

[1] Cf. Herzog, *Real-Encyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, Art. "Ölung"; Macaire, *Théologie Dogmatique Orthodoxe*, vol. ii. pp. 551–564.

Seven were appointed with special ministries when occasion arose, but certain other powers were reserved which the Seven were not permitted to exercise. Philip, one of the Seven, baptized, but the Apostles are sent after him to confirm. So it is the elders who ordain S. Paul and S. Barnabas and S. Timothy: this function belongs to them. The history of the origin of the threefold ministry is in some degree obscure. There is, however, one point in connexion with it which is not obscure, viz., that the Church accepted from the first the principle of differentiation of function; and that the effect of this was to restrict those to whom ministry was assigned to the performance of the duties committed to them. Hence the rejection of the principle of ordained ministers is a serious departure from the practice of the Church; and it is no less an act of schism if a person transgresses the limits of the ministry assigned to him.

It is important to clear up certain misconceptions on this point. There are certain things which the historic Church has never felt bound to approve, and one of the most conspicuous of these is the right to exercise spiritual functions without definite commission. On the other hand, the idea of a separate caste of ordained persons does not belong to the theory of Holy Orders. But in practice it is difficult to keep the balance between two extremes: the unbridled liberty of prophesying in one direction, and the hardest conception of differentiated function in the other. It is argued, in effect, on one side, that any man who can get a party of people to follow him has an indefeasible right to preach and administer Sacraments, just as any man who can persuade a constituency to send him there has a right to sit in Parliament. There is no warrant whatever for this contention, and it is only plausible when the Church is conceived as a loose and miscellaneous aggregate of individuals, or small congregations. The unity of the whole Body, which

aims at being much closer than the unity of the State, precludes such a casual method of delegating the power of the Church. On the other side, the commission given seems so complete and self-sufficient, that the person who has received and exercised it seems to need no help and no consentient spiritual action from those who have not the commission. What is wanted is a mediating idea: the conception of a functionary who is representative of the whole Body, and whose sole right to act lies in his being representative; but who acts in the name and with the definite consent of a number of Christians who have not received the commission, but whose devotion to the cause of Christ and His Church is no less complete and definite than his.

We may perhaps admit for purposes of argument that the Church might conceivably have adopted some other method of performing its functions than the appointment of representatives. It might have left the conduct of public worship and the administration of the Sacraments in the hands of the members as a body, so that any one who was so moved might act in the name of the Church. This plan might have been chosen, and there are those who think that it had better have been so. If they attempt, however, to innovate upon ancient practice, they have this firm fact against them, that the Church did adopt the other plan, and that its action is guided by the Holy Spirit. If it be urged that its decision was a mistake which we can now see clearly enough to rectify, such an argument virtually resigns all theory of Church unity whatever, and denies, in effect, that the Spirit of God rules over it. A body of which the Spirit of God controls the mind does not make mistakes of this sort. And if it be argued further, that the plan of differentiated function and limited commission was a temporary expedient only, and that its day is past, we answer that this again is theoretically possible. As the Church defined its organization once

in one way, it could theoretically do so again in another. But there are reasons for supposing that the time for reconsideration of the original method is not yet come: of which the chief is this—that the reconsideration is urged upon us by persons who speak from the individualist position and reject altogether the idea of a Church. The question of having or not having a specially ordained ministry is not the real point at issue. The real and ultimate matter in dispute is whether Christ founded a society or aimed merely at the conversion of a number of individual souls; whether, in fact, there is any body such as to require organization at all. We have already discussed this point at an earlier stage, and the general question of Holy Orders is carried, for us, by our decision. Specialized functions belong to an organized body: if there is no organic unity there will be no need for defining the functions of individuals. But no organization, that rises above the lowest and least complex levels, can carry on its work without division of labour.

The idea, then, expressed by the title 'an ordained minister' is that to such a person is given a definite commission and definite gifts. The process of Ordination is therefore sacramental in character. The power is conveyed by the act of laying-on of hands, which is the outward sign of the grace conferred. It is an act in which the Holy Spirit, the Guide and Ruler of the Church, is directly concerned. The essential feature of the whole act is the transmission of defined powers. An ordained person is not a plenipotentiary, he is free within the limits of his commission, but that is all. Hence the importance of the doctrine of succession. It is not that there is a mystical semi-magical efficacy in the Apostolic source of the Ordination gift: but that in this way only is the limitation preserved which the principle of transmission involves. The gift of Holy Orders must be transmitted by those to whom the function of transmission is assigned, and by no others.

Hence the difficulties which are raised around the Episcopal order are not vital as regards Orders in general. Supposing it were true that the monarchical Episcopate, as we know it, did not arise simultaneously over the whole Church, but that some Churches were governed by a College of Presbyters rather than by one individual, it still would not follow that the Apostolic succession was broken. To prove this, it would be necessary to show that the Colleges of Presbyters had not the right to transmit the power of ordination. This would be somewhat difficult; and would require the assumption that the presbyters mentioned in the New Testament were simply in the position of our modern priests—an assumption which the language of the New Testament does not support. What is probably the true account of the matter is that the College of Presbyters, by which the full power of the Church was exercised, devolved its ordinary functions of preaching and celebrating the Holy Eucharist upon persons to whom the name of presbyter was afterwards restricted: while these ordinary functions, together with the power to ordain, were massed in the single ruler of each Church. This plan would doubtless be commended by the fact that the business of management is often best performed when the responsibility rests upon a single person; but far more important than this was the function of the bishop as the repository of Apostolic doctrine and practice. This duty rose into prominence as soon as heresy began to trouble the Church; and the letters of Ignatius show how decisive a fact it was if the bishop condemned an opinion or excluded a man from communion. It stamped him at once as a transgressor of the Apostolic tradition or usage. So S. Irenæus at the end of the second century appeals against the Gnostics to the consentient testimony of the Apostolic Churches, expressed through the succession of their bishops. This is the ground upon which the Gnostic theories were rejected as innovations.

Thus the concentration of the authority of the Church upon the single ruler is a typical case of that which we have already described as the guarantee of validity.[1] The tradition of the Faith as well as the transmission of the Orders is committed to the keeping of one person. Any variations upon his creed, any independent ministerial acts outside his commission, have no guarantee at all. They may have merits of their own, they may spring from excellent motives: but they have not the stamp of the authority of the Church. It may be said, perhaps, that if this is all, if independent action simply means acting without the Church's guarantee, why should not a man run the risk of obtaining the grace he seeks, and do as he pleases? In such cases, we must answer, the value of an act depends upon its tendency, and not merely upon the motive of the agent or the actual disturbance it may cause at the time. An act such as this, which is practically one of schism, is destructive of the whole order of the Church *in its tendency*, even though its motive may be unexceptionable, and its immediate effect small. It is on the same principle that actions of very small apparent significance may be treated very severely at law, in view of the anti-social tendency they involve. It cannot, therefore, be lawful for a person thus to act independently in defiance of the society and its organization.

The Episcopal office, then, stamps with the authority of the Church all that is done with its *imprimatur*; it guarantees the validity of the Orders conferred upon those who minister in the ordinary business of the Church, and so indirectly it affirms the validity of the Sacraments they administer. The functions of the priest include all the powers of the bishop save that of laying on of hands. The priest is charged with keeping up the regular life of the Church. He baptizes, celebrates the Holy Communion, absolves, and, in general,

[1] P. 358.

displays the spiritual side of life before men. Especially is he concerned with preaching and conducting the public worship of the Church. The deacon merely assists in all these duties; he has no separate and peculiar functions. According to the present order of the Church, the diaconate is not a permanent position; it is used as a step towards the priesthood.

The Orders bestowed by the bishop in the regular way are indelible. No person who has once been ordained can get rid of the fact, or be other than an ordained man. The grace of Holy Orders separates a man for the work of the Holy Spirit, and gives him a definite position and character. He may act unworthily of his high calling, or he may cease to act at all; but he does not on that account lose his priestly character. Moreover, his moral unworthiness, though it deprives him of much influence and power in the Church, does not strictly invalidate the Sacraments he administers. At first sight this may seem a hard doctrine, but in reality it could hardly be otherwise. The ordained man is the chosen minister of God, to whom positive functions have been entrusted. It may be that he should never have sought Orders at all, and some responsibility may rest with the bishop who ordained him; but, once given, the Orders cannot be denied; the gift is there, however unworthy the recipient. No man is, strictly speaking, worthy of the gift, and if the validity of the Sacraments depended upon the worthiness of the priest, there would indeed be few celebrated, which the Church could be sure were valid. Of the effect upon the man who thus tramples upon the gift of God, it is not necessary to speak. That such men occur and are chosen to act in the name of the Church, is one of the signs of incompleteness which depend on its militant position in the world.[1]

[1] The indelibility of Orders does not deprive the proper authority of the power of degradation, any more than the uniqueness of Baptism deprives the ecclesiastical authority of the power of excommunication. To all intents and purposes, a minister who is degraded is deprived of all power of ecclesiastical

V. There are two subjects connected with the Church to which we must give some portion of our remaining space—the Christian life and the invisible Church, the Communion of Saints. They cannot be treated exhaustively in a work such as this: but it may be well to indicate the lines on which a fuller treatment would move.

A. The Christian life. The conduct of life is one of the questions which has exercised the minds of philosophers at all times, and some of the loftiest results of human thought on this subject have been the work of pagan thinkers. The problems which have engaged the attention of philosophers are concerned with the nature of good, the motive for moral action, and the ideal of human life. They are closely allied problems. According to the answer given to the question of the nature of good, the motive and the ideal of human life will vary. If good be only another name for pleasure, then the motive for obtaining it will be found in the natural desire for pleasure, and the ideal will be a life as full of pleasure as may be. There are, roughly speaking, three lines upon which the philosophy of this subject moves. The nature of good it sought in expediency or pleasure, or in knowledge, or it is represented as having a special character of its own. According to the first, that rule of conduct will be best which brings the greatest happiness or pleasure to the greatest number; according to the second, virtue is the knowledge of right and wrong; according to the third, virtue is its own reward: it is expressed by the surrender of desires and passions to what is recognized as the higher motive, and is independent of pleasure or pain as such.

To rest the whole weight of the obligation to virtue on

action: his sacraments would be invalid, and the whole authority of his preaching would be gone. In the same way, a man who was excommunicated would be incapable of receiving the Eucharist, or of taking part in any act of the Church, just as if he had never been baptized. Yet both would, if penitent, be reconciled and reinstated, not re-baptized or re-ordained.

pleasure, or even on knowledge of good and evil, is an experiment which cannot be said to have proved successful. For the former suggests no reason why the virtuous course should be preferred by any one who is prepared to face the unpleasantness of evil, when it happens to be unpleasant, or refuses to trust the future to make up in pleasure for the immediate unpleasantness of doing good. And the latter never accounts for the desire and the habit of doing evil in the face of knowledge that it is evil. The theory which recognizes that virtue is a thing which stands alone, and cannot be explained in terms of anything else, has a great advantage over either of these other positions. If it fails to explain virtue and merely recognizes its existence, it at least does not offer an untenable explanation.

The prominent note of the non-Christian systems is the externality of the moral law to the conscience. The Jewish Law demanded obedience to an elaborate code of ritual acts, and commanded, as from without, the pursuit of virtue. In Pagan systems virtue consists in the conformity of the life to an ideal. It is an ideal formed by the reflection of the mind upon itself, but it is thrown outwards in statuesque separation, and regulates life from outside. This is true even of the ethical idea of Aristotle, although he lays so much stress upon the value of motive in estimating action. The decisive test of an action is whether it is done as the good man would do it: but the good man is an ideal and statuesque figure, to whose various attitudes in the various occasions of life it is our business to conform. Stoicism is a philosophy of despair. It has given up all hope of manipulating life: it rests content with the thought that much of the evil of the world is inevitable and inexplicable, and that the sufferer is not responsible for it. Hence it bids men bear in grim silence what they cannot alter, taking care they do not, by folly or passion, add to their own troubles. Its morality is severe

and lofty : and there are few ethical works in which a sterner and more conscientious theory of life can be found than in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. But even in Stoicism, in spite of its subtle heart-searchings, the moral law comes in from without and compels the will: it does not inspire it from within. It is the best that can be done under the circumstances: it is not the free self-expression of the man.

The Christian conception of virtue is primarily likeness to God. That is at once the nature of virtue, the motive to pursue it, and the ideal to which the moral agent tends. Further, the ideal Life has been already lived upon the earth; the Christian ideal is historical and not imaginative; it is to be found in the Life of Christ. Now the Life of Christ depended upon unbroken Communion with the Father, an indwelling Presence of the Holy Spirit. These conditions are realized anew through the Sacraments and the Church in the life of the Christian. Hence the struggle to attain the ideal is not merely a struggle after an external conformity to a pattern; it is a continuous effort to allow a force and a presence already within the soul to have free play. The struggle is, therefore, with oneself far more than with external conditions. Morality has taken on an internal character which it never had before; it has to pass from within outwards into the active life, it does not from an outward ideal mould the inward self. Are there, then, any further differences between the Christian and pre-Christian systems of ethics? We think there are.

The inward and spiritual character of Christian ethics expresses itself in a difference in the states classed as virtues. There are few contrasts more remarkable than that which is felt at the change from the Ethics of Aristotle to the second section of the second part of S. Thomas's *Summa Theologiæ*. We meet with in the Schoolman a discussion of the three theological virtues—Faith, Hope, and Charity—which did

not fall within the horizon of Aristotle at all. But the difference is, if possible, still more remarkable in that portion of the work in which S. Thomas deals with the virtues which Aristotle does discuss, the four cardinal virtues—Courage, Temperance, Justice, Prudence. These four moral states are described in Plato's *Republic* as well as in Aristotle, and the division adopted by S. Thomas is Stoic rather than Aristotelian. But this is not the whole of the contrast. It lies in the moral atmosphere, not in the form only. The reader of Aristotle is probably startled at the narrow range assigned to temperance in the Ethics; it is a mean state in regard of pleasures and pains, and its range is confined to the lowest and most sensual of pleasures. The principle is affirmed that the ideal man will enjoy and deny himself pleasures of this kind in due proportion; he will keep a hold on himself, and beware lest he becomes a slave to passion of any kind. S. Thomas gives an account of temperance differing in appearance but slightly from that of Aristotle: it is the right adjustment of the claims of the body and the soul. But then when he expands his definition and traces it into its various forms, a whole area of ethical conditions comes into view, of which we have no hint in Aristotle. The most striking of these are the virtues connected with purity. Aristotle leaves no doubt as to his view of the overt acts connected with impurity, but his condemnation ends there. He would not have the virtuous man mastered by his passions, but he does not trace out the secret of self-mastery to purity in word and deed. It is not to his discredit that he did not do this; he had not the key to the whole situation, which the belief in the indwelling of the Holy Ghost supplies. And S. Thomas is right in recognizing the essential continuity of the Aristotelian virtue and his own conception of it. The body has claims as well as the soul: and it is wrong to neglect them. The Aristotelian temperance, limited

as it is, is the true precursor of the Christian virtue of purity. One other instance may be quoted, the passion of anger. Aristotle treats it in his usual way, as an opportunity for exercising self-restraint; he admits that there are occasions when one ought to be angry—injuries which one ought to resent. Seneca, on the other hand, is afraid to trust even the best of men to be angry: it is a passion which should be wholly subdued. The meaning of anger is wholly changed when the idea of sin is introduced. Then it is seen to be the due reward of sin, the true way of meeting evil. We see something of the difference in the condemnation of the lukewarm in the Revelation, or in the fate of those who were neither 'rebels nor faithful to God' in Dante's *Inferno*.

Secondly, the mode of the Life and Death of Christ caused a serious alteration in the standards of virtuous life, and in the conception of the ideal life. This was specially conspicuous in regard to outward prosperity. It had always been a question whether external success was a necessary adjunct to moral virtue, and it was only the Stoics and Cynics who ventured to ignore altogether its influence. Christianity could not, in the face of the Cross of Christ, make prosperity part of its ideal. So far, therefore, it ranged with the Stoic and the Cynic. But even here there is a difference. The Stoic severity was the indifference of pride and despair: it rested upon nothing but a distrust of the world as it is: the Christian type of self-abnegation rests upon humility and a sense of the immediate Presence of God. This modifies and sweetens a conception which would otherwise run the risk of being hard and inhuman. At certain periods of the history of the Church, the example of Christ has been pressed into the service of a rigorous and, in many cases, unreasoning asceticism. It has seemed as if the world were wholly bad, and pain almost a thing to be desired. This is not, we think, the true result of the application of

the example of Christ to human life. The ill-regulated desire for pain is not, however, a danger to which we are prone in modern times: asceticism can never be said to be our besetting sin. And when, in our exaltation of the free and childlike surrender to nature which we find among the Greeks, we are inclined to connect asceticism with devil-worship; let us remember that the life of Christ was ascetic, as a matter of fact; that the ascetic ideal arose at a time when the world was very largely committed to evil; and that, after all, there is nothing which a man may not risk rather than his soul.

Lastly, there is an important difference in the estimate of action due to the enormous and eternal significance which the Christian finds in it. Here again Aristotle's theory of the development of habit and the grave importance of each individual action, or Plato's myth, in which he describes the judgment passed upon the souls of men, might be quoted as a true anticipation of Christian doctrine. But while the attitude of these philosophers towards the risk and significance of human action is closely similar to that of Christian ethics, there is a deep difference in their estimate of the importance of human life as a whole. To the Christian every human soul is one of those for whom Christ died, and each is engaged in determining his eternal condition by what he does here. To identify oneself with evil is to grieve the Holy Ghost; to move in the direction of blasphemy against Him. Aristotle cites the law of the gradual development of habit in order to justify the moral condemnation of those who ignore it; and Plato treats the life beyond the grave as a stage between this present life and another, which is to be spent, like this, upon the earth. Both fail to reach the solemnity of the Christian doctrine, which sees in the transient things of this life the working of eternal principles.

Christian ethics, then, differ from the ethical conceptions

of pagan thinkers in virtue of the special relation which Christians bear to God. The whole of the Christian's life is dominated by this relation. His existence here, and his circumstances, are not the result of blind chance, but the gift of God. The law of right and wrong is not merely God's Will expressed in form of law, but a manifestation through human life of the Divine Nature. The Cross of Christ interprets and glorifies pain and sacrifice without ever disturbing the proportion and order of human life: it explains how evil things are here, without denying that they are evil. And the power by which the Christian meets his temptation is not knowledge or emulation or an enlarged estimate of what is pleasurable, but the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. The best pagan conceptions of human life are but syntheses of present experience: Christianity combines in one view and co-ordinates under the same principles the life here and that which is to come.

B. By our belief in the Communion of Saints we pass beyond the limits of this present life. It is an assertion of the continuity of the fellowship of the Church beyond the grave. In Christ, the physical death is but a stage in the progress from the new birth in Baptism to the day when we see face to face, and know as we are known. The true death to the world takes place at Baptism, and thenceforward the Christian is *in via* until he reaches the country—the City of God, the new Jerusalem. On this side the grave he struggles with the powers of evil, and endeavours by degrees to let the power of the Holy Spirit command his life. And then, when this life closes, he passes out into the unseen world. His body and soul are separated, and the decision of his will is made. With the bodily life the period of probation closes, but not the period of education. The soul, we cannot doubt, has much to learn in order to make it fit to appear before God in the last day.

The doctrine of the Communion of Saints expresses the attitude of the Church towards the question of Immortality. It is of the highest importance that the nature of this doctrine should be clearly understood, as considerable confusion exists in regard to the whole matter. The question of Immortality is practically as follows: Does any part of man, and if so what part, survive the disintegrating touch of death? It is obvious that the body does not survive: the cessation of life means the cessation of the balance between decomposition and restoration which goes on all through life. In ancient times, and under the influence of philosophy, the permanent part of man was found in the *soul*. It was maintained that the soul, if anything, survived the process of death. But it is not too much to say that this theory was never proved. It was based on arguments drawn from the nature of the soul, or from the nature of knowledge, and was certainly assisted by the widespread belief in appearances at or after death. But though these arguments were sufficient to produce a weighty and impressive case, they were involved in difficulties of the very gravest sort. The stories of appearances have always been mixed up with imposture and delusion, and there are no statements in regard to which it is harder to sift out truth from fiction.[1] Also the experience of man in this life gives him no method or suggestion of a method of conceiving the condition of a disembodied soul. If some recent speculations in the region of Psychology have made the difficulty somewhat less of imagining a way in which the dead may appeal to the minds of the living, it is the most that can be said: and it remains true that the doctrine of the Immortality *of the soul* is precarious and obscure in a very high degree.

If we ask what Scripture tells us on the subject, we are

[1] This is apparent, even in so scientific a work as Mr Myers' *Human Personality*.

surprised to find how very great a reserve obtains there. Comparatively little is told us of the condition of the dead. There is an allusion to it in our Lord's parable of Dives and Lazarus, where two conditions are described: called, in the case of Lazarus, Abraham's bosom, and, in the case of Dives, Hades. The continued existence of the dead is said by our Lord to be involved in the phrase, 'The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.' Such a phrase, He argues, would be impossible, if these persons had ceased to exist. On the Cross our Lord promises the penitent thief that he shall be with Him in Paradise: and in 1 Peter iii. we have an account of His visit and His ministry to the spirits in prison; where it is reasonable to suppose that His preaching would have effect. The Revelation describes the souls of the martyrs to Christ's faith as dwelling beneath the altar (Rev. vi. 9–11), and crying out, 'How long'? They are told in answer that they must wait until the number of their brethren is complete. These are almost all the definite notices of the condition of the departed. From these we seem to learn three facts of a general kind about their condition. (1) It is a state in which conscious intercourse is possible; (2) the evil and the good are separated in it; (3) progress is possible in it. These fragmentary results are far indeed from satisfying the curiosity and the hopes of man. And it is important to add that, taken in connexion with the truth of our Lord's Resurrection and the doctrine of the one Church, even these imperfect hints become less barren. One clear fact about the Resurrection story is specially significant. The appearances to the disciples were clearly distinguished by them from ghostly apparitions, and the Lord Himself is described as emphasizing this distinction. If the conditions of our Lord's Risen Life represent, as is most reasonable, the condition to which humanity will ultimately come, the difficulties which surround the conception

of the disembodied soul are cleared away, so far as man's ultimate condition is concerned. Crudely and unreasonably as the doctrine has been at times presented, it is the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body which gets rid of the miserable pictures of a shadow-world such as the imagination of man has hoped for and dreaded. The body of our humiliation is to be transformed into the likeness of the glorious Body of the Lord. But this deals rather with the final condition of redeemed human life than with the present condition of the departed. And it may seem as if they had dropped out, as it were, from the scheme of things; as if we who are left had no relation with them till the unknown day of the consummation of all things.

This difficulty is largely met by the doctrine of the Church. It is clear that the unity of the Body includes all who are in Christ, living in this life or dead, and that though we may not be able to conceive their condition now, our relations with them have not ceased. In the truest sense of the words, they are gone before: they have passed out of our bodily sight; but not out of the overshadowing unity of the Church: and we are most conscious of their nearness in acts like that of the Eucharist, which bring vividly before us the whole vast fellowship of those who are in Christ.

This view of the condition of the dead gives rise to two questions on the subject: Is the condition of the dead rightly described in the Romish doctrine of purgatory? and, What is our relation to them? Ought we to pray for them or not? May we ask their prayers or not? As regards the first question, we may say that if purgatory means only the place where the scars which sin has left are purged away, there is nothing to object to in the doctrine. For it is certainly an error to suppose that at the moment of death the soul passes straight into heaven or hell. But the Romish doctrine of purgatory means more than this; it means that the souls of

those who are to be saved in the end are tortured with pains, like those of hell, during their sojourn there; for this there is no warrant, even though the souls of the martyrs seem to desire the close of the time of waiting.[1] And it is construed so as to imply that some specially pure souls are allowed to escape purgatory altogether: and this again seems to lack foundation. In accepting, therefore, the belief in an intermediate state, we do not commit ourselves to the Romish doctrine of purgatory.[2]

The other question is far more difficult. This, too, has been complicated rather unnecessarily by Romish practice. It is customary in that communion, even if it be not part of the dogmatic system of the Church, to allow a kind of traffic in masses for the departed. It is apparently believed that a release from certain definite quantities of pain may be attained by this means. The whole theory is hopelessly material and mechanical, and can only be accepted, *ex animo*, by persons whose views of the after-life are extremely crude and materialistic. But we must not allow ourselves to decide the question of the value of intercession for the dead by mere reaction against it. The difficulty of this lies very largely in our ignorance of the positive conditions under which the life of the departed is spent. We do not know what will be the effect of such prayers, because we do not know what room there is for their effectiveness. But this difficulty, in a measure, pervades the whole question of intercession. It is hard to understand how prayers of ours can make a vital difference to other people. We cannot suppose that God does not do for them all that is in His power; and, if that is so, it is not easy to see how prayers from us can make any real difference. The fact that the

[1] Rev. vi. 9–11.

[2] Cf. Luckock, *After Death—The Intermediate State.* Mason, *Purgatory and The Invocation of Saints.*

people for whom we pray are dead, scarcely makes the matter appreciably more difficult. We can only say about it that God has willed in ordinary cases to use the prayers and intercessions of men in order to effect His ends. We are commanded to pray for one another in life; and there is no prohibition upon prayer for those who are departed. It is a difficulty not very dissimilar to that which we found insoluble when we were attempting to put the course of God's Purpose in connexion with the individual will. The course of the Purpose of God goes on independently of the action of individuals, and yet in some way it is carried on through their instrumentality. Prayer is, in one aspect of it, a declaration of conformity to the Divine will, it expresses the submission of the human will to the Divine; though it is difficult to believe that this exhausts its meaning; and thus prayer for other people enters into and combines with the Purpose of God for them.

As regards the custom of prayers for the dead, there seems to be no doubt that it was habitual among the Jews (2 Macc. xii. 41–48), and it seems to have been connected by them with the belief in the resurrection of the dead. Since the time of our Lord it seems to have been freely used in the Church until the Reformation: and it is obvious that the practice is closely connected with a vivid realization of the Communion of Saints. Those in whom the unity of the Body consciously includes the dead, will naturally tend to think of them in the same terms with the living, and the fact of their having passed on a stage will hardly change the sense of companionship which makes the joy of intercourse in this life. If they prayed for their friends in life, they will not cease when death steps in and makes a severance. The action of the Reformers was probably dictated by a fear of the abuses connected with purgatory, and possibly also by the theory that the judgment on each individual soul

took place immediately after death. This theory we cannot accept, and it is probable that the fear of the Romish doctrine of purgatory is less pressing than it once was. The only remaining sign of the practice in the services of the English Church is in the end of the prayer for the Church Militant, in which we return thanks 'for all who have departed this life in God's faith and fear; beseeching Him to give us grace so to follow their good examples, that with them we may be partakers of His heavenly kingdom.' Prayer for the dead is, then, a custom of very ancient authority in the Church. It is one as to which the English Church is silent. The use of it will probably depend very much upon individual feelings. It is not regular to adopt it in public services without the sanction of authority. But private devotion will be less fettered; and it must be confessed that the practice tends to keep in view our close and real connexion with those who have gone before.

The question is rather different in regard to Invocation. It may be argued that as the living do not cease to pray for those who are departed, it may be legitimate to ask for the prayers of departed friends as we might do in life. There is considerable evidence that this reasoning was held conclusive in early times, and that it was customary to ask for the intercession of the dead. Within these limits the practice may be unobjectionable, though there is no trace of its existence in the New Testament. But it is necessary to point out that thus restricted the usage falls within extremely narrow limits, so that it is difficult to understand the extraordinary spiritual advantages which are said to arise from it. And it cannot be denied that the practice appears and becomes prevalent in close connexion with an exaggerated estimate of martyrdom, and an exaggerated reverence for the tombs and relics of the martyrs. Also it would seem that such invocations are not addressed, as a

fact, to dead friends, but to persons who have in the judgment of the ecclesiastical authority attained a position of special dignity. It is said that in the Russian Church people do invoke the aid of their departed friends as well as of the conspicuous saints of the Gospel and the Church.[1] But this is probably not the usual practice in the West, where the Roman system of Canonization is in vogue, and where the Roman doctrine of Purgatory defines the condition of the dead somewhat precisely. It is very hard to attach any positive value to the grades of Canonization, in which certain names are placed; and a system of Invocation which is in any way involved in this or in the special doctrine of Purgatory cannot be defended in the English Church. If the extremely restricted use of the practice, noted above, may be regarded as unobjectionable, it must always be remembered that the difficulty of separating it from habits of thought which are really pagan, and from other doubtful theological positions, will always be a very serious one.

We have now passed through the various subjects which the Creed contains, and noticed their relation one to another. We have not followed in this discussion the order in which the articles of the Creed occur, and this for a definite reason. It has seemed well to present them in such a form that they may be, if possible, recognized as being not a collection of accidental and disconnected truths, but a complete system of thought. Theological science has lost enormously by making an inadequate claim for itself. It has attempted to preserve a precarious and *apologetic* existence, rescuing its doctrines from time to time by various methods of defence. It is true that when assaults are made there must be some method of defence adopted: but this will always be ultimately uncon-

[1] Headlam, *The Teaching of the Russian Church*, p. 20, note 2.

vincing, unless it be recognized from the first that a serious assault upon one article of the Creed means far more than it says; and that it is the hidden matter of controversy, the underlying questions which, perhaps, do not come openly into debate, upon which the real struggle turns. The question is not in reality whether there shall be a dogma more or a dogma less; whether this or that fragment of the Creed shall be held good, while others are surrendered; but whether the world as a whole is to be held capable of spiritual significance. This question is ultimate, and it includes all others. If we accept the principle of treating the world from a spiritual point of view we must do it thoroughly; every breach in continuity is a fatal weakness in our armour. The whole world must be regarded from the beginning to the end as God's world. The order of nature must not be thought of as a blind and mechanical system, at one end of which we may allow ourselves to think of God. It is a Divine order, full of Divine purpose and significance. So, in the case of the moral world and the progress of history, the rational movement, which we can trace, will never be fully explained, except in the light of its spiritual meaning. We cannot consistently or logically think of God as a sudden spiritual force supervening upon a predominantly mechanical order. And we cannot do so for this reason: things are woven together in a web of so complex and intricate a structure that we can find no gap or hole through which to introduce, on a sudden, so tremendous a fact as a spiritual being. If we start without one, we shall end without one.

It is not a peculiarity of theology that it has to make room for its chief fact at the outset: it is common to all sciences. Their character is decided by their ultimate scope. The highest fact to be dealt with is the measure of any theory which includes it. The science which deals with

inorganic being remains within the limits imposed by its scope. The science of mere life is bounded by that conception. The science of human life begins and ends in the human sphere. Each as it proceeds becomes sensible that it is incomplete and abstract, and that further facts are necessary to enable it to deal fully even with its limited subject matter. Were there nothing in the world but inorganic matter, the laws of inorganic matter would represent the sum of possible knowledge. But they do not: because life, which is a factor in the world as well as inorganic matter, interferes with and complicates them. Hence, so far as completeness is the object of philosophical knowledge, the science of inorganic matter is perpetually feeling its limited scope. Its phenomena cannot be wholly separated from the intrusion of life. But knowledge does not become complete by recognizing its incompleteness on this lower level. It must start again, and include in a more comprehensive sweep the whole set of phenomena of life. The same thing occurs in connexion with human life. This is a new element, and introduces a large number of complications into the problems of mere life. And if it is to be dealt with at all, it cannot be allowed to fall in as an accident or a detail, it must govern the whole conception of the science which proposes to deal with it.[1] In the same way the Existence and Power of God will never be adequately interpreted if it is allowed simply to put in an appearance at the end, to eke out the one-sidedness of some mechanical or non-theological assumptions. The world is different as a whole if the Existence of God is taken into consideration, and the science which is to combine the world and God must have both factors in its premisses. The test of its validity will then be its inner coherence. It cannot from

[1] Cf. E. Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. i. ch. i., esp. pp. 31–35.

the nature of things point out of itself to a wider view of things in which its assumptions could be tested and verified. It is, for us, the end of things, and its discussions include all that can be known. The science of inorganic nature loses itself in the wider science of life; the science of life in that of human nature; the science of human nature in the science of God. Further than this we cannot go: and, for that very reason, the facts which are the peculiar property of theology are given and not proved.

The systematic continuity of theology as a science is, or should be, expressed in life by a consistent and unswerving unity of motive. All things which man has to do are two-sided. There is their outward insignificant form, and their inner meaning which is eternally significant. It is the latter which must be taken into account by those whose lives profess to be governed by a spiritual idea. It is the only thing which needs to be taken into account, for it is the only part of our action which we can fully control. Our circumstances are not in our own hands; the use we make of them—the principles by which we deal with them —are in our hands altogether. No misfortune crushes out the spiritual element in life, or makes this spiritual self-development impossible. And no part of life is so secular that it cannot be brought under spiritual rules, except what is positively sinful. To the religious man, therefore, politics, as well as private life, art, and science, and literature, will be simply varying modes of realizing his one life purpose, whensoever he is brought in contact with them. This is not religious interference; it is the expression, in fact, of the ultimate condition of human life, man's relation with God.

Not only must the theological point of view be dominant throughout experience, but the personal conception of God must be continuous throughout theology. There are reasons

in the moral nature and elsewhere which point to the Personality of God; and this notion, when once accepted, must condition all our treatment of the Divine action. It is a new point of departure, which must influence all our thought about God. We have already called attention to the importance of this in connexion with the Divine Omnipotence and the question of evil. The difficulty of this problem will always be made infinitely more perplexing than it is, if the personal notion fails to rule the conception of omnipotence and save us from a mechanical or material group of associations. The same is true of all theological problems.

There is one other point in regard of which the mode in which God is conceived is all-important. The personal conception of the Nature of God lends itself to the sacramental mode of self-revelation. So far as we know, no personality communicates with another save through a medium of some sort. Language, gestures, the laws of thought and will and the like, are the means employed by men; nature, history, the Church of Christ, the specially sacramental ordinances, are the means employed by God. It must have been already noticed that our thoughts were leading us this way. We now see that the Personality of God is in some sense the explanation of the whole method of dealing with men which Christianity reveals. This is only another way of expressing what we have already said, that all life is ultimately spiritual in its character, and requires spiritual premisses in order that we may interpret it rightly and fully. But the recognition of the fact that mediated self-revelation is the natural mode in which a personal being communicates with others, draws the connexion of the various parts of theology yet more closely together. The whole is now grouped round the central belief in a personal God.

But though thus coherent within itself, Theology is far

from telling us all that we could wish to know, or doing for us all that the mind in its desire for completeness leads us to attempt. For it leaves us, so far as we can see, in a permanent dualism: matter and spirit remain for us permanently separate; matter, or rather a world in which matter is an element, is the permanent veil between spirit and spirit. There is no way that we can see at present for getting rid of this opposition. And though we may be sure of this as a fact, it is impossible to rest content with it There is one direction in which a solution seems possible, but even this turns out on examination to be partial only. The difficulty is partly solved in the idea of creation. The Will of God is the source from which matter and spirit both took their origin. But the solution is, as we say, partial only. For creation and the created world bring us into contact with the most intractable of all the elements with which Theology has to deal—the form of time: we have to explain how the changeless Counsels of God took shape in time. This, as we have seen more than once already, is the hinge of all the questions which we have had to regard as finally insoluble. We cannot understand how God expresses Himself and His Purposes in the form of temporal succession. Yet our incapacity is but another way of reminding ourselves that we are limited in speculative matters by our experience, and that any knowledge which may come to us from without the bounds of experience is given us by God: we know that God does certain things—that He has created and redeemed the world; but we cannot explain them.

If, then, we find that Theology is in some places less clear than we could wish, if revelation turns out to be more closely connected with the order of nature than we had supposed, it does not follow that it is all on wrong lines, and that the Faith must be deserted for some system which promises greater exactness. The Faith of Christ can only be

held to fail when it is demonstrated that it is less clear than it ought to be, seeing what its nature and scope are; or that revelation is too closely bound up with physical conditions to be a real communication from God. Both these are theoretical considerations, and are not, strictly speaking, within our power to decide, seeing the amount of the knowledge we possess. All that we can expect to do is to become more familiar by degrees with the handiwork of God in the world; to advance in our knowledge of the power and significance of the Incarnation; and to feel more and more at home in the society in which the Father has embodied His love for men —the one Father, from whom are all things, and we unto Him.

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
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